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ABSTRACT 
This research examines the legal issues arising in the inter-relationship between 
climate change law and policy on the one hand, and international trade regulation 
on the other. The focus is government procurement. It looks at “green” government 
procurement (GPP) policies and practices used by the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol 
as a tool for climate change mitigation, and as it relates to these countries’ 
obligations under the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA). GPP is 
government purchase practice that favours goods, services and service suppliers 
that are more climate-friendly and energy efficient over similar others that are less 
so. For example, under the EU GPP policy, for climate reasons, procurement 
authorities have a preference for green electricity (generated from renewable 
sources) as against the conventional fossil-based electricity. The two types of 
“electricities” are ordinarily same products as far as their performance is concerned, 
that is, at the consumption level. Discriminating between the two has the potential to 
raise serious issues of law at WTO level.  
 
Under the WTO non-discrimination disciplines (GATT Arts. I and III, and GPA Art. 
III) product or service standards based on non-product related processes and 
production methods (PPMs) such as climate-friendliness should not serve to permit 
differentiation in treatment between “like” products. The general exceptions 
provisions (GATT Art. XX(b) and (g) and GPA Art. XXIII) however, may permit such 
climate-related differential measures if they are: (1) necessary to achieve the 
legitimate policy objective intended, (2) not applied in a discriminatory manner and 
(3) not a disguised restriction on international trade.  
 
There are two issues of major concern to this study: First, there are textual 
discrepancies as between the GATT and GPA provisions related both to the non-
discrimination norms and the exceptions, which may pose interpretation difficulties 
in the event of a dispute. Secondly, the provisions of GATT Art. XX (b) and (g) are 
interpreted to refer to environment in general terms. However, the current trend is to 
single out and address climate change separately from among other environmental 
problems of transboundary nature. This is in view of the urgency associated with the 
challenge it poses. Generally, also, in accordance with established WTO 
jurisprudence, the party who invokes the GATT Art. XX exceptions bears the burden 
to prove the measure in question as being covered under the exceptions. Some 
scholars suggest that this situation places at a disadvantage the subjects covered 
  
xviii 
 
by the exception provisions (in this case climate-related procurement). Examined, 
therefore, is not only the extent to which GPP practices can be accommodated 
under these exceptions, which are also in line with the WTO’s recognition of the 
principles of sustainable development, but also whether climate-friendly 
procurement is best protected if expressly provided for as “positive norm” in the text 
of the GPA. 
 
The Revised GPA 2007 (not yet in force) contains a new paragraph (Art. X:6) which 
explicitly permits the Parties to include environmental considerations in their 
procurement policies. This study argues that the revision would not fundamentally 
address the issues observed earlier. In order to avoid the interpretation difficulties 
envisaged, and to promote mutual supportiveness and coherence between the 
climate and trade regimes further amendment would be necessary to the text of Art. 
XXIII of the GPA to the general exceptions, or in the alternative, to Art. X:6 of the 
Revised GPA. The amendment should, subject to appropriate conditions, explicitly 
permit discriminatory GP measures meant to address climate change subject. This 
amendment would effectively shift the burden of proof from the Party maintaining 
the measure to the one complaining against it. In the final analysis, this research will 
contribute to the current discourse on what role the WTO may play in the efforts to 
fashion out new international climate policy to succeed the Kyoto Protocol to the 
UNFCCC  by 2012. 
PART I 
GENERAL BACKGROUND TO THE 
RESEARCH 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1
 
CHAPTER 1:  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The conceptual and theoretical background of the research 
This research examines the interactions of the global legal regimes for climate 
change mitigation and international trade, in the area of government procurement 
(GP). While climate change is regulated by the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change of 19921 and the Kyoto Protocol2, international trade 
is regulated at global level by the World Trade Organisation (WTO)3. GP is a 
subject-matter of the WTO, and is regulated by the WTO Agreement on 
Government Procurement (GPA),4 a plurilateral agreement binding only those WTO 
Members that subscribe to it.5 GP signifies the purchases of goods and services by 
                                                        
1
 UNFCCC Secretariat, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change of 9 May 1992, 31 
I.L.M. 849, (entered into force 21 Mar. 1994) [hereinafter, “the UNFCCC” or “the Convention”]. See 
infra,, Chapter 4, Section 4.4.1. 
2
 Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC, 10 Dec. 1997, 37 I.L.M. 32 (1998) (signed at Kyoto, Japan, 1997, 
entered into force 14 February 2005) [hereinafter “the KP” or “the Protocol”]. See infra,, Chapter 4. 
Section 4.4.2. 
3
 See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, Legal Instruments- 
Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31, 1915 U.N.T.S. 103, available also at the WTO website: 
<http://www.wto.org/English/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto.pdf>. WTO operates the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), an agreement signed in 1947 by some 23 countries. By 1994, 128 countries 
signed an up-graded GATT (known as GATT 1994) on the basis of which WTO was created on 1 January 
1995. The WTO has since that date been the organization overseeing the multilateral trading system. As at 
December 2008 WTO has got 153 members. For more brief on the evolution of the WTO, see Chapter 3, 
and at <http://www.wto.org/english/theWTO_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm>. On the current state of the 
WTO membership see Understanding the WTO, at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last accessed 06/01/09). 
4
 WTO, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation, Annex 4: Plurilateral Trade 
Agreements: Agreement on Government Procurement, done at Marrakesh on 15th April 1994 entered into 
force I January 1996.  
5
  A “Plurilateral” agreement as opposed to the “Multilateral” one is negotiated based on special sector 
and/or interest of WTO Members who wish to be parties thereof. It is more of a club for the like-minded, 
on an area of trade that is of particular interest or relevance to them. GPA is one of the four such 
agreements. The other three are: the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft which entered into force on 1 
January 1980, the International Dairy Agreement and the International Bovine Meat Agreement. The WTO 
General Council, however, at its meeting of 10 December 1997, deleted the International Dairy and 
International Bovine Meat agreements from Annex 4 of the WTO Agreement, with effect from 
1 January 1998 (WT/L/251 and 252). They were deleted because the signatories decided that the sectors 
covered by the deteted agreements were better handled under the Agriculture and SPS agreements, 
respectively. See WTO, Understanding the WTO: the Agreements 
Plurilaterals: of minority interest, at: http://www.wto.int/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm10_e.htm 
(last visited: 06/04/10). The GPA has 39 Parties (including the 27 member-countries of the EU). Of this 
number, only 4 are developing countries. The basic disciplines of the GPA are discussed infra, Chapter 3, 
Section 3.4. 
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public authorities for the purpose of governmental functions. Thus, the focus of the 
research is to examine the legal issues arising out of the use of GP as a policy tool 
to promote climate change mitigation under the climate regime.  Accordingly, the 
GPA is the centre of the discussions, even as other Agreements within the WTO 
system are also referred to as appropriate.  
 
More specifically, the research investigates the concept of “green” government 
procurement (GPP)6 used as climate change mitigation policy tool especially by 
countries that have higher climate change mitigation commitments under the 
UNFCCC and KP, and generally tighter environmental regulations. Public 
procurement authorities in those countries engage in GPP give preference for 
environmentally friendly and more energy-efficient goods, services and service 
suppliers, over others that are less so. Similarly, service suppliers are required by 
procurement authorities to show evidence of technical environmental qualifications 
or certification. This may disqualify otherwise capable suppliers who do not possess 
such formal qualifications. GPP practice thus potentially constitutes a trade barrier 
as it results in disproportionate impacts against products and services as well as 
producers and suppliers from countries with lower climate change mitigation 
commitments and lax environmental regulations.  
 
The basis of the differential treatment between otherwise similar (or "like”) products 
or services (or suppliers) is the climate-friendly attributes as considered from the 
manner they were produced (referred to in trade parlance as “the processes and 
production methods” or “PPMs”).7 Where these PPMs do not affect the physical 
                                                        
6
 While GPP refers generally to the incorporation of environmental considerations in the specification of 
goods and services to be purchased by public authorities, “climate-friendly” procurement denotes a 
targeted procurement policy with the objective of climate change mitigation, which is essentially the focus 
of this research. 
7
 On PPMs, see infra Chapter 2, section 2.2.3 and Chapter 6, section 6.4.  
  
3
 
characteristics or performance of the “products” or “services” 8 in their final forms, 
that is at consumption stage, differential treatment between them in GPP could 
amount to discrimination or protectionism not warranted by WTO rules. 
Discrimination and protectionism give undue favours to domestic products and 
services by shielding them from foreign competition.  
 
GPP is one of the response measures taken pursuant to the Kyoto Protocol’s call on 
the Parties to “implement and/or elaborate policies and measures” aimed at 
enhancement of energy efficiency, promotion of the development and increased use 
of new and renewable energy, as well as diffusion of environmentally sound 
technologies.9 These measures are considered necessary to address the grave and 
urgent challenges posed by anthropogenic climate change.10 Indeed, GP was cited 
by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) as among the 
“environmentally effective” tools to address climate change.11 This is moreso 
because of the huge expenditure by States, annually, for the purchase of goods and 
services used in everyday governmental functions. The share of public procurement 
                                                        
8
 In the case of service supply, the PPMs would refer to the manner of performance of the service. For 
instance, in a contract for delivery of climate-friendly municipal public transport service, a requirement that 
the vehicles should not only be energy efficient in their PPMs, but also in the manner they work. In the 
extreme, the contract may require that the supplier must use biofuels on the vehicles. See more on this, in 
Chapter 5 Section 5.2.2. 
9
 Kyoto Protocol Art. 2(a) 
10
 See IPCC, Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change, 2007, available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-
spm.pdf . On the distinguishing features of the climate change problem, see infra, Chapter 4, Section 4.2.2.  
11
 See IPCC, Summary for Policymakers, Climate Mitigation. Contribution of Working Group III to the 
Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007 [B. Metz, O.R. 
Davidson, P.R. Bosch, R. Dave, L.A. Meyer (eds.)], Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United 
Kingdom, (Table SPM.7), p. 20. GPP practice can be seen in for instance, the EU green energy 
procurement system by which procurement authorities favour “green” electricity (generated from 
renewable power sources: hydro, wind, biomass or solar) over “brown” electricity (generated from the 
conventional fossil fuel sources). For a critical examination of the EU green energy procurement and trade 
law, see generally,  Malumfashi, G. I., Procurement Policies, Kyoto Compliance and the WTO Agreement 
on Government Procurement: The Case of the EU Green Electricity Procurement and the PPMs Debate, in 
Cottier, T., et al (eds.), International Trade Regulation and the Mitigation of Climate Change, (World Trade 
Forum, Cambridge University Press, 2010).      
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in the developed economies represents between 15 and 20% of GDP.12 For the EU, 
in particular, it is about 18% of the GDP.13 Channelling this expenditure in the 
direction of climate friendly goods, services and technology will help reduce 
pressure on the environment, while also creating more business opportunities in 
that sector.  
 
It ought to be stated, however, at the outset that the climate regime has cautioned, 
at an early stage, that such climate-motivated measures should “not constitute a 
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on 
international trade.”14 GPP however raises issues in particular with Art. III of the 
GPA which requires Parties to accord products and services, as well as service 
suppliers of other GPA Parties treatment no less favourable than that given to their 
own domestic products, services and suppliers. Similarly, Parties should not 
discriminate between goods, services and suppliers of other Parties selling or 
supplying in their domestic market.15 These provisions are a reflection of the 
fundamental principles of non-discrimination provided under GATT Arts. I and III 
and GATS Art. XVII.16 Consequently, GPP may set the climate and trade policies in 
potential collision. This thus exemplifies an aspect of the wider trade-environment 
debate which centres on how “to ensure the economic benefit of liberalised trade 
                                                        
12
 See The Size of Government Procurement Markets, OECD Journal on Budgeting, Vol. 1 No.4. The 2002 
data for the OECD countries as a whole, government procurement, including consumption and investment 
expenditure, was estimated at 19.96% or $4 733 billion. For the non-OECD countries, the estimate was 
14.48% or $816 billion.  
13
 Other estimates put the GDP at 16% (equivalent to €1500Bn). See Linking CSR to Public Procurement in 
the EU, - Report from an ECCJ seminar and workshops at Stockholm, Sweden, 3 October 2007, available 
at: http://www.cora-netz.de/wp-content/uploads/eccj_spp_seminarreport.pdf (accessed last 23/06/09). See 
infra,, Chapter 3. Section 3.2.4. 
14
 UNFCCC Art. 3.5 and KP Art. 2.3. 
15
 GPA Art. III:1and 2 
16
 These principles are: the most favoured-nation (MFN) and the national treatment (NT). The principles 
are the cornerstone of the WTO multilateral trading system. The MFN requires WTO Members to treat all 
goods and services of all WTO Members, bought or sold in their domestic markets, in the same way in 
terms of tax and other regulatory measures. NT, on the other hand, requires WTO Members not to treat 
goods and services of other Members less favourably than they treat their own goods or services. These 
MFN/NT requirements apply where the goods or services in question are “like”. See infra, Chapter 3, 
Section 3.4.1. 
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whilst at the same time allowing states to take measures protective of the 
environment.”17  This debate led to the establishment, in 1995 of the WTO 
Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE)18 which has served as the formal 
WTO forum for discussing the issues with a view to proffering solutions.  
 
Going by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,19 both the UNFCCC/KP 
and the GPA are “treaties”20. All treaties in force are equal in status,21 and parties 
are bound to implement their treaty commitments in good faith as dictated by the 
doctrine of pacta sunt servanda.22 Similarly, parties to treaties should not act 
pursuant to one treaty in such a way as to undermine the provisions of another 
treaty in force.23 Thus pursuant to the principle of effectiveness in treaty 
interpretation (ut res magis valeat quam perea), norms within a treaty should be 
interpreted in such a way as to complement and not conflict with one another.24 
 
                                                        
17
 Kunzlik, P., Green Procurement under the New Regime, in Neil, R., and Treumer, S. (eds.), The New EU 
Public Procurement Directives, (Djof Publishing, Copenhagen, Denmark, 2005), 117. See also Zarilli, S., 
WTO Doha Declaration and Trade in Energy Goods and Services, OGEL Issue 1, January 2003, p.3 
(available on www.gasandoil.com/OGEL). See also infra, Chapter 5, Section 5.4.1.1. 
18
 See WTO, Ministerial Decision on Trade and Environment (WTO Document G/C/W/432/Rev.1, 24 
February 2003) (hereinafter “the Decision on Trade and Environment”, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/56-dtenv_e.htm (last accessed: 10/07/10). See infra,, Chapter 2, 
Section 2.2.2.3.  
19
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Done at Vienna on 23 May 1969 (entered into force on 27 
January 1980), UNTS, vol. 1155 (hereinafter, “the VCLT”). 
20
 The VCLT Art. 2(1)(a) defines a "treaty" as “an international agreement concluded 
between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument 
or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation.”  
21
 This is subject to the VCLT Art. 30 on the principles regulating the application of successive treaties 
relating to the same subject-matter. These principles generally provide thus: (1) a later rule should prevail 
over an earlier rule (lex posterior derogat legi priori), and (2) a special rule prevails over a general rule (lex 
specialis derogat legi generali). On this see generally, Pauwelyn, J., Conflict of Norms in Public 
International Law: How WTO Law Relates to Other Rules of International Law, (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003). 
22
 VCLT Art. 26: Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in 
good faith. 
23
 Ibid., Art. 31(3)(c). 
24
 See Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages Appellate body Report, WT/DS8/AB/R; WT/DS10/AB/R; 
WT/DS11/AB/R, (Adopted November 1, 1996) [Hereinafter. “Japan — Alcoholic Beverages (ABR) II”], 
ps. 12 and 18. See also Pauwelyn, J., supra, n. 21 at pp. 249 – 251. 
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The GPA under Art. XXIII, however, provides for general exceptions which, inter 
alia, permit procurement measures considered “necessary to … protect human, 
animal or plant life or health.” These exceptions are comparable to, but not identical 
with, those of the GATT Art. XX (b) and (g) generally interpreted to permit measures 
otherwise GATT-inconsistent, on grounds of environmental protection. The striking 
difference between the GPA and the GATT versions however, is that the GPA 
version does not include the equivalent of paragraph (g) of Art. XX (permitting 
measures aimed at “conservation of exhaustible natural resources”).25 The 
questions therefore are: to what extent is GPP discriminatory contrary to the GPA 
Art. III, and whether the exceptions could provide policy space for the GPA parties 
to pursue climate change agenda through GPP? Many commentators consider the 
possibility of GPP being accommodated under the GPA exceptions.26 For example, 
Aaron Cosbey,27 referring to the exceptions, believes that there is some “scope in 
the GPA for this sort of [GPP] discrimination, even perhaps on the basis of how a 
good is produced.”28 Similarly, Richard G. Tarasofsky holds the view that GPA Art. 
XXIII, “as suggested by the jurisprudence around GATT Art. XX, may cover 
measures aimed at tackling climate change – having multilateral cover, through the 
Kyoto Protocol, could contribute to the defence of the measure.”29 
                                                        
25
 See Hufbauer, G. C., Charnovitz, S. and Kim, J., Global Warming and the world Trading System, 
(Peterson Institute for International Economics, March 2009), p. 72 at footnote 13. 
26
 Indeed, even the OECD, while acknowledging the concerns over GPP compatibility with GPA non-
discrimination rules, also appeared confident that the exceptions could come to the rescue. See OECD, 
Report on Trade and Environment to the 1999 OECD Ministerial Council Meeting (C/MIN(99)14) at p, 
8available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/integration/pdf/oecd_te_1999.pdf . 
27
 See A Scoping Paper produced for the Trade Ministers’ Dialogue on Climate Change Issues,  Held in 
conjunction with UNFCCC COP 13, Kyoto Protocol MOP 3 Bali, Indonesia, December, 9, 2007 by 
International Institutes of Sustainable Development (IISD) (available at: 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/trade_climate_linkages.pdf (last accessed 15/04/09). 
28
 See Ibid. at p. 6 at www.iisd.org (last visited: 08/01/09). The problem was also highlighted by Conrad, C. 
R., The status of measures linked to non-physical aspects and processes and production methods (PPMs) in 
WTO law A contribution to the debate on the impact of WTO law on national regulation pursuing social 
goals [PhD Thesis submitted to University f Berne, Switzerland, July 2008 (unpublished, on file with 
author)], pp 42-43. 
29
 See Tarasofsky, R. G., Trade, Competitiveness and Climate Change: Exploring the Issues, available at: 
www.chathamhouse.org.uk/sustainabledevelopment (last accessed: 08/01/10)  
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There has so far been no WTO dispute based on a discriminatory climate-friendly 
procurement measure, and thus no jurisprudence available on this specific issue. 
Thus, in the event of such a dispute, one could preliminarily suggest, on the basis of 
the jurisprudence based on GATT Art. XX(b) and (g), that GPP, as an 
environmental measure taken pursuant to another multilateral treaty (Kyoto 
Protocol), could be accommodated under the GPA Art. XXIII exceptions.30 The 
jurisprudence referred to as supporting this suggestion is the interpretation of the 
exceptions given by the GATT/WTO judicial authorities in a number of rulings.31 For 
instance, the AB in the US – Shrimp,32  over-turning earlier GATT Panel rulings in 
the US – Tuna/Dolphin disputes,33 interpreted the GATT Art. XX(b) and (g) to 
include measures maintained to protect the environment.34 To the same effect also, 
the AB ruled in EC – Asbestos35 that WTO Members were entitled to maintain 
otherwise GATT-inconsistent measures to protect the health of their citizens.   
 
                                                        
30 However the multilateral cover of the Kyoto Protocol is not necessarily a justification for a WTO-
inconsistent climate friendly measure. The disputing parties must ratify that non-WTO rule before it 
becomes relevant See infra, Chapter 7, section 7.3.2.1. See Martin, M., Trade Law Implications of 
Restricting Participation in the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, Georgetown International 
Environmental Law Review, Vol. XIX, Issue 3, Spring, 2007, at pp. 35-36. 
31
 These include: United States–Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, L/6175, GATT 
Panel Report, adopted 17 June 1987, BISD 34S/136 [hereinafter, “US – Superfund”]; United States – 
Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Panel Report, WT/DS2/R, 29 January 1996, 
modified by Appellate Body Report, 29 April 1996, WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted 20 May 1996 [hereinafter, 
“US – Gasoline (ABR)”]; European Community—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, 
Appellate Body Report, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (adopted, January 16, 1998) [hereinafter “EC – 
Hormones (ABR)”].  See also Picciotto, S., The WTO's Appellate Body: Legal Formalism as a Legitimating 
of Global Governance’, Governance, vol. 18, issue 3, summer 2005), pp. 10-11, n. 23, Doelle, M., Climate 
Change and the WTO: Opportunities to Motivate State Action on Climate Change through the World Trade 
Organization, RECIEL 13 (1) 2004.  
32
 United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Appellate Body Report, 
WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998, DSR1998:VII, 2755 [hereinafter “US – Shrimp (ABR)”].  
33
 United States -- Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT Panel Report, General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade: Basic Instruments and Selected Documents (hereinafter GATT, BISD) 39S/155, reprinted in 30 
ILM (1991) 1594 (US - Tuna/Dolphin I); GATT Panel Report, United States -- Restrictions on Imports of 
Tuna, 16 June 1994, GATT Doc. DS29/R, reprinted in 33 ILM (1994) 839 (US - Tuna/Dolphin II). 
34
 See infra,, chapter 2, section 2.2.2.1 
35
 European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products Appellate 
Body Report WT/DS135/AB/R [hereinafter “EC – Asbestos”]. See also the application of the exceptions 
for the protection of public morals under the GATS: United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border 
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS285/AB/R [hereinafter, 
“US – Gambling (ABR)”]. 
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Then, came Brazil – Tyres,36 the most recent of the trade-environment disputes in 
the WTO, where the AB re-affirmed its rulings in US – Shrimp and EC - Asbestos. 
Indeed, as observed by Van Calster37 reviewing the Brazil – tyres ruling, the WTO 
jurisprudence in this regard had developed over time from the mere recognition of 
the environment or health as accepted regulatory arena for the WTO Members, 
more to the manner the regulatory measures are fashioned and implemented. Thus, 
it is not enough that a measure in contention is intended for either environment or 
health protection; it has much more to do with the extent the conditionalities of the 
chapeau to the GATT Art. XX, which safe-guards against abuse of the permission, 
could be satisfied.38  
 
On the other hand, from the existing literature,39 it still remains uncertain whether 
the GATT Art. XX(b) and (g) interpretation could be automatically adopted to cases 
brought under GPA Art. XXIII:2. The bulk of the literature still discusses 
controversies surrounding the real legality of GPP as well as many other climate 
policy instruments, under the WTO. The question cited earlier, of textual disparity 
between the the GPA Art. XXIII:2 on the one hand, and those of the GATT Art. 
XX(b) and (g) provisions on the other, brings into perspective the relationship 
between the GATT and GPA generally. As the GPA does not contain a provision 
equivalent to (g), could the GATT Art. XX(g) be applied to fill in the lacuna in the 
GPA? If not, will the disparity affect the permissibility or otherwise of GPP under the 
                                                        
36
 See Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres Report of the Panel WT/DS332/R (12 June 
2007)/ [as modified by AB:] WT/DS332/AB/R, adopted 17 December 2007 [hereinafter “Brazil – Tyres 
(ABR)”]. 
37
 See generally, van Calster, G., Faites Vos Jeuxç Regulatory Autonomy and the World Trade 
Organisation after Brazil Tyres, Journal of Environmental Law 20:1, Advance Access: 11 February 2008 
[Oxford University Press, 2008]. See infra, Chapter 2 Section 2.2.2; Chapter 7, Section 7.  
38
 Ibid. 
39
 See for example, Matthias, B., M., and Verheyen,.R., International Trade Law and Climate Change – A 
Positive Way Forward, (FES-Analyse: International Trade Law and Climate Change, July, 2001), available 
at: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/stabsabteilung/01052.pdf last visited 03/07/09; Van Asselt, (et al), Greener 
public purchasing: opportunities for climate-friendly government procurement under the WTO and EU 
rules, Climate Policy 6 (2006), pp. 217-229, van Asselt, H., Green government procurement and the WTO, 
(Institute for Environmental Studies: 2003) and Van Calster, G., Green Procurement and the WTO- Shades 
of Grey, RECIEL 11 (3) 2002 (hereinafter, “Van Calster, Shades of Grey”). 
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GPA? This omission thus may add to the uncertainty about the adequacy of the 
exceptions to cater for climate-related procurement measures.     
 
These questions also lead to the issue of the 2006 revision of the GPA which has 
now produced the Revised GPA 2007 (hereinafter, “Revised GPA”). The Revised 
GPA has retained the Art. XXIII:2 exceptions as they are, but introduced a new 
provision under Art. X:6 by which it explicitly permits procuring authorities to use 
government procurement tools “to promote the conservation of natural resources or 
protect the environment.”40 For the start, this new text austensibly fills in the lacunae 
created by the omission of the Art. XX(g) equivalent (even without the word 
“exhaustible” to qualify natural resources), in Art. XXIII:2.  
 
As the GPA Art. XXIII:2 is still retained in the Revised GPA, this situation has two 
effects, namely: (1) the “environment” aspect of the GPA Art. XXIII: renders 
redundant the new Art. X:6.41 and (2) the existence of the two provisions in the 
same instrument creates a problem as to placement of burden of proof. It is an 
established principle under the GATT/WTO jurisprudence that a party asserting an 
exception has the onus to prove it.42 The question therefore is if a GPA Party 
maintains an environmental measure as a positive norm under the new Art. X:6, 
who bears this burden? Moreover, the new Art. X:6 is a blanket provision devoid of 
conditionalities, hence susceptible to abuse. As it currently is, the provision 
potentially opens opportunities for GPA Parties to maintain all sorts of measures 
                                                        
40
 The Revised GPA 2007 is available at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/negotiations_e.htm 
(last accessed: 24/06/09). The Art. X:6 reads: “For greater certainty, a Party, including its procuring 
entities, may, in accordance with this Article, prepare, adopt, or apply technical specifications to promote 
the conservation of natural resources or protect the environment.” 
41
 This is because the GPA Art. XXIII on the general exceptions provision addresses other issues in 
addition to the environment too. So if one of the two provisions is to be removed, it will naturally be the 
“environment” aspect of the GPA Art. XXIII. 
42
 See generally, Grando, M. T., Allocating the burden of proof in WTO disputes: a critical analysis JIEL 
9(3), 615–656 (Oxford University Press, 2006). See also. United States – Measure Affecting Imports of 
Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, Appellate Body Report, WT/DS33/AB/R and Corr.1, adopted 
23 May 1997 [hereinafter “US – Shirts and Blouses”]; US – Gasoline (ABR), p. 21, supra n. 31. 
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and claim them as “environmental”. As the intention is clearly to allow for 
environment-motivated procurement measure this confusion could argually be 
avoided by enlarging the GPA Art. XXIII exceptions with a (g) part of the GATT Art. 
XX. But then, even if this suggestion is acceptable, it still leaves unsolved the bigger 
question whether the GPA effectively accommodates climate-motivated 
procurement policies. This is because, placed within the confines of the 
environmental exception provisions of the GPA, GPP practitioner countries have the 
onus to prove that the climate-motivated procurement policies are covered under 
the exceptions, are necessary, and must comply with the chapeau.  
 
A particular concern of this research, in this regard, is that requiring climate-related 
procurement practitioner-countries under the rigorous burden of proof process may 
negate the urgency associated with the need to tackle the climate change 
challenge. That is to say, while the term “environment” is omnibus, climate change 
problem poses special, enormous and urgent threat to global well-being. Thus, 
efforts by a GPA Party to control climate change should be considered as delivering 
and enhancing global public good43 which should earn commendation and 
encouragement rather than “punishment” of a sort, namely, with imposition of the 
burden of proof. This positive gesture can be encouraged by insulating climate-
motivated procurement from the exceptions under GPA Art. XXIII, and instead 
inserting a new provision that permits such procurement policies as aimed at 
achieving climate change mitigation ends.44 This will, inter alia, effectively, shift the 
burden of proof to any Party complaining of an alleged “discrimination” or 
                                                        
43
 Carraro, C. and Egenhofer, C., Bottom-up approaches to climate change control: some policy 
conclusions, in Carraro, C. and Egenhofer, C. (eds.), Climate and Trade Policy Bottom-up Approaches 
Towards Global Agreement, Edward Elgar, (Cheltenham, United Kingdom, 2007), pp. 116-120, at p. 116. 
See also See Andrews-Speed, P. China and Global Climate Change: contrasting views, (CEPMLP 
Research Gateway, July, 2007) available at https://my.dundee.ac.uk/webapps/portal/frameset.jsp (last 
visited 30/01/08). 
44
 This is probably similar to a question being discussed of recent on the International Economic Law Blog, 
on the US green car production subsidy, namely, whether “WTO rules need to be modified so that subsidies 
to promote a cleaner environment are explicitly permitted?" See International Economic Law Blog, 
http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2009/06/green-car-subsidies.html (accessed on 26/06/09). 
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“protectionism” suffered on account of those measures. To prevent an abuse of 
such a positive norm, appropriate conditions could be attached to it.  
 
This approach can be likened to the case of the Enabling Clause, which is an 
exception to GATT Art. I:1 on MFN obligation, but was raised to the status of a norm 
as in EC — Tariff Preferences.45 The AB here considered the developmental motive 
and design of the Enabling Clause as entailing peculiar kind of “exception” to the 
GATT Art. I.46 The same approach is desirable for climate change, which is a 
developmental as much as it environmental phenomenon too.47 According to the UN 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, the adverse impacts of climate change “could 
undo much of the investment made to achieve the Millennium Development 
Goals.”48 
1.2 The research questions  
Following from the above, the questions for this research, therefore, are as follows:  
1. In pursuing green government procurement policies pursuant to their climate 
change mitigation commitments under the climate regime, how will the GPA 
Parties also safeguard their non-discrimination and related obligations under 
the GPA?  
                                                        
45
 European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries 
Appellate Body Report,, WT/DS246/AB/R (April 7, 2004) [hereinafter, “EC – Tariff Preferences (ABR)”]. 
46
 Ibid., paras. 106- 118, See also Chapter 7, Section 7.4. 
47
 The WB regards the climate change as a “key-development” issue which also is “expected to hit 
developing countries the hardest”. See WB, Climate Change & the World Bank, at 
http://beta.worldbank.org/climatechange/overview (last accessed 11/10/09). An example is the Sub-
Saharan Africa, with its special vulnerabilities. See Making Development Climate Resilient: A World Bank 
Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa Overview (available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFRICA/Resources/Overview_of_Strategy.pdf (last visited 
04/07/10). 
48 See the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s address to the high-level event on climate change in New 
York, today, 24 September available at: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sgsm11175.doc.htm 
(last accessed 20/06/10). Kofi Annan and Sir Nicholas Stern also reiterated that solution to climate change 
is “fundamental to the success of economic growth and achievement of the millennium development 
goals.” See A green deal for Africa, in The Guardian, 15 May 2009 at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/may/15/climate-change-africa (accessed on 16/05/09).  
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2. To what extent does the current version of GPA Art. XXIII:2 accommodate 
climate-motivated government procurement practices? Or will there be need 
for an amendment?49  
In effect, the research questions not only seek to determine whether discriminatory 
GPP measures are compatible with the trade rules, but also consider if, climate-
friendly procurement policies would be more effective if be permitted as a positive 
“norm” rather than under the general exceptions as the situation currently is, under 
the GPA. 
1.3 Research objective and motivation 
The objective of this research is broadly to examine the legal issues arising in the 
intersections of GP policies targeted at climate change mitigation and the WTO 
GPA. It is motivated by the desire to exemplify GPP as one of the areas to achieve 
mutual supportiveness between different sub-sectors of international law, in 
accordance with the general principles of international law as enunciated in the 
VCLT.50 The target is “to address the question how, in developing and interpreting 
WTO rules, an appropriate balance can be maintained between on the one hand, 
GPA objectives of non-discrimination and transparency and, on the other, the 
freedom of national governments to pursue legitimate domestic objectives”51, 
including those of climate change mitigation.”  
                                                        
49
 Voices have since started emerging that to the effect that in order to adequately cater for the urgency 
associated with the efforts to address climate change, these provisions need to be amended. See for 
instance, Tucker, T. and Bottari, M., , Presidential Candidates’ Key Proposals on Health Care and Climate 
Will Require WTO Modifications Overreach of WTO Highlighted by Potential Conflicts with Candidates’ 
Non-Trade Proposals, (Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch, 2008), p. 16, available at: 
http://www.citizen.org/Page.aspx?pid=2131 [“Trade,” Energy and Climate Change Policy”]. 
50
 For instance, the general principles of international law do not, hierarchically, place one sub-sector of 
international law over another, and require treaties to be interpreted so as to avoid conflicts between them. 
See, for instance, Art. 31 of the VCLT on the interpretation of treaties, and Art. 26 on the principles of 
good faith and pacta sunt servanda. For in-depth discourse on this subject, see generally, Pauwelyn, J., 
supra n. 21; See also Lindros, A. and Mewling, M.,  Dispelling the Chimera of Self-Contained Regimes’ 
International Law and the WTO, Euro J Into Law 16 (2005) pp. 857-877.  
51
 As per Arrowsmith, S., Government Procurement in the WTO, (Lower International, The Hague, The 
Netherlands: 2003), p. xxii.  
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1.4 Justification 
Climate change is increasingly being singled out and treated separately from the 
myriad of other environmental problems. This research attempts to reflect this 
phenomenon. The emerging GPP practice targeted at climate change exemplifies 
an area where environmental policies and trade rules interact. As this interaction at 
times leads to conflicts, a systematic study devoted to finding ways to establish 
coherence and harmony between the conflicting norms is clearly needed. This study 
therefore aims to contribute to the development of the critical literature in this area.   
1.5 Methodology 
1.5.1 Analytical framework 
The Concept of WTO linkages with “Non-Trade Concerns”: As the research 
examines a perceived conflict between two separate sub-sectors of international 
law, namely climate and trade regimes, this brings into focus the question of how 
WTO relates with other values and concerns. These concerns may be subjects of 
other treaties. As noted earlier, the VCLT has provided the applicable guiding 
principles regulating interrelationships between treaties. However, as WTO is taken 
to have recognised environmental concerns, then analysis will be targeted 
essentially at examining the extent to which this recognition applies to the emerging 
climate-friendly procurement policies.  
 
On the climate change aspect, analysis will be focused on specific provisions of the 
UNFCCC and KP which require the Parties to institute policies and measures, to 
control GHG emissions pursuant to their specific commitments. The relevant 
sections of the treaties include Articles 3 and 4 of the UNFCCC and Articles 2 and 3 
of the KP. On the trade aspect, the main relevant Articles for this purpose are GPA 
Articles III, VI as well as Art. XXIII.52 Analysis will be targeted at identification of 
                                                        
52
 See Appendices I – IV. Indeed, Art. X:6 of the Revised GPA 2007 (GPA/W/297) is also relevant. 
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conflicts or overlaps between the two regimes. And based on the principles 
enunciated in the VCLT, the analysis will suggest an interpretation that will 
harmonise the conflicting or competing provisions with a view to facilitating a 
coordinated implementation by Parties. 
1.5.2 Methods: The Doctrinal/Black-Letter Approach  
The research employs essentially the doctrinal method otherwise referred to as 
“black-letter” approach. This approach seeks to define what the law is, and how it is 
interpreted and applied through decided cases.53 However, because the research 
touches upon other disciplines in social sciences, such as economics, the black-
letter approach is complemented by an interdisciplinary and critical legal approach 
too. Thus, the research is concerned with not only the legal texts, and decided 
cases but also the problems associated with the everyday application of the law, as 
well as the impact of the law on policy-making. This leads to assessment of the 
legal texts vis-à-vis the policy thrusts behind them. The purpose is to investigate the 
efficacy of the texts, and assess the need for improvement of the texts and where 
amendment would be desirable if the law is to serve its purpose effectively.54  
 
As dispute settlement is “the best measure” 55 to assess how trade rules relate with 
other sub-sectors of international law at large, the research examines available 
jurisprudence under the GATT and WTO as well as under the EU system.  Thus, 
although the research assesses the GPA, it uses EU law and policy related to GPP 
to serve as an illustration.  The purpose of this illustration is to practically exemplify 
                                                        
53
 See  Dobinson I., and Jones, F., Qualitative Legal Research, in Research Methods for Law, edited by 
McConville, M., and Hong Chui, W. (University of Edinburgh Press Ltd, United Kingdom, 2007), pp. 16-
45.  
54
 Ibid., p.19. See also Brownsword, R., An Introduction to Legal Research, revised version of  the paper 
prepared for a Welcome summer school on neuroethics, held at St Anne’s College Oxford, September 
2005, available at:  
http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/stellent/groups/corporatesite/@msh_grants/documents/web_document/wtx030
897.pdf (last visited 07/08/10). 
55
 See Lindros, A. and Mewling, M., supra, n. 50, p. 858.  
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where and how the WTO-related legal issues and questions arise in GPP 
processes. The choice of EU system is based on the following considerations: 
1. EU and its member countries are individually and collectively within the Annex I 
list of the UNFCCC. At the same time, the EU is a Party to the GPA. Therefore, 
the EU has been faced with the task of how to reconcile trade liberalisation 
constraints within the Union, with the high environmental standards, and in 
particular the ambitious GHG emissions reduction commitments under the KP. 
2. The EU has a green energy procurement policy as a component of its over-all 
climate change and energy policy. This is a reflection of the EU “integration 
principle” contained in Art. 6 of the EC Treaty.56  
3. While there is still not much reference material on GP under the WTO system, 
GPP-related jurisprudence is fast developing under the EU procurement system.  
1.6 Limitations 
This work has limitations in terms of its subject-matter and working tools. As for the 
subject-matter, the research, though related to economics (in terms of international 
trade) and natural sciences (climate change and global warming), it is neither 
economics nor natural sciences-based work. It is essentially a legal analysis, 
dealing with the international law, policies and regulations related to climate change 
mitigation, energy, as well as international trade regulation, with a focus on GP. 
Similarly, as GPP is an element of sustainable procurement, the study does not 
incorporate other components of sustainable development, namely, economic and 
social issues. The reason is to ensure narrower focus and depth of analysis within 
the confines of the available time and space. Finally, the study is also constrained 
                                                        
56
 The “integration principle” is incorporated in Art. 6 of the EC Treaty. That Art. requires that:  
 [E]environmental requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation of other 
Community policies in particular with a view to promoting sustainable development” 
The “integration principle” thus imposes legal obligation upon the EU Member States. See the Opinion of 
the Advocate General Jacobs, in Case C- 379/98 PreussenElektra AG v. Schleswag AG [20010 ECR 1- 
2099, para. 231. 
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by unavailability of relevant academic literature addressing the specific research 
questions.  This is probably because the subject-matter of the research is still in its 
experimental stage. There are however vast materials on the other relevant 
aspects, and in particular, on issues related to the wider trade environment debate. 
Thus, these materials will be used to draw inferences and analogies to address the 
specific issues covered by the research questions.  This study therefore hopes to 
contribute to fill in this gap in the literature.  
1.7 Structure 
The research is organised in 8 chapters which are divided into 3 parts. Part 1 which 
consists of chapters 1 and 2, sets the general research background. Chapter 1 
highlights the main features of the research, including research questions, 
objectives, justification and limitations. This chapter in short gives an overview of the 
whole study. Chapter 2 surveys and reviews the relevant literature which helps to 
properly give focus to this research.  
 
Part 2 comprising chapters 3, 4 and 5, establishes linkages between the various 
sub-themes around which the research revolves. These are international trade law 
and the regulation of public procurement; the linkages of international regimes for 
climate change, environment and the energy sector. Thus, Chapter 3 lays the 
conceptual foundation and importance GP as well as the evolution of the regulation 
of GP, including an overview of the GPA. Chapter 4 explores the linkages between 
climate change mitigation regime, the energy sector and green procurement.  
Chapter 5 examines the institutional aspects of GPP and reviews the global and 
national initiatives for GPP. It lays the ground for the argument why climate-
motivated GP, so widely accepted and practiced, should be regarded not only as a 
“legitimate policy objective” but also an environmental activity area which deserves 
special attention under the trade law.  
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In Part 3, Chapters 6, 7 and 8 examine the technical legal issues raised for and 
against GPP. The Chapters also discuss the possible policy space available under 
the existing trade law for countries to pursue GPP, and the potential technical legal 
difficulties to be encountered from the GPA. Chapter 6 elicits the PPMs debate 
within the context of the broader trade-environment debate. It analyses the WTO 
case-law and jurisprudence as well as the EU procurement law and policy on the 
issues. Further analysis in Chapter 7 led to a conclusion which suggests 
amendment to the GPA. The amendment aims to suggest the GPA as a medium by 
which the WTO could support the objectives of the fight against climate change, and 
the overall need for coherence between trade regulation and environmental 
protection policies. Finally, Chapter 8 draws conclusions from the discourse, as well 
as offers research recommendations including suggestions for further research. 
1.8 Summary 
GPP, as a climate policy tool exemplifies an area of interaction between trade and 
the environment which has been a subject of intense debates in the academia and 
by policy makers. The climate change has gained recognition as a special global 
environmental problem, the solution to which requires not only a multilateral 
approach, but also utilization of all available avenues in the overall polity. GP seen 
as an avenue to mainstream sustainable development factors in international trade 
regulation is feared as discriminatory. Climate change and the trade arenas are both 
regulated by treaty law, and their interpretation is guided by the international law 
principles as enunciated under the VCLT. This therefore presupposes a harmonious 
interpretation that will allows countries to pursue the objectives of the two regimes in 
a coherent manner. To ensure this coherence and harmony as between GPP 
policies and GPA provisions, the research suggests an amendment to the GPA so 
as to permit countries to maintain procurement policies specifically targeted at 
climate change mitigation. It shows how, through amendment to the legal texts, the 
WTO trade liberalisation mission could be more amenable and responsive to 
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climate change mitigation. This will further allow the WTO to perform its role of 
contributing towards “achieving coherence in global economic policymaking”,57 as 
enunciated under Art. V:1-2 of the WTO Agreement.58  
                                                        
57
 See WTO, Declaration on the Contribution of the WTO to Achieving Greater Coherence in Global 
Economic policymaking, by Minister in Marrakesh on 15 April, 1994. See also WTO Secretariat, Guide to 
the Uruguay Round Agreements, 15-16 (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, The Netherlands, 1999). 
58
 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter aims to highlight the current state of the literature on the interactions 
between GPP, climate change and trade regulation. In order to do that it was 
considered necessary to examine the trade-environment interactions in some detail 
and from an historical perspective. This brought into focus the long-standing debate 
on trade and environment59 that has attracted major interest in academia from legal, 
economics and international relations perspectives. While government procurement 
(GP) is a subject of international trade, the greening of government procurement 
falls within the purview of environmental protection agenda.  
 
With the emergence of sustainability principles especially after the adoption of the 
Agenda 21 at the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED),60 climate change challenge has taken a centre stage. 
Agenda 21 urged that environmental and sustainability concerns should be 
integrated into all economic development policies.61 This call became imperative 
especially for the UNFCCC Parties and particularly those that ratified the KP. 
Accordingly, the EU and such other jurisdictions having high climate commitments 
                                                        
59
 Environment is just one out of a host of issues which fall under domestic social and regulatory agenda of 
the WTO parties. They are referred to as “trade and ...” issues. Environment is probably the most 
controversial among them, in international trade regulation. Those other sub-themes include human rights, 
labour standards, and national competition policies, in which the WTO’s position (or lack of it) has been 
subjected to scrutiny. The “Trade and…” theme has been the subject of a scholarly symposium on The 
Boundaries of the WTO. See Alvarez, J. E. (ed.), in AJIL, Vol. 96, No. 1, 2002. 
60
 See Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Rio de Janeiro, 3-14 
June 1992) Annex I: Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I) 
(hereinafter “the Earth Summit” or “Rio Declaration” or “Agenda 21”), available at: 
<http://www.un.org/geninfo/bp/enviro.html> <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-
1annex1.htm>. See also UNEP at 
http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=78&Art.ID=1163 (last accessed: 
03/08/09). See infra,, Chapter 4 
61
 See Ibid. Agenda 21, Chapter 8 
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under the said Protocol, regard government procurement as a potent tool not only to 
integrate the environment but also to pursue their climate change agenda. GPP thus 
features prominently in the EU’s climate change strategy.62  
 
Indeed, even the WTO and sister multilateral institutions like the World Bank have 
started to officially treat climate change separately from other environmental issues 
hitherto lumped together under the omnibus title of “the environment”.63 Similarly, 
some national governments committed to climate change including the United 
Kingdom, have created government departments or assigned cabinet ministers 
specifically to deal with climate change issues.64 There are so many reasons 
identified for this special status of climate change. Basically, there is close 
interaction between climate change and the energy sector which is the driving force 
of economic development.65  
 
Following from the research questions stated in chapter 1,66 this chapter seeks to 
look at earlier works done related to the position of GPP motivated by the Kyoto 
emissions reduction commitment, under the WTO GPA. The review finds generally, 
that although there has been some work done in the area of GP as a subject, little 
work has been done in establishing the linkages of GPP and the WTO law and 
policy. In order to appreciate the concept of GPP in the context of trade regulation it 
is pertinent to elicit the content and essence of the trade-environment debate, and in 
the light of the GATT/WTO jurisprudence on the GATT Art. XX(b) and (g).  
                                                        
62
 See infra, Chapter 6, Section 6.4. 
63
 See WTO-UNEP, Trade and Climate Change (WTO, 2009), available at: 
<http://www.unep.ch/etb/pdf/UNEP%20WTO%20launch%20event%2026%20june%202009/Trade_&_Cli
mate_Publication_2289_09_E%20Final.pdf >.  See also WB, International Trade and Climate Change -
Economic, Legal, and Institutional Perspectives (The World Bank, Washington DC, USA, 2007).  
64
 In 2008, the UK government upgraded the Department of Energy to include climate change matters, and 
renamed it as: Department of Energy and Climate Change. See http://www.decc.gov.uk/ 1. Meanwhile, 
other environmental matters are retained with the Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. 
65
 On the interaction between climate change and the energy sector, see Chapter 4 Section 4.3. 
66
 See supra, Chapter 1 Section 1.2 
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The chapter is divided into three sections; the next section looks at the literature 
covering the various sub-themes of the research, namely: (a) The trade-
environment interaction and the state of the debate, with particular attention given to 
AB reports in US – Shrimp,67 and more specifically, in US - Gambling and Brazil – 
Tyres disputes68; (b) GPP and the WTO rules, and (c) GPP under the EU system 
and lessons for the WTO GPA. The review is finally concluded with observations 
and synthesis of the gap in the literature which the research seeks to address.  
2.2 The research sub-themes in the light of the literature 
2.2.1 Trade and the environment interaction: an overview 
It is pertinent before discussing GPP in the context of trade regulation, to give an 
overview of the wider debate including brief history of this interaction since the 
GATT days through to the WTO era. The debate has been described succinctly by 
Taira69 as follows: 
“On the one hand, environmentalists argue that the values of free trade 
conflict with the values of the environment… [Trade] liberalization creates 
new market opportunities and enhances economic activity [...] But freer trade 
and economic growth, if they go without fair payments of costs 
(“internalization”), result in the unsustainable consumption of natural 
resources and waste production and lead to increased pollution and other 
environmental harm (“externality”). Trade agreements contain market access 
provisions that can be used to override domestic environmental 
regulations…. Countries with lax environmental standards have competitive 
advantage in the global market place and put pressure on countries with 
high environmental standards to reduce their environmental requirements. 
TREMS [trade related environmental measures] make it possible for those 
                                                        
67
 US – Shrimp (AB) supra, n. 32; 
68
 US – Gambling (ABR) supra, n. 34, and Brazil – Tyres, supra, n. 36. 
69
 Taira, S., Live with quiet but uneasy status quo? – An evolutionary role the appellate body can play in 
resolution of “trade and environment” disputes, in Holmann, H. (ed.), Agreeing and implementing the 
Doha Round of the WTO, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom, 2008), pp. 420-437. 
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countries to avoid such pressure …. On the other hand, free traders mainly 
argue as follows: environmental values and trade are complementary and 
the later serves the former. If consumption of a country’s environmental 
resources is correctly priced, liberal trade improves a country’s overall 
welfare and leads to a more efficient use of natural resources.”70  
 
From the above, one can say that the issue surrounding the trade-environment 
debate broadly, from the legal perspective,71 concerns whether, and to what extent 
TREMS may be used to protect the environment. More specifically, to what extent 
can states unilaterally adopt a trade measure pursuant to an international 
environmental treaty (like the Kyoto Protocol), to protect the environment where 
such a measure infringes international trade law?  When is unilateralism illegal 
(even if desirable for the protection of the environment), and when is it not? In sum, 
therefore, the argument of the thesis essentially revolves around this hypothetical:  
Country A, a GPA Party, pursuant to its climate policy, incentivises mass 
generation of green electricity as well as electric-motored vehicles which would 
run on 50% energy from battery and the remaining 50% from gasoline. A then 
requires that 50% of all government vehicles in each ministry, parastatal or 
department to be electric-motored, and the remaining 50% to use green energy 
for at least 50% of their fuel; A then places a standing tender to purchase, for its 
use, all the vehicles produced with the above specifications. A also commits all 
energy procurement entities to ensure procuring the needed green energy for 
the stated purpose, namely, to be used by the government vehicles. K, L, and M 
                                                        
70 Ibid., pp. 421-423, [Italics in the original]. See more extensive exposition of the debate from both legal 
and economic perspective in Esty, D., Greening the GATT – Trade, Environment, and the Future, (Institute 
for International Economics, Washington DC: USA, 1994) (Chapter 1); Schoenbaum, T. J., Free 
International Trade and Protection of the Environment: Irreconcilable Conflict?, AJIL Vol. 86, No. 4 
(Oct., 1992), pp. 700-727, available at www.jstor.org/stable/2203789 (last accessed: 24/079/2010).; 
Shaffer, G., WTO Blue-Green Blues: The Impact of U.S. Domestic Politics on Trade-Labour, Trade-
Environment Linkages for the WTO’s Future, in The Future of the World Trade Organization, Fordham 
International Law Journal 608-651 (Nov.-Dec. 2000), pp. 3 – 13, and Bodansky, D., What's So Bad about 
Unilateral Action to Protect the Environment? EJIL 2000 11 (339)2 
71
 The economics dimension of this problem relates inter alia to the question of the competitiveness effects 
of adopting a unilateral environmental measure to protect the environment? On this question, See Aldy, J. 
E., and Pizer, W. A., The Competitiveness Impacts of Climate Change Mitigation Policies, (Resources for 
the Future Prepared for the Pew Centre on Global Climate Change, 2009). 
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supply companies won 98% of the contracts living only 2% to X, Y, Z, D and E 
companies. The winners however, happen to be all from A domestic industry. 
They have the advantage of being generally more prepared (in terms of their 
technical ability), but also because, being subjects of A, they have made special 
provisions in their production processes and operations to comply with A’s 
climate change-related demands. X, Y, Z, D and E are foreign but locally-based 
supply companies doing business in A. They feel aggrieved as the government 
policy affected them adversely disproportionately. They also see their products 
did not meet the tender specification not because they are not good enough, but 
more because of their PPMs.They would seek redress under the WTO dispute 
settelement system.72  
 
The maze above depicts a case of de-facto discrimination likely occuruing in GPP 
process. The possible issues that arise here include: 
a) X, Y, Z, D and E, can jointly or individually institute, through their home 
countries a complaint to the WTO DSB under the GPA Art. III on non-
discrimination, against A, for de-facto discrimination and based on NPR 
PPMs. A may have a defence under GPA Art. XXIII exceptions. 
b) Assuming A is EU, and X, Y, Z are nationals of Member Countries of EU, 
they cannot complain, because the EU Common Market has instituted GPP 
targeted at climate mitigation. 
c) Assuming also A relies on its Kyoto commitments, but D is not even a Party 
to the Kyoto or any climate regime, can A still have a defence under GPA 
Art. XXIII exceptions?  
d) Where E is from a developing country, but not party to GPA even though a 
signatory to the Kyoto, can a complaint on E’s behalf be sustained? 
                                                        
72
 This hypotheitical is an example of the practical issues essentially addressed by the thesis. Analyis on 
how a WTO dispute settlement panel may handle such issues are found mainly in chapters 6 and 7. 
However, the conclusion of the thesis leads to an amendment proposal to the WTO GPA which may pre-
empt the occurrence of the complicts depicted here. The proposal is at the end of analysis in chapter 7. 
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A similarly relevant question, in the trade-environment interaction, but which is 
usually over-looked in the discourse, is as to the nature of the particular 
environmental problem at issue: local, transboundary or global and to what extent 
does this matter? A trade restrictive measure required to address a “local” or even 
“transboundary” pollution may not be as justifiable as that required, for instance, to 
address an environmental problem of global nature like climate change. This view 
seems to be endorsed by Bhagwati when he said, in order to analyse “with clarity” 
and to “design optimal policy solution” to the issues of linkage of trade and 
environment, one of the crucial questions is whether the environmental damage or 
pollution is “‘domestic’ or ‘international’.”73 
2.2.2 Trade and the environment interaction: a brief historical perspective  
2.2.2.1 Environmental issues in the GATT  
Among the prolific and vocal commentators on this debate were Daniel Esty,74 
Steve Charnovitz75 Gregory Shaffer,76 Robert Howse (with Donald Regan)77 and 
Jagdish Bhagwati.78 Shaffer79 for instance, states that when the original GATT was 
drafted in 1947, environmental protection was not contemplated. This is because 
the environment as it is known today was neither on the agenda of the institutions of 
                                                        
73
 See Bhagwati, J., On thinking clearly about the linkage between Trade and the Environment, in The 
Wind of the Hundred Days –How Washington Mismanaged Globalization, (The MIT Press, 2002), p. 191. 
74
 See Esty, D. C., supra, n. 70, p. 49.  
75
 For instance, Charnovitz, S., Exploring the Environmental Exceptions in GATT Art. XX, J. World Trade 
37 (Oct. 1991) (hereinafter, “Charnovitz, Exploring the environmental exceptions”), available at 
www.geocities.com/charnovitz/JWT.htm; Charnovitz, S. GATT and the environment: Examining the 
issues, International Environmental Affairs 4 (3), 1992, 203-33. See also Charnovitz, S., The WTO’S 
Environmental Progress, JIEL Vol. 027 (2007) 1–22 at p. 3. 
76
 See for instance, the extensive article by Shaffer, Blue-Green Blues, supra, n. 70. 
77
 See generally, Howse, R. and Regan, D. H., The Product/Process Distinction -An Illusory Basis for 
Disciplining “Unilateralism" in Trade Policy (EJIL, 2000 pp. 249-289). See also infra,, Section 2.2.3. 
78
 See Bhagwati, J., Afterword: the Question of Linkage, in Alvarez, J. E (ed.), The Boundaries of the WTO, 
supra, n. 59. 
79
 Shaffer, G., The World Trade Organization under Challenge: Democracy and the Law and Politics of 
the WTO’s Treatment of Trade and Environment Matters, 25 Harvard Environmental Law Review 1-93 
(Winter 2001). Published also as Shaffer, C. G., If Only We Were Elephants: The Political Economy of the 
WTO’s Treatment of Trade and Environment Matters in The Political Economy of International Trade 
Law: Essays in Honour of Robert Hudec, (Kennedy and Southwick Eds., 2002). 
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global governance nor in the domestic policies of any country. Thus, interest in the 
environment was “largely non-existent”80 or “not a major concern”.81  The focus at 
that time was on economic reconstruction following the destruction meted by the 
World War II, and to avoid depression similar to what followed the World War I.82 
There were therefore no provisions in the GATT 1947 that clearly addressed 
environmental protection and sustainable development.83 Thus, even the provisions 
of Art. XX(b) and (g) of the GATT84 which sought to permit inter alia “measures... 
necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health,” and those “relating to the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources,” respectively, arguably were not 
referring to environmental protection as it was known in 1994 when the GATT was 
up-graded to WTO.85 Indeed some commentators argue that the exact intendment 
of the negotiators on those provisions were not clear enough.86  
 
On the other hand, however, Charnovitz drew attention to the fact that it was not 
entirely correct to suggest that there was no environment foot-print in the original 
                                                        
80
 See   Jackson, J. H., Davey, W. J. and Sykes, A. O., The Legal Problems of International Economic 
Relations: Cases, Materials and Text on the National and International Regulation of Transnational 
Economic Relations, (Third Edition) (West Publishing Company, 1995), 561, (Hereinafter, “Jackson, The 
Legal Problems”). 
81
.Ibid. p. 559  
82
 See Weiss, E. B., Environment and Trade as Partners in Sustainable Development: A Commentary, 86 
Am. J. Int’l L. 728-735, (1992), 728. Edith noted that at the date of the Article (two decades after 
establishment of UNEP) environment and sustainable development had become so much on the global 
arena that there were “almost 900 international legal instruments that were either fully devoted to 
environmental issues or had one or more significant provisions directed to environmental protection”. See 
p. 729.  
83
 See Ibid., 728. 
84
 For the text of GATT Art. XX(b) and (g) and their GPA version see Chapter 7, Section. See also 
Appendix I Part III [Selected Provisions From The General Agreement On Tariffs And Trade]. 
85
 See Mattoo, A. and Subramanian, A., Regulatory Autonomy and Multilateral Disciplines: The Dilemma 
and a Possible Resolution, JIEL 1(1998)303 -322. Throughout the paper, the authors kept referring GATT 
Art. XX, as not covering the “environment.” See for instance, pp. 307-308. 
86
 Ibid,. The earliest cases under the GATT that addressed environmental concerns appeared only in the 
1990s. See however, Charnovitz, S., supra, n. 75. See also Trade and the Environment – A Report 
Prepared by the GATT Secretariat (1992), in Jackson, J. H. (et al), The Legal Problems, supra, n. 80, p. 
651. This report suggests that trade-environment interaction “dates back at least to the trade provisions in 
the 1933 convention on fauna and flora”). 
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GATT.87 He traced the history of environmental provisions in international trade and 
commerce agreements to the 1927 International Convention for the Abolition of 
Import and Export Prohibitions and Restrictions,88 the world’s first round of trade 
negotiations. This Convention sought to abolish all kinds of trade restrictions. The 
Convention however, inserted exceptions for trade restrictive measure maintained 
for “protection of public health or for protection of animals or plants against disease, 
insects and harmful parasites.”89 After heated debate by the Parties to the 
Convention on the import of these exceptions, an addendum had to be inserted in 
the Treaty’s Protocol which clarified that the “protection of animals or plants against 
disease,” would include “measures taken to preserve them from degeneration or 
extinction”.90 Charnovitz then concluded inter alia that because of the inter-
relationship of “sanitary, veterinary, psychopathological and nature preservation, 
their objectives were encompassed under the same exception.”91 
 
To Esty, in order to address environmental concerns in a multilateral manner in the 
same fashion as the WTO in the case of trade issues, there would be the need, inter 
alia, for the creation of a global environmental organisation (GEO), in the format of 
the International Labour Organisation (ILO) to exist side by side with the WTO.92 
The GEO would serve as a more viable forum to address even the competitiveness 
concerns and the cost internalization for environmental externalities.93 Absent that, 
Esty opined the next alternative would be review of the GATT or in particular Art. 
                                                        
87
 See Charnovitz, S., supra, n. 75.  
88
 The Convention was signed at Geneva, November 8, 1927, League of Nations Doc. 557, M201, 
1927.IIB. See also The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 25, No. 3, Supplement: Official 
Documents (Jul., 1931), pp. 121-145 (American Society of International Law) available at: 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2213116 (last accessed: 09/07/10). 
89
 Ibid., Art. 4:4 
90
 Charnovitz, S., supra, n. 75.  
91
 Ibid. 
92
 See Esty, supra, n. 70, pp. 4-5 
93Ibid. 
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XX, to take into cognisance the concerns of the environmentalists.94 The review 
suggested of Art. XX will target the word “necessary”, to be replaced with some 
other term or phrase which will soften the grip on the ability of WTO Members to 
exercise their right to institute domestic policies of their choice to protect the 
environment with less apprehension of litigation.95 In all circumstances, Esty 
suggests, due regard should be given to the nature of the environmental concern 
being addressed. It is the level and magnitude of the harm or threat posed by an 
environmental challenge that gives legitimacy to the policy or measure imposed or 
proposed.96 
 
The lack of certainty as to the positioning of the environment in the overall scheme 
of the GATT was clearly exhibited, in 1991, by the Panel rulings in the US-
Tuna/Dolphin I and II disputes97. It was decided in these disputes that the US 
                                                        
94
 Ibid.  
95
 Ibid., pp. 221 – 222. This suggestion emanated from an earlier summary paper by Austria on the EMIT 
(see EMIT infra, Section 2.2.2.2).  
96
 Esty, D., supra, n. 70, pp. 120-127. Indeed, in this regard Esty suggested to issue to be assessed by 
considering: 
- “The importance of the environmental resource affected 
- The strength of the scientific assessment of inquiry 
- The speed at which the harm is occurring (i.e., the urgency  of the situation) 
- Irreversibility of the potential damage, and The breadth of the threatened harm.” 
97
 In the US - Tuna/Dolphin I dispute, in 1990, some US environmental groups obtained a court injunction 
forcing the US government to place a ban on imports of Mexican tuna. The ban was predicated upon the 
Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 (16 U.S.C. 1412), a US legislation which inter alia provided for a 
programme aimed at protecting dolphins usually trapped in Mexican fishing nets. Mexico filed a complaint 
before the GATT. The MMPA also set standards for fishing fleets for domestic fishing industry, applicable 
also on fishermen from countries that exported fish to the US. Thus, countries exporting tuna to the US 
must prove to US trade inspectors that the fishing method they used complied with the US-set standards, 
before their tuna would cross the border into the US. The Panel found that the US ban violated Art. XI of 
GATT that prohibits “quantitative restrictions”. The reasoning of the ruling was that the ban targeted the 
“process of producing tuna,” and not the quality of the tuna itself. Secondly, the US ban amounted to a 
unilateral imposition of US domestic standards on foreign countries (otherwise referred to as “extra-
territoriality”) which the Panel thought was not warranted by GATT Art. XX. This ruling disregarded the 
fact that the ban sought to protect the living natural resources (dulphins), thus disallowed recourse to the, 
the environmental exceptions, to save the US’s measure.  
In the US – Tuna/Dolphin II, the US embargo (in the US – Tuna/Dolphin I case) affected both “primary” 
and “intermediary nations” (including EC and The Netherlands). Thus these intermediary nations filed a 
complaint against the US. The Panel found that neither the primary nor the intermediary nation embargo 
were covered under Article III as claimed by the US, and that the embargo as it affected both categories of 
nations was contrary to Article XI:1 and not justified by the exceptions in GATT Article XX (b), (g) or (d). 
The Panel also rejected the territorial limitation of the application of Art. XX as in the first case, and, 
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unilateral “process-based”98 measure restricting the import and sale of tuna caught 
by non-dolphin friendly methods run counter to Art. XI, and not be justified under the 
Art. XX(b) and (g) exceptions. The main contention in these disputes surrounds the 
GATT-illegality of unilateral use of process-based trade measures to promote 
environmental protection.99 The Panel even suggested that if the GATT had wished 
to permit such trade-restrictive measures on the basis of environmental protection 
then there would have been more rules developed to that effect.100 This ruling 
attracted wide media attention, as it sparked up heated criticism from especially 
international environmental NGOs. They believed this lack of clarity led to the 
relegation of environmental concerns to the background, as exemplified by that 
ruling.101  
 
As this Panel deliberated while the Uruguay Round negotiations were still going on, 
the negotiators were able to insert in the Preamble to the WTO agreement 
establishing the WTO, a brief mention of the “objective of sustainable development’ 
                                                                                                                                                             
instead suggested that Article XX (b) and (g) could not apply to measures where such (measures) would 
only be effective in protecting the environment if other countries would change their policies in 
compliance. This aspect of the ruling disregarded the fact that reduction of imports of dolphin-unfriendly 
tuna and fewer dolphins being killed. Thus change of policy was not necessary to achieve some 
environmental benefits from the measure. For in-depth reviews on these disputes at See WTO, Mexico, etc 
versus US: ‘Tuna-Dolphin’ at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/edis04_e.htm (last visited: 
01/05/10); Parker, R., The Use and Abuse of Trade Leverage to Protect the Global Commons: What We 
Can Learn from the Tuna-Dolphin Conflict, 12 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (Fall 1999); Trachtmann, 
J., Decision: GATT Dispute Settlement, 86 AM. J. INT’L. L. 142 (1992); Howse, R., The Appellate Body 
Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: A New Legal Baseline for the Trade and Environment Debate, 27 
Colum. J. Envtl. L. 2002, 491available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/articles/howseshrimp.pdf (last 
visited: 17/07/10). 
98
 On the distinction between “product” and “process-based” measures, see infra, Chapter 6 Section 6.4. 
99
 Cheyne, I., Trade and the Environment: the Future of Extraterritorial Unilateral Measures after the 
Shrimp Appellate Body, [2000] 5 Web JCLI: http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/2000/issue5/cheyne5.html (accessed 
last 06/09/09). See also, for example, Esty, D. C., Supra, n. 70. Sands, P., ‘Unilateralism’, Values, and 
International Law, 11 EJIL 291 (2000); Schoenbaum, T.J., International Trade and the Protection of the 
Environment: The Continuing Search for Reconciliation, 91 AJIL 268, 1997). 
100
 Ibid.. para. 6.3. 
101
 See Santarius, T., et al, Balancing Trade and Environment: an ecological reform in the WTO as a 
Challenge in sustainable Global Governance –What Kind of globalisation is sustainable? (Wuppertal 
Institute for Climate, Environment, Energy, Wuppertal, Germany, 2004), pp. 8-12. In the case of North 
America, another triggering facto was the signing of the NAFTA, which many environmental groups 
feared would allow trade objectives enunciated in that agreement (because of the involvement of Mexico, a 
developing country) to undermine environmental standards. See Esty, D. C., supra,, n. 70, pp. 27-32, and 
Shaffer, G., WTO under Challenge, supra, n. 79, at 26. 
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and “protection of the environment,” as part of the objectives of the multilateral 
trading system.102  Of course, to the environmentalists, and many trade law 
commentators, this was a monumental positive breakthrough in the history of the 
interactions of the trade and environmental policies, and the first of its kind.103  
 
As there were still no substantive provisions in the GATT on environmental 
protection the Preamble to the WTO Agreement had to be strengthened using 
teleological and evolutionary methods of interpretation by the WTO AB in the US-
Shrimp ruling.104 The AB in that ruling stated that the words in GATT Art. XX, which 
were “crafted more than 50 years ago ... [are] by definition, evolutionary... [and] 
                                                        
102
 See the Preamble to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization at: 
<http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto.pdf>. See also Picciotto, S., supra, n. 31, pp. 10-11, 
footnote. 23.  
103
 See for example, Staffin, E. B., Barrier or Trade Boon - A Critical Evaluation of Environmental 
Labelling and Its Role in the Greening of World trade, 1996 Columbia Journal of Environmental Law, Vol. 
21: 205, footnote 1 (HeinOnline). See also Berber, J. R., Unilateral Trade Measures to Conserve the 
World’s Living Resources: An Environmental Breakthrough for the GATT in the WTO Sea Turtle’s Case, p. 
1, Columbia Journal of Environmental Law, vol. 24, 1999, Page 355.. 
104
 US – Shrimp (ABR), paras. 129-131. The facts of this are similar to those of the US – Tuna/Dolphin. 
This was a joint complaint by India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand, against the unilateral imposition of 
import prohibitions by the U.S. on the importation of certain shrimp and shrimp products pursuant to its 
legislation [Section 609 of Public Law 101-162 (hereinafter, "Section 609") and associated regulations and 
judicial decisions]. This law aimed to prohibit importation into the U.S. of shrimp harvested with fishing 
technology that adversely affects sea turtles. The law exempted certain countries from the prohibition. 
There was also a provision for grant of permits certification for any exporting state that adopts a regulatory 
programme for the incidental taking of sea turtles where it is comparable to that of the U.S. The US’s 
fishing technology required the use of “turtle excluder devices” (TEDs). At Panel level, the US measure 
was found to contravene GATT Art. XI, and it was not saved by GATT Art. XX (g) exceptions. The 
measure was not considered under Art. III, As the measure was found inconsistent with the chapeau of Art. 
XX, the Panel ruled that it needed not to address Art. XX(b) or (g). The Panel based its decision on the fact 
that the measure was unilateral one, and thus not justifiable under the exceptions under GATT Art. XX as it 
would “undermine the multilateral trading system.” (See Panel Report, para. 7.60). 
 
The AB rejected the Panel’s reasoning and but still reached the same ruling based on other grounds. The 
AB held the U.S. measure did qualify for provisional justification under paragraph (g) of Art. XX but does 
not comply with the chapeau. The AB re-established the logic of examining the essence of a measure first 
against the paragraphs of Art. XX before proceeding to look at the manner of the application the measure 
against the chapeau. The AB’s finding of discrimination contrary to the chapeau was based on essentially 
two grounds: (1) the US’s failure to establish or follow due process procedure in manner Section 609 was 
implemented, and (2) although the law itself provided for the establishment of negotiations process with 
countries that could be affected by the operation of the law, the US did not engage in such negotiations, or 
engaged with some and disregarded other countries. Thus, while the AB “did not explicitly accept that a 
multilateral environmental agreement would be a sound basis for an exception under art. XX, it welcomed 
environmental measures, and recommended those that are not unilateral.” The AB also adopted the so-
called evolutionary approach to deviate from and interpretation based on the concept of “original intent” of 
the GATT art. XX(g), now favouring “a more dynamic” approach that takes into account current 
circumstances. See also Trachtman, J. P., Introduction to the Shrimp-Turtle Case, Brief Summary and 
Analysis of the WTO Panel and Appellate Body Decisions, at: 
http://www.iilj.org/courses/documents/Shrimp-Turtlecase.pdf (last accessed: 17/07/10). 
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must be read... in the light of contemporary concerns of the community of nations 
about the protection and conservation of the environment.”105 This was the first high 
level judicial interpretation of the said provisions of the GATT. It came in 1998, that 
is, only after the establishment of the WTO. It was the “boldest attempt” so far to 
strike a balance between trade liberalisation and environmental protection under the 
WTO system.106 However, it should be noted, going by the VCLT Art. 31(2), that 
preambular provision is only part of the “context” for the purpose of interpretation of 
the text of a treaty. It should not serve as authority for an interpreter to insert 
extraneous material into the treaty text.107 Thus, Kelly,108 among others, stated that 
the interpretation of paragraph (g) above, using the so-called evolutionary approach 
to include non-living exhaustible natural resources was far-fetched. 109  
 
                                                        
105
 See more commentary on this in Charnovitz, S., The WTO’S Environmental Progress, supra, 75, p. 3. 
106
 Benjamin, S., In Search of Balance: An Analysis of the WTO Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body Report: 
Note, vol. 24, 1999, Page 414 (Heinonline) available at: 
http://www.heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/cjel24&id=1&size=2&collection=journals&in
dex=journals/cjel accessed (24/10/08). See also Mills, R., U.S. Wins WTO Case on Sea Turtle Conservation  
(10/22/2001) Ruling Re-affirms WTO Recognition of Environmental Concerns, Office of the United States 
Trade Representative (USTR) at: 
http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Press_Releases/2001/October/US_Wins_WTO_Case_on_Sea_Tur
tle_Conservation.html (accessed 14/09/08). 
107
 See Picciotto, S., supra, n. 31, pp. 10-11, footnote. 23. See also: Access to the Port of Danzig. 1931 
P.C.I.J., Scr. A/B, No. 43, p. 144: "The Court is not prepared to accept the view that the text of the Treaty 
of Versailles can be enlarged by reading into it stipulations which are said to result from the proclaimed 
intentions of the authors of the Treaty, but for which no provision is made in be text itself." See generally, 
Jacobs, F. G., Varieties Of Approach To Treaty Interpretation: With Special Reference To The Draft 
Convention On The Law Of Treaties Before The Vienna Diplomatic Conference, 18 ICLQ 1969(318-346). 
One recalls here, Thomas Walde’s criticisms of the legal drafting practice where drafters introduce 
concepts that seem not intended by the  negotiators of the treaties: “Or do we have a case of preambular 
overshoot, i.e. the production of high-sounding and far-reaching preambular references to all sorts of 
currently prevailing concepts and attitudes (economic liberalism; human rights; environment; indigenous 
people and whatever is politically correct in treaty-making and its surrounding public opinion), which 
neither the negotiators/drafters nor the signing governments nor the ratifying legislatures really wanted to 
be taken that seriously?” See Waelde, T., Sustainable development and the 1994 Energy Charter Treaty: 
between pseudo-action and the management of environmental investment risk, in: Weiss, F., et.al. (Eds.), 
International Economic Law with a Human Face, Kluwer Law, London 1998, 223-271. See also Members’ 
contributions on OGEMID (Oil-Gas-Energy-Mining and Infra,structure investment) Electronic Discussion 
Forum [http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/ogemid/ ] discussions on the subject of Legal 
effect of preambles in treaty interpretation, 19th -30th April 2007. 
 
108
 Kelly, J. P., The Seduction of the Appellate Body: Shrimp/Sea Turtle I and II and the Proper Role of 
States in WTO Governance, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1106895 (last 
accessed 30/09/09),  p. 459.    See also Taira, supra, n. 69. 
109
 Ibid., pp. 468-469. Of course, some other commentators commended this adoption of evolutionary 
approach by AB. See for instance, Trachtman, J. P., Introduction to the Shrimp-Turtle Case, supra, n. 104. 
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Bhagwati’s treatises generally indicate an apparent dissatisfaction with the current 
state of the WTO system as it relates to the linkages issue. His own perspective is 
more developing-country centred. He supported the US - Dolphin I and II rulings, 
and went to the extent of insinuating that the “environmentally more accommodating 
interpretation of the scope of Article XX” in the AB ruling in the US – Shrimp might 
have well been influenced by strong environmental interests represented by the 
North-based NGOs.110 These were the NGOs, he opined, bent on undermining free- 
trade, and with adverse consequences on the developing countries’ market 
access.111 He said the term “sustainable development” used in the Preamble to the 
WTO agreement was not known even by God himself,112 but was constantly pushed 
onto developing countries. He then suggested inter alia that reform would be 
required in the WTO jurisprudence, so that the US – Dolphin position is re-affirmed, 
or if environmental measures are fully accommodated, then there should be some 
in-built mechanism that would minimise their impacts on the developing countries.  
2.2.2.2 The UNCHE, the GATT Secretariat and the EMIT Working Group 
The  AB ruling in the US – Shrimp case was certainly informed by developments 
then in the global arena marked by growing awareness and “concern about the 
impact of economic growth on social development and the environment”.113 These 
developments became more manifest in the 1970s when international response 
started building up through the UN system114 with the 1972 UN Conference on 
                                                        
110
 See Bhagwati, J., supra, n. 78, p. 133. This view was shared and strongly re-echoed by Kelly where he 
emphasized inter alia, that the AB ruling in US – Shrimp, which allowed the environmental PPMs to block 
developing countries’ exports to developed world had effectively undermined their (developing countries’) 
development contrary to the objectives of the WTO.… See generally, Kelly, J. P., supra, n. 108, p.1. 
111
 See Ibid., generally.  
112
 Ibid., p. 133. Bhagwati then opined that in the spirit of fairness, the AB ruling in US – Shrimp should 
have affirmed the earlier US – Tuna Dolphin rulings, and then leave the trade-environment contentious 
issues to be decided politically through the renegotiation of the GATT Art. XX(b) and (g).  
113
 WTO, Environment: Early years: emerging environment debate in GATT/WTO, at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/hist1_e.htm#EMIT (accessed 17/08/09). 
114
 Shaffer, G., WTO Under Challenge, supra, n. 79, p. 22. 
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Human Environment (UNCHE) on how best to manage the relationship between 
development  and human environment.  
 
As preparatory to the UNHCE the GATT Secretariat submitted a contribution in a 
study entitled Industrial Pollution Control and International Trade.115 The study 
focused on “the implications of environmental protection policies on international 
trade.”116 The paper sought to explore the extent to which the then 78 GATT 
contracting parties were “free to act in this (stated) area consistently with the 
obligations they have assumed with respect to promotion of international trade on a 
non-discriminatory basis.”117 In order to look into the issue further the GATT 
Contracting Parties formed the Working Group on Environmental Measures and 
International Trade (EMIT Working Group)118 in 1971. This Group was assigned to 
examine, “upon request any specific matters relevant to the trade policy aspects of 
measures to control pollution and protect human environment, especially with 
regard to the application of the provisions of the General Agreement.”119  
 
The EMIT participation then became necessary in view of the growing concern that 
some MEAs earlier concluded had contained specific trade measures. These 
measures though aimed at facilitating achievement of the objectives of those MEAs, 
raised issues with the provisions of GATT. Such MEAs include the Montreal 
                                                        
115
 GATT L/3538, 9 June 1971, available at:  
http://gatt.stanford.edu/bin/search/simple/process?offset=0&length=10&query=Industrial+Pollution+Contr
ol+and+International+Trade&search=Search (last accessed 17/07/10). 
116
 WTO, Early years: emerging environment debate in GATT/WTO, at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/hist1_e.htm (last accessed 07/07/10). See also Trade and 
Environment: Factual Note by the Secretariat, (L/6896 18 September 1991). 
117
 See GATT L/3538, 9 June 1971, supra, n. 115, p. 3. See also Trade and Environment Factual Note by 
the Secretariat, (L/6896 18 September 1991). 
118
 Hereinafter referred to as “EMIT”. 
119
 See GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting Held in Geneva, on 9 November 1971, C/M/74 at 4 (Nov. 17, 
1971) (containing the decision of the GATT contracting parties to establish a group on environmental 
measures and international trade).  
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Protocol120 which has been submitted as having inspired much of the structure of 
the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol but for the “stick” it uses in the form of trade 
measures to entice non-parties into compliance.121 Other such MEAs are the 
CITES,122 the CBD,  especially through the Bio-safety Protocol,123 the Rotterdam 
Convention,124  Stockholm Convention125 and the Basel Convention.126  
                                                        
120
 The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montreal Protocol to the Vienna 
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer which was adopted on 22 March 1985), (as either 
adjusted and/or amended in London 1990 Copenhagen 1992, Vienna 1995 Montreal 1997 Beijing 1999), 
available at: http://www.unep.org/OZONE/pdfs/Montreal-Protocol2000.pdf (accessed 08/09/08). The 
Montreal Protocol’ objectives as provided for under Arts. 2 and 5, includes the protect ion of the 
stratospheric ozone layer, and thus human health and the environment, by equitably controlling the 
production and consumption of substances that deplete it, with the ultimate objective of their elimination. 
Trade-related measures in this Protocol are found inter alia under Art. 4, which prohibits, with respect to 
controlled substances, the import and export to non-Parties. It also establishes a process for Parties to limit 
the international movement of products containing the controlled substances or produced with the 
controlled substances  
121
 Garnak, A., May the Second Best Win: Another Look at the Lessons for Climate Change Mitigation from 
the Montreal Protocol” MEA Bulletin (A newsletter on the activities of key multilateral environmental 
agreements (MEAs) and their secretariats), Issue No. 57, 7 November 2008, International Institute for 
Sustainable Development (IISD), pp. 1-2.  
122
 The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species  
of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) Signed at Washington, D.C., on 3 March 1973, and [entered in force on 
1 July 1975] The Convention aims at ensuring that international trade in of wild animals and plants does 
not threaten their survival. It recognizes the need to complement conservation efforts with support for 
responsible trade in wildlife, available at: http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/what.shtml (accessed 08/09/08). 
Trade-related measures in this Convention include provisions under Art. II for a permitting system for 
international trade in listed species, requirements for trade with non-Parties, and measures for cases of 
noncompliance. Other trade-related provisions are found in Arts. IV, V, VI, VII and VIII with their 
accompanying Appendices.  
123
 The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) was adopted at the UNCED. It came into force at the end 
of 1993. The Convention establishes three main goals: the conservation of biological diversity, the 
sustainable use of its components, and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits from the use of genetic 
resources. The CBD is available at: www.cbd.int/convention (accessed 08/09/08). On 29 January 2000, the 
Conference of the Parties to the CBD adopted the Cartagena Protocol on Bio-safety, as supplementary to 
the Convention. The Protocol seeks to protect biological diversity from the potential risks posed by living 
modified organisms (LMOs) resulting from modern biotechnology. Although the Protocol contains a 
broader overall objective, which primarily focuses on transboundary movements of LMOs, the provision 
related to trade, are mostly found in the measures within the advance informed agreement (AIA) procedure. 
These refer to trade with non-Parties and to the handling, transport, identification and packaging of LMOs. 
124
 The Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals 
and Pesticides in International Trade was adopted on 10 September 1998 by a Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries in Rotterdam, the Netherlands. The Convention entered into force on 24 February 2004. 
The objectives of the Convention are: (1) to promote shared responsibility and cooperative efforts among 
Parties in the international trade of certain hazardous chemicals in order to protect human health and the 
environment from potential harm, and (2) to contribute to the environmentally sound use of those 
hazardous chemicals, by facilitating information exchange about their characteristics, by providing for a 
national decision-making process on their import and export and by disseminating these decisions to 
Parties.  It is available at: http://www.pic.int/home.php?type=t&id=49&sid=16 (accessed 08/09/08).  
125 The Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (Stockholm Convention) was signed on 
May 23rd 2001 in Stockholm, Sweden. The convention entered into force on May 17th, 2004 with 
ratification by an initial 128 parties and 151 signatories. The convention aims to take global action on 
POPs, defined as “chemical substances that persist in the environment, bio-accumulate through the food 
web, and pose a risk of causing adverse effects to human health and the environment”. 
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The main justification for including trade-related measures in the MEAs is that these 
measures play “an important role in supporting other MEA provisions … and 
ensuring [their] effectiveness”.127 Such measures aim at “assisting in compliance 
and enforcement”128 of the provisions of the MEAs and the implementation of their 
purport. Thomas J. Schoenbaum analyses four situations characterising the trade 
and environment interactions in which environment related measures give rise to 
trade restrictions. These are (1) regulation of imports and exports to protect the 
domestic environment; (2) trade restrictions to enforce environmental standards in 
international agreements, (3) trade restrictions in response to perceived inadequate 
environmental protection controls in other countries; and (4) controls on the export 
of hazardous products, technologies and wastes.129  
 
It could be added that as in the case of MEAs that address trans-boundary 
environmental challenges of a global nature, another objective of inserting trade 
related measures is to force compliance by non-parties or at best to prevent or 
minimise free-riding. An example of such MEA is the Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, which under Art. 4, for instance, 
                                                                                                                                                             
126
 The Basel Convention on the Control of Trans-boundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and their 
Disposal (Basel Convention) came into force in 1992. It is aimed fundamentally at the control and 
reduction of transboundary movements of hazardous wastes and other wastes subject to its provisions. This 
includes the disposal and treatment of such wastes as close as possible to their source of generation, the 
reduction and minimization of their generation, the environmentally sound management of such wastes and 
the active promotion of the transfer and use of cleaner technologies. 
127
 See generally, UNEP, Trade-related Measures and Multilateral Environmental Agreements, Economics 
and Trade Branch Division of Technology, Industry and Economics United Nations Environment 
Programme, 2007), pp 9-10. For more graphic listing and analysis of the trade-related measures contained 
in 14 MEAs, see the WTO 2000 study which has been up-dated several times, with current version being 
the 2007 revision: WTO, “Matrix On Trade Measures Pursuant To Selected Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements,”(2007 Revision) WT/CTE/W/160/Rev.4 TN/TE/S/5/Rev.2, 14 March 2007, available at: 
http://www.jmcti.org/2000round/com/doha/tn/te/tn_te_s_005_rev2.pdf  (accessed 08/09/08). 
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 Ibid. 
129
 Ibid.. See Schoenbaum, T. J., supra, n. 70, p. 731. Hudec also cited two motivations for import-related 
enviromental measures that may give raise to discrimination concerns: these measures that seek to “level 
the playing field” and those directed to influence a change in the foreign government’s behavior. These 
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prohibits, with respect to controlled substances, the import and export to non-
Parties. This is clearly contrary to Art. XI of the GATT prohibiting quantitative 
restrictions.  
2.2.2.3 The Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) 
The EMIT was for all practical purposes a dormant, ineffective body. Since its 
establishment in 19971 the group was said to have never met until 1991 when the 
GATT Council was considering a proposal submitted by the European Free Trade 
Area (EFTA) to convene the EMIT meeting.130 This meeting first muted the idea of 
the desirability of creating a committeed to oversee trade-environment interactions 
in the GATT. This lead to creation in 1994 of the CTE pursuant to the 1994 Uruguay 
Round Ministerial Decision on Trade and Environment,131 the CTE was tasked with 
the responsibility to identify the relationship between trade measures and 
environmental measures in order to promote sustainable development.132 The CTE 
then was to make recommendations to the WTO on whether changes in the 
provisions of the various Uruguay Round agreements were needed in light of such 
relationship. The Doha Ministerial Declaration (DMD) thereafter mandated the CTE 
to conduct negotiations, through special sessions, on various trade and 
environment-related issues under Paragraph 31(i), (ii), and (iii) of the DMD. 
Membership in the committee was open to representatives of all WTO Members.133  
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Consequently, the subject of climate-friendly procurement policies in so far as it 
brings into focus the interrelationship between environmental measures and trade 
policies, falls within the ambit of the CTE’s responsibility. The forum can be utilised 
to discuss how GP measures could support climate change mitigation, so that 
conflicts between the GPA and UNFCCC/KP are avoided. Regrettably however, the 
CTE deliberations, so far, whether in the Special Sessions or under the Doha 
negotiations agenda, have not yielded much results on the issues. And the Doha 
process, in which much hope is placed, has been moving on rather too slowly. 
2.2.2.4 The trade-environment jurisprudence after the creation of the WTO 
As noted earlier, it took the creation of the WTO to see clearer progress in the trade-
environment interactions. On the authority of both US – Gasoline and US – Shrimp 
rulings the WTO asserts now that “while there is no specific agreement dealing with 
the environment under WTO rules, members can adopt trade-related measures 
aimed at protecting the environment provided a number of conditions to avoid the 
misuse of such measures for protectionist ends are fulfilled.”134 Specifically, the AB 
in US – Gasoline, which incidentally was also the first ever WTO dispute, accepted 
the finding by the Panel inter alia that “clean air” is an exhaustible natural resource 
within the meaning of the GATT Art. XX(g).135  
However, a bolder position was arrived at with the 2007 AB ruling, in the Brazil – 
Tyres ruling. To many commentators, WTO is turning through this ruling as 
potentially more environment-friendly.136 What Brazil – Tyres has done essentially is 
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to confirm the shift in emphasis from the analysis of a measure at issue against the 
sub-paragraphs of GATT Art. XX, to the chapeau. In other words, a trade-related 
environmental measure is easy to fathom, but whether such a measure is justifiable 
against the chapeau is more tricky.  Indeed, according to Joost Pauwelyn,137 Brazil 
– Tyres shows that so long as the defendant strictly observes the dictate of the 
chapeau to GATT Art. XX it would matter less if the measure at issue would result in 
a more trade restrictive outcome.138  
 
But the chapeau has been one hurdle that no environmental measure ever crossed, 
not even in the US – Gasoline, US –Shrimp or the Brazil – Tyres disputes. Thus 
most attention has now been focused on the satisfaction of the chapeau 
conditionalities (and not the sub-paragraphs of GATT XX) in the analysis of 
environmental measures in trade regulation. This then raises the question whether 
environmental measures would ever cross this chapeau hurdle? And to what extent 
would this chapeau constrain climate-motivated measures which have been 
accepted as not only desirable but urgent.139. 
2.2.3 GPP, climate change and trade interaction 
While there is abundant literature on the general subject of public procurement, the 
treatment of public procurement in the context of the WTO law and policy seems to 
be a relatively recent development. Arrowsmith’s elaborate work cited earlier,140 
which deals with the regulation of GP under the GPA generally does not specifically 
address the subject of the WTO regulation of “green procurement”. It refers to the 
                                                                                                                                                             
rectify its policy including extending the import ban to include MERCUSOR nations, then the decision 
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GPA parties pursuing “secondary” policies in procurement.141 This means using GP 
as a policy tool with which to support development of non-competitive domestic or 
infant industry and regional development.142 Included under this category are 
procurement policies directed at workplace safety and environmental initiatives, 
even as environment is not explicitly provided for.143 This is where the greening of 
procurement might feature.  
 
The major issue of contention in this regard is the potential of GPP to constitute a 
“non-tariff barrier”144. This may arise where procuring authorities use environmental 
standards or criteria and eco-labelling schemes to define the characteristics of 
goods and services to be procured. Traditionally, standards and eco-labelling 
schemes have been regarded as potentially trade restrictive as they are based on 
processes and production methods (“PPMs”). PPMs are literally different from the 
actual product itself. To say, for instance, that two pieces of furniture of the same 
type are different because one is made of wood sourced from a more sustainably 
managed forest (PPMs), hence more acceptable in the market makes this a very 
controversial question in trade regulation. However, PPMs may be taken into 
account as part of the products or services where the PPMs affect the actual 
performance of the products or the quality of the services delivery. Thus where the 
furniture in the example above, made of a sustainably managed wood is shown to 
be actually stronger, hence more durable for the ordinary function and use of a 
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chair, then these processes here are called “product-related PPMs”. Such PPMs 
can be a reason for differentiated treatment by a procuring authority. Where the 
processes are not discernible in the products or the services, they are “non-product 
related PPMs”, and can not be used as basis for different treatments.145 
 
One of the early attempts to examine this issue in some structured detail was by 
Buck and Verheyen.146 They suggested that procurement programmes which take 
into account the direct energy performance of procured products or services are 
“well within the scope of technical specifications allowed under the GPA”.147 They 
also warned, however, that there might be a problem with “climate change 
procurement programmes which refer to the non-product related climate change 
impacts of products and services.”148 They proffered no particular solution to the 
problem raised.  
 
The trade concerns in GPP were also highlighted by many other commentators, 
among them, Zhang and Assunção149 when they warned that:  
In order to meet their Kyoto emission targets with minimum adverse effects 
on their economy, it is highly likely that Annex 1 governments … might 
pursue … policies in such a way as to unfairly favour domestic producers 
over foreign ones. Such differential treatment could occur [inter alia] in…. the 
determination of the category of eco-labelled products and the procedures of 
establishing eco-labels, in the specifications in tenders, and in specifying 
condition(s) for participating in government procurement bids. Measure(s) of 
this sort may well raise complex questions with respect to the WTO 
consistency.  
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Here, the authors identified several possible scenarios whereby ‘green’ purchasing 
could violate the GPA. Among these circumstances, they cited an example of green 
energy procurement, where a procuring entity favours “electricity from hydro 
sources rather than coal-fired sources.”150 This scenario does not overtly 
discriminate against foreign bidders for the supply of the required type of electricity. 
However, the effect of the preference may be disproportionately more favourable to 
domestic electricity suppliers than foreign-based suppliers. This may happen 
because domestic suppliers would have been more prepared to comply with the 
specifications, on account of the Kyoto commitment of the government. This 
therefore may constitute a ground for complaint by the disfavoured suppliers under 
the non-discrimination norms of the Agreement.151 Neither of these works has done 
an in-depth analyses of GPP in the context of the GPA provisions.  
 
A similarly brief but thought-provoking treatment of the regulation of GPP under the 
GPA under the wider WTO system is by Van Calster.152 This is probably the first 
purely academic attempt to position green procurement within the context of WTO 
and GPA. But even Van Calster concluded inter alia that the provisions of the GPA 
related to green procurement are far from clear. The GPA Art. XXIII on general 
exceptions to accommodate an otherwise WTO-inconsistent measure for 
environmental and other reasons (as enlisted in GATT Art. XX) does not contain the 
term “environment” or “natural resources conservation”. Van Caster nevertheless 
posited that this omission notwithstanding, environmental measures could still be 
covered under the sub-paragraph on the protection of “human, animal and plant life 
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or health”.153 Van Calster also noted that the definition of technical specifications 
under the footnote to the GPA Art. VI:2 referred to PPMs but does not say whether 
these should be product-related or non product-related. This work also has not 
specifically addressed GPP in the context of climate change mitigation.  
 
The fact however, is that, as mentioned earlier, the PPMs arguments and debates in 
the WTO system are far from over. This has also been attested to by Conrad in her 
recently concluded PhD thesis on the subject.154 And indeed, when Howse and 
Regan attempted to down-play the product/process debate from the wider trade and 
environment context, it triggered opposition from seasoned publicists and 
academics including John Jackson. In one of their works on this subject, Howse and 
Regan155 faulted the decision in the US – Tuna/Dolphin disputes,156 on the basis 
that product/process distinction was illusory. John Jackson157 however, took a 
different position from that taken by Howse and Regan above. He posited that 
product/process distinction has been part and parcel of trade law and policy, and to 
disregard the distinction would be unrealistic, and would open a door for abuses and 
result in trade restrictive measures tied to PPMs. However, while asserting the 
distinction as still useful, Jackson conceded that the distinction "should not be too 
rigid". He then posed what he regarded as "the real question", thus: "How far to 
relax the distinction and in what areas?"158  
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In his comment on the papers presented at the symposium on The Boundaries of 
the WTO, Bhagwati159 lent more weight to Jackson’s caution on the need for the 
product/process distinction in trade law. Bhagwati drew attention to the value and 
justification for the distinction which informed the US - Dolphin Panel’s conclusions. 
The basis of the ruling is the tradition in trade economics which seeks to pre-empt 
discriminatory measures through the application of “facially non-discriminatory” 
ones.160  Thus, if countries are allowed “an automatic right to exclude products on 
PPMs grounds, especially moral grounds, that would be opening a Pandora’s Box.” 
The consequence will be weaker states would be at a disadvantage as they will be 
realistically too weak to resort to or invoke trade measures against the powerful 
nations, or as much as powerful nations could.”161 Whether the product/process 
distinction generally remains, the US – Shrimp ruling is already in place. Though the 
ruling did not directly address PPMs issue thereby making it, in in prinple rather 
insignificant, especially as ti relate to environment-related measures. This reflects 
the new posture of the WTO as evidenced by the WTO Agreement’s preambular 
recognition of the environment and sustainable development.162  
 
However, in his treatise on how to determine how environmental policies interact 
with trade rules, Bhagwati’s main concerns seem to be the lack of regard paid to the 
nature of the environmental problems being addressed, in terms of magnitude, and 
the objective sought by the country that takes the unilateral measure. He opines that 
the scope of an environmental problem, namely, whether it is domestic or 
international, should constitute part of the factors to be considered in the 
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determination of the policy options to be designed.163   He also warns that trade 
rules permitting environmental measures should take cognizance of the situation of 
developing countries.164 
On the other hand, a GPP measure as described earlier is essentially origin-neutral 
addressing the product/process standards only, and not the origin of the products. 
Such measures, according to some commentators, including Robert Hudec, should 
not attract strict requirement of proof under the general exceptions of GATT Art. XX. 
This is to give the WTO Members the opportunity to distinguish between valid 
exercise of their sovereign right to maintain well-intentioned regulatory polices from 
those intended to undermine the objectives of trade liberalization.165 We will see in 
Chapter 7, the effect of this reasoning to the analysis for finding a proper position for 
climate-motivated procurement policies under GPA Art. XXIII. 
2.2.4 EU green energy procurement and the WTO 
This research sought to look at the practice of green procurement in a jurisdiction 
that is not only a Member to the GPA, but also a committed Party to the Kyoto 
Protocol. For the purpose of this research, the EU has satisfied all these conditions 
and many more. In particular, the EU has a mature green procurement system 
relative to many other Kyoto Parties including Canada and Japan.166 The essence of 
this illustration is to examine the real-life climate-motivated green procurement in 
terms of the law and the practice. This will facilitate informed analysis of the legal 
problems envisaged by the research, namely in the intersection of climate-motivated 
GPP and WTO law. The EU experiences will show how the EU dealt with the 
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problems, and the extent to which those experiences could illustrate the situation in 
other countries that are also engaged in GPP. Similarly the challenges faced by the 
EU may serve as a guide for jurisdictions proposing to experiment GPP.   
 
The EU permits green energy procurement pursuant to its climate change and 
energy policies. The permissibility of GPP in the EU law and policy is established by 
the new public procurement Directives.167 Indeed, literature is developing on the EU 
GPP sector with most of it emanating from institutional works done under the 
auspices of the EU.168 What is still debatable is the PPMs issue especially as it 
relates to green energy procurement.  
 
Kunzlik’s works on this aspect are rich with arguments in favour of the view that 
PPMs at both production and consumption stages169 are acceptable as 
differentiating factors in green energy procurement.170 He opines that the non-
discrimination principles of EU law are comparable to the WTO’s. Hence the 
environmental arguments based on the Preamble to the WTO agreement, as well 
as the US – Shrimp decision could be applicable to permit PPMs-based distinction 
under the EU procurement system. Accordingly, he interpreted GPA Art. VI:1 which 
defines technical specifications of products to include also “the processes and 
methods for their production” as meaning both product-related and non-product 
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related PPMs and at both production and consumption (in the case of services) 
stage.171  
 
In a more recent work, Trepte172 opined that in view of the fact the EU participated 
actively in the architecture of the current WTO GPA and that many of its provisions 
are moulded in the fashion of the EU public procurement directives, there is the 
presumption that the EU law is (or should be) consistent with the GPA.173 But this is 
not necessarily so. Indeed, Trepte’s work mentions the potential of EU green energy 
procurement policy to raise issues with the principle of non-discrimination in view of 
the fact that both green electricity and the fossil-based type are as far as end-user is 
concerned, one and the same thing, hence there is no basis, even under the EU 
law, for preferential treatment for one over the other.  
 
Another attempt to address the question of compatibility of GPP with the WTO rules 
in the context of EU law and practice on GP was by Van Asselt.174  He observed 
that although the WTO law and jurisprudence, particularly in the context of GATT 
Art. XX, could well support measures taken by GPA members to protect the 
environment, there was still a degree of uncertainty in the manner it would treat 
GPP by the EU and some other GPA members concerned with climate change. The 
study opened up questions for research, some of which are the focus of this 
research too. The central question is: “What are the opportunities offered by the 
current WTO legal framework to accommodate a greener public procurement in 
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terms of weighing environmental gains against trade principles based on Art. XXIII 
GPA, taking into account WTO jurisprudence?”175  
 
This work also examined part of the works of the CTE related to public 
procurement.176 Again, there was no specific answer or proposal by which to tackle 
the problem. The major recommendations of this research include that the 
opportunities existing in the GPA should be “examined in more detail in order to 
increase legal certainty.”177 It also added that there should be more dialogue 
between the developed and developing countries on the issue of green 
procurement. 178 The present research takes into account the above observations 
and the arguments. 
In a short article179 jointly authored by Van Asselt, van den Grijp, N., and Oosterhuis, F., 
however, attempt was made to more directly position GPP within the context of 
climate change and the WTO. This work expressly concluded thus: 
“[T]here is the risk that the use of environmental considerations in public 
procurement discriminates between domestic and foreign suppliers, thereby 
possibly conflicting with international rules on procurement. However, it still 
needs to be clarified under what circumstances the greening of public 
procurement may constitute a barrier to trade, and under what 
circumstances the rules on public procurement may constitute a barrier to 
green procurement.”180  
 
The authors, however, even without making analysis of the relevant WTO/GPA 
rules, concluded that green procurement is compatible with both the WTO and EU 
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rules.181 The basis for this conclusion is that the GPA in its current plurilateral form 
“has hardly any influence on climate friendly public procurement practices … 
because of its limited scope and coverage.”182 The present author concurs with van 
Asselt’s conclusion, as related to the compatibility of GPP practices with the 
relevant EU rules. This author however disagrees with the said conclusion as 
relating the WTO GPA rules. Moreover, this work does not foresee climate friendly 
green procurement as posing even more trade barriers against developing countries 
that currently do not have commitments under the climate regime.  
2.3 The synthesis 
Generally, the literature has indicated that GPP can serve as a too with which to 
anchor the energy sector, climate change and international trade so that they 
complement one another in a harmonious and coherent way. State parties to GPA 
will need such guidance, so that they benefit from the policy space available under 
the trade rules to pursue multiple objectives through their government procurement 
practices. Thus this study generally sees climate-friendly measures being 
accommodated under the Article XXIII of the GPA. The US – Shrimp as well as 
Brazil – Tyres rulings are clear evidence to this effect. GPP under the EU system 
seems to be a more settled issue as between the Members of the Common 
Market.183 However, under the WTO, technicalities still remain especially those 
associated with the requirements of the chapeau to GPA Art. XXIII, and as the 
discrepancies in the relevant texts of the GATT and compared with those of the 
GPA,  which potentially negates the urgency required in dealing with the climate 
change challenge, the study would advise for climate-motivated GPP to be 
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addressed outside of those exceptions. In other words, a government procurement 
measure targeted at climate change should more appropriately be handled as the 
“norm” rather than arguing it under the “exceptions”. Accordingly, a case is made for 
an amendment to the current GPA to create a new provision making it a positive 
norm. The effect of this positive provision will be the reversal of the procedure on 
burden of proof so that a complainant is now to prove its claim against the 
defendant. This study thus seeks to provide the material to fill in this gap in the 
literature. It will thereby contribute in establishing coherence in the fragmented 
system especially as between climate change mitigation measures and international 
trade regulation.   
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CHAPTER 3 
GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE WTO 
REGULATION OF PUBLIC PURCHACE 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter lays the conceptual foundation of the subject-matter of the research, 
namely, government procurement (GP) (also referred as as “public purchase” 184) 
and how it is regulated under the GPA.185 The chapter seeks to present the 
framework and the parameters around which the discussions that follow in the 
subsequent chapters of the thesis revolve. It introduces the subject of government 
procurement and highlights its importance and relevance to trade law. Particularly, 
the chapter highlights how and why GP has been regarded as one of the non-tariff 
measures (NTMs) which may constitute barriers to trade.186 In so doing, the chapter 
traces the historical evolution of the regulation of government procurement from the 
GATT 1947 through the OECD public procurement guidelines, to the Tokyo Round 
Public Procurement Code of 1979, and how it culminated in the WTO GPA 1994.  
 
The objective of this chapter, thus, is two-fold. First, it is intended to give an 
overview of the evolution of government procurement regulation under the WTO 
system, so as to establish a foundation for the subject-matter of the thesis. The 
                                                        
184
 Some commentators see “public procurement” as a wider concept, hence, more aptly describes the 
subject. Public procurement according to Stephen Woolcock, includes purchasing by “government”, as 
well as “by public enterprises and entities, such as in the form of utilities for energy, transport, postal 
services, telecommunications and water.” See Woolcock, S., The Interaction between levels of rule-making 
in public procurement, in Woolcock S. (ed.) Trade and Investment Rule-Making: the Role of Regional and 
Bilateral Agreements (UNU Press, 2006), p. 108. 
185
 See WTO, GPA, supra, n. 4. 
186
 NTMs are distinguishable from Non-tariff barriers. Whereas NTMs are “policy measures, other than 
ordinary customs tariffs, that can potentially have an economic effect on international trade in goods, 
changing quantities traded, or prices or both, [and] may constitute non-tariff barriers”, NTBs, on the other 
hand are NTM having ” a protectionist intent”. See  a presentation at WTO Non Tariff Measures Data Day 
at 18-19 May 2009 www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/data_day_may09_e/nicita_e.ppt  (visited on 
14/06/09) 
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thesis as stated in chapter one essentially seeks to examine the relationship 
between GPP, climate change mitigation, and the potential trade effects, from the 
stand point of the GPA. Secondly, the chapter highlights the central disciplines of 
the WTO multilateral trading system as provided for in the GPA as well as GATT 
and other WTO agreements as may be relevant and appropriate. These disciplines 
are: 
i. national treatment and non-discrimination; 
ii. transparency in government procurement; 
iii. the rules on technical specifications of the subject-matter of procurement; 
and 
iv. the GPA general exceptions, and how climate-friendly procurement 
measures may be treated under those exceptions, 
The chapter, in effect, seeks to highlight the major legal and policy issues that raise 
the potential of conflict between the GPA disciplines and norms, and national 
climate change mitigation policies. 
3.2 Government procurement  and the application of the GPA  
3.2.1 Government procurement in context  
Procurement is generally seen as “the process of acquiring the right goods, works 
and/or services at the best value, in the right quantity and quality, in the right place, 
at the right time.”187 Government procurement (GP) as opposed to private sector 
procurement is the purchase by government of goods and services needed to 
perform governmental functions.188 GP includes all governmental expenditure from 
the acquisition of office pins, paper clips, or computers for use in government 
offices, or energy and energy/power generating facilities, and armoury in the 
national defence sector. This acquisition can be by purchase, lease or other 
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 See Procurement Overview by Advantage West Midlands and the European Regional Development 
Fund available at www.advantagewm.co.uk (accessed 25/12/2007). 
188
 See Arrowsmith, S., supra,, n. 51, p. 1 
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means.189 Thus, public procurement encompasses purchase or supplies of goods 
and equipment, or works in terms of construction projects, or services190 such as 
architectural, financial or legal services as may be required to execute public 
projects or other governmental functions.  
 
Private sector procurement, on the other hand, is generally the same as public 
procurement in so far as the conventional procurement objectives are concerned. 
The fundamental distinction between public and private sector procurement lies in 
the fact that in public procurement, the purchase is regulated by rules and 
procedures for public sector spending, expenditure and scarce resources 
management, while private procurement is subject ot the commercial or other 
considerations applying to private operator or industry involved in the procurement 
exercise.  
3.2.2 Government procurement and the application of the GPA 
GPA applies to procurement by governmental agency acting not for commercial, but 
for administrative or purely governmental functions.191 Where a governmental 
authority conducts procurement acting in a commercial capacity, then this is “state 
trading” and would be governed by the provisions of GATT Article XVII192 on the 
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 Matsushita, M., Schoenbaum, T. J. and Mavroidis, P. C., The World Trade Organisation -Law Practice 
and Policy, (2nd ed.), The Oxford International Law Library, Oxford, United Kingdom, 2006), p. 740.  
190 There is however “uncertainty over exactly what constitutes ‘government procurement’ of services.” 
Currently, there is no provision in the GATS on government procurement of services. Indeed while GATS 
Art. XIII:1 on Government Procurement simply excludes the application of GATS rules to GP, GATS Art. 
VIII:2 merely directs the WTO Members to commence “multilateral negotiations on government 
procurement in services under this Agreement within two years from the date of entry into force of the 
WTO Agreement”. See Hardstaff, P., From GATS to New WTO Investment Rules  – Undermining Pro-
Poor Investment Regulation, Paper to one-day Symposium on ‘Investment, Sustainable Development and 
the WTO’, Washington, May 22 2003, available at 
<http://www.wdm.org.uk/resources/reports/trade/fromGATStonewWTOinvestment22052003.pdf>  
191
 For a discourse on the distinction between public authorities action on “governmental” or  “commercial” 
capacity, see generally, Malumfashi, G., State Responsibility in Investment Arbitration: to What Extent Is 
the State Responsible for Contracts Concluded By State Enterprises and Sub-National Authorities? 
Transnational Dispute Management Vol. 2 - issue 1, January 2005 available at: www.transnational-dispute-
management.com (last accessed 14/06/09). 
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 The GATT XVII(1) (a) states that where a WTO Member establishes or maintains a State enterprise, 
such enterprise “shall, in its purchases or sales involving either imports or exports, act in a manner 
  
53
 
activities of state-trading enterprises (STEs). Thus such purchases would generally 
be subject to the non discrimination norms of Art. III of the GATT.193 
 
The GPA Art. I defines the scope and coverage of the Agreement. The Agreement 
applies to “any law, regulation, procedure or practice regarding any procurement by 
entities covered by this Agreement, as specified in Appendix I.”194 Appendix 1 
contains the list of government entities as well as the types of services (including 
construction services) that each Party offers to be bound by the provisions of the 
GPA. This is part of the ratification or accession documentation required of each 
GPA Party. Therefore, only procurement carried out by any of the entities (including 
whether the entities are at central, sub-central, provincial or local levels) and related 
to the services (including whether, “negative” or “positive”195) mentioned in this 
appendix, should be subject of the GPA regulation.196 As for products,197 the GPA 
applies to procurement of all products as conducted by the specified entities.  
 
Thus, the Panel in Korea - Government Procurement198 ruling stated that GPA 
obligations apply only to procurement:  
                                                                                                                                                             
consistent with the general principles of non-discriminatory treatment prescribed in this Agreement for 
governmental measures affecting imports or exports by private traders.” 
193
 GATT Art. XVII(2) however provides an exception to the above rule. It states that state-enterprises that 
import products for governmental consumption are exempted from the non-discrimination principles, but 
are obliged to accord “fair and equitable treatment” to the trade of other Parties.  
194
 GPA Art. I:1 
195
 Annex 4 of Appendix 1: Negative list contains services not to be subject of the GPA, while the Positive 
list is for services offered to be covered by the Agreement. For more on the coverage issues, see generally 
Wang, P., Coverage of the WTO’s Agreement on Government Procurement: challenges of integrating 
China and other countries with a large state sector into the global trading system, Journal of International 
Economic Law, doi:10.1093/jiel/jgm034, 1–34. 
196
 The Appendix 1 itself is divided into 5 Annexes  
197
 This includes any combination of goods and services, purchase, lease and rental. See GPA Article I:2 
198
 Korea – Measures Affecting Government Procurement, Report of the Panel, WT/DS163/R 1 May 2000, 
paras. 27-28. This is the only GP-related dispute under the WTO system. However in the GATT era, there 
were two other disputes adjudicated based on the Tokyo Round Government Procurement Code, which 
also do not have a bearing on the environment, and thus not relevant to the issues at hand. For a brief 
analysis on these reports see Matsuishita, M., Major WTO Dispute Cases Concerning Government 
Procurement, AJWH vol. 1 2006, pp 298-315. 
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 (a) by procuring entities that each Party has listed in Annexes 1 to 3 of 
Appendix I relating respectively to "central government entities," "sub-central 
government entities" and "other entities"; 
(b) of all products; and 
(c) of services and construction services that are specified in lists found 
respectively in Annexes 4 and 5 of Appendix I.  
 
Another condition for the application of GPA to procurement is that it must reach a 
certain minimum value, called “the threshold” which also is to be specified in the 
Appendix 1, and for each of the annexes.199 Article 2 gives further guidelines as to 
the determination and application of the thresholds. In addition to the Appendices 
and the Annexes, the GPA also allows parties to insert general notes to annexes by 
which to make further derogations if required from the commitments listed. Wang 
has cited an example of such derogation by Canada which excludes all ‘intra-public 
sector procurement’ from the coverage of the agreement. These are procurement 
activities conducted between covered entities themselves.200 
 
The above stated provisions as to the content of the annexes constitute the offers of 
commitments made by the Parties to the GPA. However, this does not imply an 
automatic application of the most favoured nation treatment benefits as between 
them. There has to be reciprocity of offers multilaterally or bilaterally among the 
Parties. Thus, before Party A, for instance, enjoys the benefit of an offer from Party 
B, Party A must have also made an equivalent offer acceptable to Party B as could 
be read in the A’s Appendix. So also if Party C wants to benefit from offers of A and 
B (which are equivalent and reciprocal), C must also make an offer as high or 
valuable as A’s and B’s, in terms of entities or sectors covered. Thus, the 
application of MFN is circumscribed by the levels of the offers in terms of both the 
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 GPA Article 1:4. See also WTO, Government Procurement, at 
http://www.wto.int/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm10_e.htm (last accessed 06/01/09). 
200
 See Canada, Appendix I, General Notes to Annexes, Note 2, WT/Let/330, 1 March 2000. 
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entities and subject-matters of the procurement.201 Therefore, the GPA has given 
the Parties considerable freedom to determine for themselves the level and extent 
of their commitment to the provisions of the GPA. That level of commitment has to 
be respected.202  
3.2.3 The objectives of public procurement 
3.2.3.1 Primary objectives of procurement: the ‘value for money’ concept 
The purchase of goods and services by government agencies enables government 
to deliver public services and fulfil related primary and “secondary” government 
tasks. The primary objectives of GP relate to the functions of the government, 
namely, provision of basic social services which include security, employment and 
general welfare services. Thus government spending should have “a significant 
impact on the efficiency of the use of public funds and, more generally, on public 
confidence in government and on good governance.”203 Thus, good procurement is 
essential to ensuring good public services, from buying goods and services that 
work as they are supposed to, to achieving savings that can be ploughed back into 
front-line services.204 The primary objective of GP therefore is essentially about 
achieving economic efficiency205 and the attainment of best value for the tax-payer’s 
money. To economists, this objective could be interpreted in more than one sense: 
it could mean “the purchase of goods that meet certain quality levels, at minimum 
                                                        
201
 See Arrowsmith, S., Towards a multilateral agreement on transparency in government procurement, 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 47 [October 1998], 796; Wang, P. supra, n. 195, p. 14. 
202
 This situation has however been regarded by some commentators as a weakness of the GPA. See Wang, 
P., supra, n. 195, pp. 12-14. 
203
 See WTO, General overview of WTO work on government procurement, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/overview_e.htm (last visited 18/10/07) 
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 See HM Treasury, Transforming Government Procurement, (Foreword by the Financial Secretary to the 
Treasury ), (United Kingdom Treasury, 2007), p. 1.  
205
 See Trepte, P., supra, n. 172, p. 63.  
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cost.”206 It also alternatively means aiming to purchase the highest quality goods or 
services among a set of similarly priced category of same or similar goods.207  
 
This concept imposes a duty on the public sector to manage and spend public 
money wisely and make continuous improvement in their services in terms of 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness.208 This is best achieved where the 
procurement process is open, transparent, and allows for competition between 
prospective suppliers, both domestic and foreign. 
3.2.3.2 Secondary objectives of procurement 
There are however “secondary” objectives of procurement which are also referred to 
by economists as “non-economic” objectives.209 Non-economic objectives are those 
national policy objectives which, when pursued by a government, indicate “the 
willingness [of a government] to forego potential real income in order to achieve 
other objectives of national policy.”210 That is to say, they are not aimed at achieving 
optimum economic efficiency.211 Thus, governments’ use of government resources 
to pursue social and environmental concerns comfortably falls within this 
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 See Evenett, S. J. and the Swiss State Secretariat of Economic Affairs (eds.), Is There A Case For New 
Multilateral Rules on Transparency in Government Procurement? (Chapter III of The Singapore Issues and 
the World Trading System: the Road to Cancun and Beyond, p. 8, (World trade Institute, Bern, 2003).     
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 Ibid. See also Arrowsmith, S., Linarelli, J. and Wallace, D., Regulating Public Procurement National 
and International Perspectives, Kluwer Law International (17 April 2000), 28-29. Value for money is a 
factor in the determination of the most economically advantageous tender under the EU public procurement 
system. See Directive 2004/18/EC Recitals 5 and 46 infra n. 317. For more on the achieving of “value for 
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 Arrowsmith, S., supra, n. 51, p.15.  
210
 See Maneschi, A., Noneconomic Objectives in the History of Economic Thought, American Journal of 
Economics and Sociology, Vol. 63, No. 4 (October, 2004), pp. 911-912. 
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 See Evenett, S. J. and  Hoekman, B. M., Government procurement: market access, transparency, and 
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57
 
categorisation.212 The question therefore is to what extent is discrimination allowed 
in pursuing a non-economic objective of procurement. Also does it make any 
difference if that non-economic objective sought is climate change mitigation? From 
another perspective, GPP in which government favours environmental sector is 
being seen by some commentators as a form of subsidy which could raise concerns 
with trade law.213  
 
And for the proponents of the view that governments should be seen to be actively 
also dispensing corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the same manner as the 
private sector, then GPP could provide a suitable avenue for fulfilling that role.214 
The potential of GP to serve this purpose is seen in, inter alia, the size it occupies in 
the market. This, according to McCrudden, “might be used to encourage the 
development of ‘green’ products at an affordable price for the general market, 
simply by guaranteeing a sufficient number of public purchases to create 
viability.”215  
3.2.4 The importance and size of government procurement  
GP signifies a strategic activity of the government not only as regulator of 
production processes, but also as a consumer.216 Through GP, a government shows 
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 See McCrudden, C., International Economic Law and the Pursuit of Human Rights: A Framework for 
Discussion of the legality of “Selective Purchasing” Laws under the WTO Agreement on Government 
Procurement, JIEL, 1993, 3-48 at pp. 7-8. 
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 See also Trebilcock, M. J., and Howse, R., The Regulation of International Trade (3rd Edition), 
Routledge, Oxon, United Kingdom 2005), p. 292. See also Steenblik, R. P., A Subsidy Primer, (Global 
Subsidies Initiative/IISD), undated, available at: http://www.globalsubsidies.org/subsidy-
primer/ASubsidyPrimer.php#18 (accessed 26/02/09).  
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 See McCrudden, C., Corporate Social Responsibility and Public Procurement, in McBarnet, D., 
Voiculescu, A. and Campbell, T. (eds.), The New Corporate Accountability: Corporate Social 
Responsibility and the Law, Cambridge University Press, 2007; Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 
9/2006. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=89968 (last accessed 10/12/08). 
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technological innovation in the automobile industry. See McCrudden citing Cowe, R. and Porritt, J., 
Government’s Business: Enabling Corporate Sustainability (Forum for the Future, 2002), p. 33.  
216
 See EC,  Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the 
European Economic and Social Committee [Brussels, 5.5.2009 COM(2009) 215 final]: Contributing to 
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leadership in public resource management. Because of the enormity of its 
responsibilities, government is a significant spender of money making it a major 
source of business and economic activities in the polity.217 Thus the government 
uses its purchasing power to provide essential social services, and promote various 
domestic social and political policies.218 The exercise of this purchasing power in 
respect of some of those policies, as will be seen later, tends to affect the 
government’s other obligations under international trade rules. The size of the GP 
market219 also underscores its significance in trade policy. According to the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), total world 
procurement was approximately $5.5 trillion in 1998.220 GP represents up to 18% of 
the GDP in the OECD countries, and in the EU it amounts to 10-25% of the GDP.221  
The GP market is even larger in North America, where for instance, governments, in 
2002, “spent US$3 trillion out of the total US$11 trillion economy”
222
  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Sustainable Development: The role of Fair Trade and non-governmental trade-related sustainability 
assurance schemes available at: 
217
 For further discussion on the significance of GP, see Arrowsmith, S., Linarelli, J. and Wallace. J. D., 
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21st Century, (Zed Books, London, United Kingdome, 2008), p. 391 
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Looking at GP at national government level, the public sector of the United Kingdom 
alone “spends £125 billion annually on procuring goods and services,”223 for the 
performance of its everyday functions. Similarly, the Canadian federal government 
spends $13 billion each year on purchase of goods and services.224 In the US, the 
government expenditure in 2002 amounted to $1.98 trillion equivalent to 19.96% of 
the GDP.225 The contestable226 share of this figure amounts to 6% according to 
OECD records. The average contestable government procurement for all OECD 
countries is 7.6 % of GDP which is equivalent to $1.795 trillion annually.227 In 2006, 
it was expected that, during fiscal year 2007, the US federal procurement market 
alone accounted for approximately $400 billion.228  
 
For developing countries, of the 106 countries surveyed, 40 accounted in 2001 for 
about 5% ($287 billion) in total contestable markets, which is equivalent to about 
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 See Transforming Government Procurement, supra, 204,  p. 1. 
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suppliers. See Baumol, W. J. and Willig, R. D., “Contestability” in International Library of Critical 
Writings in Economics, 126 (Volume 3) (2001), pp. 493-520, available at 
http://www.serco.com/instituteresource/subjects/marketdev/contestability/index.asp (accessed  on 
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1/6th of the total OECD market. About 60 of the 106 of the developing countries had 
public procurement figure of less than $1 billion per annum.229  
 
These figures thus illustrate the influence governments have over markets. Hence, 
GP is considered an “important aspect of international trade”230 which could benefit 
domestic and foreign businesses in terms of increased competition.231 Added to 
these expenditures is the governmental authority and responsibility which 
empowers public bodies to take measures necessary for the performance of their 
social functions. In view of the enormous resources being expended, governments 
consider green procurement could make a significant difference in their efforts to 
reduce emission. It is in this connection that the EU, Canada and other 
governments loaded with Kyoto commitments started purchasing practices with 
environmental considerations so as to reduce GHG emissions for climate change 
mitigation.232  
3.2.5 The conventional GP processes  
In its broadest sense, GP covers “both the action and the process” of governments 
or their agencies, to acquire goods and services for their own consumption and 
needs.233 The processes of GP are regulated usually by procurement rules or 
guidelines adopted by government. The processes begin after an entity has decided 
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on its requirement, and continue through to and including contract award.234 The 
process typically involves the following stages: tendering, evaluation, and award 
notification and review procedures. Tender notices are published in accordance with 
applicable regulations to invite tender from suppliers of goods or services. The 
notices define the need for the procurement and provide for the technical 
specifications of the goods/services required. The specification may in principle 
include the manner and time in which those goods are produced. Suppliers submit 
tenders or express interest to bid and the procurement authority evaluates the 
tenders submitted against various pre-set selection and award criteria. These 
criteria are usually communicated early to the prospective tenderers as part of the 
procurement notice. The contract is then awarded to the best bidder. Best bidder, 
pursuant to the best value for money, is in principle, the one that offers the best 
quality goods or services required at the best (lowest) price possible. After the 
publishing of the award, a review process may follow where there is complaint from 
any aggrieved bidder.  
 
For each of the above mentioned stages in the process of public procurement, 
opportunities abound for public procurement authorities to introduce the secondary 
objectives. Chapter 5 shows how environmental considerations are incorporated in 
the processes. 
3.3 Government procurement and international trade concerns 
This section reviews a brief history of how GP was seen as a non-tariff measure 
having the effect of a trade barrier, and which has historically raised concerns in 
international trade regulations. The trade concerns would apply to GPP which is a 
specie of GP.  
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3.3.1 Government procurement as a non-tariff measure 
Historically, multilateral trade negotiations under the GATT were structured so as to 
facilitate free flow of cross-border trade by reducing and eliminating tariffs235 that 
stood as barriers.236 Indeed, the first six Rounds of the GATT multilateral trade 
negotiations237 were primarily devoted to tariffs reductions.238 This however is not to 
say that GATT did not address non-tariff measures (NTMs) too. Indeed, quantitative 
restrictions (QRs)239 which exemplify NTMs have been an integral part of the GATT 
regulation right from inception.240 The GATT process succeeded in that “limited 
field”241 of tariff reduction. However, GATT Contracting Parties (GCP)242 
subsequently resorted to NTMs other than QRs, which, according to the United 
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15/11/08).  
238
 WTO, World Trade Report, 2007, supra, n. 236, p. 234. See also Practices and Procedures Government 
Procurement in Africa, by Economic Commission for Africa (December 1997), p.1 (available at 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/IDEP/UNPAN003894.pdf (accessed on 16/11/08). 
which found that Tariff barriers on manufactured products in the nine leading industrialized countries 
decreased from an average of 40 percent when GATT was founded in the late 1940s to less than 4 percent 
at present: 
239
 These are limits specifically set by governments on the quantity or value of goods that can be imported 
(or exported) during a specific time period. An example is an import quota, where a quantitative restriction 
on the level of imports is imposed by a country.  This protects domestic industry or suppliers from foreign 
competition, prohibited under GATT Art. XI. 
240
 Indeed, the GATT was said to have been drafted because certain countries did not want to wait till the 
coming into effect of the Havana Charter before they commence tariff negotiations. They thus included in 
the GATT Part II provisions regulating NTMs so that they (NTMs) did not prevent the benefits accruing 
from (or the nullification or impairment of) tariff concessions. See GATT Group on Quantitative 
Restrictions and Other Non-Tariff Measures, Past GATT Activities Relating to Quantitative Restrictions 
and Other Non-Tariff Measures, (NTM/W/2, 24/ Feb., 1983), 5. 
241
 See WTO, Understanding The Wto: Basics: The GATT years: from Havana to Marrakesh, at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm (last accessesd, 18/09/10). 
242
 “GATT Contracting Parties” is the official name for the governments that had signed GATT 1947.  
Upon signing the new WTO agreements (which include the updated GATT, known as GATT 1994), they 
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Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) almost replaced the 
tariffs, many of them curtailing free-flow of cross-border trading.243  
 
There were thousands of NTMs as gathered from an inventory conducted by the 
GATT Committee on Trade in Industrial Products (CTIP) which was set up under 
the auspices of the GATT Programme for Expansion of International Trade.244  Five 
working groups were established under the CTIP to analyse the NTMs as they 
relate to five sub-heads, one of which addressed government participation in 
trade.245 On further examination of the NTMs, government procurement was among 
those regarded as constituting a trade barrier246 and for which regulations were 
needed. One of the major achievements of the Tokyo Round was the conclusion of 
the Agreement on Government Procurement and five other codes targeted at 
reduction of obstacles posed by these NTMs. 
 
The GATT CTIP on the inventory of NTMs examined twenty-five notifications 
relating to government procurement, and elected eleven of them as being 
                                                                                                                                                             
officially became known as “WTO Members”. See more on the GATT/WTO history at 
http://www.wto.org/english/theWTO_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm  (last accessed ....)  
243
 See generally, UNCTAD, Report of the Expert Meeting on Methodologies, Classifications, 
Quantification and Development Impacts of Non-Tariff Barriers, Geneva, 5-7 September, 2005, available 
at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/c1em27d2_en.pdf (last visited 30/11/07). According to UNCTAD 
analysis, NTBs embody a wide variety of policy measures. UNCTAD distinguishes three general groups of 
NTBs based on their links with trade: i) directly trade-related NTBs (e.g. import quotas, antidumping 
measures, etc.); ii) NTBs that have a link with trade since their implementation is monitored at the border 
(e.g. SPS measures, and packaging,); iii) NTBs that appear from general public policy (e.g., government 
procurement, and investment restrictions) (UNCTAD, 2005). 
244
 CTIP was mandated to, inter alia draw up and analyse an inventory of non-tariff and para-tariff barriers 
affecting international trade. See report of the first meeting of the CTIP held on 17 and 18 October 1968 
(L/3083 28 October 1968). The initial list of the NTMs is found in GATT document BISD 15S/69. See also 
UNECA, Practices and Procedures Government Procurement in Africa, (Economic Commission for 
Africa, December 1997, 1. 
245
 Ibid. para. 19. And the other four are those concerning customs and administrative entry procedures, 
standards involving imports and domestic goods, specific limitations on trade, and charges on imports . 
246
 See GATT Group on Quantitative Restrictions and Other Non-Tariff Measures, supra, n. 240. paras. 
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representative of the problems that arise in this area.247 These include: (a) 
Preferential price treatment generally for products of indigenous origin; (b) 
Preferential price treatment for the products of certain domestic socio-economic 
groupings and product groups; (c) Inadequate notice to foreign bidders and advance 
notice of prospective contracts being given only local publicity; (d) Short time 
periods for bidding; (e) Requirement that foreign firms operate through local 
counterparts; (f) Predominant use of the technique of selective tendering; (g) A 
specified percentage of government purchases to consist of products from a 
particular geographical area; and (h) Specified products are closed to foreign 
competition by the use of the technique of selective bidding.248 
 
According to UNCTAD, GP policies and practices could constitute an NTB249 
especially if they discriminate in favour of domestic suppliers when competitive 
imported goods are cheaper or of better quality. This, according to Arrowsmith, 
“may distort the natural patterns of international trade, creating inefficiencies in the 
global economy.”250 Governments usually adopt discriminatory procurement 
procedures in order to pursue the secondary non-economic social polices other than 
the “value for money” objectives. For instance, the government utilises its 
procurement power to assist infant industries, improve the condition of a 
geographically disadvantaged social group, raise labour standards or aim at higher 
environmental protection. In the case of climate-friendly procurement, governments 
engage in GPP not as a domestic environmental protection policy but also seeking 
to comply with their obligations under the KP.  
 
                                                        
247
 GATT Multilateral Trade Negotiations Group on Non-Tariff Measures: Government Procurement: -
Note by the Secretariat [MTN/NTM/W/16] 5 August 1975) para. 9 
248
 Ibid. pages 4-5. 
249
 See generally, UNCTAD, Report of the Expert Meeting, supra n. 243. 
250
 Arrowsmith, S., supra, n. 51, 794. 
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Such domestic preferences can be both overt expressed in legislation or policy 
statements, and also covert, occurring only in the way legislation or policy is 
implemented. These two situations respectively may lead to what is referred to as 
“de-jure” or “de-facto” discrimination.251 A classic example of an overt use of GP for 
domestic preferences seen in the US legislation, the 1933 Buy American Act252 and 
the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act253 by which US public 
authorities in charge of procurement were instructed, under certain conditions to buy 
only American products or from American firms. Thus Van den Bossche stated: 
“[WTO] Members are often politically and/or economically ‘compelled’ to adopt 
legislation or measures which are inconsistent with the rules of WTO and, in 
particular, with the principles on non-discrimination and the rules on market 
access.”254  
 
Indeed, some captains of the US domestic manufacturing industry hailed the buy-
American stimulus provision as “potential recovery multiplier and significant policy 
                                                        
251
 “De jure” and “de facto” discrimination were defined by the Panel in its Report, Japan — Measures 
Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, WT/DS44/R, adopted 22 April 1998, 
DSR 1998:IV, 1179, as follows: a de jure discrimination is “a measure that discriminates on its face as to 
the origin of products”, while a de facto discrimination is “a measure that in its application upsets the 
relative competitive position between domestic and imported products”. See also the AB Report in Canada 
– Autos. Thus, discrimination is said to be de jure where it is “explicitly stated in national law or published 
regulations”. But it is de facto where it “results from the implementation of those laws and regulations”. 
See Evenett, S. J. and the Swiss State Secretariat of Economic Affairs, supra, n. 206, p. 9. 
252
 The Buy American Act (41 U.S.C. § 10a-10d) (BAA) initially enacted 1933 explicitly restricted the 
Federal agencies from the purchase of supplies, which were not domestic products, if intended to be used 
within the US. They were required to procure only US mined or produced unprocessed goods. Domestic 
end product is determined under the Act as follows: if (a) the article is manufactured in the US; and (b) if 
the cost of domestic component exceeds 50% of the cost of the entire components making up the product. 
Foreign end product could be purchased only if the price of the lowest domestic offer was unreasonable. 
For analysis on preferential procurement based on the Buy American Act and its impact on the GATT/WTO 
GPA see Tiefer, C., The GATT Agreement on Government Procurement in Theory and Practice, 26 U. 
Balt. L. Rev. 31 (1996-1997), pp. 32-34. 
253
 The US President Obama’s $787 billion economic stimulation package issued as a response to the 
global recession that hit harder on the US economy in 2008. The Act in Section 1605(a) obliges all relevant 
government departments and agencies to ensures that "all of the iron, steel and manufactured goods used in 
the project [funded from funds provided under the Act] are produced in the United States." 
254
 See Van den Bossche, P., The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organisation: Text, Cases and 
Materials, (Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 597. 
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precedent”, 255 and actually calling for presidential enforcement as key to maximizing 
benefits, including in the green manufacturing sector.256 
 
On the covert discriminatory GP policies Trebilcock and Howse257 have outlined 
possible instances. These include “price differentials applied against foreign bids,”258 
“discounts for domestic content of the bid,” “selective sourcing” and “set asides.”259 
Covert or hidden discrimination is origin-neutral, and could emanate from 
manipulation of tendering procedures in such a way as to exclude foreign 
competition, e.g., by using what is referred to as “selective tendering” procedure, or 
giving short deadlines in order to suit domestic suppliers. Particularly, covert 
discrimination could result from setting of technical specifications that require 
products or services standards which are only readily met by domestic producers. 
This as has been noted is an area where climate-friendly procurement policies may 
arise.260  
 
A recent study by the OECD Joint Working party on Trade and Environment, which 
surveyed the types of NTBs that exporters of environmental goods and associated 
services encounter in foreign markets, found covert protectionism through GP as 
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 See Kearns K. L., and Tonelson, A, Buy-American Provision in Stimulus Bill Sets Important Precedent, 
The AmericanEconomicAtlert.org at http://www.americaneconomicalert.org/view_art.asp?Prod_ID=3170 
(February 15, 2009). 
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 See Trebilcock and Howse, supra, n. 213, p.293 
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 BAA 1933 is a good example here. It required the US government to purchase—for public use only—
domestic end products, if they were available domestically at a reasonable price. For highlights on the 
operational conflicts between BAA and the US Trade Agreements Act (TAA) see Buy American Act—Help 
for United States Manufacturers, Government Corner, Contract Management / April 2002, pp. 42-43 
(Available at: http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-62525_ITM) (accessed 10/12/08). 
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still prevalent.261 GP was one of the areas found as a “major” and “prohibitive” 
problem.262 This practice was observed mainly in France, Austria and the United 
States. The complaints against GP were not per se based on GPP practices of the 
importing countries but due mainly to the procedural constraints imposed at the 
border which constrained the free flow of transactions.263  
3.3.2 The evolution of government procurement regulation in trade law  
The history of the GATT shows a marked caution in the way GP was subjected to 
regulation within the multilateral trading system (MTS). This is because while the 
MTS would require the observance of, inter alia, the non-discrimination obligations, 
governments hold GP as a special area or tool of intervention in the market 
economy. Governments thus are reluctant to surrender this area too, and subject it 
to international competition.264 The regulation started, since the beginning of the 
multilateral trade negotiations in 1946, with GP enjoying explicit exclusion from one 
of the two principal disciplines of the MTS, namely, the national treatment under the 
GATT Art. III.  
 
Thus this situation which permitted government to pursue discriminatory 
government procurement policies continued until the Tokyo Round of multilateral 
trade negotiations when the first government procurement agreement, the "Tokyo 
                                                        
261
 The study conducted by Fliess, B., and Kim, J., is entitled: Business perceptions on Non-Tariff Barriers 
facing Trade in Selected Environmental Goods and associated Services, [OECD Trade and Environment 
Working Paper 2007-02 Part I] (OECD COM/ENV/TD(2006)48/FINAL), pp. 24-26.  The study surveyed 
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Round Government Procurement Code"265 was negotiated on a plurilateral basis. 
This code, which came into force in 1979, provided for the non-discrimination 
treatment obligations. The code was revised during the Uruguay Round of Trade 
Negotiations to produce the WTO GPA which was signed in 1994 and came into 
force in 1996.  
 
This section highlights the gradual approach adopted in the regulation of GP from its 
exclusion from the GATT non-discrimination norms, to the WTO GPA which re-
incorporated those norms. 
3.3.2.1 Exclusion of government procurement from the GATT  
Despite its importance and strategic position to international trade, GP was 
traditionally placed outside the non-discrimination norms of the multilateral trading 
system266. GATT Art. III:8(a) explicitly excluded GP from its ambit, thus: 
“The provisions of this Article shall not apply to laws, regulations or 
requirements governing the procurement by governmentalagencies of 
products purchased for governmental purposes and not with aview to 
commercial resale or with a view to use in the production ofgoods for 
commercial sale.”267 
                                                        
265
 The Tokyo Round Government Procurement Code, opened for signature at Geneva 12th day of April 
1979, came into force in 1981 (available at 
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/tokyoround/procurementcode.pdf)  
266
 The term “Multilateral Trading System”, according to Van den Bossche, consists of six “basic rules and 
principles” for the regulation of international trade under the WTO law. These are: (1) the principles of 
non-discrimination, (2) the rules on market access, including rules on transparency, (3) the rules on unfair 
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rules on special and differential treatment for developing countries, and (6) the rules and institutions for 
dispute settlement. See Van den Bossche, P., supra, n. 254 at pp 38-39.   
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  [Emphasis added] See also GATT Arts. XVII:2 which also excludes the provision of GATT Art. I in 
relation to the governmental purchases made by State Trading Enterprises (STE), thus: 
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production of goods for sale. With respect to such imports, each contracting party shall accord to 
the trade of the other contracting parties fair and equitable treatment.  
Paragraph 1 of this Article in turn requires WTO Members to ensure that any State Trading Enterprise they 
maintain, “act in a manner consistent with the general principles of non-discriminatory treatment 
prescribed in this Agreement for governmental measures affecting imports or exports by private traders.” 
The principles of non-discriminatory treatment which have been excluded here are those contained in 
GATT articles I and III. See more on the government responsibility for STE’s commercial purchases, in 
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As GATT Art. III is all about national treatment (NT) obligation it will seem this 
exclusion does not include the MFN obligation (GATT Article I).  However, in view of 
the intricate relationship between these two most important principles in trade 
regulation, it is arguable that MFN obligation is also excluded even as there is no 
equivalent exclusionary provision in the body of Art. I similar to the GATT Art. III:8(a) 
cited above. For a start, the two principles are complementary to one another. While 
the MFN obligation requires the WTO Members, in their treatment of internationally 
traded goods, not to discriminate between countries (WTO Members), the national 
treatment obliges them not discriminate against foreign countries’ goods.268 So the 
obligations in practice may overlap, to the extent that dispensation in respect of one 
of them may affect the full operation of the other.  
 
Indeed, this scenario is demonstrated by the fact the GATT Art. I makes reference 
to GATT Art. III:2 and 4. This means that if the application of the GATT III is 
excluded, this inevitably will affect the operation of GATT Art. I at least to the extent 
of the significance of the interconnection between the provisions cross-referenced. 
This view seems endorsed by some commentators, among them John Jackson, 
who observed thus, “[G]overnment procurement practices have traditionally been 
considered unreached by the language of GATT Art. I, and GATT Art. III.”269 He 
added that Art. I on MFN obligation is included arguably because it made reference 
to the obligations of the GATT Art. III:2 (taxes) and III:4 (domestic regulation).  
                                                                                                                                                             
Irwin, D., Mavroidis, P. C. and Sykes, A’. O., The Genesis of the GATT (Cambridge University Press, 
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269
 See Jackson, J. H., The Jurisprudence of GATT and WTO (Cambridge University Press, 2000), 63. 
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Practice under the GATT also supports this interpretation.270 For instance, the GATT 
Panel ruling on Belgium – Family Allowances271 found that tax exemptions for 
products purchased by public bodies, was an “internal charge” within the meaning of 
Art. III:2, should be administered not only on MFN basis, but also, by virtue of the 
reference of GATT Art. I:1 to GATT Art. III: 4 as stated above be subject of NT 
obligation.272 However, the exclusion provision of GATT Art. III:8(a) refers to “laws, 
regulations or requirements or requirements”. Thus “internal taxes or charges” 
imposed after the product has crossed the border, according to the Belgian – Family 
Allowances Panel, are not covered by the exemption.273 In other words, the subject-
matter (tax exemption) was an issue extreneus to the Belgian procurement laws, or 
regulations, or procurement. 
 
The exclusions of GP from the GATT NT obligation were also contained in the 
Havana Charter of 1948 which proposed the International Trade Organisation 
(ITO).274 Art. 18:8(a) of the Charter says:  
The provisions of this Art. shall not apply to laws, regulations or 
requirements governing the procurement by governmental agencies of 
products purchased for governmental purposes and not with a view to 
commercial resale or with a view to use in the production of goods for 
commercial sale. 
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 See Jackson, J., The World Trading System: Law and Policy on International Economic Relations, (2nd 
Ed.), p 38, (The MIT Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom, 1997), p. 225. 
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It should be noted that the initial drafts of the charter (the “Suggested Charter” for an 
ITO275) which was tabled by the U.S.A., indeed included, in Arts. 8 and 9, specific 
reference to public purchasing under the MFN and NT obligations.276 At that stage 
the US had sought that these disciplines woul be required to be observed only with 
respect to central government purchases, with the exceptions to apply only to 
specific areas of defence and military establishment procurement277. This however 
met with opposition from many of the signatories mainly because GP was too close 
to sovereignty to permit regulation that time, and would create unsommountable 
problems of compliance.278 Other arguments include the potentially high compliance 
costs involved;279 and the concern that the use of explicit preferences for national 
suppliers, such as through ‘Buy American Act’ provisions would undermine the 
effectiveness of the agreement. It was also considered that an attempt to reach 
agreement on such a commitment would lead to exceptions almost as broad as the 
commitment itself. Indeed, there was the implicit desire on the part of many 
governments to retain procurement as an instrument of industrial policy.280  
 
A more decisive basis of the objection had to do with national security concerns 
since many domestic suppliers for public goods were also the manufacturers and 
suppliers of merchandise related to intelligence, military and other security-related 
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issues.281 The exclusions thus prevailed in the final act of the Havana Charter in line 
with what was already in the GATT then.  
 
The same exclusion was later adopted in the GATS.282 On this, the GATS is more 
explicit and does not allow room for controversy as to the scope of what is excluded. 
The GATS Art. XIII:2  provides thus: 
“Articles II, XVI and XVII shall not apply to laws, regulations or requirements 
governing the procurement by governmental agencies of services purchased 
for governmental purposes and not with a view to commercial resale or with 
a view to use in the supply of services for commercial sale.”  
 
Articles II, XVI and XVII referred to above, concern the WTO Members’ obligations 
on MFN, market access and national treatment respectively. It is clear therefore that 
the GATT’s exclusion is broader as it includes also market access commitments, 
and it is more explicit as regards MFN.  
3.3.2.2 The 1979 Agreement on Government Procurement 
The exclusion of GP from the main disciplines of the multilateral trading system 
coupled with the fact that it featured prominently in the list of non-tariff measures 
made it a “serious problem”283 to the system. In order to address that “problem”, 
Working Group 1 (WG1) of the CTIP284 was assigned the task of “examining 
possibilities for concrete action in the area of government procurement”,285 as the 
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“solution lay in the formulation of a code or set of guidelines that would apply to 
government procurement operations.”286  
 
Incidentally the OECD had already started working on this issue. For instance, it 
launched in 1963 a survey of national procurement policies of its member states, 
and this led to further discussions on the rules to promote competition and 
transparency in government procurement.287 It was agreed to codify detailed 
procedures to apply to procurement above certain thresholds. The works under the 
OECD resulted in the production in 1973 of Draft Instrument on Government 
Purchasing Policies, Procedures and Practices.288 This draft served as a framework 
for the GATT works on agreement on government procurement.289 
 
The OECD code thus generally provided the model to guide the works of the WG1 
which produced proposals for Tokyo Round negotiations (1973-79). The result of 
the negotiations was the adoption of the Tokyo Round Government Procurement 
Agreement of 1979.290 This Agreement was plurilateral in nature. It subjected GP to 
international competition by extending the national treatment and MFN obligations 
“with regard to all laws, regulation, procedure and practice regarding 
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procurement”291 by the entities specified. This obligation however was conditional 
upon mutual reciprocal promises between the signatories.292 It also required the 
members to observe transparency rules at all stages of the tendering processes: 
from advertisement of contracts, submission, receipt and opening of tenders and the 
ultimate award of the contracts. Provisions were also made in the Agreement for 
special and differential treatment for developing countries.293    
 
Thus the 1979 GPA, though still limited in its coverage, was described as ”an 
outstanding reversal of more than fifty years of international trade and economic 
history”.294 The limit in respect of its coverage can be seen in the fact that it covered 
only the procurement of goods.295 It also did not cover purchase of arms and military 
hardware.  The threshold was also limited to cover procurement of the value of 
US$190,000 [equivalent to Special Drawing Rights296 (SDR)150,000] and above. 
This was considered too high, with the effect of excluding a significant portion of 
members’ procurement with a value below that amount. Another limitation of this 
agreement is that it applied only to purchases by central-government controlled 
purchasing agencies. It excluded state and local government’s purchases. It thus 
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provided under Art. IX:6(b) for the Parties to “undertake further negotiations, with a 
view to broadening and improving this agreement on the bases of mutual 
reciprocity”. 297  
 
The negotiations for the review of the 1979 Agreement were conducted at two 
different stages. The first stage was initiated in 1983, and the new Agreement 
entered into force in 1988. This revision extended coverage to rental and leasing 
contracts.298 The second revision, which a major one too299 was launched during the 
Uruguay Round negotiations. This revision was aimed primarily at “elimination of 
discriminatory measures and practices which distort open procurement practices”.300 
It also sought to expand the scope and coverage of the GPA and thereby generally 
strengthening it inter alia, by way of increasing the number of entities covered by the 
agreement and expanding the coverage to include services contracts. There was 
also the desire to improve the enforcement mechanisms of the agreement by 
means of a bid challenge or compliance provision. Bid challenge provisions would 
allow an aggrieved supplier to challenge the decision or award of a contracting 
authority before domestic court or a specialised dispute settlement body. 
Compliance provisions would ensure that an entity complies with an award issued 
against it in event of a dispute. Finally, the revision was to “promote expanded 
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membership of the GPA by making the Agreement more accessible to non-
members”301 especially from developing countries and thus make it a genuine 
multilateral agreement.302  
The revision was a modest success, as improvements were achieved in most of the 
areas highlighted above.303 That is to say it achieved enlargement of the coverage 
of entities to include sub-central and quasi-governmental bodies, and to cover 
procurement of telecommunications, electrical and transportation equipment. In the 
same vein, coverage was also enlarged to include procurement of government 
purchases of services. The threshold was also decreased from SDR150,000 to 
SDR130,000 to allow for more contracts to be eligible for the Agreements 
application. More work, however, was needed to attract more members from the 
developing countries, which still is the situation. The result of this review was the 
conclusion of the WTO GPA of 1994 which came into force in 1996. 
3.4 The WTO GPA: An overview  
This section gives an overview of the GPA. It discusses the key provisions of the 
GPA especially as they relate to the non-discrimination obligations that have been 
the subject of the exceptions under GATT Art. III:8(a) and Art. XVII:2. The WTO 
GPA resulted from the second review of the 1979 Code mentioned earlier. It was 
one of the two Plurilateral Agreements attached in Annex 4 to the WTO Treaty 
signed on 15 April 1994.304 The objective of the GPA 1994 as stated in its Preamble, 
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is to provide an effective and transparent multilateral framework of rights and 
obligations with respect to laws, regulations, procedures and practices regarding 
government procurement with a view to achieving greater liberalization and 
expansion of world trade and improving the international framework for the conduct 
of world trade.305 GPA is regarded as the most important of the plurilateral 
agreements, inter alia, “because of its very substantial coverage, [and] because it 
takes trade liberalization into an important area which was specifically excluded 
from the coverage of the GATT”.306 
 
The GPA applies only to procurement “covered” by the agreement. “Coverage” is 
determined by three factors, thus: (1) whether the particular government entity 
responsible for the procurement is included in the list provided by the Party’s 
schedule to the agreement;307 (2) whether the procurement contract is for goods, 
services or construction works, and (3) whether the value of the particular 
procurement is above the “threshold” agreed under the Agreement, as provided by 
each Party in its schedule.308 In this regard, in order to ascertain if a particular 
procurement contract is covered by the GPA, Parties “check not only whether the 
procuring entity in covered, but also the threshold level, and if the contract is for 
service, whether that service is covered. Parties therefore are expected to check the 
General Notes at the end of most Parties’ schedules which usually provide for a 
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number of exceptions.”309 Thus, the rights and obligations created under the GPA 
are observed by the parties on a reciprocal basis as with commitments specified in 
the schedules, rather than on strict MFN basis.310  
3.4.1 The key disciplines of the GPA 1994 
Pursuant to its stated objectives, the GPA requires that non-discrimination as well 
as transparency should be the basis of the laws, procedures and practices 
concerning government procurement of the Parties. As this agreement is the focus 
of this study, it is pertinent to highlight some of its basic features and disciplines that 
have direct bearing on the research question. These are (a) non-discrimination, (b) 
transparency and (c) the rules on technical specifications.   
3.4.1.1 National Treatment and Non-Discrimination 
Non-discrimination obligation, as encapsulated in the NT and MFN, is the 
cornerstone of the WTO Multilateral Trading System.311 The text of the GPA. Art. III 
entitled “National treatment and Non discrimination,” 312 states: 
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1. With respect to all laws, regulations, procedures and practices 
regarding government procurement covered by this Agreement, each Party 
shall provide immediately and unconditionally313 to the products, services 
and suppliers of other Parties offering products or services of the Parties, 
treatment no less favourable than: 
(a) that accorded to domestic products, services and suppliers; 
and 
(b) that accorded to products, services and suppliers of any other 
Party. 
2.  With respect to all laws, regulations, procedures and practices 
regarding government procurement covered by this Agreement, each Party 
shall ensure: 
(a) that its entities shall not treat a locally-established supplier 
less favourably than another locally-established supplier on 
the basis of degree of foreign affiliation or ownership; and 
(b) that its entities shall not discriminate against locally-
established suppliers on the basis of the country of production 
of the good or service being supplied, provided that the 
country of production is a Party to the Agreement in 
accordance with the provisions of Article IV. 
 
The two arms of the non-discrimination obligation (MFN and NT) ensure that 
national policies including those related to environmental protection do not arbitrarily 
discriminate between foreign and domestically made products, or between products 
imported from different trading partners. These provisions are a reflection of the 
GATT Arts. III and I related to goods and Arts. II and XVII of the GATS on 
services.314 These provisions in GATT and GATS deal with differences in treatment 
resulting from regulatory distinctions made by governments, whether these 
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distinctions are made “explicitly with respect to the origin of the product, or with 
respect to manifestly different products.”315  
a) The MFN 
The MFN obligation is incorporated in the GPA Art. III:1 above. While the NT 
principle prohibits discrimination against foreign products, MFN prohibits 
discrimination between the GPA Parties. Looking at from the GATT persepective, it 
means where countries X, Y and Z are all members of the GATT, then any trade 
advantage that X grants to Y should also be extended to Z regardless of the 
relationship between Y and Z, and also regardless of whether Y actually made 
some reciprocal commitments to X which Z is not capable of doing to X. The same 
applies the other way round. Mitsushita states that MFN was conceived in the GATT 
as “a carrot to attract members in the institution”.316 As members are obliged to offer 
to outsiders “advantages that were not immediately granted to members of the club, 
countries knew that adherence to the GATT ipso facto meant access to an ever 
growing number of markets under most favoured terms.”317 Thus, entitlement to the 
MFN imposes on the Member the duty to observe other GATT obligations, which 
may entail restrictions on the Members domestic regulatory authority. It is therefore 
a give-and-take situation, applying only to the Members of the club. 
b) The “unconditional” observance of MFN obligation 
An important feature of the MFN obligation is that it should be performed 
unconditionally. MFN in its ordinary sense would mean that “any concession 
negotiated with a single trading partner or group of trading partners must be 
extended without condition to all other trading nations.”318 Hence, the GPA Article 
                                                        
315
 See United States - Taxes On Automobiles DS31/R, 11 October 1994 Report of the Panel [hereinafter, 
“US – Autos (Panel)”], para. 5.5. 
316
 Matsushita, M., Schoenbaum, T. J. and Mavroidis, P. C., supra, n. 189, p. 234 
317
 Ibid. 
318
 See Schwartz, W. and Sykes, A. O., The economics of the most favoured nation clause, in Bhandari, J. 
S. and Sykes, A. O. (Eds.), Economic dimensions in international law –Comparative and empirical 
perspectives, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1997), pp. 43-79 at 59. 
  
81
 
III:1(b), following the style of the GATT Art. I, obliges the Parties to “immediately and 
unconditionally” treat the products, services or suppliers of services of all Parties 
equally in the business of government procurement.  
 
It is believed by commentators that the Belgian Family Allowances dispute is “the 
fountainhead for a strict interpretation of the unconditional MFN requirement in 
GATT Article I”.319 In that case, certain Belgian legislation320 placed certain internal 
ad valorem percentage of tax on the price of imported products if these were 
purchased by government bodies, for governmental functions (GP). The tax is used 
to finance “Family Allowances” (Allocations Familiales), a Belgian government social 
security programme. This tax however, is waived for products emanating from 
countries that have in place a social programme similar to the Belgian Allocations 
Familiales. Thus, the exemption (“favour”) here which should be granted on an MFN 
basis to all GATT (WTO) Members, “unconditionally” is now made conditional by 
Belgium. Certain countries321 satisfied this condition, and thus qualified for the 
exemption. Others including Norway and Denmark (the complainants in this 
dispute), did not according to the Belgian Law, qualify for the exemption.  The Panel 
held, inter alia, that the Belgian legislation was inconsistent with the GATT Art. I 
since it introduced discrimination between countries having a given system of family 
allowances and those which had a different system or no system at all, and made 
the granting of the exemption dependent on certain conditions.322 On this, Hudec 
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added that this was exactly the kind of “condition” the MFN clause “unconditionally” 
sought to eliminate.323  
 
However, in GPA, as in other plurilateral agreements, observance of MFN 
“unconditionally” seems technically problematic. Indeed, even Jackson and Hudec 
alluded to the fact that by their very nature plurilateral agreements could be 
antithetical to the MFN principle of the GATT system.324  This is because obligations 
of the Parties to the GPA are closely related to the coverage issue mentioned 
earlier. GPA Parties are bound to observe the non-discrimination obligations 
towards other Parties only to the extent that the other Parties also reciprocate with 
the same level of commitments.325 These commitments are determinable by what 
the Parties specify in their schedules.  
 
Thus under GPA, following the earlier example of XYZ above, the problem is how 
can GPA Party X confers MFN advantage to Z to the level it has conferred to Y 
where Z has less entities or sectors included in its schedules than Y’s commitments. 
In other words, MFN obligation is only required to be observed between Parties that 
have mutually and comparably reciprocated their commitments to others.326 This 
has resulted in Parties engaging in cross bilateral negotiations and exchange of 
schedules of commitments. In this case a party would only provide concessions to 
another party which also offers equivalent concessions. Example is how the EC 
withheld MFN concession to Canada and Japan in respect of some sectors or 
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utilities as covered by its Annex (e.g. its water sector) because these countries have 
not made similar concessions in the same sectors.327 To this extent, then, the 
application of MFN obligation as it is known in trade law and policy is restricted 
under the GPA.328 As Wang puts it, “GPA does not restrict parties’ discretion to 
make various types of party-specific derogations departing from MFN”.329Thus, it 
may be safe to say that unconditional observance of MFN under the GPA would 
mean rendering equal treatment towards all Parties who have made comparable 
reciprocal concessions in their schedules. 
 
One of the problems associated with the requirement that MFN should be observed 
“unconditionally” is “free-riding”. This question has attracted a lot of interest among 
commentators.330 This signifies a situation where non-Parties to a plurilateral 
agreement like GPA are entitled to the advantage of market access provided by 
Parties to other Parties under the general GATT MFN basis. This issue, which used 
to affect all the other Tokyo Round Codes until they were multilateralised, has not 
been resolved in the respect of the GP which still remains as plurilateral. The 
practical question is could developing countries (non-GPA members) be entitled to 
the GATT unconditional MFN in procurement-related comitments. This question 
would probably be answered with reference to the GPA provisions on differential 
and more favourable treatment to be given to developing countries in procurement 
process. The apparent answer should be that any developing countries wishing to 
enjoy an MFN privilege in the procurement sector should first sign up to the GPA. It 
can then negotiate schedules with the bigger developed countries that would offer 
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concessions without asking for reciprocal commitments from the developing 
countries. Going into details on this issue is outside the purview of this study. 
c) National Treatment 
The NT obligation “imposes an obligation of like treatment and non discrimination 
between domestic and imported goods.”331 This obligation becomes due as soon as 
imported goods have cleared the customs procedures and formalities.332 That is to 
say, in simple terms, once goods have entered a market, they must be treated no 
less favourably than like domestically produced goods.333 The essence of this 
obligation in trade policy as stated by the Panel in the US – Superfund, referring to 
GATT Art. III:2 is, inter alia, that “it protects [the WTO Members’] expectations on 
the competitive relationship between imported and domestic products.”334  
 
This principle as contained in GPA Art. III:2 above thus requires GPA Parties to 
refrain from subjecting products, services and suppliers of other parties to the 
agreement to a treatment  “less favourable” than that given to their domestic 
products, services and suppliers. Furthermore, each Party is required to ensure that 
its entities do not treat a locally-established supplier less favourably than another 
locally-established supplier on the basis of degree of foreign affiliation or ownership 
and do not discriminate against a locally established supplier on the basis of country 
of production of the good or service being supplied.335  
 
Thus to the extent that GPP from Kyoto Parties with high emissions reduction 
commitment discriminates between products or services or suppliers of services 
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based on energy-saving criterion, and this results in disproportionate impact on 
foreign products, services or suppliers of services, this may raise issues with the 
national treatment obligation against the said Kyoto Parties. It may even be seen as 
a disguised protectionism in favour domestic renewable energy production industry 
of the Kyoto Parties. 
d) The National Treatment obligation and the “Like” products question 
It is to be noted here that while the GATT Article III on national treatment used the 
term “like”, the GPA has avoided that term. And, since GATT Art. III is not applicable 
to GP the question is to what extent will this disparity in the text affect the meaning 
of the text or the effectiveness of its application? The essence of the term “like” in 
the GATT version of the NT obligation is to provide a basis of comparison between 
the foreign product that has allegedly suffered less favourable treatment as against 
the domestic similar product. The term “like” therefore is central to the determination 
of the discrimination prohibited by the WTO system. Could the term “like” therefore 
be assumed to be in the GPA text by default?  
 
As this study centres on discrimination between products and services and 
suppliers of services, based on environmental criteria, determination of likeness of 
environmental goods and services is therefore also essential. Indeed “likeness” of 
products based on an environmental criterion is at the heart of the trade 
environment debate which addresses the interactions between trade regulation and 
national environmental policy.336  In other words if products are “like,” but are 
differentiated based on the manner they are produced (PPMs), in this case their 
energy efficiency characteristics, could procurement authorities legally give 
preference to the more energy-efficeint products over others with less efficient 
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PPMs? This aspect of the study is explored in detail in chapter 6337  where the 
issues of GPP, product standards and related issue of PPMs are discussed.  
3.4.1.2 Transparency in government procurementunder the GPA 
 (a) Transparency and government procurement 
Transparency is a difficult concept to define. It broadly means “openness”.338 It is 
the legal requirement on the public authority to ensure not only the publication, 
notification, and dissemination of information about procurement procedures, but 
also doing these on an equal and non-discriminatory basis towards all prospective 
bidders.339 Transparency thus enhances predictability of the process, and facilitates 
equal treatment to all prospective tenderers, at all stages of procurement processes. 
Underscoring the significance of transparency in international trade, Arrowsmith 
stated that “[I]n all markets, lack of transparency in the sense of absence of 
information on rules and practices, operates as a distinct barrier to trade, and often 
affects foreign suppliers disproportionately.”340 Hence, the GPA, GATT and many 
other WTO agreements contain obligations to deal with the need for Parties to be 
transparent in their trade laws, policies and practices.341  
Transparency in GP has been one of the work areas of the WTO system. In 1996, 
at the Singapore Ministerial Conference, a Working Group on Transparency in 
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Government Procurement was set up “to conduct a study on transparency in 
government procurement practices, taking into account national policies and, on 
that basis, to develop elements suitable for inclusion in an appropriate 
agreement”.342 Although this process for developing a multilateral agreement on 
transparency in government procurement has been suspended,343 this decision 
nevertheless, underscores the importance of establishing transparency discipline in 
the conduct of government purchases. 
 
Indeed, transparency can be valuable also in increasing opportunities for 
competition, which in turn can stimulate innovation between and among suppliers to 
the government.344 Where more bidders are encouraged by a transparent 
procurement system, to participate, this widens the market and makes competition 
more acute. In the end, the situation benefits more innovative bidders. This element 
of “innovation,” is also one of the driving forces for climate-friendly procurement 
policies of the Kyoto Protocol signatories.345 In the same vein, transparency which 
engenders real competition between different bidders forces prices down to secure 
the best value for tax- payers’ money, which is a duty on public authorities.346 
Similarly transparency promotes openness which in turn encourages foreign 
business to participate in the domestic procurement biddings. This can increase 
possibilities and market access through partnering between local and foreign 
bidders, as they (foreign business) establish “commercial presence” and the 
                                                        
342
 See WTO, Singapore Ministerial Declaration, adopted on 13 December 1996 (WT/MIN(96)/DEC, 
18 December 1996), paragraphs 21-22. 
343
 See WTO, July Decision, of the General Council, paragraph 1(g) adopted on 1 August 2004 (WT/L/579, 
2 August 2004), available at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gpmand_e.htm#jd (last visited 
10/01/09). 
344
 See Beyond the WTO Round: Greater transparency in government procurement available at: 
http://trade-info.cec.eu.int/doclib/html/123509.htm and 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/icentre/opportunities/index_en.htm  
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 See infra, Chapter 5. 
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opening of local branches in the domestic commercial environment of the foreign 
markets.  
 
Another important objective of transparency discipline in procurement is it helps in 
fighting bribery and corruption which is the bane of procurement practices. This is 
more the case with the developing world where procurement regimes are still not 
mature. A transparent set of rules makes it difficult for a contracting entity to 
demand or receive bribes and helps establish a level playing field. Arrowsmith puts 
it rather differently, saying that transparency provides for “a rule-based system that 
limits the discretion of procuring entities”.347 An unfettered discretion on the part of 
the procuring authority is a gate way to corruption in the system.  
(b) Transparency requirements under the GPA 
At the outset, the Preamble to the GPA recognises that “it is desirable to provide 
transparency of the laws, regulations, procedures and practices regarding 
government procurement”.348 The GPA provisions on transparency are therefore 
aimed at facilitating and complementing the observance of the GPA basic 
disciplines of national treatment and non-discrimination.349 The provisions relate to 
(1) the requirement for publishing of procurement notices, and (2) the openness of 
tendering procedures. 
(i) Publishing of procurement notice:  
The GPA requires that invitations to tender and the notice of award results be 
published.350 This requirement is aimed at putting the public to notice of both the 
invitation to tender, which gives equal opportunity for companies or firms to express 
                                                        
347
 See Arrowsmith, supra, n. 51 at p. 170.  
348
 See the Preamble to the GPA, GPA, supra, n. 4. 
349
 Arrowsmith, S., supra, n. 51, pp. 168-169; Also a definition of transparency, offered by Steven 
Schooner emphasises the connection between open procurement procedures as between the “offerers and 
the contractors”, and the need to “ensure that government business is conducted in an impartial and open 
manner.” See Schooner, S. L., Desiderata: Objectives for a System of Government Contract Law, 11 Pub. 
Procurement L. Rev. 103, 105 (2002), cited by Zoellner, C., supra, n. 343, at p. 6.  
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interest to participate or to tender for the goods or services required. The GPA 
similarly requires the publishing of any domestic law, regulation, judicial decision, 
administrative ruling and any procedure of the contracts in which the result of the 
tendering process appear.351 This requirement is aimed inter alia at putting to notice 
the prospective participants, including foreign suppliers, as to the local legal and 
policy environment under which they would operate. It informs them of their rights 
as well as responsibilities in the procurement process. It thus prepares them on an 
equal footing, so that no surprises are sprung against any participating firm. 
(ii) Tendering 
The GPA Arts. VII – XVI provide for three types of tendering procedures: open, 
selective, and limited.352 Open procedure allows all interested suppliers located at 
home or abroad, to submit tender or bid. Selective procedure allows only those 
suppliers invited to do so, or pre-qualified firms, to submit a tender. Pre-qualification 
is an additional step where a firm must demonstrate its ability to supply goods in the 
manner and time, and of the quality specified in the notice. In this regard, GPA Art. 
VIII emphasises that “any conditions for participation in tendering procedures shall 
be limited to those that are essential to ensure the firm’s capability to fulfil the 
contract and shall not have discriminatory effect.”353 Thus, pursuant to Art. X:3 in 
order to afford more opportunity for maximum participation of more firms, non-
qualified suppliers requesting to participate may also be included where there is 
adequate time to complete the qualification procedure in accordance with Arts. VIII 
to IX. 
 
                                                        
351
 Ibid. Art. XIX:1.  
352
 Competitive Dialogue is another procedure, but not covered by the GPA. It is a feature of the EU 
procurement system. It has been introduced to complement the existing open, restricted and negotiated 
procedures. It is intended to be used for large complex projects in circumstances where other procedures 
are not workable, remains unchanged. This procedure is used for particularly complex contracts where use 
of the open or restricted procedures will not allow the award of the contract. See Art. 29 (1). 
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In Limited procedure, on the other hand, the contracting authority here contacts 
suppliers individually. The Agreement allows this deviation from the general 
principles governing tendering, in accordance with Art. XV, in specified instances. 
These circumstances include where there were no tenders in response to an open 
or selective invitation, or collusive tenders submitted,354 or extreme urgency, or from 
suppliers who do not comply with the conditions of participation provided for in 
accordance with the GPA.355  
 
From the foregoing, it can be deduced that the “Open” procedure is the most 
transparent method which opens up the opportunity for international bidding with no 
limitations on the number of potential bidders. Selective procedure is permitted 
where it is not feasible or efficient to consider and evaluate a large number of 
potential bids, as long as all potentially interested suppliers are given the same 
opportunity to access information on procurement and to seek to be invited to bid.356 
On the other hand, the object of limited tendering which potentially “frustrates one of 
the principal objectives of procurement reform—namely, to stimulate competition 
among suppliers,”357 is adopted as a necessary fall-back to address the situations 
stated in these paragraphs. There is of course the potential for  abuse of the limited 
tendering method being used with a view to restrict wider participation. 
 
GPP processes should observe the above transparency disciplines. Chapter 5 
which discusses in detail the GPP process indicates that where procurement 
entities intend to incorporate environmental considerations in their process, then 
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 “Collusion” is described as an “explicit agreements between competing firms in the same market on 
how they will bid for one or more projects.” See Zarkada-Frase et al, ‘Decisions with Moral Content: 
Collusion', Construction Management and Economics, 18:1, 101 – 111, p. 102. 
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 There are other instances which may warrant the use of limited procedure. These are listed in paras. (b) 
to (j) of Art. XV. 
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 UNCTAD/WTO at: http://www.jurisint.org/pub/06/en/doc/C24.pdf  
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they should do that in a transparent manner. These considerations should be 
reflected in all the stages in the procurement process where suppliers would be 
required to supply the “green” goods and services. Failure to make explicit such 
information may render the process invalid. 
3.4.1.3 Technical specifications of products/services or suppliers358 
Technical specifications define the characteristics of a product or material, including 
“levels of quality, performance, safety and dimensions.”359 They normally set “the 
minimum quality standard acceptable for performance of the contract.”360 Technical 
specifications may also “lay down the environmental characteristics, such as a given 
production method, and/or specific environmental effects of product groups or 
services.”361  
 
One of the concerns in this regard is the potential of using technical standard setting 
for products and services to be procured, for disguised or de-facto discrimination 
where compliance is made easier for the domestic than foreign firms. This is 
possible, where, for instance, pursuant to an internal government policy, the 
procuring authority inserts strict environment-related technical specification for the 
goods/services to be procured, and compliance with which the domestic firms found 
easier. 
                                                        
358
 Chapter 6 of this research analyses these general conditions for use of technical specifications and the 
scope for procurement entities to incorporate environmental considerations as part of the technical 
specifications. Thus, here is only a highlight of the GPA provisions related to the issue of technical 
specifications. In so doing the Chapter addresses the complexities associated with the relevance of TBT 
and SPS agreements on the issue of standards 
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Under the GPA, technical specifications inserted in the tender notice should relate 
to the “performance rather than design or descriptive characteristics” of the products 
or services, and should “be based on international standards where such exist, 
otherwise on national technical regulations, recognised national standards, or 
building codes.”362 These terms in italics are defined under the GPA to include 
“related processes and production methods.”363 It is however still “uncertain” 
whether this provision “either negates, or on the contrary, enforces the conclusion, 
that non-product-related PPMs are within the limits of Art. VI(1) of the GPA”364 The 
implication of this express mention of related PPMs may also be seen in its potential 
to suggest that environmental protection (for example, climate change mitigation) 
and energy security-motivated technical standards for products may not be justified 
where such measures result in differential treatment given to otherwise “like 
products” based on non-product-related PPMs.  
 
Thus, a GPA party embarking on GPP has the challenge to prove that the technical 
specifications it inserted in the tender documents relate to the performance of the 
product rather than descriptive design, or physical characteristics. Hence, such a 
Party will have difficulty showing how a fossil-fuel based electricity performs below 
or less qualitative than green one. In the EU, however, as seen earlier, the law has 
taken care of this problem, namely, for climate change concerns entities are 
required to give preference to green electricity over fossil-fuel based electricity. So it 
is not discriminatory under the law to enage in green energy procurement. All the 
defendant needs to do is to establish that the green electricity performs differently 
from the conventional electricity as this serves the climate change and energy 
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 GPA Art. VI:2. 
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 See for instance the definition provided under Footnote 3 to GPA Art. VI. 
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efficiency purpose of the EU law, hence warrants the differentiated treatment. If this 
cannot be demonstrated in a GPP challenge, then green energy procurement is 
simply discriminatory and protectionist. Thus under the GPA, the defendant has 
more difficulty to prove its GPP poly than under the EU system. Under the GPA, the 
fall-back is the Art. XXIII on general exceptions. 
3.4.2 The general exceptions 
GPA Art. XIII provides for general exceptions to the non-discrimination rules.365 This 
Article essentially is a reproduction of the GATT Arts. XX and XXI. The exceptions 
legalise a measure otherwise inconsistent with the GPA where it is applied “to 
protect … human, animal or plant life or health.”366 There are certain conditions 
specified in the Article to be fulfilled. The jurisprudence under GATT Art. XX 
indicates that the Party invoking an exception must first prove the measure as being 
covered by the exceptions. This will require the proof of the “necessity” of the 
measure. Then the chapeau, or introductory part of the Article, engages the Party to 
prove further that such a measure is maintained in a non-discriminatory manner as 
between all the GPA Parties, and does not amount to an unnecessary obstacle to 
international trade. In other words, it should not amount to protectionism in disguise.  
 
The significance of these exceptions to this study must not be overstated. The 
central argument for GPP hinges on these exceptions which are seen as providing 
the GPA Parties with the needed legal policy space to maintain GPP. However, the 
research goes beyond the consideration of climate-friendly procurement as 
justifiable pursuant to the UNFCCC/KP. It looks more at the critical nature of climate 
change, and suggests that it deserves a treatment outside the exceptions in the 
trade rules. 
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3.5 GP under multilateral institutions: UN and the WB 
It should be noted that in addition to the processes undertaken under the auspices 
of the GATT/WTO system, procurement reform initiatives have also been taking 
place in other multilateral fora, which may also impact on the operation of the GPA. 
For instance, procurement guidelines were also prepared under the auspices of the 
United Nations system, the UNCITRAL367 Model Procurement Law,368 as well as by 
the World Bank.369 Similarly, the Asian Development Bank/OECD (ADB/OECD) 
Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia and the Pacific included guidelines for reform in 
the GP sector of the member countries.370 These initiatives have played important 
complementary roles in the efforts to properly regulate procurement practices 
generally. These multilateral rules and guidelines on procurement share many 
similarities, on all the major procurement disciplines, with the rules formulated under 
the GATT/WTO system. For example, in relation to supplier qualifications, the 
UNCITRAL Model Law lists a range of criteria that procuring entities may require the 
suppliers to meet in order to qualify for participation in procurement process.371 
Similarly, the World Bank Guidelines stipulate that the qualification criteria should be 
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 UNCITRAL, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law established by the United 
Nations General Assembly by its Resolution 2205 (XXI) of 17 December 1966 "to promote the progressive 
harmonization and unification of international trade law.  
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371
 See UNCITRAL Model Procurement Law, supra, n. 368, Arts 6 – 8. 
  
95
 
geared towards establishing the capability and resources of the supplier to perform, 
in relation to the requirements of the contract.372 These guidelines, generally, 
conform to those  stipulated in the GPA on supplier qualifications (Art. VIII). 
 
In relation to procurement of goods and equipment, the WB Guidelines also list 
other factors that could be taken into account. These include “payment schedule, 
delivery time, operating costs, efficiency and compatibility of the equipment, 
availability of service and spare parts, and related training, safety, and 
environmental benefits”.373 
According to the enactment guide, the UNCITRAL Model Procurement Law was 
intended to serve as a model for States for the evaluation and modernization of their 
procurement laws and practices. 374 It is thus a non-binding recommendation of best 
practices.375 The model law aims to foster and encourage “participation in 
procurement proceedings by suppliers and contractors … regardless of nationality, 
and thereby promoting international trade”376 The WB Procurement Guidelines, on 
the other hand, apply to procurement of goods, works, and services required for 
projects “financed in whole or in part by a loan from the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) or a credit or grant from the International 
Development Association (IDA).”377 While the Loan Agreement itself regulates the 
relationships between the borrower country and the Bank, the Guidelines apply to 
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the procurement of goods and works for the project. Therefore, as international 
institutions and donor countries finance projects and programmes in developing and 
low-income countries, these Guidelines regulate the necessary purchases for the 
goods and services required to execute these projects.  
 
The Guidelines are “similar in many respects to the provisions of the [GPA] 
Agreement.”378  Section 1.3 of the WB procurement guidelines states that “Open 
competition is the basis for efficient public procurement”, and advocated 
international competitive bidding as “the most appropriate method”.379 Chapter 5 
also discusses how these multilateral agencies also pursue, through these 
procurement guidelines, the practice of GPP in their internal operations as well as 
external dealings with other stakeholders.  
3.6 Summary 
This chapter defined the concept of GP and its importance in international trade 
practice and regulation. It also highlighted the evolutionary stages of the regulation 
of government procurement from exclusion from the GATT 1947 to the negotiations 
leading to the 1979 Tokyo Round GPA, and finally, the GPA 1994. The chapter 
dwelt on the key provisions of the GPA which would provide the parameters and 
framework which will guide further discussions in the subsequent chapters of the 
thesis. These provisions relate to national treatment and non-discrimination, 
transparency, the rules on technical specifications of the subject-matter of 
procurement, and the general exceptions.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE CLIMATE REGIME, THE ENERGY SECTOR AND GPP: THE 
LINKAGES 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter addresses one of the major themes of this thesis, namely, the climate 
change problem. It aims to discuss climate change and its relates with the energy 
sector, and then establish its linkage with GPP policies. One major characteristic of 
climate change is the fact that it is intricately intertwined with the energy sector, and 
is thus linked to the economic growth and well-being of nations. Some economists 
describe this inter-relation in these words, “[t]he bottom line is stark. Economic 
growth is still directly linked to energy growth and energy growth is still directly 
linked to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.”380 Thus, the fact that energy is central 
to economic growth, and that the climate change problem is linked to the fossil 
energy sources, underlines the necessity to institute policies and measures to 
address the problem. In other words, finding solutions to the climate change 
problem is indirectly also addressing problems that face energy sector, which 
ultimately means also tackling global economic development.  
 
Therefore, if government procurement is linked to, or contributes towards efforts to 
reduce GHG emissions, then this can find justification even in the WTO system 
which regulates international trade. It is part of the WTO objectives to pursue trade 
liberalisation while also protecting the environment for sustainable development.381 
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 See Skrebowski, C., 2004 energy demand– too much of a good thing? Petroleum Review Editorial - July 
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The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)382 and the United Nations 
(UN) assert that climate change is mainly blamed on carbon dioxide emissions from 
economic activities in the energy sector,383 particularly the fossil fuel exploration, 
extraction, development and combustion. Fossil-fuels are today already under 
immense pressure because of various and inter-related factors. These factors 
include the increase in demand partly as a result of rapid global population growth 
and then the economic growth in both the developed and developing countries. 
While the energy sector grapples with this pressure, the climate change challenge 
exacerbates the problem as its solution calls for a reduced production and use of 
fossil fuel sources, and emphasises on the development of renewable energy to 
serve as an alternative.   
In consideration of this inter-connection between climate change and the energy 
sector, the UNFCCC and KP called upon nations to integrate climate change 
concerns in their national policies. It is in this spirit also that government 
procurement (GP) is being considered for climate change mitigation purposes. The 
UNFCCC Annex I parties thus see their climate friendly procurement policies as an 
effort to deliver global “public good” in economics parlance.384 
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 The IPCC was established in 1988 under the auspices of the World Meteorological Organization 
(WMO) with support from the UNEP. All Member States of the WMO and of the UN are Members of the 
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GP however, is a subject of international trade and is primarily regulated by the 
WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA). The GPA as seen in the 
preceding chapter seeks to discipline the conduct of its parties in their procurement 
regulations and activities. It, for instance, requires caution in the way the Parties 
would use GP to pursue environmental objectives. This therefore calls for an 
examination of the ways GP policies interact with climate change objectives. This 
examination will help States to establish coherence and coordination as well as 
cooperation in the establishment and interpretation of the international legal regimes 
regulating inter-dependent sub-sectors, such as trade and climate change. 
 
This Chapter thus provides background information and establishes the basis for 
GPP as a climate change policy measure. The chapter first highlights the concept of 
climate change as a scientific phenomenon, as expounded by the IPCC. This will be 
followed by an examination of the global legal regime to address the problem of 
climate change, namely, the UNFCCC and KP. There is also a brief survey of the 
principles guiding the implementation of the instruments as well as the international 
and domestic compliance mechanisms. However, the concept of GPP and how it 
may affect the parties’ obligations under trade rules is specially treated in Chapters 
5 and 6 of the thesis.385 
4.2 Climate change and the environmental challenge: a brief overview 
4.2.1 Climate change in context 
The IPCC defines Climate Change as “a statistically significant variation in either the 
mean state of the climate or in its variability, persisting for an extended period 
(typically decades or longer). Climate change may be due to natural internal 
processes or external forcings, or to persistent anthropogenic changes in the 
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composition of the atmosphere or in land use”386 Stated more simply, “climate 
change is any natural or induced change in climate, either globally or in a particular 
area.”387 According to the UNFCCC however, Climate Change is “a change of 
climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the 
composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate 
variability observed over comparable time periods”.388 The UNFCCC thus makes a 
distinction between “climate change” attributable to human activities altering the 
atmospheric composition, and “climate variability” attributable to natural causes. 
And for the purpose of the UNFCCC, climate change is that which is attributable to 
human causes.389  
 
These definitions entail one central common message, namely, that the climate is 
not static, and its change can be caused naturally or anthropogenically. The 
terminology used by the UNFCCC is of special significance, in that when climate is 
altered by natural causes it is referred to as climate variability, which could mean no 
one is to blame but Mother Nature herself. But where the alteration in the climate is 
caused by external forces, and in this case, human activities, it is referred to as 
climate change, where change means alteration. If man alters (changes) the natural 
course of the climate to satisfy his appetite, then man has the responsibility to do so 
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 WMO & UNEP, IPCC 16 years of Scientific Assessment in Support of the Climate convention, p. 4 
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Analysis and Management Paper presented at a Climate Change workshop. Abuja, April 2002. 
387
 Park, Chris, Oxford Dictionary of Environment and Conservation, (Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 
42. 
388
 UNFCCC Art. 1 available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf (last visited 14/12/07). 
389
 Ibid.. See also IPCC, Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis Summary for Policymakers 
Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change, p. 2 footnote 1 available at 
http://www.aaas.org/news/press_room/climate_change/media/4th_spm2feb07.pdf (last visited 02/01/08). 
  
101
 
in a sustainable manner, and also to make amends where damage is done. This is 
the guiding philosophy behind the call for international cooperation to address 
anthropogenic climate alteration. This research, adopts the UNFCCC sense of the 
term “climate change”.  
4.2.2 Climate change as a challenging environmental problem  
Climate change is believed to be “one of the most significant environmental 
challenges that mankind faces in the twenty-first century.”390 The gravity of the 
challenge stems from its complexity in terms of causes, and also the scientific 
uncertainty as to the extent of its future implications, and more particularly, “in the 
determination of the rate of climate change, the impacts on regional scales where 
society and environment are most vulnerable and the occurrence of extremes.”391 
Another level of “uncertainty” relates to the GHG emissions and removals as a 
result of a variety of reasons, including uncertainty as to “the availability of sufficient 
and appropriate data and the techniques to process them.”392  
 
Carraro and Egnhofer identified seven “peculiar features” which distinguish the 
climate change problem from other environmental problem and which must be taken 
into account in fashioning out any agreement towards addressing the problem. 
These are as follows: 
                                                        
390
 United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Human Development Report (HDR) 2007 declares that 
“Climate change is the greatest challenge facing humanity at the start of the twenty-first century. Failure 
to meet that challenge raises the spectre of unprecedented reversals in human development. The world's 
poorest countries and poorest people will bear the brunt. Failure to respond to that challenge will stall and 
then reverse international efforts to reduce poverty.” Similarly, on the urgency to act to reverse the climate 
change phenomenon, and take effect adaptation measures, Yvo de Boer, the head of the UNFCCC, in 
November 2007, declared that “Failure to recognize the urgency of this message and to act on it would be 
nothing less than criminally irresponsible." See generally Goodland, R., and Counsell, S., How the World 
Bank Could Lead the World in Alleviating Climate Change, OGEL Issue: September 2008 (provisional) 
available at www.ogel.org accessed (09/10/08). See also Freeston, D. and Streck C. (eds.), Legal Aspects 
of Implementing Kyoto Protocol Mechanisms: Making Kyoto Work, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
United Kingdom, 2005), p. v.  
391
 See World Climate Change Research Programme (WCCRP), Anthropogenic Climate Change (ACC) at 
http://wcrp.ipsl.jussieu.fr/SF_ACC.html (last visited 12/12/07). 
392
 See International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) Policy Brief (December, 2007), 
Uncertainty in Greenhouse Gas Inventories. Uncertainties play a role in determining whether or not a 
country’s commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions are credibly met. (available at www.iiasa.ac.at) 
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[1] The problem is global; this implies that climate change control is a public 
good, providing strong motivation for free-riding. [2] The long-term nature of 
climate change necessitates taking into account not only long periods – 
sometimes stretching over half a decade or even beyond - but also but also 
dealing with intergenerational transfers that any regulation implies. [3] There 
exist no narrowly defined technological solutions as in the case of Montreal 
Protocol to phase-out ozone-depleting substances. [4] Greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions and their reductions affect in a fundamental way all 
economic activities including agriculture, transport, manufacturing and 
services, and by extension, our lifestyles. [5] Climate change measures 
exhibit strong interactions with other parameters population and economic 
growth, rate of technological progress, competitiveness or core- benefits, 
such as reduction of local pollution, energy security or even development. [6] 
Quantitative and even qualitative measurement in the past has proven to be 
difficult. [7] The climate change problem is surrounded by pervasive 
uncertainty. While there is a global consensus that we know enough to 
justify action, there is disagreement on almost every other aspect, notably on 
the rate of climate change, the necessary level of stabilization of 
concentrations, impacts and their probabilities, mitigation and adaptation 
costs, and even on the cause of climate change.393 
 
The climate change concern though is not a new phenomenon. Scientists indeed 
started critical observation of climate change since early 19th Century.394 In 1827, for 
instance, French scientist Jean-Baptiste Fourier identified the existence of 
greenhouse effect.395 Also the global warming idea was already in the news media 
as early as 1930s. For instance, the Time magazine in 1939 reported that “gaffers 
who claim that winters were harder when they were boys are quite right … weather 
                                                        
393
 Carraro, C., and Egenhofer, C. supra, n. 43, pp. 1-2. See also Carraro, C. and Goleotti, M., The future 
evolution of the Kyoto Protocol: costs, benefits and incentives to ratification and new international 
regimes, in Carraro, C. and  Egenhofer, C. (eds.), Firms, Governments and Climate Policy: Incentive-Based 
Policies for Long-term Climate Change, (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK: 2003). 
394
 For an account of earlier attempts towards scientific understanding and expounding of the climate, see 
The Historical Roots of WMO, at World Meteorological Organization celebrates 50 years of service at 
http://www.wmo.int/pages/about/wmo50/e/wmo/history_e.html  (last visited 11/01/08). 
395
 See Evans, A., and Steven, D., A short history of perceptions of climate change, in “Climate change: the 
state of the debate,” p. 4, (Centre on International Cooperation: The London CO2 Accord, October, 2007). 
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men have no doubt that world at least for the time being is growing warmer.”396 That 
time, however, the idea that humans could influence adverse changes in the climate 
system was “very repugnant to some,” as evidenced by common reaction to an 
evidence presented, in 1938, by  Scientist GS Calendar to the effect that fossil fuels 
indeed could do so through carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions.397 
 
The anthropogenic climate change concerns however, were first formally expressed 
by the “World Climate Conference”398 organised by the World Meteorological 
Organization (WMO) in 1979. The conference stated that “…continued expansion of 
man’s activities on earth may cause significant extended regional and even global 
changes of climate”.399 The conference then advocated for “global cooperation to 
explore the possible future course of global climate and to take this new 
understanding into account in planning for the future development of human 
society.”400 This call was eventually heeded to, and as a starting point, the IPCC 
was established in 1988. Subsequent upon that development also, the UNFCCC 
was signed in 1992, and the Kyoto Protocol negotiated in 1997 to provide for a legal 
regime to address the climate problem.   
 
                                                        
396
 Ibid., citing Time, Warmer World, 2 January, 1939, p 27.  
397
 Ibid., Calendar, personal notes, Nov. 1960, Schove-Calendar Collection, Climatic Research Unit, 
University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK, quoted by Peter Brimblecombe and Ian Langford, Guy Steward 
[sic] Calendar and the increase in global carbon dioxide, paper presented at meeting of Air & Waste 
Management Association, San Antonio, Texas, June 1995 (paper 95-WA74A.02, available from AWMA) 
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global warming timeline, see Global Warming: The History of an International Scientific Consensus at 
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 This Conference, held on 12-23 February 1979, in Geneva, was the first in the series of the World 
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Thus, the IPCC is closely involved in the UNFCCC process. Indeed, the IPCC First 
Assessment Report in 1990 provided the basis for the UNFCCC.401 The 
negotiations for the UNFCCC were also coordinated with the preparations for the 
UNCED402 in 1992 at which the Convention was eventually opened for signature. It 
should also be pointed out that the GATT Group on Environmental Measures and 
International Trade was invited to make inputs in the draft UNFCCC.403 
4.3. Climate change and the energy sector 
4.3.1 The climate change and fossil energy sources  
The relationship between climate change and the energy sector presents an 
intricate scenario. This is because the energy sector is dominated by fossil-based 
sources mainly blamed for the anthropogenic climate change. CO2404 which is the 
primary GHG represents two-thirds of total greenhouse gas emissions in developed 
countries.405 The irony however, is while the fossil-based energy sources are the 
main cause of the anthropogenic climate change, the non-fossil sources of the 
same energy sector, namely, the renewables, are part of the solution.406 In its latest 
publication on the interactions between energy and climate change, the IEA re-
                                                        
401
 See IPCC Second Assessment Synthesis of Scientific-Technical Information relevant to interpreting Art. 
2 of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/climate-changes-
1995/2nd-assessment-synthesis.pdf .  
402
 See UNCED supra, n. 60. 
403
 Indeed the GATT Secretariat did also contribute in the preparatory stage of the 1972 UN Conference on 
Human Environment (UNCHE) when the environment agenda began to manifest on the global arena 
through the UN system. The GATT Secretariat contribution was in a study   entitled “Industrial Pollution 
Control and International Trade”.  The study focused on “the implications of environmental protection 
policies on international trade. See WTO, Early years: emerging environment debate in GATT/WTO, at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/hist1_e.htm (accessed 07/09/09). See Chapter 5 Section 4.1.1. 
404
 See Whorf, T.P., and Keeling, C.D., "Atmospheric CO2 records from sites in the SIO air sampling 
network (2005).  
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 Ibid. See also Rubin, E., (et al), IPCC Special Report Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage (Technical 
Summary), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/special-reports/srccs/srccs_technicalsummary.pdf 
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 Government of United Kingdom Press Statement, Department of Energy and Climate Change 
Established, 3 October 2008, “Ed Miliband, the new Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, 
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asserted this paradox by saying that “[E]nergy which accounts for two-thirds of 
today’s greenhouse gas emissions is at the heart of the [climate change] problem – 
and so must form the core of the solution.”407 It warned that countries must change 
their energy and environmental policies in order to catalyse the transition to a more 
sustainable future.408 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Stern, N., Review Report on the Economics of Climate Change, 2007409  
 
Figure 1 above from the Nicolas Stern Review Report, shows the extent and 
magnitude of the energy-related CO2 emissions arising from industrial processes, as 
at the year 2000. It indicates that about 65% of the said emissions emanate from 
energy-related sources as against 24% non-energy related sources (which includes 
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 See IEA, How the Energy Sector can deliver on a climate agreement at Copenhagen, in World Energy 
Outlook 2009 (Climate Change Excerpt)  (IEA/OECD, 2009), p. 3. 
408
 Ibid. 
409
 See Stern, N., Stern Review Report on the Economics of Climate Change (Executive Summary)” p. iv 
available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/4/3/Executive_Summary.pdf (last visited 10/01/10). 
Figure 1 Greenhouse gas emission in 2000, by source 
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agriculture and land use).410 This representation indicates clear dominance of the 
energy sector in GHG emissions, hence the response measure being directed at 
that sector and particularly power generation by different sources. This development 
naturally is sensitive as it already has “heightened the concern about climate 
change and energy security.”411 Hence, the climate change phenomenon, as Baron 
puts it, has become the “most daunting issue of global energy and environmental 
policy…”412 
 
Indeed some of the UNFCCC Annex I Parties see opportunities too in this climate-
energy interaction. They seek to do this by, for instance, specifying in their tenders 
for energy, that a certain percentage be generated from the renewable sources. The 
UK government even went a step further and established in 2008 a new 
government department to deal with climate-energy interactions.413 Similarly, the EU 
GP law and policy has integrated GPP into its energy and environmental policy 
objectives.414 
4.3.3 Climate change and the global cooperation for energy transition  
Looking at the situation affecting the energy sector as highlighted in the preceding 
paragraphs, it is logical to say that the consumption rate of energy is unsustainable. 
But the climate change phenomenon, which directly is linked to, and requires 
abstention from, the fossil energy, is making it even more unsustainable. In order to 
effectively address climate change therefore a transition is required in the way 
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 Ibid. See also Harrison, G., Climate Change Impacts on Renewable Energy, University of Edinburgh, 
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global energy is sourced and used. Developing renewables and energy efficiency 
policies addresses not only the climate problem but also contributes to improving 
energy security and protecting the environment [climate change].415 Agenda 21 
adopted at the Rio Conference places much emphasis on this climate change link 
and called upon governments to realise that: 
“[t]he need to control atmospheric emissions of greenhouse and other gases 
and substances will increasingly … be based on efficiency in energy 
production, transmission, distribution and consumption, and on growing 
reliance on environmentally sound energy systems, particularly new and 
renewable sources of energy… “416 (Emphasis added) 
 
Renewable energy sources generally consist of biomass, geothermal energy, hydro 
electric power, landfill gas, tidal power, wave power and solar power. By definition, 
renewable energy is "clean" because it produces less emissions or pollutants, and 
has minimal impact on the ecosystems. The environmental benefit of renewable 
energy is seen in green electricity that it produces.417 Hence, green electricity 
became the target area for EU GPP policy.418 
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 IEA, Energy Security and Climate Policy Assessing Interactions, (IEA, 2007) p. 44. 
416
 See Agenda 21, Clause 9.9-9.10. See also Lyster, R., The Implications of Electricity Restructuring for a 
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Policy 34 (2006) 632–642 
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4.4 The global regulation on climate change mitigation  
UNFCCC and KP are the global legal regimes to tackle climate change. While the 
UNFCCC provides for the skeletal framework defining the problem, setting the 
objectives and suggesting the solutions, the KP sets out the legally binding 
mechanisms and actions needed to give effect to the purport of the Convention. The 
two instruments therefore are interdependent and complementary. They also 
attempted to define their relationship with other sub-sectors of international law that 
may affect their implementation. In this regard, and of particular relevance to this 
research, they specifically urged the Parties to avoid coming into conflict with their 
obligations under the international trade regime by seeking to achieve their 
objectives though trade–restrictive climate policies. This section therefore explores 
the relevant provisions of the UNFCCC and KP, and the domestic policy options 
proposed under them.  
4.4.1 The Framework Convention on Climate Change 1992 
4.4.1.1 Objectives of the Framework Convention on Climate Change  
The UNFCCC419 was adopted in 1992 alongside the Agenda 21 at the UNCED.420 It 
entered into force on 21 March 1994 after deposit of the 50th instrument of 
ratification. The Parties, as stated in the Preamble, inter alia acknowledge that 
“change in the Earth's climate and its adverse effects are a common concern of 
humankind."421 The Parties also are concerned that increases in the atmospheric 
concentrations of GHG caused by human activities will result in more warming of 
the atmosphere, and which is inimical to natural ecosystems and humankind.422 The 
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Parties then expressed their resolve and determination “to protect the climate 
system for present and future generations”.423 Accordingly, the Convention set as its 
ultimate objective the stabilizing of GHG emissions: 
… at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with 
the climate system ... such a level should be achieved within a time-frame 
sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure 
that food production is not threatened, and to enable economic development 
to proceed in a sustainable manner..424  
 
The provision above signifies the adaptation measures to be taken as part of the 
response mechanisms.’425 Although the main concern of this thesis is mitigation 
actions, going by Art. 2 of the Convention, the two are complementary. Indeed 
mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions reduces the need for adaptation to the 
effects of aggregated emissions over time. The Convention is administered by the 
Convention Secretariat426 which, inter alia is responsible to “facilitate the flow of 
authoritative information on the implementation of the Convention administrative 
organs”.427 It coordinates the activities of the Conference of the Parties (COP), 
which is the "supreme body" of the Convention, and its highest decision-making 
authority.428  
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 UNFCCC Art. 2. [Emphasis added] 
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 There are two responses to global climate change identified by the IPCC: Mitigation and Adaptation: (1) 
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4.4.1.2 Parties to the Convention 
The Convention recognises the fact that anthropogenic climate change was the 
product of industrial era when the developed nations exploited fossil-based energy 
sources to fund their economic development activities. It thus apportions 
responsibilities for addressing climate change in accordance with historic 
contributions made to the activities that brought about the current state of the 
climate. Accordingly, the Convention divided countries that are signatories to the 
Convention429 into three main groups and apportioned to each group commitments, 
thus: Annex I, Annex II and Non-Annex I Parties. Annex I Parties430 are the 
industrialized countries, essentially the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development) member countries as at 1992.431 It also includes 
countries with economies in transition (the EIT Parties).432 Annex II Parties consist 
of the OECD members of Annex I, but not the EIT Parties. They are required to 
provide financial resources to enable developing countries to undertake emissions 
reduction activities under the Convention and to help them adapt to adverse effects 
of climate change. Non-Annex I Parties433 are mostly developing countries.434 
The above arrangement is a reflection of the  principles of equity and common but 
differentiated responsibilities. These principles are provided for in the Preamble to 
                                                        
429
 There are 192 Parties and 4 Observers to the Convention (as at August 5 2009).  
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the Convention, and then detailed in Articles 3.1435 and 4.2. Thus, according to the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, the Annex I developed 
country Parties are required to adopt policies and measures and to lead the in fight 
against climate change. They should also, together with annex II parties pay the full 
cost of the mitigation and adaptation efforts taken by developing countries as 
provided for in Art. 12 on clean development mechanism (CDM). Thus, GPP 
policies so far are still an Annex 1 Party activity.436 Under the Kyoto Protocol, the 
Annex I Parties specifically committed themselves to “binding” GHG emissions 
reduction targets. They stated these targets in Annex B to the Protocol.437 
4.4.2 The Kyoto Protocol and GHG emissions reduction strategies 
The UNFCCC envisioned the necessity for protocols by which to implement the 
Convention and pursue its objectives.438 The protocols would facilitate setting of 
realistic future targets, time and work plans, and to set binding commitments, rules 
and regulations and procedural mechanisms to guide and support international 
actions for the attainment of the objectives of the Convention.439 The Conference of 
the Parties (COP) was established to serve as the administering organ and to 
provide the secretariat for the conduct of these future protocols and negotiations.440 
The first Protocol signed under the convention is the first Kyoto Protocol.  
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4.4.2.1 Kyoto Protocol: an Overview 
The Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC was adopted in 1997 and came into force on 
14th February 2005.441 The major distinction between the Protocol and the 
Convention is that while the Convention encouraged industrialised countries to 
stabilize GHG emissions, the Protocol commits them to do so.442 The Protocol 
shares and strengthens the Convention’s objective and principles, and under Art. 3, 
establishes cumulative (five–year), legally-binding caps on the anthropogenic 
emissions of GHGs by the Annex 1 countries. The commitment targets of the Annex 
I Parties are listed in the Kyoto Protocol’s Annex B. These add up to a total cut in 
greenhouse-gas emissions of at least 5% from 1990 levels on the average443 in the 
first commitment period 2008-2012.444 The targets compare emissions for the period 
2008-2012 against a baseline year of 1990.  
 
However, the Protocol itself as at the time of its adoption was more “a framework 
than an agreement ready for immediate implementation.”445 This was because there 
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were several major issues on which the Parties still needed to agree, provide 
details, administer and implement. These include the Kyoto mechanisms, the 
rulebooks for which negotiations were only concluded at Conference of the Parties 
(COP) No. 7 held 29 October to 9 November, 2001 in Marrakesh, Morocco, 
otherwise known as “Marrakesh Accords”.  
As part of the objectives of the climate policy under the UNFCCC, the KP instituted 
response measures by which to pursue stabilization of GHG emissions. These 
measures should be experimented by Annex 1 countries both at domestic and 
international levels. The Kyoto international mechanisms are designed to help 
Annex I Parties cut the cost of meeting their emissions targets by taking advantage 
of opportunities to reduce emissions, or increase greenhouse gas removals, that 
cost less in other countries than at home. They are, the International Emissions 
Trading (ET)446, Activities Implemented Jointly (or Joint Implementation)447 and 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).448 How these mechanisms work and the 
corresponding legal analysis has been subject of extensive discussion in other 
literature.449  
 
By virtue of Art. 17 of the KP, Parties however are expected to perform the bulk of 
their emissions reduction obligation under Art. 3, through domestic policies and 
measures, while adopting the international options only as supplementary 
mechanisms for the attainment of the UNFCCC’s objective.450 This supplementarity 
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theory451 was up-held at COP7 (The Marrakesh Accords) whereat the Parties 
affirmed that “the use of the mechanisms shall be supplemental to domestic action, 
and … domestic action shall constitute significant element of the effort made by 
each Party included in Annex I to meet its quantified emission limitation and 
reduction commitments under Article 3, paragraph 1.”452  
4.4.2.1 The Kyoto Protocol and domestic policies and measures 
The domestic measures are not specified by the KP, and this allowed the Parties 
wide leverage and opportunities to include any policies and measures aimed at 
emissions reduction. GPPfalls under the domestic measure classification. The KP 
under Art. 2 called upon the Annex 1 countries to: 
“… strive to implement policies and measures [to combat climate change] 
under this Art in such a way as to minimise adverse effects, including the 
adverse effects of climate change, effects on international trade, and social, 
environmental and economic impacts on the parties, especially developing 
country Parties."453 
 
The above generalised instruction only provides for an indicative list of policies and 
measures required to reduce GHG emissions and promote sustainable 
development. Thus the Protocol in Art. 2(3)(a) requires each Annex-I country to, 
inter alia implement and/or elaborate policies and measures to enhance energy 
                                                        
451
 The supplementarity theory though has been subject of some controversy and extensive debate in the 
academia, especially among economists. The controversy surrounds not only what constitutes 
“supplemental” but how measure the domestic actions and what percentage of it that will qualify a Party to 
pursue the supplementary internationally mechanisms. In the Bonn Agreement, reached at COP6, 2001, 
Parties agreed to a “qualitative” definition of supplementarity. This meant that Parties’ domestic efforts [as 
gathered from information supplied by each party in accordance with KP Art. 7] would be rated to the 
minimum level of sufficiently "significant." The rating will be made by the Compliance Committee's 
facilitative branch. It is argued that without a quantitative definition of supplementarity, the qualitative 
approach will make no meaning in real terms. Consequently, supplementarity requirement may not be an 
effective constraint on Parties' use of the Kyoto mechanisms. See Climate change Knowledge network: 
Climate compendium, international negotiations, - Kyoto Mechanisms update: COP6 Bonn, 2001 available 
at: http://www.cckn.net/compendium/int_kmu.asp . For more on the economic argument on 
supplementarity theory see Hourcade, J and Ghersi, F., The Economics of a Lost Deal 01–48 Resources for 
the Future Discussion Paper December 2001) 01-48;  available at: http://www.rff.org (accessed, 20/04/10) 
452
 See the Preamble to Marrakesh Accords & the Marrakesh Declaration at Marrakesh, Morocco 2001 as 
well as decisions no. 1, available at: http://unfccc.int/cop7/documents/accords_draft.pdf  
453
 Art. 2:3. (Emphasis added) 
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efficiency, and to promote development and use of renewable forms of energy and 
new innovative environmentally sound technologies. 
 
Pursuant to the mandate given under this provision since the year 2000 - 2001 after 
the Bonn Agreement,454 the Kyoto Annex B Parties especially from among the 
OECD Member countries have instituted or proposed different domestic policies and 
measures (PAMs) for emissions reduction. These PAMs take both the forms of 
regulatory (regulations, standards and guidelines, including voluntary agreements), 
and market-based (emissions trading, tradeable renewable certificates) approaches. 
Indeed, many countries use “a portfolio approach”455 to policy-making by which 
various complementary policies are integrated and pursued together in order to 
maximise the result, save time and resources. In the EU, for example, energy policy 
is integrated with environment policy, while public procurement legislation is used to 
pursue climate change, energy and environmental policy. It is also for this reason 
manner  that France suggested for the EU to impose green or CO2 tax on imported 
auto-mobile and other energy-intensive products.456 The purpose of the tax is to 
inter alia safeguard the competitiveness effect of the EU GHG emissions reduction 
policies, on the domestic industry. Another example is the proposed imposition of 
permit allowances under the EU ETS on imports to value equivalent to the domestic 
producers of energy-intensive sectors and sub-sectors otherwise called “FAIR”.457 
                                                        
454
 “Bonn Agreement to the Kyoto Protocol” is the international climate negotiations that took place in 
Bonn from 16 to 27 July 2001, after the failure of the Sixth COP in November 2000. This agreement is 
described as “a set of political compromises for the most contentious issues left open by the Kyoto 
Protocol”. See Ott, H. E., The Bonn Agreement to the Kyoto Protocol  Paving the Way for Ratification 
International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 1: 469–476, (Kluwer Academic 
Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands 2001). 
455
 See, IEA, Dealing with Climate change: Policies and Measures in EIA Countries” (2001 Edition), 11 
(OECD/IEA, 2001). 
456
 See Weirs, J., French Ideas on Climate Change and Trade Policies, CCLR 1/2008. See also Financial 
Times report 
457
 FAIR: Future allowance import requirements. 
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FAIR is proposed to be applied against countries which have not undertaken 
comparable reduction commitments as those taken by the EU.458 
 
It has been noted earlier how, in the same direction, the United Kingdom even 
created a new department/ministry for energy and climate change. Generally, the 
policy mix for GHG reduction depends on “cost, social concerns, administrative 
feasibility and institutional capacity, as well as national culture.”459 One common 
theme about all the different policy instruments is the relationship they have with, or 
impact on, emissions reduction, improvement of the energy sector situation, and 
sustainable development. GPP which is more of market-based is the subject of the 
next chapter of this study. 
4.4.3 The principles for  implementing the climate regime commitments 
 
Pursuant to its primary objectives, and taking into account the relationship of climate 
change with the energy sector, the UNFCCC devised appropriate principles to guide 
its implementation. Most of these principles are provided for under Art. 3 of the 
Convention. These include the principles of equity, common but differentiated 
responsibilities and polluter-pays, precaution, cost-effectiveness, the right to 
sustainable development, and the avoidance of arbitrary restriction on international 
trade. Discussions will however be limited only to the most relevant of these 
principles to this study. These are the principles of sustainable development, 
precaution and avoidance of trade restriction.460  
                                                        
458
 See EC Communication on the Proposal for a Directive Amending Directive 2003/87/EC (ETS) (1), Art. 
10. The FAIR is proposed to only apply to goods which are subject of significant risk of carbon leakage, 
and would not apply to countries and administrative entities which are taking action to reduce GHG 
emissions comparable to the action taken by the EU. See ICC side-event presentation entitled: Trade and 
Climate Change, by Reinhard Quick, available at: 
http://www.iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/ICC/policy/Environment/Presentation%20by%20R.%20Quick.ppt#2
64,8, FAIR – will it work? (1) 
459
 Ibid. 
460
 For discussions on  equity and common but differentiated responsibilities, see Climate Change and 
Human Rights: A Rough Guide 2008 International Council on Human Rights Policy, 2007) p. 60. See also  
UNDP HDR 2007/08, available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2007-2008, as well as  UNDP 
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4.4.3.1 The principle of sustainable development 
The UNFCCC asked the Parties to “protect the climate system for the benefit of 
present and future generations of humankind...”461 This thus makes the principle of 
sustainable development (SD) a guiding principle for the implementation of the 
climate convention. SD is defined by the World Commission on Environment and 
Development (Brundtland’s Commission) as the “development that meets the needs 
of the present and without compromising the ability of the future generations to meet 
their own needs”462 The principle, which had its roots in the 1972 Stockholm 
Conference on Human Environment,463 also led to the explosion of more multilateral 
environmental conferences, agreements (MEAs) and institutions from the 1980s.464 
The principle was particularly popularised first by the Brundtland Commission which 
was charged, inter alia, with the preparation of the UNCED in 1992.465 Indeed the 
definition of the principle of sustainable development466 as expounded by the said 
                                                                                                                                                             
HDR 2007/08, available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2007-2008/; For Polluter-pays-
principle as related to climate change, see Otsuka, T., Designing an International System to Prevent and 
Adapt to Global Warming: The Japanese Perspective, A paper presented at an international workshop on A 
Future Climate Regime and Legal Principles, Shoji houmu Kenkyukal, Tokyo, Japan ,January 8, 2005, 
available at: http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/3-
International_Workshop_A_Future_Climate_Change_Regime_and_Legal_Principles.pdf (accessed last: 
131/01/09) 
461
 UNFCCC Art. 3.1. 
462
 See World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future, 1978 and UNGA Res. 
44/228 of December 22, 1989. See also IPCC Climate Change 2001: Working Group III: Mitigation,  
Setting the Stage: Climate Change and Sustainable Development, At “Introduction” available at 
http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc_tar/wg3/050.htm 
463
 See Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 5-16 June 1972 
(United Nations publication, Sales No. E.73.II.A.14 and corrigendum), Chapter I, and the Declaration of 
the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, particularly at principles 8-15 available at 
http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.Print.asp?DocumentID=97&Art.ID=1503&l=en 
(last accessed 03/08/08).  
464 Indeed, the idea of establishing UNEP was also a by-product of the Stockholm Conference. See the 
recommendations of the Ibid., convening of a second United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment, Ibid., at: 
http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=97&Art.ID=1515&l=en . See also 
Strauss, A. L., From Gattzilla' to the Green Giant: Winning the Environmental Battle for the Soul of the 
World Trade Organization, 1998 J Int'l Econ. L. vol.1 19:3, 779. 
465
 See Report of the UNCED, supra, n. 60.  
466 For a brief on Sustainable development, see supra, Chapter 4, Section 4.4.1.2. See also IPCC Climate 
Change 2001: Working Group III: Mitigation, Setting the Stage: Climate Change and Sustainable 
Development.(“Introduction”), available at http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc_tar/wg3/050.htm (last 
accessed: 30/06/09). 
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Commission became its household name, and became widely adopted by 
governments and academia. Subsequently, Principle 4 of Agenda 21 provides that 
in order to achieve sustainable development, environmental protection shall 
constitute an integral part of the development process and cannot be considered in 
isolation from it. 467 
 
SD has been a controversial concept, though.468 Simply put, the principle is based 
on the understanding that rapid economic development of the industrialised world 
has exerted heavy pressure on the environment and the energy system. 
Industrialisation which was achieved through the use of fossil-based energy has led 
to the current state of global climate. That was because there were no 
environmental protection measures in place to mitigate the pressure. Then comes 
another circle of the process with the developing world now rapidly also 
industrializing using, mainly, the fossil-based energy sources. Therefore, in order to 
avoid the mistakes done in the past by the developed world, necessary 
environmental protection safeguards have to now be integrated in all economic 
activities both in the developed and developing world.  
 
GPP is considered along the above line of thought. As governments spend large 
fortunes to acquire goods and services for governmental functioning which includes 
socio-economic development projects, emphasise or preference made in these 
purchases for climate friendly goods and services will help achieve the twin goals of 
governmental functioning as well as environmental protection. The WTO also 
recognised the potential of the principle of SD to serve as a tool with which to 
deliver development with the least harm to the environment. This is stated in the 
                                                        
467
 See Rio declaration, supra, n. 60.  
468
 “Sustainable development” like “public policy” is an unruly horse which, if you get astride it, you never 
know where it will carry you”.-borrowing from Burrough J. in Richardson v. Mellish (1824) 2 Bing. 229, 
252 cited in Priaulx, N., That’s One Heck of an “Unruly Horse” Riding Roughshod over Autonomy in 
Wrongful Conception, in Feminist Legal Studies Volume 12, No.3, January, 2004 available at: 
http://www.springerlink.com/content/w834641x5429/?p=14aef366040740a0801366bfe7bd9aa0&pi=0  
  
119
 
Preamble to the WTO Agreement that pursuing trade liberalisation should take 
cognisance of the need to protect the environment and to promote SD.  
4.4.3.2 The Precautionary principle 
The foundation of policies and actions against climate change is precaution, in the 
sense of prevention of the occurance of future uncertain and irreversible effects. 
This makes the precautionary principle directly relevant to the current discourse. 
The principle implies that action should be taken to limit, regulate, or prevent 
potentially dangerous undertakings even in the absence of absolute scientific 
proof.469 In practice, the principle means taking precautionary measures to prevent 
greater or uncertain harm. Such measures also naturally entail taking economic 
costs into account. 470 The principle which is now increasingly being recognized as a 
key legal principle in environmental law, in particular, and of international law in 
general471 was first recognised by the UNGA in the World Charter for Nature 
adopted in 1982.472  It was then re-affirmed as Principle 15 of Agenda 21.473 This 
laid the ground for its prominence in the UNFCCC Art. 3.3, thus:  
                                                        
469
 See, The European Environment Agency (Author), et al., The Precautionary Principle in the 20th 
Century: Late Lessons from Early Warnings (Earthscan Ltd, London, United Kingdom, 2002), pp. 4-9. See 
also Park, Chris, Oxford Dictionary of Environment and Conservation, supra, n. at, p. 387. 
470 See Martin, P.H., If You Don't Know How to Fix it, Please Stop Breaking it! The Precautionary 
Principle and Climate Change, Foundations of Science, Volume 2, Number 2, 1997 , pp. 263- 292(30) 
(Springer 1997) Available at 
http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/foda/1997/00000002/00000002/00155949;jsessionid=1l6oe2g
or9m8i.alexandra?format=print . 
471
 There is of course a controversy on the actual status of precautionary principle, namely, whether or to 
what extent it has crystallized or been accepted as a principle of international (environmental) law. This 
controversy reflected especially in the EC – Hormones and EC – Biotech disputes. In EC – Hormones, for 
instance the AB in the EC – Hormones, the AB stated that “[T]he status of the precautionary principle in 
international law continues to be the subject of debate among academics, law practitioners, regulators and 
judges. The precautionary principle is regarded by some as having crystallized into a general principle of 
customary international environmental law.” [Italics in the original]. See EC – Hormones, , Para. 123. 
472
 See World Charter for Nature, Art. II:12(b) [UN A/RES/37/7 (48th plenary meeting, 28 October 1982)] 
Some commentators believe that precautionary principle was first recognized by this Charter See  Faulkner, 
E. B. and Schwartz, R. J. (eds.) High Performance Pigments (Wiley VCH; 2 Revised edition (14 Jan 2009), 
p. 460. See also Bodansky, D., .Deconstructing the Precautionary Principle, in Caron, D. D. and Scheiber, 
H. N. (eds.), Bringing New Law to Ocean Waters, (381-91) (Koninklijke Brill N.V. The Netherlands © 
2004), p. 386. 
473
 See Rio Declaration, supra, n. 60. Principle 15 provides thus: “In order to protect the environment, the 
precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are 
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for 
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.” 
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The Parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or 
minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects. 
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full 
scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such 
measures, taking into account that policies and measures to deal with 
climate change should be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at 
the lowest possible cost. [Emphasis added] 
 
In view of the scientific uncertainties which are still being investigated about its 
nature, impact and consequences,474 climate change seems the best example for 
the application of the precautionary principle. Climate change, which is accepted as 
an issue of “common concern for mankind” and which requires the widest possible 
cooperation among nations, arguably fulfils the theoretical requirements set for the 
application of the precautionary principle. These theoretical requirements are 
embodied in the definition of the principle given at the 1998 Wingspread 
conference.475 These are: (1) taking prompt preventive action even in the face of 
scientific uncertainty, (2) shifting of burden of proof and persuasion to proponents of 
potentially hazardous technologies,476 (3) assessment of alternatives,477 and (4) 
                                                        
474
 Science is still uncertain as to the extent of the anthropogenic contribution to climate change, even as the 
IPCC seems more optimistic in its current findings. The uncertainties relate to “long time lags between 
forcings and response, the impossibility to test experimentally before the facts arise, and the low frequency 
variability with periods involved being longer than the length of most records.” See Le Treut, H., (et al), 
Historical Overview of Climate Change, in Solomon, S. (et al) (eds.), Climate Change 2007: The Physical 
Science Basis.  Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom 
and New York, NY, USA, 2007), pp. 119-121.  
475
 This is the Science and Environmental Health Network conference at Wingspread in Racine, Wisconsin, 
1998. See report of the conference entitled: “The Precautionary Principle and Environmental Policy 
Science, Uncertainty, and Sustainability” by Carl Smith at http://www.sehn.org/pdf/ppep.pdf  
476
 This means, that rather the conventional approach in international environment law, which places the 
burden on the person opposing an activity to prove that it would harm the environment, the principle would 
reverse this burden and require the proponent of an activity to prove that it is safe. The onus is usually 
difficult to discharge, and this leads to a political decision to cancel the project. See Bodansky, D., supra, n. 
479. See also, generally, See Peter H. Sand, The Precautionary Principle: A European Perspective, 6 
Human & Ecological Risk Assessment 448 (2000) and also Verbruggen, H. And Kuik, O., Environmental 
Standards in International Trade, in Van Dijck, P. And Gaber, G. (eds.), Challenges to the New World 
Tarde Organization, pp. 265-290, Kluwer Law international, The Netherlands the Hague, 1996), p. 273. 
Applying the precautionary principle in the context of climate-friendly procurement, the current WTO 
jurisprudence is similar to the conventional international environmental law position. That is to say, a GPA 
Party adopting climate-friendly must prove the measure as being covered under the exceptions, and that is 
it necessary and not applied in a discriminatory manner (GPA Art. XXIII). However, applying the 
precautionary approach will mean to allow climate mitigation measure without asking for proof, as climate 
change has already been an established fact by sound science. Thus, any country that complains against a 
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transparency. 478 The principle thus calls for a greater sense of responsibility 
especially on the part of scientists whose explanations and analysis guide a political 
decision towards a precautionary action.  
 
The precautionary principle, like the sustainable development principle, has also 
found expression in the WTO system. For instance, Art. 5.7 of the WTO Agreement 
on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures ("SPS Agreement")479 
allows WTO Members in an event of insufficiency of scientific evidence to 
“provisionally adopt sanitary or phytosanitary measures on the basis of available 
pertinent information”. The measures taken pursuant to this provision however 
should not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between members where identical 
or similar conditions prevail, or constitute a disguised restriction on international 
trade.480 The application of the principle was examined in EC – Biotech.481 The 
arguments in this dispute surrounded the extent to which precaution qualifies as a 
principle of international law for the purpose of the Article 5.7 of the SPS 
Agreement.482  
                                                                                                                                                             
climate-related measure should prove its “discrimination” or “protectionist intent” claims, or alternatively, 
that climate change state of the world is safe. See generally Chapter 7. 
477
 This requires the adoption of best available and cost effective technology. See Bobansky, supra, n. 401 
at p. 391.  
478
 See Ibid. for further discourse on the theoretical foundations of the precautionary principle. 
479
 WTO, Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, opened for signature 15 
April 1994, 1867 UNTS 493 (entered into force 1 January 1995), available at <http://www.wto.org>.  
480 SPS Agreement Art. 3.3. See also WTO Secretariat [Croome, J.], Guide to the Uruguay Round 
Agreements, (Klwuer Law International, 1998), pp 62-63. The principle of precaution as embodied in this 
Agreement has been attracting a lot of interest and scholarly commentary in the academia. E. g., 
Gruszczynsk, L., The SPS Agreement within the Framework of WTO Law. The Rough Guide to the 
Agreement’s Applicability, Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1152749 (June 28, 2008); Nupur, 
C., Precautionary Principle in the SPS Agreement: Developing Disciplines and Practices (SSRN, April 8, 
2007). 
481
 Reports of the Panel, European Communities – Measures Affecting The Approval And Marketing Of 
Biotech Products, WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R (29 September 2006). 
482 In the EC- Biotech dispute, the EU, based on precaution and pursuant to Article 5.7, placed a 
moratorium temporarily restricting the import of biotech products from some countries. The United States, 
Canada and Argentina complained before the WTO DSB against the EU. The EU argued that the 
moratorium would be justifiable as a precautionary measure, since precautionary principle was, in fact, an 
international law principle. The complainants on the other hand argued that precautionary principle had not 
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4.4.2.3 Avoidance of unnecessary restriction on international trade  
Rather than pursuing their purpose through the use of trade measures against the 
parties or non-parties, as was the case in some earlier MEAs,483 the UNFCCC and 
KP cautioned to the contrary. The UNFCCC thus requires that measures taken by 
the Parties to combat climate change, “including unilateral ones, should not 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised 
restriction on international trade.”484 These cautions are clearly the footprint of the 
earlier participation of the GATT EMIT group in the processes that led to the 
UNCED and the preparation and adoption of the UNFCCC. This is evidenced by the 
fact that these rather boilerplate provisions have always been in the GATT.485 A 
more recent study486 published jointly by UNEP and WTO, has discussed many of 
such climate-motivated potentially trade-restrictive measures, including GPP.487  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
attained the status of an international law principle, but could at best be regarded as “an approach”, and as 
such could not provide a justification for an SPS-inconsistent measure. The Panel accepted the 
complainants’’ argument on that point. The AB ruling in EC – Hormones is to the same effect. See 
particularly, the EC’s arguments relating to the precautionary principle (para. 16,), U.S.’s (para. 43) and 
Canada’s (para.60). Then see the ruling on para. 236(c).  So, in effect, while the precautionary principle is 
considered as part of the body of international law, its status is still uncertain, and the EC attempts to 
invoke the principle in E.C.-Hormones and E.C.-Biotech were not successful. See also Martin, M., supra, 
n. 29. 
483
 The WTO has identified the UNFCCC and KP as among the fourteen out of about two hundred 
multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) that used trade measures to pursue their objectives, and this 
approach would be problematic in the face of the WTO multilateral trading system (MTS). See WTO 
Secretariat, Matrix on Trade Measures Pursuant to Selected Multilateral Environmental Agreements, 
(Revised 2005) (WT/CTE/W/160/Rev.3,TN/TE/S/5/Rev.1, 16 February 2005) at <www.wto.org>. See also 
Van den Bossche, Schrijver, N. and Faber, G. Unilateral Measures Addressing Non-Trade Concerns) (The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of The Netherlands, 2007) pp. xxxix-xl; 179-181. 
484
 UNFCCC Art. 3.5 [Emphasis added]. And, the KP Art. 2.3, Parties included in Annex I should: “[s]trive 
to implement policies and measures in such a way as to minimize adverse effects, including the adverse 
effects of climate change, effects on international trade. [emphasis added] 
485
 The most prominent being the text of the chapeau to the GATT Article XX as replicated in almost all 
the other WTO Agreement. See Appendix … for the texts of  GATT Art. XX(b) and (g)  
486
 WTO-UNEP, Trade and Climate Change (WTO, 2009). Other works on the linkages between climate 
change and trade rules include: in Cottier, T., (et al) (eds.) supra, n. 11.  Chambers, W. B. (Eds.), Inter-
linkages, WB, , supra, n. 450; Carraro, C. and Egenhofer, C. (Eds.) supra, n. 43 at 321; and Hufbauer, G. 
C., Charnovoitz, S. and Kim, J supra, n 25. 
487
 Other such climate-related measures identified in the study include domestic measures (e.g., taxes on 
GHG emissions and emissions) and border measures (e.g. border tax adjustment).  
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Avoidance of unnecessary restrictions on international trade seeks to reinforce the 
sustainable development principle. It will be seen in chapter 5 how multilateral 
instruments and initiatives at global, regional and national levels that encouraged 
GPP also ended with the same caution.  For example, para.13 of Agenda 21 called 
upon governments, specifically in the context of GP, to “review the purchasing 
policies … so that they may improve … the environmental content of government 
procurement policies without prejudice to international trade principles”.488  
 
As the UNFCCC and KP however have empowered the Parties to take actions 
deemed necessary at domestic and international levels by which to pursue the 
objectives of the instruments, the question is to what extent could GPP be said to 
have the effect of restricting trade as described by Schoenbaum’s treatise cite 
earlier489 or in any other manner? It could be recalled that until 1981 when the 
Tokyo Round Procurement Code came into force, GP was not regulated. In other 
words, the GATT contracting parties were allowed to continue their discrimination 
and protectionism in GP.490 But the reason for the caution against GPP being 
protectionist was that since GP was traditionally used for protectionist ends,491 then 
GPP which seeks to pursue non-trade objectives may even be more prone to be 
used for protectionist purposes. It could indeed be used as a tool to protect local 
business thereby reversing the object of the WTO/GATT regulation of GP since the 
coming into force of the Tokyo Round code, and now the GPA.  Indeed, the real 
problem with GPP, as Zhang and Assunção492 warned, may be seen in the use of 
                                                        
488
 See generally supra, Section 3.3. This was replicated in essence by WSSD Plan of Implementation 
under Chapter III 19(c). See also Arts. 10 and 69 of the UN guidelines for consumer protection 1999 which 
cautioned that due regard should be given to ensuring that government purchasing policies “do not become 
barriers to international trade and that they are consistent with international trade obligations.” See also 
OECD Environmental Strategy for the First Decade of the 21st Century, part of the environment vision 
adopted by OECD Environment Ministers in May 2001. 
489
 Supra, Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2.2. 
490
 Supra, Chapter 3, Section 3.3.2. 
491
 Ibid., Section 3.3.1. 
492
 See Zhang, Z., and Assunção, L., supra, n. 149. See also Chapter 2, Section 2.2.3. 
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technical specifications in tender notices, which require specific standards for the 
products and services required for government purposes.  
 
4.5 Summary 
 
This chapter has indicated, following the IPCC works, that the complexity of the 
anthropogenic climate change including its global impacts, and the intricate 
relationship with the energy sector, provided the ground for the international 
community to design cooperative precautionary response strategies. This strategy 
resulted in the signing of the UNFCCC and the KP as the legal mechanisms to 
address the climate change problem. Pursuant to these instruments, countries 
formulated policies and measures at both international and domestic levels for cost-
effective reductions in the GHG emissions that cause global warming resulting in 
the climate change. The various policy actions being taken to mitigate climate 
change at international level, as designed under the KP, including the Kyoto 
Mechanisms, could have potential effects on the countries’ obligations under the 
WTO MTS. Actions at domestic level could even be more complex as are being 
treated already in other academic works. What remains, largely, to be treated in 
great detail, among the domestic policy options, is GPP, hence the subject of the 
next chapter of this study.  
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CHAPTER 5  
 
GREEN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT, CLIMATE MITIGATION POTENTIAL 
AND THE TRADE - ENVIRONMENT DEBATE 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The objective of this chapter, broadly, is to provide a more detailed discussion on 
the evolution of the concept of green public procurement (GPP) and its processes, 
and then relate the GPP practice to climate change mitigation strategy. The chapter 
seeks to show that although the primary objective of procurement is to deliver what 
in economics is referred to as “value for money,” GPP seeks to deliver value for 
money while at the same time improving the quality of the environment. And as, at 
times, environmental protection measures constitute non-tariff barriers to trade; this 
chapter examines the extent to which GPP in practice could raise issues with the 
GPA.  
 
The chapter first traces the origin of GPP to the concept of sustainable development 
envisaged in the report of the 1972 UN Stockholm Conference on Human 
Environment (UNCHE) through the 1992 UNCED, and finally the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development (WSSD) and the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation. 
The aim of this historical overview is to establish how solidly founded is the concept 
of GPP as increasingly being adopted by multilateral institutions, regional economic 
organisations and national governments, and especially those committed to 
reducing GHG emissions under the climate change regime. This historical overview 
is followed by analysis to identify the nexus between GPP, climate change and 
trade regulation, and then with GPP in the context of trade-environment debate.493 
                                                        
493
 The Chapter thus does not attempt an economic evaluation of GPP as an environmental policy 
instrument or compare it with other environmental policy instruments. These issues are outside the purview 
of the thesis. For this, see for instance, Marron, D., Greener Public Purchasing as an Environmental Policy 
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The structure of the chapter is as follows: Section 2 gives a general description of 
the public procurement process and introduces GPP as sub-field of public 
procurement.494 Section 3 proceeds with the nexus between GPP concepts and 
practices and climate change mitigation objectives. Section 4 then looks at the 
possible trade issues in green procurement. It highlights the fear of green 
procurement being used as a non-tariff barrier to trade. The issues raised in this 
section will serve as foundation for further analysis in the light of the WTO GPA in 
subsequent chapters. The last section concludes the chapter.  
5.2 Procurement processes and the concept of GPP 
5.2.1 An overview of the stages in public procurement process 
 
GPP seeks to deliver one of the secondary objectives of public procurement, 
namely environmental protection for sustainable development. It has been noted in 
chapter 3 that generally, the objectives of public procurement are the same as those 
of private sector procurement. The same can also be said of their structure and 
procedure. The difference, if any, between public and private procurement process 
is the added responsibility of probity and accountability required of public procuring 
authorities that spend tax-payers’ money,495 in accordance with applicable public 
law.  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Instrument, in OECD, The Environmental Performance of Public Procurement: Issues Of Policy 
Coherence, (OECD, 2003), pp. 22-50. 
494
 See Brander, L. and Olsthorn, X., Three Scenarios for Green Public Procurement, (Institute for 
Environmental Studies, Vrije Universiteit, The Netherlands, 2003), 3 available at: http://www.iclei-
europe.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Procurement/RELIEF/Publications/IVM-
paper_Procurement_scenarios.pdf (visited 22/07/08). 
495
 EC, Buying Green!, supra n. 168, p. 12. 
  
127
 
The GPA does not provide for the details of the conduct of procurement. Practice 
however indicates that public purchasing process involves typically four stages: (1) 
determination of the objective of the particular procurement, and identification and 
specification of the nature of the goods/services required to fulfil that set objective; 
(2) determination of what would be the minimum qualification for the prospective 
tenderer. This is particularly relevant to the case of “selective process” where the 
entity draws the tenderers from a list of pre-qualified suppliers based on specified 
qualification criteria; (3) evaluation of offers or bids based on specified award 
criteria, and (4), the awarding of the contract to winning tender. An outline of these 
stages could be found in an OECD study,496   as are represented in the Figure 2 
below: 
Figure 2 stages in public procurement process 
Source: OECD, 1999497 
5.2.1.1 Defining initial procurement objective and subject-matter 
The very essential first step in the public procurement process is the defining of the 
subject-matter and the objectives and requirements for the particular 
                                                        
496
 See OECD, Trade Issues in the Greening of Public Purchasing, 
OECD/TD/ENVIRONMENT(97)/111/FINAL, (Paris, 1999) p. 11, available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/17/7/39919037.pdf (last visited 12/03/08).  
497
 Ibid. 
  
128
 
procurement.498 This understanding then leads to stage 1 above, which begins with 
market research499 and choice of product groupings including price overview and 
sampling by window-shopping. This exercise may involve holding technical dialogue 
with targeted potential bidders. Notice of intention to engage in such dialogue may 
also be published to ensure more transparency.500 The purpose of this exercise is to 
enable the purchasing entity to generate some idea of the availability and cost of the 
products or services, and of any available alternatives, for the purpose of inclusion 
in the tender document. It helps to target particular bidders while arming the 
procuring entity with the tool to demand and enforce its “value for money” strategy.  
 
Pursuant to Art. VII:2 of the GPA this initial market research and technical dialogue 
should not in any way have the effect of precluding or distorting competition.501 
Similarly, the GPA transparency provisions require that technical specifications for 
the goods or services required form an integral part of the tender documents to be 
formally published.502 These contain the general conditions of the contract as well. 
As will be seen later, the intention of a procuring entity to engage in green 
procurement must be indicated early enough and at this stage. 
5.2.1.2 Drawing up of qualification criteria for the suppliers 
This stage of the process sets the qualification criteria for prospective tenderers, 
and the manner they are notified. This stage is generally regulated by Arts. VIII and 
IX of the GPA. The cardinal rules in this regard are: Firstly, that any conditions set 
for participation in tendering procedures by suppliers shall be limited to those that 
                                                        
498
 See ProInno Europe, Guide on Dealing with Innovative Solutions in Public Procurement - 10 elements 
of good practice [Commission Staff Working Document Sec (2007)] 280, p. 6. 
499
 Ibid. 
500
 Ibid. 
501
 See also Recital 15 of Directive 2004/17/EC and Recital 8 of Directive 2004/18/EC as to technical 
dialogue. 
502
 GPA Art. IX, Appendix II 
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are essential to ensure the firm’s capability to fulfil the contract.503 Secondly, such 
conditions must be transparent.504 The first condition is substantive, defining the 
“what” of the rule, namely, the content of the supplier qualification conditions, while 
the second is procedural, specifying “how” those conditions are set and then 
communicated.   The cumulative effect of these two rules is to ensure non-
discrimination in the manner potential bidders are treated, thereby supporting the 
non-discrimination obligations provided for under GPA Art. III.  
 
Generally, the tender documentation provided to suppliers “shall contain all 
information necessary to permit them to submit responsive tenders, including 
information required to be published in the notice of intended procurement.”505 This 
thus includes information on the economic and technical requirements, financial 
guarantee and the criteria for awarding contract. This provides another opportunity 
for procuring entities who aim to employ environmentally more conscious suppliers 
to insert relevant environmental qualifications in the notice, observing the above 
mentioned rules. Whether insertion of environmental considerations in the 
conditions of qualification of suppliers is acceptable under the rules is one of the 
issues to be determined. 
 
                                                        
503
 GPA Art.  VIII(b) states in part: 
In the process of qualifying suppliers, entities shall not discriminate among suppliers of other 
Parties or between domestic suppliers and suppliers of other Parties. Qualification procedures 
shall be consistent with the following: 
 
[ … ] 
 
(b) any conditions for participation in tendering procedures shall be limited to 
those which are essential to ensure the firm's capability to fulfil the contract in question. 
Any conditions for participation required from suppliers, including financial guarantees, 
technical qualifications and information necessary for establishing the financial, 
commercial and technical capacity of suppliers, as well as the verification of 
qualifications, shall be no less favourable to suppliers of other Parties than to domestic 
suppliers and shall not discriminate among suppliers of other Parties…. [emphasis 
added] 
 
504
 This rule relates to the procedure of notification of particular procurement to prospective bidders. 
505
 GPA Art. XII:2 
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As for the procedural aspect or the rule, the notice of invitation is required to be 
published. The medium by which such invitation notice should be published are 
included in the Appendix II. As an essential requirement, the GPA Art. IX:11 
provides that the notice of invitation should make it clear, in the publication in which 
it appears, whether the procurement in question is covered by the Agreement.506 
For this purpose, procuring authorities using selective tendering are required to 
publish once a year, in a publication indicated in Appendix III to the Agreement, their 
list of qualified suppliers, and to specify the period of validity of those lists and the 
conditions that need to be met for inclusion of interested suppliers in the lists.507 In 
the EU for instance, the requirement to publish a notice is also governed by the 
public procurement thresholds, and should include a declaration that the entity’s 
total annual expenditure for goods and services of a similar type exceed these 
thresholds.508  
5.2.1.3 Evaluation and selection of offers based on award criteria 
This stage evaluates and selects the suppliers that indicated interest to bid (as in 
Selective tendering method), or the tenders already submitted (as in Open tendering 
procedure). Thus the criteria used in the evaluation exercise are determined by the 
tendering method used. In the case of Selective tendering process, the procuring 
authority sends an invitation to tender to qualifying tenderers. In the Open tendering 
procedure, however, evaluation exercise is based on the qualification criteria 
published at the earlier stage.  
 
                                                        
506
 Under the EU system, for instance, all contracts from the public sector which are valued above a certain 
threshold must be published in the Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU), available at 
http://www.ojec.com/Help/Help_OJEU.aspx (accessed 17/04/08). 
507
 GPA Art. IX:9. 
508 See European public contracts directive (2004/18/EC) and the utilities contracts directive (2004/17/EC). 
The current levels of the thresholds came into effect, from 1st January 2008. See also Tenders Direct at 
http://www.tendersdirect.co.uk/infoCentre/thresholds.aspx  
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Generally, in order to ensure non-discrimination and to prevent protectionist 
tendencies towards domestic products or suppliers, the GPA provides for the 
following criteria to be applied for evaluating and selecting tenders:  
• the tenderers’ capability (both technical and financial) to undertake the 
contract, and  
• the lowest tender or the tender which in terms of specific evaluation criteria 
set forth in the notices or tender documentation is determined to be the most 
advantageous should be chosen.  
Although there may be found minor variations, the above principles are largely 
found in all the public procurement policies.509  
 
Indeed, under the EU new public procurement directives, for instance, contracts 
should be awarded not on the basis of lowest price consideration alone, but on 
whether it is the most economically advantageous tender, in view of a number of 
criteria linked to the subject matter of the contract. These criteria include: price, 
delivery date, running cost, cost effectiveness, quality aesthetic and functional 
characteristics, and technical merit as well as after-sales service.510 Of particular 
interest to this study, environmental considerations are, since 2004, added criteria 
for the determination of the most advantageous tender under the said Directives.511 
5.2.1.4 The awarding of the contract to winning tender 
The last stage in procurement process is the award of the job to the winning 
contractor/supplier. In order to evaluate tenders leading to award of the contracting 
                                                        
509
 GPA Art XIII. See also Simula, M., Public Procurement Policies for Forest Products and their Impacts 
(Draft Discussion Paper) (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, August 8, 2006) 
(available at: http://www.fao.org/forestry/webview/media?mediaId=11153&langId=1 accessed 12/05/05): 
510
 See Section 6.4 for discussion on the EU New Public Procurement Directives, and the relevant case law.  
511
 Ibid. 
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to a winning supplier, they have to first be “opened.”512 The GPA provides that all 
tenders solicited under open or selective procedures by entities shall be received 
and opened under procedures and conditions guaranteeing the regularity of the 
openings, and consistent with the national treatment and non-discrimination 
provisions.513 As for the award, the GPA provides generally that awards shall be 
made in accordance with the criteria and essential requirements specified in the 
tender documentation. The award is made to either the lowest tender or the tender 
which in terms of the specific evaluation criteria set forth in the notices or tender 
documentation is determined to be “the most advantageous.”514  
 
The phrase, “most advantageous tender”, has not been defined in the GPA. 
Guidance is therefore sought from the EU public procurement law515 where the 
phrase in the extended form of “most economically advantageous tender” has not 
only been interpreted but indeed received much attention in the case law. That 
attention came as a result of the up-surge in the demand for clarification as to the 
scope for inclusion of GPP objectives in the EU public procurement system. In 
short, the EU law allows contracting authority to include in the determination of 
economically most advantageous tender factors outside those usually related to the 
“value for money” concept. These may include environment-friendliness of the 
goods or services required, or the methods of delivery of services to be employed 
by the supplier.516  
                                                        
512
 The “Opening” of tender is the process of receiving and opening the tenders for evaluation. For an 
example of this process see European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Standard 
Tender Documents: Standard Tender Evaluation Format Procurement of Goods or Works 2005 at:  
http://www.ebrd.com/oppor/procure/guide/evalu.pdf. See also the Advanced Procurement for University 
and Colleges (Scotland) Tender Opening Procedure (for hard copy tenders only), at http://www.apuc-
scot.ac.uk/home.htm. 
513
 GPA Art. XIII:3 
514
 Ibid. Art. XIII:4(b)  
515
 The New Public Procurement Directives, infra, Chapter 6, section 6.4.1.3. 
516
 See  infra,, Chapter 6, Section 6.4 
  
133
 
5.2.2 The concept and practice of green procurement 
Having highlighted the stages in public procurement tendering process, the next 
pertinent question is, at what stage in the process does green procurement (GPP) 
feature? This section attempts to address that question starting with an insight into 
the concept of GPP.517 GPP is a component of sustainable procurement, which in 
turn, has its roots in the concept of sustainable development. As a trade subject, 
this linkage will be followed in section 5.3 of this chapter with an analysis of the 
trade implications of green procurement under the WTO and GPA. 
5.2.2.1 “Green” procurement and “sustainable” procurement: the roots 
Governments use public procurement as a policy tool to address numerous other 
non-economic governmental policies,518 including those related to sustainable 
development.519 Climate change and energy security concerns, diffusion of 
innovation and technologies, and the concept of leading by example, are most 
prominent of these side-policy objectives. In this regard the UN defined sustainable 
(public) procurement (SPP) to include green procurement practices thus: it is “a tool 
which allows governments to leverage public spending … in order to promote the 
country’s social, environmental and economic policies. SPP contributes to create 
markets for appropriate technologies and innovative solutions.”520 Indeed, ‘Green 
                                                        
517
 GPP under the United States’ procurement system is referred to as environmentally preferable 
purchasing (EPP). See United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA), EPA's Final Guidance 
on Environmentally Preferable Purchasing, at 
http://www.epa.gov/epp/pubs/guidance/finalguidance.htm#GuidingPrinciple1 (last accessed 3/08/08). 
518
 Arrowsmith, S., supra, n. 51. 
519 See Chapter 4 where it was also indicated that concern for global climate change, and the environment 
generally was not a new phenomenon. And, specifically, according to the IISD (International Institute of 
Sustainable Development), 1962 was considered by many as the “seminal year” which heralded the 
people’s understanding of the close linkage between environment and development. That year, for the first 
time, an environmental book, Silent Spring, was published by Rachel Carson. This was a research on 
“toxicology, ecology and epidemiology”. It suggested the catastrophic build up of agricultural pesticides, 
which was linked to the damage to animal species and to human health. It reversed the belief that the 
environment had an infinite capacity to absorb pollutants. See IISD, Sustainable Development Timeline, 
prepared by the IISD, 1972, at http://www.iisd.org/rio+5/timeline/sdtimeline.htm  (accessed 27/07/08). 
520
 See UNEP, Division of Technology, Industry and Economics, Sustainable Consumption & Production 
Branch, Sustainable Procurement, at http://www.unep.fr/scp/procurement/ (last visited 15/05/10).  
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Procurement’, ‘Sustainable Procurement’, “Ethical Procurement” and Social 
Procurement”, are commonly used “to link the whole procurement process within 
the business to more environmentally sustainable or more socially equitable 
practices.”521 GPP is thus an aspect of a broader environmental protection and 
sustainable economic development policy. By definition, GPP requires public 
procurement authorities to integrate, in a systematic manner, environmental … 
factors and considerations into all procurement processes “ - whether purchasing 
goods, services or works –from defining the true needs, to setting appropriate 
technical specifications and evaluation procedures, to monitoring performance and 
results.”522   
 
Incorporating environmental considerations in public procurement, and the debate 
surrounding it, however, according to McCrudden,523 is a recent phenomenon.524 
This development is being driven, in part, by the development of the concept and 
practice of the sustainable development principle, and, in part by the growth of 
awareness by the private sector of the potential to use green procurement as a tool 
for the observance of their corporate social responsibilities (CSR).525 Agenda 21 
                                                        
521
 A research report entitled Sustainable Development: a Review of International Literature was sponsored 
by Scottish Executive Social Research 2006, pages 3 and 49, available on the Scottish Executive Social 
Research website at: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2006/05/23091323/17  [last accessed 
15/05/10]. 
522
 ICLEI (International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives) (Local Governments for 
Sustainability), Procura+ Manual: A Cost-Effective Sustainable Public Procurement (2nd Edition), (ed. 
Clement, S.) (ICLEI, Freiburg, Germany, 2007), p. 8. See also:  Brander, L. &  Olsthoorn, X., supra, 494, 
p. 13; Bolton, P., Protecting the Environment through Public Procurement: The Case of South Africa, 
Natural Resources Forum 32 (2008) 1–10 at p. (available at: http://www.blackwell-
synergy.com/action/showPdf?submitPDF=Full+Text+PDF+%28122+KB%29&doi=10.1111%2Fj.1477-
8947.2008.00171.x&cookieSet=1 (accessed 07/06/08). See also generally McCrudden, C., Using public 
procurement to achieve social outcomes, Natural Resources Forum, 28 (2004): 257–267, p. 1.  
523
 McCrudden, C, Buying Social Justice -Equality, Government Procurement & Legal Change, (Oxford 
University Press, 2007). 
524
 Ibid. pp. 390-391. 
525
 Ibid. at pp. 365-389. This work has treated extensively the linkage arguments between public 
procurement as a trade policy tool and the three “core areas” of corporate social responsibility (CSR), 
namely, human rights, labour standards and environmental practices. 
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under paragraph 23 called upon governments to use their vantage position to 
influence markets in their procurement policies, thus: 
Governments …particularly in countries where the public sector plays a 
large role in the economy and can have a considerable influence on both 
corporate decisions and public perceptions… should …review the 
purchasing policies of their agencies and departments so that they may 
improve, where possible, the environmental content of government 
procurement policies, without prejudice to international trade principles.526 
(Emphasis added) 
In the same vein, chapter III.19 the World Summit on Sustainable Development 
(WSSD) Plan of Implementation adopted at Johannesburg in September 2002 
reiterated the need to take sustainable development considerations into account in 
public procurement and to “promote public procurement policies that encourage 
development and diffusion of environmentally sound goods and services”.527  
 
Thus, pursuant to the sustainable development principles, the public sector 
demands more GPP from the private sector suppliers of goods and services. The 
private sector responds by increasingly incorporating the GPP whether as a matter 
of legal requirement, or as a CSR package. This research however, is concerned 
with public procurement as a required by the regulator. Suffice it to mention here 
that the CSR tends to narrow the divide, and to intersect between the public and 
private procurement, thereby bringing the government and the private sector into 
closer partnership. This enhances government’s services delivery in the areas of 
                                                        
526
 http://www.gdrc.org/u-gov/a21-consum-patterns.html  
527
 See Johannesburg WSSD Plan of Implementation, 2000 Chapter III.19(c), the UN Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs, Division of Sustainable Development, at 
http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/WSSD_POI_PD/English/POIChapter3.htm (accessed 27/07/08). 
The comments of the ex officio Vice-President of the Summit (A/CONF.199/16/Add.1) on the partnership 
plenary meetings on water and sanitation, energy, health, agriculture and biodiversity (WEHAB) also noted 
the potential of local authorities to promote green procurement policies so as “to push industries to produce 
in environmentally friendly and fair manners.” See 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/636/93/PDF/N0263693.pdf?OpenElement para. 6 (42) on 
Energy. 
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sustainable development, while also delivering benefit to the market, as well as the 
business community’s CSR. And as GP is a subject of trade, the same chapter 
cautioned that whatever environmental protection and sustainable development 
strategy is adopted within the procurement process, it should be pursued inter alia 
“without distorting international trade”.528  
 
In recognition of the value of GPP, the United Nations and its agencies, multilateral 
development and financial institutions, and inter-governmental and non- 
governmental organisations including the WB, OECD, took steps to promote green 
and sustainable procurement.529 They first incorporated sustainable procurement in 
their manual of internal operations, and propagated its ideal in their international 
programmes and in their relationship with other clients and stakeholders. The said 
institutions and organisations in 2001 formed an Interagency Sustainable 
Procurement Group called the Environmentally and Socially Responsible 
Procurement Working Group whose objectives include the promotion of green 
procurement practices in their internal operations as well as identifying “new 
sustainable procurement partners in developing and developed countries”.530  
5.2.2.2 Green procurement in practice: the 3 elements of GPP 
GPP in practice starts at the very moment the need for a particular procurement 
arises, and continues throughout the process. GPP thus, “does not seek to re-write 
                                                        
528
 Ibid., Chapter III.19(b). Safeguarding international trade regulations is one of primary concern to this 
research. This is addressed in Section 3 of this Chapter, and more specifically in Chapters 6, 7 and 8.  
529
 Multilateral institutions and organisations, indeed, are big spenders to run not only their headquarters 
but also their out-reach-offices, and their operations especially in developing countries. For instance, the 
UNDP Human Development Report 1998 found that the United Nations alone bought “nearly $4 billion 
worth of goods and services in 2000.” Such expenditure, if channelled towards greener goods and services 
could make a huge difference in their operations, as well as kick-start sustainable market and consumption 
habits in the developing countries. See Mastny, L., Purchasing Power Harnessing Institutional 
Procurement For People And The Planet (Thomas Prugh, Ed.) (WorldWatch paper 166, July 2003). 
530
 See more from the group’s website at: (http://www.sustainableprocurement.net) (visited 20/07/08). The 
group also sees sustainable procurement in a much broader context, which, in addition to the environmental 
aspects of procurement also includes consideration of recurrent concepts and initiatives of poverty 
eradication, international equity in the distribution of resources, labour conditions and human rights. 
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the book on procurement.”531 The green aspect simply seeks to “add an 
environmental dimension to the decision-making process,”532 which is thus “seen as 
part of the ‘quality’ criterion.”533 Indeed, the standard “value for money”534 criteria 
used in public purchasing, which consist traditionally of lowest price, best quality 
and availability, still are the cornerstone of GPP. The GPA currently does not 
explicitly provide for GPP considerations in outlining technical specifications.  GPA 
provisions thus apply to ensure that GPP processes are not discriminatory or trade 
restrictive. 
 
Going by the definition and practice of GPP in the preceding section, there emerge 
three elements of green procurement activity. These are: (1) the purchaser, (2) the 
green goods and services, and (2) the supplier. Below is a brief on the elements of 
green procurement: 
a) The Purchaser: 
The purchaser in GP generally is “the government”, or a public authority or entity 
charged with the responsibility to make purchases for or on behalf of government or 
any of its departments or units. The “purchaser” should be “an entity covered” by the 
GPA.535 Covered entities are required to be specified and listed in Appendix 1 of 
each Party’s schedule of commitments.536 Parties could modify and up-date their 
commitments in the schedules by adding to, or removing from the list, any entities in 
the annexes.  
 
                                                        
531
 Global Development Research Centre (GDRC), “A Quick Introduction to Green Procurement,” 
available at: http://www.gdrc.org/sustbiz/green/doc-proc_introduction.html (last visited 25/08/08). 
532
 Ibid. 
533
 Ibid. 
534
 On the concept of value for money, see supra, Chapter 3, Section 3.2.3.1 
535
 See GPA Art. 1. 
536
 See GPA Art. 1 Footnote 1, supra, Chapter 3, Section 3.2.2 
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The significance of including the entities in the annexes has been underlined by the 
Korea – Procurement ruling.537 In this case, the US laid a series of complaints of 
protectionist attitudes against Korea in its (Korea’s) procurement, for the 
construction of the Korea International Airport. To sustain an allegation of 
protectionism against a particular procurement exercise, the complainant must first 
establish that the entity that undertook the procurement was in fact a “covered 
entity” within the meaning of Appendix 1 Art.1 of the GPA. That is to say the entity 
has been listed in Annexes 1 to 3 of Appendix I relating respectively to "central 
government entities," "sub-central government entities" and "other entities". The 
Panel in this case found that the Korean entity that undertook the procurement was 
not a “covered entity” under the GPA, and as such the US could not sustain the 
complaint against Korea. 
 
It is also pertinent that the purchase is for non-commercial purposes of 
governmental functions. If the government is buying the goods or services for the 
purpose of, or “with a view to commercial resale, or with a view to use in the supply 
of services for commercial sale”,538 then it is not government procurement covered 
under the GPA. Such procurement should be covered by the GATT or GATS.  
b) The Supplier 
The supplier is the second pillar or element in GPP. The supplier is the contractor, 
bidder, or tenderer that responds to government’s invitation to tender or bid for the 
goods or services required. The national treatment obligation under Art. III of the 
GPA prohibits discrimination between domestic and foreign suppliers who are 
Parties to the GPA. In the same vein, by MFN obligation, discrimination is prohibited 
                                                        
537
 Korea –Procurement, supra, n. 198, para. 7.6. 
538
 See supra, Chapter 3 Section 3.3.2.1 on the exclusion of GP from the regulation of GATT and GATS. 
See also Presidential Candidates’ Key Proposals on Health Care and Climate Will Require WTO 
Modifications Overreach of WTO Highlighted by Potential Conflicts with Candidates’ Non-Trade 
Proposals, pp. 9-10 (Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch, Washington, DC, USA, February 2008), 
available at: http://www.citizen.org/documents/PresidentialWTOreport.pdf (accessed last: 07/10/08).   
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in the treatment given to foreign suppliers bidding in the domestic market of the 
procuring entity. Generally however, procuring authorities are to ensure, in setting 
conditions for supplier qualification that: 
“[a]ny conditions for participating in tendering procedures shall be limited to 
those which are essential to ensure the firm’s capacity to fulfil the contract in 
question.”539 
 
Pursuant to this provision therefore, procuring entity must ensure that suppliers are 
not excluded for reasons otherwise than their ability to perform the particular 
contract in question. “Ability” is determined in terms of technical and 
commercial/financial capacity of the supplier to perform the contract. Thus, while, 
arguably it is permissible for procuring entity in GPP to require from the supplier 
evidence of technical qualification and historical performances (past projects) to 
show its technical capability, it is debatable if evidence could be required of 
supplier’s general environmental management qualification, including ISO EMAS 
certification.540 This research however will suggest, for the purpose of climate 
change objective of particular procurement, that the procurement entity should 
demand evidence of supplier’s climate change mitigation credentials or inclinations. 
c) The green products and services: the Doha Negotiations 
Governments seek to use government procurement as a channel for diffusion of 
climate change mitigation goods and services.541 For effective GPP, therefore the 
purchasing entity should be conversant with the attributes of the “green” products 
                                                        
539
 GPA Art. VIII:(b) 
540
 See Kunzlik, International Procurement Regimes, supra, n. 170, p.119, 123. See also Kippo-Edlund, P., 
et al, Measuring the Environmental Soundness of Public Procurement in Nordic Countries, (Nordic 
Council of Ministers, Copenhagen: 2005), p. 13. Under the EU law on public procurement, it is considered 
that because they are “tailor-made” contents of the environmental programmes and environmental 
management schemes may differ in their contents from supplier to supplier. Thus it will be impossible to 
say generally that EMAS should be required as evidence of technical capacity to qualify for tendering. See 
more on this in Chapter 6, Section 6.4.  
541
 See also Cosbey, A. (Ed.). Trade and Climate Change: Issues in Perspective. (ICTSD/International 
Institute for Sustainable Development, 2008), p. 1. 
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and services to be procured.542 These attributes should be explicitly communicated 
to the suppliers. This is also part of the transparency requirements of the GPA.543 
These attributes are usually inserted in the “technical specifications” as well as 
“award criteria” sections of the tender notice. It is therefore essential to have a 
common understanding of what constitutes green products and services otherwise 
known as environmental goods and services (EGS)544. This common understanding 
is essential not only as between the procuring authorities and the suppliers, but 
indeed between countries at multilateral level.  This is because, to date, there exists 
no comprehensive or common understanding or classification of what should be 
regarded as EGS.545  
The need to have a common view of what constitutes EGS [and the sub-category of 
climate change goods and services (CGS)] emphasizes the importance of the 
current WTO round of multilateral trade negotiations, namely, the Doha Round. 
Liberalisation of EGS has, for the first time been on the WTO negotiating agenda 
under the Doha process. These are a part of the negotiations for market access of 
non-agricultural goods, which take place in the Negotiating Group on Market Access 
(NGMA).546 In relation to services, negotiations are held under the auspices of the 
Special Sessions of the Council for Trade in Services (CTS). The Committee on 
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 Teresa, J. E. I. S., Base Implementation of Executive 13101: Buying Environmentally Preferable 
Products and Services, (Thesis submitted to George Washington University Law School, July 2000, 29, 
available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA388232&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf 
(visited on 14/07/09). 
543
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Trade and Environment (CTE547) (Special Sessions) monitors the role over progress 
in the EGS negotiations and in particular, their definitional aspects and scope.  
 
Progress has been hampered partly by this definitional uncertainty of the EGS 
which, arguably, was created initially by the language of the Doha Ministerial 
Declaration (DMD) itself. The DMD gave the mandate for the accelerated 
liberalization of the EGS. Paragraph 31(i), (ii), and (iii) of the DMD instructs 
members to launch negotiations on the reduction or, as appropriate, elimination of 
tariff and non-tariff barriers to environmental goods and services "[w]ith a view to 
enhancing the mutual supportiveness of trade and environment, we agree to 
negotiations, without prejudging their outcome, on the reduction or, as appropriate, 
elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to environmental goods and services”548 It 
stopped there without defining the goods or services as the subjects of the 
liberalisation sought. 
 
And indeed no such definitions of EGS are available even in the GATT on the goods 
aspect of the negotiations, nor in the GATS on the services aspect. GATT has used 
the term “products” which for practical purposes would be synonymous to “goods”.  
As for “services”, Art. I(2) of the GATS, merely defines “trade in services”, and this is 
by reference to supply of the services in question to the consumer. Thus the AB in 
EC - Bananas III549 noted, in line with GATS Art. I:1, that GATS applies to measures 
by Members “affecting” trade in services. That is to say measures broadly having 
“an effect on” services. And by virtue of Art. I(3)(b), “services” includes any service 
                                                        
547
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in any sector except services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority.550 
Further, GATS Art. XXVIII(b) provides that the “’Supply of a services’ includes the 
production, distribution, marketing, sale, and delivery of a service.”551   
 
Thus “services” is an activity, or a series of activities, that goes with related goods or 
other services. At times, however, goods/products and service are interwoven to the 
extent that an adjudicating body will need to analyse and apply both the GATT and 
GATS simultaneously in order to sort out the issues in a particular dispute.552 With 
this void, created by the mandate itself, negotiating parties had to introduce start-up 
strategies which are presented here in brief thus:  
 
i) The List Approach: 
The OECD proposed a list approach by which they presented lists of industrial 
products for inclusion in the negotiating agenda for tariff elimination of reduction in 
line with the mandate. The products in the lists consisted of “technology input in 
fields such as sewage, clean water, climate change, noise abatement, and 
renewable energy.”553 This approach was supported by industrial nations.554 A 
corollary list was proposed by UNCTAD ostensibly to serve the developing country 
interests. This proposal consisted of defining a list of environmentally preferable 
products (EPPs) for the purpose of lowering or eliminating tariffs. The products 
suggested under this list, in view of both their nature and PPMs, are beneficial to the 
environment and potentially will serve sustainable development ends. The products 
include non-timber forest products such as jute and coir, eco-labelled products, 
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organic agricultural products, and biofuels such as ethanol and bio diesel. This 
proposal was endorsed by some industrialised countries too.555 
 
ii) The Project Approach 
The Environmental Project Approach (EPA), proposed mainly by India,556 and 
supported by many developing countries envisages an environment and sustainable 
development-motivated project in which goods and services would be required. 
These would then be eligible for preferential market access facilitation during the 
implementation of the particular project. This project will be “defined by national 
governments through a Designated National Authority (DNA), within parameters to 
be negotiated within the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment Special 
Session (CTESS).”557  
 
iii) The Integrated Approach  
This represents a combination of elements of both the list and project approaches 
earlier described. This proposal was initially tabled by Argentina.558 Under this 
proposal specific environmental projects will be identified by the CTE (Special 
Session). Goods and services required to execute these projects will automatically 
be included in the list so that preferential market access is accorded both the project 
and the accompanying goods and services. The list may be amended and/or 
updated periodically through negotiations.  
 
All of these proposals and the lists have been the subject of heated controversies 
among Members, indicating just how notoriously problematic the concept of EGS is 
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in trade regulation.559 This research will not delve into those controversies. Suffice it 
to say that these negotiations are an opportunity to be utilised for multiple benefits, 
namely, for the environment and climate change, while serving the acclaimed 
foundation of the Doha round itself, namely, development.  
5.2.2.3 The emerging concept of “climate-friendly” goods and services 
It is to be noted that it is out of the lists mentioned earlier that a sub-category of 
EGS has emerged, namely, the climate-friendly goods and services (CGS).560 This 
study sees this approach as innovative, which should also be pursued and 
consolidated at the Doha process. CGS, for the purpose of this research, are EGS 
whose manufacture and use generally results in less GHG emissions than their 
alternatives. Also, the IPCC has identified a range of such mitigation and adaptation 
technologies, programmes and projects that can assist in addressing the challenge 
of climate change.561 These can conveniently be included under this sub-category. 
The WB in a recent work on international trade and climate change562 has identified 
some 43 items that could be included in this sub-category.563 Similarly, in a more 
recent study564 on climate-related single-use environmental goods conducted 
under the auspices of IISD has focused extensive discussing on a few items under 
this sub-category. These are Wind Turbines, Solar Cells and Panels, Solar Water 
Heaters, Biofuels, Hydraulic Turbines, Building-Insulation Products, Efficient 
Lighting, Heat Pumps, Control Equipment, Electric Cars.565 These CGS lists could 
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 See Sampson, G. P., World Trade Organisation and Sustainable Development, United. Tokyo, JPN: 
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be harmonised and agrred upon by GPA Parties and then targeted as subject of 
preferential climate-friendly procurement. In this regard, the EU and the US in 
December 2007 made a submission at the negotiations proposing that priority be 
given to CGS linked to addressing climate change.  
 
With this recognition of specific CGS out of the larger grouping of EGS, this lends 
support for the proposition of this research that climate change challenge should be 
given a separate treatment among the multifarious trans-boundary environmental 
problems. CGS currently comprise about one-third of the EGS already identified by 
a group of delegations.566  
 
For practical purposes, as stated earlier, this carved out CGS list could be “agreed 
upon” by the GPA members and then attached as either an appendix or a reference 
paper to the GPA. The idea is to allow for Parties wishing to embark upon climate-
motivated to do so ensuring that their subject-matter of the procurement could be 
related to items included in the Appendix or reference list. The list could, in line with 
the third negotiating proposal for EGS, namely, project-based, could include 
projects. And for this purpose, as suggested by Cottier,567 projects ordinarily eligible 
for CDM listing could automatically fit into this concessional procurement list of the 
GPA.  
 
Thus, the pre-determination of what constitutes climate friendly goods and services 
serves the following objectives: 
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I. It makes it easier for both the procuring authority to identify or verify the 
products and services in the particular green procurement as climate friendly.  
II. It affords the procuring authority an opportunity to seek legal justification for 
the procurement as being prima facie motivated by climate change concerns 
III. It makes it easier for suppliers to supply what is clearly already identified 
through the indicative list. This makes a good case for transparency in 
government procurement. 
 
With the stagnation of the Doha negotiations now, and in order to facilitate some 
progress especially in the area of climate change mitigation aspects, the WB list of 
CGS designation can be endorsed at the WB members’ level, so as to serve as a 
guide for international standardizing bodies and in formulating national technical 
regulations. The list can even serve as the basis of what could be included or 
acceptable as climate-friendly goods and services.568  
 
While hopes are still being entertained for the resuscitation of the Doha 
negotiations, one may take a quick look at an example of GPP practice of the 
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA).569 SIDA defines 
green goods broadly as those “manufactured using renewable products … or using 
non-renewable products in a sustainable manner.” Their essential characteristics 
include that in their manufacture, use and disposal no harmful emissions are 
occasioned.570 These will be the main considerations in setting the technical 
specifications as well as evaluation and selection criteria for green products and 
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services. Generally the criteria, using whole-life cycle assessment (LCA) approach 
cover that whole-life cycle of the goods and services to be purchased. An LCA 
assessment of a product, services or process seeks to evaluate environmental 
effects of the product, process, or activity in a holistic approach. It looks at the entire 
life cycle of the product or process from raw materials extraction through consumer 
use to disposal the so-called “cradle to the grave” assessment approach.571 The 
figure below represents the stages of a product life-cycle: (1) material extraction, (2) 
material procession including recycling, (3) manufacturing/re-manufacturing, (4) 
use/re-use and (5) waste management which including reuse and disposal. 
 
Thus, green products and services include the products or services themselves and 
their PPMs, as well as considerations of the product’s environmental safety on 
disposal. It may also include consideration of the energy saving that may result from 
the re-usability or even re-manufacturability of the product. This therefore re-
emphasises the PPMs-related legal problems under the trade law. These problems 
and possible solutions are the subject-matter of discussions of chapters 6 and 7. 
5.3 Government procurement as climate change mitigation measure  
GPP, the focus of this research falls under environmental protection of these non-
trade concerns. Indeed, energy efficient GP was identified by the IPCC as an 
“environmentally efficient” policy tool to address climate change.572 Thus, countries 
started to implement GPP as domestic compliance measure to help address climate 
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change. Hence, discussions here will be devoted to GPP as a climate change 
mitigation measure. 
5.3.1 GPP as a domestic compliance measure  
In order to effectively address the climate change challenge, and also to meet their 
commitments under the Protocol, Annex I Parties must put in place domestic 
policies and measures.573 The Protocol thus called upon the Annex 1 countries to: 
“… strive to implement policies and measures [to combat climate change] 
under this Art. in such a way as to minimise adverse effects, including the 
adverse effects of climate change, effects on international trade, and social, 
environmental and economic impacts on the parties, especially developing 
country Parties."574  
The Protocol further provided for an indicative list of the “policies and measures” 
that might be adopted by the Parties pursuant to the above provision, and so as 
promote sustainable development. It requires each Annex-I Parties to, inter alia: 
(a) Implement and/or further elaborate policies and measures in 
accordance with its national circumstances, such as: 
(i)  Enhancement of energy efficiency in relevant sectors of the national 
economy 
(iv) Research on, and promotion, development and increased use of, 
new and renewable forms of energy, of carbon dioxide sequestration 
technologies and of advanced and innovative environmentally sound 
technologies. 575 
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It is clear from the above provision that countries are not instructed to implement 
any specific type of measure.576 Parties are thus free to enact those measures, or a 
combination of measures deemed appropriate to meet their GHG reduction 
commitments. Pursuant to the above mandate the Parties especially the OECD 
member countries have engaged in a number of actions and policies to mitigate 
climate change. They use the so-called “portfolio approach”, using multiplicity of 
relevant sectors and actors involved in the energy, environment and trade arenas. 
One of the most effective courses of action suggested as part of the solution to 
climate change is recourse to human ingenuity and creativeness which, rather 
paradoxically, “got us into our greenhouse mess”.577  
 
If utilised effectively, GPP can engender innovation in new technology and modes of 
production thereby complementing other policies targeted at climate change 
mitigation and adaptation programmes.578 Thus, many of the UNFCCC Annex I 
parties have incorporate GPP within the overall climate change and energy policy 
package.579 The drive to local innovation580 in the long run will translate into financial 
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savings, while achieving local environmental, social and health goals which are all 
associated with global sustainability.581 Through GPP, Parties aim also at directing 
their expenditure and power towards encouraging investment in and innovation of 
new cleaner technologies for both products and services, and production processes 
that are more climate-friendly.582  
 
Ultimately, these climate-friendly technologies as manufactured en mass could 
reduce pressure on the climate system by the reduced GHG emission resulting from 
both their production and usage. Therefore, the massive capital spending in 
government purchases pursuant to this objective could well be targeted in the 
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direction of climate-friendly goods and services. In this wise, the EU Environmental 
Technologies Action Plan583 also sees green public procurements part of a broader 
strategy to motivate innovation.584  
5.3. 2 GPP as a “leading by example” tool  
With GPP, which is a market-based, rather than traditional command and control 
(legislation) approach, Kyoto Parties are also aiming to lead by example in the 
action against global warming. They seek to also improve their public image and 
increase their legitimacy as contributing to global sustainability.585 As governments 
acts as both a regulator and participant in the procurement market, their actions, 
including greening of the process, naturally will be looked upon by other players in 
the market.586 This will incentivise the private sector and individual citizens to also 
make their contribution.587  
 
Private sector and individual citizens’ contribution may manifest in the form of 
supporting other climate change related policies. They will for instance embrace in 
good faith carbon, green congestion or “gas guzzler” taxes. Similarly citizens will 
                                                        
583
 (COM (2004) 38 (final). 
584
 See Guide On Dealing With Innovative Solutions In Public Procurement: 10 elements of good practice 
(Commission Staff Working Document), SEC (2007) 280, p. 3 (available at: http://www.proinno-
europe.eu/doc/procurement_manuscript.pdf)  
585
 See Clement, S., et al, The Procura+ (Manual: A Guide to Cost-Effective Sustainable Public 
Procurement) (2nd edition) (ICLEI European Secretariat, 2007) at p. 9. 
586
 See also McCrudden, supra, n. 523 at pp. 378-379 (discussing the significance of using public 
procurement as a tool for governments to use in showing leadership and to encourage the observance, by 
private business, of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in their purchases and operations. He cited the 
UK government practice as an example. See p. 387). 
587 An example is the requirement by UK government under the Display Energy Certificates (DECs) 
scheme for building to display the extent of energy of buildings, which comes into effect from 1 October 
2008. In order to support the new measures prior to the implementation start-up time of October 2008, 
public authorities are already producing DECs ahead of October and a range of buildings now have the 
certificates including Eland House and the Natural History Museum. See Display Energy Certificates 
(DEC) and Advisory Reports (AR): Transitional arrangements for buildings on a site or campus, 
(Department for Communities and Local Government, London UK, August 2008), available at: 
http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/planningandbuilding/pdf/919529.pdf (accessed 31/08/08). See 
also Energy Performance Certificates (EPC) which is part of a series of measures being introduced across 
Europe to reflect legislation which will help cut buildings’ carbon emissions and tackle climate change. 
(http://campaigns.direct.gov.uk/epc/ ) 
  
152
 
tend to show more understanding if, for instance, green procurement policy results 
in higher electricity bills on them. Higher costs borne by them will in due course be 
translated into “asset” as this makes them change their behaviours and attitude to 
energy usage: making them conserve more energy, and use it more efficiently. 
Green procurement thus potentially instils in the private sector and private citizens 
the sense of discipline so that they use their energy more efficiently. Indeed it will 
encourage private business, as McCrudden588 has shown, to also initiate other 
voluntary activities and measures to serve as part of their CSR. 
5.4 Global and national initiatives on green/sustainable procurement 
In recognition of the value added by GPP to the efforts targeted at climate change 
and sustainable economic development, several initiatives and programmes have 
started at global, regional and national levels to promote it. The following 
paragraphs highlight such initiatives. 
5.4.1 The United Nations 
At global level, the UN guidelines for consumer protection call on governments and 
international agencies to ensure sustainable practices in their operations, 
particularly through their procurement policies. The guidelines cited government 
procurement as an “appropriate” avenue through which to encourage the 
“development and use of environmentally sound products and services.”589 The 
guidelines also warned that GP policies should “not become barriers to international 
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trade and that they are consistent with international trade obligations.”590 The UNEP 
is one of the UN designated agencies coordinating the development of 
environmental policies.591 UNEP supports green and sustainable procurement 
initiatives especially under Marrakesh Task Forces, a framework for promoting 
sustainable consumption and production.592 UNEP generally promotes exchange of 
information regarding stakeholder experiences gained in sustainable procurement 
initiatives and activities around the globe.593  
5.4.2 The World Bank 
The WB’s Environment Department collaborates with other departments including 
the Operational and Country Procurement Services Group, to promote what the WB 
calls environmentally and socially responsible procurement (ESRP). The ESRP 
program works to green the specifications for the Bank’s corporate and operational 
procurement. It also strengthens the requirements for procurement related to Bank-
funded projects. The objective is “to better reflect global environmental concerns 
such as biodiversity, climate change, the ozone layer, and persistent organic 
pollutants.”594 So far, the WB’s focus in this regard, is mainly to educate and create 
more awareness and train staff and schedule officers on how to develop bidding 
documents and the drafting clauses for technical specifications which incorporate 
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accessed 03/08/08), especially at pp. 72-79. For more on the task force and the regional and national policy 
responses and activities see UN Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD), “Overview of progress 
towards sustainable development: a review of the implementation of Agenda 21, the Programme for the 
Further Implementation of Agenda 21 and the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation Report of the 
Secretary-General,” (CSD Fourteenth session 1-12 May 2006), p. 24. 
593
 See UNEP at www.uneptie.org/pc/sustain/  See also Polak, J., The Climate Change Difference, 
Government Procurement / October 2003, p.13.   
594
 See The World Bank’s Operational and Corporate Commitments at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ESSDNETWORK/Resources/481106-1129303936381/1777397-
1129303967165/Chapter6.html (last visited 03/08/08).  
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environmental concerns.595 In 1998, the WB collaborated too with the World Wildlife 
Fund for Nature (WWF) to institute green procurement in forestry. 
5.4.3 The OECD 
The OECD also has made immense progress in the area of GPP. Greener 
purchasing initiatives in the OECD member countries dates back to 1996596 when 
the Recommendation of the Council on Improving the Environmental Performance 
of Government, 1996,597 was adopted. This recommendation served as formal 
declaration of “support for the use of environmentally-preferable public procurement 
practices” of the member countries. The recommendation called upon member 
countries “to take concrete steps to ensure the incorporation of environmental 
criteria into public procurement of products and services,” and suggested the steps 
to be employed to achieve that end. Just like the WB’s, this recommendation also 
warned that GPP measures should not create unnecessary obstacle to, or be a 
disguised discrimination contrary to, international trade regulations.598 The OECD 
organised workshops and produced publications which most focussed on “policy 
reviews of GPP programmes and initiatives as practiced in OECD member 
countries, as well as examined the institutional factors which facilitate or hinder their 
success.”599  
                                                        
595
 Ibid. 
596
 See OECD, The Environmental Performance of Public Procurement: Issues of Policy Coherence, 
(OECD, 2003), p. 5. 
597
 OECD Council Recommendation: C(96)39/FINAL dated 21-Mar-1996. This recommendation which 
was also reiterated in the OECD Recommendation of the Council on Improving the Environmental 
Performance of Public Procurement of 23 January 2002 [OECD document no. C(2002)3 available at: 
www.webdomino1.oecd.org/horitontal/oecdacts.nsf/linktoC(2002)3]. 
598
 See OECD Environmental Strategy for the First Decade of the 21st Century, part of the environment 
vision adopted by OECD Environment Ministers in May 2001. See Ibid., p. 15. 
599See OECD, Greener Public Purchasing: Issues and Practical Solutions, supra n. 219; See also Trade 
Issues in the Greening of Public Purchasing [COM/TD/ENV(97)111/FINAL] (available also at 
http://www.oecd.org/ech/docs/envi.htm ). See also a note on Sustainable Public Procurement: Issues 
Facing the Marrakech Process Task Force on Sustainable Public Procurement, prepared for the 1st SPP 
Task Force Meeting, Jongny sur Vevey (Switzerland), 2006, 
http://eea.eionet.europa.eu/Public/irc/envirowindows/scp_procurement/library?l=/background_papers/back
ground_paperdoc/_EN_1.0_&a=d (accessed: 21/04/08) 
  
155
 
5.4.4 The European Union 
The EU has relatively a more mature GPP system. It will be seen in chapter 6600 
how GPP in the EU has become an integral part of its portfolio approach to 
environmental and energy policies of the EU. So far, green criteria have started 
appearing significantly in tenders of seven of the 27 EU Member States. These 
include Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland 
and the UK representing more than 40 per cent of tenders published in the year 
2007.601  
 
5.4.5 GPP and developing countries  
The performance of developing countries in the area of green procurement and the 
challenges they face is considered a subject of another and more extensive study. 
However, as developing countries are partners in the global fight against 
environmental degradation, it pertinent to include a few remarks as are relevant to 
the points being made in the discourse. The participation of developing countries in 
climate change mitigation efforts however has been controversial as the UNFCCC 
and Kyoto Protocol do not impose on them legal obligations to reduce their 
emissions. This is in view of the fact that they did not contribute, historically, to the 
current deplorable state of the global climate. Secondly, developing countries have 
low capacity to address environmental challenges which mostly require capital-
intensive programmes and projects.602 They lack the technology to produce and 
                                                        
600
 See infra, Chapter 6 Section 6.6 
601
 See The power of green public procurement in the EU, at Climate Action, at: 
http://www.climateactionprogramme.org/features/Art./the_power_of_green_public_procurement_in_the_e
u/ 9last accesses 13/02/09). 
602 See The Economist [Sep 12th 2008 (online edition)], Climate change and the poor: Adapt or die -Poor 
countries are hit hardest by global warming. The story indicated, as the IPCC and the Stern Review on the 
Economics of Climate Change reports had warned, the “poorest, a billion people in 100 countries”, would 
be affected most adversely by climate change. Coping with climate change, according to a UNDP and other 
authoritative sources, would cost the developing world “tens of billions of dollars” annually. With the 
current aid standing at a meagre $300m, developing countries will then have to do it all themselves, thus 
paying for “the sins of their neighbours” available at 
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market climate-friendly products and services that meet up the standards required 
at international procurement markets. GPP will therefore mean opening up of 
markets for green goods and services produced by developed countries into 
developing countries.  
 
The above are the real issues being raised, including at conferences.603 Friends of 
the Earth (FoE), an international environmental NGO, has voiced such concerns 
citing, for example Malaysia’s complaints against Japan’s green purchasing law and 
policy as constituting a non-tariff barrier against Malaysa’s exports thus:604 
“The law on Promoting Green Purchasing, implemented on 1 April 2001, has 
designated several products of export interest to Malaysia, the procurement 
of which will need to comply with the law. The law enforces stringent 
‘evaluation criteria’, such as recycling and reuse, and minimal impact on the 
environment upon disposal. [There is also an] unrealistic target for suppliers 
to meet 100 per cent of the evaluation criteria by end of 2001. Adaption 
takes time and this is causing disadvantage to Malaysian exports.”605 
 
Already, the WTO GPA requires more transparency and the opening up of domestic 
procurement markets to international competition. Thus, in the absence of any 
special provision or arrangement to address this capacity building issue, developing 
countries may be alienated further from the GPA, and consequently further disabled 
to participate in procurement market for green goods and services. This is an area 
where further research would be required. It ought to be mentioned however that 
                                                                                                                                                             
http://www.economist.com/research/Arts.BySubject/displayStory.cfm?story_id=12202374&amp;subjectID
=348924&amp;fsrc=nwl (accessed: 19/09/08). 
603
 See Commission's green procurement plans heavily criticized, published Monday 16 August 2004 and 
Updated: Thursday 9 November 2006, at Euractiv Forum Europe Conference report 2004: 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/environment/commission-green-procurement-plans-heavily-criticised/Art.-
114854 (last accessed 12/08/08). 
604
 WTO document: TN/MA/W/25/Add.2 
605
 See Selected notifications of non-tariff barriers in the Non-Agricultural Market Access, WTO talks - 
compiled by Friends of the Earth International April, 2005 (TN/MA/W/25/Add.2), available at 
http://www.foe.co.uk/resource/evidence/non_tariff_barriers.pdf  (accessed 05/11/08). 
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despite these constraints on the developing countries, Taiwan (Republic of China)606 
has the credit of being the first country in the world (developed countries inclusive) 
to legislate for green procurement.607   
 
On the wider issue of the interaction between environmental policies and trade, the 
WTO jurisprudence has started to look in-wards seeking to give special 
consideration to the above stated constraints of the developing countries. For 
instance, the AB in the recent Brazil – Tyres ruling, in applying the necessity test 
under GATT Art. XX(b), considered the reality of the conditions in Brazil, a 
developing country, and rejected the alternative measures suggested by the EC as 
less trade-restricting than the measure instituted by Brazil (total import ban). 608   
5.5 Summary 
This chapter, broadly, discussed the evolution of the concept of GPP and its 
processes. The primary aim of procurement is to deliver value for the tax-payers’ 
money. The protection of the environment is thus an added value of the GPP. The 
chapter saw the connection between GPP policy objectives and practices, on the 
one hand, and climate change mitigation strategies, on the other. GPP was 
promoted as a component of sustainable procurement, by multilateral agencies and 
regional economic integration organisations. GPP also features in the environment 
and energy polices of the member countries to these institutions. This was all in 
pursuance of the principle of sustainable development as developed from the 
UNCHE, UNCED and the WSSD.  
                                                        
606
 Taiwan (Republic of China) should not to be confused with the People’s Republic of China (popularly 
known as “China”) which is not the reference point here. See Taiwan’s Government Information office 
website at: http://www.gio.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=18690&CtNode=2579&mp=807 (last visited 07/06/10) 
607 The Government Procurement Law of 1998 of the Republic of China, under Art. 96, states that 
government agencies may give preference to the purchase of environmental-friendly (green) products. See 
Lai, M. S. and Yu, N., “The Current Status of Green Procurement in Taiwan, ROC,” Special Reports 
(Environment and Development Foundation, Hsinchu, Taiwan, ROC) (undated but estimated 2002) 
available at: http://proj.moeaidb.gov.tw/isdn/sidn/3-2/special.htm (last visited 12/08/08). 
608
 Ibid. paras. 171-175. See infra, Chapter 7, Section 7.3.1.5(c). 
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The chapter also discussed the trade connection of the GPP. Green or climate-
friendly products and services are by nature based on non-product related PPMs. 
This brought into play the question whether GPP in fact constitutes non-tariff barrier 
or in any way discriminatory contrary to the trade rules. This question becomes 
even more prominent because GPP permits the use of international standards and 
eco-labelling in designing technical specifications for the products and services to 
be procured. This aspect is considered in detail in the following chapter. 
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PART III 
 
 
THE SCOPE AND POLICY SPACE FOR GPP UNDER 
THE GPA: EXAMINING THE PPMS DEBATE AND THE 
EXPERIENCE UNDER THE EU SYSTEM 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE SCOPE FOR GPP UNDER THE GPA AND EU LAW: 
PRODUCT/SERVICES SPECIFICATIONS AND THE “PPMs” QUESTION 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter addresses the likely legal issues that arise when environmental 
considerations are incorporated into procurement processes. It specifically looks at 
GPA regulations concerning product specifications and supplier conditions for 
participation vis-à-vis climate-friendly procurement practices. To serve as an 
illustration of the issues being discussed, the chapter will have a brief609 look at GPP 
practice under the EU procurement system.  It was indicated in chapter 2, the fears 
expressed by commentators in the academia, on the potential for GPP to be 
problematic under the WTO rules. They opined, for instance, that differential 
treatment prohibited by WTO rules “could occur in [inter alia] … the [technical] 
specifications in tenders and in specifying condition(s) for participating in 
government procurement bids”610 Thus, the chapter looks more closely at GPP 
practice, including how product/services technical specifications are designed.  
 
The requirement in tender notices for environmental and energy efficiency 
standards of product/services usually give rise to PPMs questions.611 One fear is the 
use of non-product related PPMs to covertly protect domestic industry or suppliers. 
To address this concern, the GPA requires that such specifications should be based 
on international standards where available and appropriate, or national technical 
regulations. Also eco-labels could be used to identify or describe the products and 
                                                        
609
 The examination of the GPP under the EU and GPA is brief here for space-saving. This is because the 
author has published a paper on the subject. See Malumfashi, G. I., supra, n. 11. 
610
 See for instance, Zhang and Assunção, supra, n. 149. 
611
 See supra chapter 2, section 2.2.3.  
  
161
 
services needed. The question is to what extent is this requirement a solution to the 
problem of protectionism based on non-product related PPMs?  
 
Another area of concern relates to the extent of the procurement entities’ freedom to 
set the conditions for the suppliers’ participation in the process. That is to say can 
they require tenderers to show technical environmental management certification or 
qualification? The GPA provides that only those conditions relevant to the supplier’s 
ability to perform the contract in question should be included. This is to guard 
against unjustifiably disqualifying an otherwise qualified potential bidder.  
 
The chapter in section 2 identifies the main GPA provisions regulating generally the 
use of technical specifications in GP tendering processes. Section 3 introduces the 
basic features of the EU GPP system as compared with the GPA’s approach. 
Section 4 discusses the GPP in the context of the debate on PPMs. Section 5 
discusses how GPP processes could result in de-facto discrimination contrary to the 
GPA non-discrimination norms under Art. III. Section 6 will conclude the discourse. 
6.2 Regulation of technical specifications in tendering under the GPA 
6.2.1 Technical specifications stage and its significance in GPP process 
The technical specifications stage is a key feature of GP processes.612 This stage 
signifies the part of the tender notice where the goods or services are described in 
detail so that prospective tenderers or suppliers are clearly and adequately informed 
of what the procuring entity requires in the particular procurement exercise. The 
stage affords the opportunity for procuring entity to include climate-friendly attributes 
of the goods and services required. The provisions of Art. VI of the GPA regulate 
the use of technical specifications, in relation to goods, services and their 
                                                        
612
 See OECD, Trade Issues in the Greening of Public Purchasing, 
OECD/TD/ENVIRONMENT(97)/111/FINAL, (Paris, 1999) p. 12, available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/17/7/39919037.pdf (last visited 15/03/08). 
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processes. These provisions guide procuring entities to observe the disciplines of 
non-discrimination as well as transparency in their GP procedures.  
 
Art. VI of the GPA on technical specifications states, in part: 
1. Technical specifications laying down the characteristics of the 
products or services to be procured, such as quality, performance, safety 
and dimensions, symbols, terminology, packaging, marking and labelling, or 
the processes and methods for their production and requirements relating to 
conformity assessment procedures prescribed by procuring entities, shall not 
be prepared, adopted or applied with a view to, or with the effect of, creating 
unnecessary obstacles to international trade. 
2. Technical specifications prescribed by procuring entities shall, where 
appropriate: 
(a) be in terms of performance rather than design or descriptive 
characteristics; and 
(b) be based on international standards, where such exist; otherwise, on 
national technical regulations, recognized national standards. or 
building codes.613 (Emphasis added) 614 
Thus, technical specifications should define the general and specific characteristics 
of a product or service, including levels of quality, performance, safety and 
dimensions as well as marking and labelling and other features, so as to distinguish 
it from other products and services in the same category.615 The function of 
technical specifications therefore is to generally stipulate measurable requirements 
for the evaluation of tenders, thereby providing the prospective tenderers with the 
                                                        
613
 This provision has 2 footnotes (Nos. 3 and 4) which provided definitions for national “technical 
regulations” and “national standards” respectively. See below: Sections 3.2 (b) and (c). 
614
 There is as yet no WTO judicial interpretation or jurisprudence on the above provisions of the GPA. 
However, “technical regulations” are essentially a subject of two other WTO agreements: the Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) and the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) (See WTO Agreement Series, Vol. 4 available at www.wto.org). 
“Technical specifications” are defined in these agreements in similar terms as the GPA Art. VI above, with 
minor variations.  
615
 See also the UK government procurement guidelines at BERR (Department for Business, Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform), Procurement manual Section H: guide to the European Union services directive & 
WTO government procurement agreement (GPA) available at BERR website: 
http://www.berr.gov.uk/aboutus/procurement/buyers-guides/page22752.html (last visited: 21/10/08). 
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minimum compliance criteria for the particular procurement.616 Specifically, technical 
specifications should set “the minimum quality standard acceptable for the 
performance of the contract in question.”617 Technical specifications may thus 
include the environmental characteristics, processes and production methods, or 
specific environmental effects of product or services.618 
 
By informing the tenderers what is required of them, technical specifications stage is 
thus targeted at safe-guarding equal treatment towards all suppliers pursuant to the 
non-discrimination requirements of Art. III of the GPA. In this regard, also, Art. VII:2 
requires entities to provide suppliers with information in a manner that will “not 
preclude competition, nor have that effect.” This stage thus serves to ensure 
transparency in GP.619 
 
Technical specifications in GPP therefore are about setting consideration of 
environmental externalities (additional effects on the environment of the purchase 
and use of products or services) which were not paid for by the manufacturer or 
consumer. These externalities could relate to the product itself at the level of 
consumption, or the PPMs at the level of production.620 The PPMs are relevant and 
strategic in GPP in two senses or levels:  
a) they could indicate how much energy was used and/or saved in producing a 
particular product or performance of a particular service, for instance, in 
                                                        
616
 See EC, Buying Green, Supra, n. 168, p. 17. 
617
 See UK Government Timber Procurement Policy: Timber Procurement Advice Note, November 2005 
available from the CPET website: www.proforest.net/cpet  
618
 See also Directive 2004/18/EC, supra, n. 361, particularly Section 9 thereof, for discussions on 
environmental specifications of the product in procurement process. 
619
 In particular Art. VII:1 requires each Party to the GPA to ensure that its tendering procedures are 
applied in a non-discriminatory manner, referring also to Arts. VII – XVI on tendering processes. See 
supra, Chapter 3, Section 3.4.1.  
620
 See, WTO, World Trade Report 2005: Exploring the links between trade, standards and the WTO, 
(WTO Secretariat, Geneva, 2008)  at p. 49. 
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producing energy efficient computers, or generating electricity. It may also 
be included here, a consideration of the “type” of energy used in the 
process, namely whether it was produced from a renewable source or that 
produced from conventional fossil-based sources.  
b) they indicate how the product performs or how the service is being rendered, 
in terms of energy efficiency, and general environment-friendliness. 
The above scenario in (b) is distinguished from (a) in that while (a) relates to the 
production processes and methods of a particular product or services, (b) relates to 
the working or performance of the product or service specifically in terms of energy 
efficiency and general environment-friendliness. That will mean, in the case of a 
climate-friendly “product,” for instance, a more energy-efficient computer (in terms of 
its PPMs) would be preferable to one that is less energy efficient even if the two 
computers are not only physically the same, and perform efficiently the normal 
purpose for which computers are required. But an energy-efficient computer (in 
terms of its lower energy consumption in terms of performance) would be even 
more preferable. Compliance with such requirement is usually indicated by the 
packaging system or the labelling printed on the products.621 And this makes the 
issue of eco-labelling relevant.  
 
In the case of a climate-friendly “service” procurement, procuring entity (for 
instance, local public transport service), would specify that the required public 
transport service should be provided by a company whose: (i) bus fleet themselves 
were manufactured through energy efficient methods, and that (ii) bus fleets use 
certain minimum percentage of the fuel (electricity) generated from renewable 
energy or biofuels. It will make matters more complex in this regard if the fuel-
related requirement adds that the renewable fuel (e.g. biofuels) should itself be 
                                                        
621
 Where such packaging or labelling proliferates, then this may bring about problems of their authenticity, 
which then calls for the need coordination and certification by recognised body or institution. 
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shown to have been produced or generated through the use of sustainably 
managed biomass.622 Further, that the supplier of the service must show an EMS 
certification.  Thus, in GPP, the technical specifications could refer to the products 
or services to be procured, but could also indicate the intrinsic values of the 
products and services which may or may not be physically discernible or even 
relevant in terms of the performance of the final product, or the delivery of the 
service. These are the types of requirements generally feared to potentially 
constitute a non-tariff barrier623 in international trade which the DDA is inter alia set 
to eliminate.624  
6.2.2 Conditions governing technical specifications 
Where a procuring entity inserts climate-friendly considerations in tender notices, it 
should bear in mind the GPA requirements in that regard thus: 
1. technical specifications should where “appropriate,” be based on international 
standards, where such exist; otherwise, on national technical regulations, 
recognized national standards or building codes.625 
2. eco-labelling could be used as evidence of compliance with a specified standard 
for the product or services.626     
3. technical specifications should relate to the performance rather than 
characteristics or descriptive design of the products.627 
                                                        
622 See New Zealand Procurement Policy, Ministry of Economic Development, Manatu Ohanga, 
Government Procurement Standards and Targets, available at: 
http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/ContentTopicSummary____29449.aspx  (last visited 08/10/08). 
623 According to the WTO, there is no official definition of a non-tariff barrier but, in general terms, it refers 
to “any measure other than a tariff which protects domestic industry.” Agreements such as the SPS and 
TBT aim at allowing governments to take due care of these legitimate goals while minimizing the impact 
on trade and avoiding the temptation to use them as disguised protectionism. See 
http://www.wto.org/English/tratop_e/markacc_e/nama_negotiations_e.htm (accessed 27/06/08). 
624
 See supra, Chapter 5, Section 5.2. 
625
 GPA Art. VI (2), 
626
 Ibid., Art. VI:2(b) 
627
 Ibid., Art. VI:2(a) 
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The above rules are also to be considered against the chapeau to Art. VI, namely, 
technical specifications should not be “prepared, adopted or applied with a view to, 
or with the effect of, creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade.” These 
conditions are discussed below in the light of GPP policies and practice. 
6.2.2.1 International standards 
Unlike the TBT and SPS Agreements, the GPA has not specifically defined an 
international standard to form the basis for technical specifications.628 Standards are 
usually set by recognised international bodies. They incorporate the views and 
expertise of a very wide range of interests from consumers, academia, special 
interest groups, government, business and industry.629 Thus, an international 
standard for the purpose of the GPA Art. VI:2 may mean that which is developed 
multilaterally and with the involvement of all relevant stakeholders.630  Footnote 4 to  
GPA Art. VI(2) above, requires that a standard should be “a document approved by 
a recognized body”. As no “recognised body” has been defined by the GPA, this 
may mean a body recognised at an intergovernmental level, or with membership 
composed of a combination of governments, private sector and non-governmental 
organisations.631 The International Standardisation Organisation (ISO)632 can be an 
                                                        
628
 Indeed it is only the SPS Agreement that has defined comprehensively what international standards are 
to be covered by the Agreement. Annex A paragraph 3 on International standards, guidelines and 
recommendations. The TBT agreement, on the other hand, merely says that “standards prepared by the 
international standardization community are based on consensus.”   
629
 Standards thus represent a consensus on current best practice. http://www.bsi-global.com/en/Standards-
and-Publications/About-standards/Differences-between-Consensus-and-Commissioned-standards/   
630
 A “standard,” however, has been defined by the Concise Oxford Dictionary is “a level of quality or 
attainment…. Something used as a measure, norm, or model in comparative evaluations”. See 10th Revised 
Edition edited by Judy Pearsall, 2001, p. 1399. 
631
 Indeed, GATS Art. VI.5(b) under footnote 3, has defined “Relevant international organizations” for the 
purpose of GATS Art. VI.5(a),_as those open to all WTO Members.  
632 ISO is one of the world's foremost developers of voluntary technical standards, and seeks to establish a 
“bridge between the public and private sectors” on formulation and certifications of industry standard. See 
ISO website at http://www.iso.org/iso/about.htm (accessed last 10/08/08).  
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example of such an international body is the Indeed, ISO is the “the world’s largest 
developer of standards” according to the World Trade Report 2005.633 
6.2.2.2  Appropriateness of International Standards 
 The GPA requirement of technical specifications to be based on international 
standard applies only where such a standard is “appropriate”. This term 
“appropriate” however has not been defined by the GPA. This omission has already 
been seen as a “potential loophole in the GPA.”634 Literally, appropriate could mean 
“suitable”.635 Thus it is suitable for the purpose intended, an international standards 
that exists alongside national technical regulations, national standards or building 
codes, should used as basis for technical specifications. This interpretation could be 
justified by the term “otherwise” in the same paragraph (b).636 The effect of this is to 
give international standards a superior position or preferential treatment among the 
alternative sources listed in that paragraph.  However, it is still not clear what the 
legal effect will be if technical specifications are not based on international 
standards, but on one or more of the other sources in the list. In other words, there 
is no specific sanction for non-compliance, or reward for compliance. That may 
inform the view held by some commentators including van Calster that use of 
international standards as basis of technical specifications under the GPA is merely 
optional.637  
 
The provisions of GPA on the use of international standards could be contrasted 
with those of the TBT and SPS agreements dealing also with the subject of 
standards. The approach used both in the TBT and SPS agreements is that of 
                                                        
633
 See generally, WTO,  World Trade Report 2005, supra, n. 621. 
634
 See Hoekman, B. M., and  Mavroidis, P. C., supra, n. 264, p. 7. 
635
 See Concise Oxford Dictionary (10th Edition), supra, n. 687. 
636
 GPA Art. VI:2(b) 
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 See Van Calster, G., surpa n. 38, p. 302. 
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explicitness. The TBT Agreement requires638 national technical regulations to be 
based on international standards, where they exist and are not inappropriate or 
ineffective.639 Indeed, the TBT Agreement explicitly provides that basing national 
technical regulations on relevant and appropriate international standards leads to 
presumption, though rebuttable, that the regulations are not more trade restrictive 
than necessary to fulfil the legitimate objectives aimed at.640 Thus, it seems safe to 
suggest that the meaning of “appropriateness” here is with reference to the actual 
relevance of the content of the standards and not just its hierarchy, namely, its 
being “international” and not national. 
 
Similarly, under Art. 3 of the SPS Agreement, Members should mandatorily base 
their sanitary or phytosanitary measures, for the protection of risk to human, animal 
or plant life or health, on international standards where they exist.641 Thus, 
international standard is the bench-mark for the required level protection of risk to 
human, animal or plant life or health. Indeed, the SPS Agreement went a step 
further and allowed Members to adopt a sanitary or phytosanitary measure which 
provides a higher level of protection than what relevant international standards 
                                                        
638 The term used in TBT Art. 2 is: “shall use” denoting a duty. See Bernstein, S. and Hannah, E., Non-state 
global standard setting and the WTO: legitimacy and the need for Regulatory Space, JIEL (Advanced 
access published July 19, 2008), pp. 1-34, at p. 12. 
639
 TBT Agreement Art. 2.4. Note however that TBT generally doesn’t apply to transactions generally 
covered by the GPA. TBT Art. 1.4 provides that Purchasing specifications prepared by governmental 
bodies for production or consumption requirements of governmental bodies are not subject to the 
provisions of this Agreement but are addressed in the Agreement on Government Procurement, according 
to its coverage. 
640
 TBT Art. 2.5. The legitimate objectives for which technical regulations may be maintained are stated in 
Art. 2.4. They include, inter alia: national security requirements; the prevention of deceptive practices; 
protection of human health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the environment.   
641
 The relevant international standards for the purpose of SPS Agreement are those developed by 
FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission and the International Animal Health Organization (Office 
International des Epizooties) for food available and animal health respectively. These are available at: 
http://www.codexalimentarius.net/web/index_en.jsp and (accessed 18 October, 2008). And international 
standards for plant health are those issued by the FAO’s Secretariat of the International Plant Protection 
Convention, available at: https://www.ippc.int/IPP/En/default.jsp (accessed 18 October 2008). 
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provide, provided that there should be scientific justification for this.642 The AB in EC 
- Hormones643 ruling confirmed this position. In other words, SPS Members may 
maintain whichever of the two standards (international or national) that results in a 
higher level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection. Subjecting the use of stricter 
SPS standard than the level required by international standards to scientific risk 
assessment has been described by Melaku Desta as a “delicate compromise” 
between the need for industrialised countries of the WTO to  maintain high 
standards and the developing countries members to safe-guard their market access 
in agricultural commodities.644 
6.2.2.3  International environmental standards as specifications in GPP  
For the purpose of GPP, international standards to be used could include those 
international environmental standards developed by international standardisation 
bodies concerned with environmental protection and management. The ISO has 
developed a series of such standards.645 These standards assist entities in 
preparing step-by-step implementation plans to adopt an adequate and effective 
                                                        
642
 SPS Agreement Art. 3.3. See also WTO brief: Understanding the WTO: The Agreements, at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm4_e.htm (accessed 18/10/08).  
643
 EC – Hormones (ABR), supra, n. 31, para. 127. See also infra, Chapter 7, Section 7.3.2 
644
 See Desta, M. G, EU Sanitary Standards and Sub-Saharan African Agricultural Exports: A Case Study 
of the Livestock Sector in East Africa, [The Law and Development Review manuscript 1002) 2008], p. 21. 
645 The ISO series include the ISO 14000 and 14001 for environmental management systems (EMS). ISO 
14001 is an internationally accepted standard which sets out how to establish effective environmental 
management systems (EMS) by firms. ISO 14000 environmental standards are divided into six categories: 
(1) environmental management systems; (2) environmental auditing; (3) environmental performance 
evaluation; (4) environmental labelling; (5) life-cycle assessment; and (6) environmental aspects in product 
standards. See Egger, M., “Are ISO standards a suitable instrument for supporting a sustainable banana 
economy?” available at:  
<www.bananalink.org.uk/documents/ISO_as_suitable_instrument_for_sustainability_by_M_Egger.doc>. 
Indeed ISO 14001 is reputed as the “second most global standard”. Its recognition and use spread to “over 
90,000 organisations in 127 countries”. The standard is designed for organisations to balance profitability 
and reducing environmental impact and working to achieve both objectives. see BSI British Standards at 
http://www.bsi-global.com/en/Standards-and-Publications/About-BSI-British-Standards/ (accessed last 
15/11/08) 
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environmental management system, conduct proper environmental audits, and 
successfully become registered to ISO 14001.646 
 
There are however thorny associated legal and ethical issues as the above 
arrangements relate to international trade. These issues also surround the 
questions of appropriateness of international standards. These include: 
1) For international environmental standards to be appropriate for the purpose 
of technical specifications, they, inter alia “need to reflect the particular 
environmental and developmental context to which they apply,”647 and that 
they do not unnecessarily constitute a non-tariff barrier to cross-border trade, 
or cause additional economic and social cost to others, particularly 
developing countries.648  
2) Generally, under both the TBT and SPS agreements, international standards 
would be inappropriate if they are not based on sound science and risk 
assessment.649 However, international environmental standards could also 
be based on the precautionary principle, one of the central premises upon 
which the climate legal regime is based.650 
Thus, where an international standard constitutes a barrier to trade, the purpose for 
which a particular standard is maintained then becomes contentious. The GPA in 
this regard seems to accommodate the approaches found both under the TBT and 
SPS agreements mentioned earlier.651 However, GPA is less strict on the 
                                                        
646 See Rezaee, Z., Emerging ISO 14000 environmental standards: a step-by-step implementation guide, 
Managerial Auditing Journal, Volume 15 Number 1/2 2000 pp. 60-67.  
647
 See Principle 11 of the 1992 Rio Declaration at UNCED, supra, n. 60 
648
 See WTO, Environmental requirements and market access: preventing ‘green protectionism’ at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/envir_req_e.htm (last visited 10/03/08) 
649
 TBT Agreement Art. 2.5; SPS Agreement Art. 5. 
650
 See supra, Chapter 4, Section 4.4.3.2. 
651
 That is to say the effect under TBT and SPS of adopting international standard is the presumption of 
compliance and non-trade restrictiveness. 
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admissibility of technical specifications not based on international standards. In 
other words, since technical specifications can be based also on other premises or 
sources than international standards (includind national technical regulations, 
national standards, and building codes), it gives GPA parties the flexibility and more 
policy space upon which to base their climate-friendly technical specifications.  
 
Whether based on international standards or on other sources, so long as the 
suppliers are required to fulfil those specifications then compliance has become 
mandatory. Hence one may conclude that the wider latitude given by the GPA as 
compared with the TBT and SPS affords more policy space for GPA Parties to 
legislate in the area of technical specifications. This the wider legal space however 
could translate to a disadvantage on the suppliers, as the wider discretion in the 
hands of procuring authorities allows them to include all sorts of technical (e.g., 
climate-friendly) specifications. These may constitute more barriers against the 
suppliers.652 
6.2.2.4  National technical regulations, standards and building codes  
As an alternative to international standards, GPA Art. VI:2(b) allows technical 
specifications to be based on national technical regulations (NTRs). Thus procuring 
entities could demand from suppliers such products or services the technical 
descriptions of which are contained in certain national technical regulations in force 
in the country.653 Thus, in substance, technical regulation is similar to a standard. 
                                                        
652
 For an insight on the positioning, by TBT disciplines (under Art. 2.4) of international standards which 
are essentially voluntarily created, into a source of international obligations, see generally, Howse, R., ‘A 
New Device for Creating International Legal Normativity: The WTO Technical Barriers to Trade 
Agreement and “International Standards”’, in Jeorges, C. and Petersmann, E. (eds.), Constitutionalism, 
Multilevel Trade Governance and Social Regulation, (Portland: Hart, 2006) 383–96. 
653
 Footnote 3 of this Art. defined “technical regulation” as  “a document which lays down characteristics 
of a product or a service or their related processes and production methods, including the applicable 
administrative provisions, with which compliance is mandatory. It may also include or deal exclusively 
with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling requirements as they apply to a product, 
service, process or production method.” 
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The main difference is that technical regulation is a State legislation.654  Therefore, 
while compliance with international standard is not mandatory, it is, in the case of 
NTRs. This means producers of products, or suppliers of services are not generally 
bound to comply with international standards, but would be bound to observe them 
if they are incorporated in relevant NTRs. Where the product description in the 
NTRs incorporates climate-friendly specifications, then tender notices could refer to 
them.  
 
Technical specifications included in tender notices could also be based on 
“recognised national standards” and “building codes”.655 National standards could 
be corollary to national technical regulations, in the sense of the two being a 
national instrument, subject of course to the fact that a standard is not generally a 
binding document until it is codified into national regulations. It is not certain, for lack 
of jurisprudence on this section of the GPA, what constitutes a “recognised” 
standard at national level of the GPA Parties. A national standard may earn the 
“recognised” status, for the purpose of the GPA, if derived from international 
standards, or formulated through the involvement of various relevant stakeholders. 
This is analogous to national technical regulation which under the TBT and SPS 
commands more acceptability internationally if based on international standard. 
 
Building codes too are technical guidelines developed by design and construction 
industry to provide “safe, decent, affordable, and environmentally safe buildings.”656 
                                                        
654
 NTRs related to GPP are usually issued by State environmental protection agencies or ministries 
responsible for environmental protection affairs. They usually also mandate the use of specified eco-
labelling schemes as a basis for product specifications. In the US, for instance, there is U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (USEPA) and the U.S. Department of Energy, which mandated the use of Energy Star 
eco-labelling programme. See generally, Commission for Environmental Cooperation of North America 
(CEC), “Green Procurement: Good Environmental Stories for North Americans” (Prepared by Five Winds 
International, March 2003). This document is available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/ECONOMY/2003-
GreenProcurementReview_en.pdf (accessed on 10/08/08).. 
655
 GPA Art. VI:2(b) 
656 This definition is by the US National Conference of States for Building Codes and Standards 
(NCSBCS). See NCSBCB is a not-for-profit organization formed in Wisconsin in 1967. It was in response 
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These codes serve as model for the adoption of the countries that participate in their 
formulation, and for the regulation of building and construction industry. By an 
analogy to an internationally based TBT regulation, such codes as multilaterally 
formulated could be presumed, rebuttably though, to be less trade restrictive, since 
is if it is based on international standards.  
6.2.2.5  Eco labelling 
Technical specifications may also cite a particular eco-labelling (also called 
“ecological labelling” or “environmental labelling”) scheme as evidence of 
compliance with the quality and standard required of the product or service. Eco-
labelling signifies the using of labelling systems “to inform consumers that a product 
is determined by a third party to be environmentally friendlier relative to other 
products in the same category."657 The information on the label usually is 
comprehensive covering also the PPMs-related aspects.658 Eco-labelling could thus 
influence consumer preferences in the market thereby giving the otherwise “like” 
goods competitive advantage over others in the same category.  
 
As an information tool, eco-labelling systems are used to promote GPP.659 This fact 
has also been underscored by a study by UNEP660 which used the US Energy 
                                                                                                                                                             
to the recommendations of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations Report, Building 
Codes: A Program for Intergovernmental Reform. NCSBCS represents, on a national level, the states’ 
building codes and public safety concerns, Available at: 
http://www.showroom411.com/SiteBrowser.aspx?&uid=-1&url=http%3a%2f%2fwww.ncsbcs.org%2f (last 
visited 04/11/08). 
657
 Goodland, R., Eco-labelling: Opportunities for Progress Towards Sustainability,  (Consumer Choice 
Council, Washington DC, USA, 2002), p. 2; UNCTAD, Trade, Environment and Development, Aspects of 
Establishing and Operating Eco-Labelling Programmes; Report of the UNCTAD secretariat 
(TD/B/WG.6/5); (Geneva, 1995) cited by Gröge, S.,  Ecological Labelling and the World Trade 
Organization (Discussion Paper No. 242) Berlin, February 2001 
658
 See Australian Government, Market-based for natural resource management (NRM) change, (Designer 
Carrots) available at: http://www.marketbasedinstruments.gov.au/WhatisanMBI/tabid/66/Default.aspx 
(accessed on 24/10/09).In fisheries, essentially, eco-labelling is PPM’s-based. This is because the product 
itself is fish, which everybody knows. What is at issue is the process by which it is produced. 
659
 See Announcement of Green Purchasing Sendai Declaration: Chair of the Steering Committee of the 1st 
International Conference on Green Purchasing in Sendai, 6-7 October, 2004, Sendai, Japan, available at: 
http://www.city.sendai.jp/kankyou/kanri/icgps-e/report/sendai_e.html  
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Star661 as an example. The study stated that the US Energy Star proved an effective 
tool for the US government to inform suppliers that it had integrated energy 
efficiency into public procurement contracts system.662 In the same manner, product 
suppliers were able to communicate to the US government that “their products 
deserved preferential treatment in [the] procurement decisions.”663 Indeed GPP 
strategies in such countries as the EU and Canada have relied most heavily on 
national eco-labelling programs. In Canada, the most influential eco-labelling 
system is Canada’s Environmental Choice Program (ECP).664 This is also the “North 
America’s largest, most respected environmental standard and certification mark”.665  
 
The utility of eco-labelling is founded on the neoclassical economic theory which 
assumes that “perfect information is required for the efficient operation of economic 
markets.”666 This means in order to help consumers make rational decisions in their 
purchases, government should help them to access information relevant to their 
decision-making.667 Thus government-mandated eco-labelling scheme fulfils just 
this objective. It also highlights the fact that consumer preferences are influenced 
not only by price or health and safely factors but also environment- friendliness and 
                                                                                                                                                             
660
 Rotherham, T., The Trade and Environmental Effects of Eco-labels: Assessment and Response, 11 
(UNEP, 2005). 
661
 See Energy Star at http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=about.ab_index (last accessed 24/10/08). 
See also supra, notes 653. 
662
 See Rotherham, supra, n. 660. 
663
 Ibid. 
664
 See Legault, L., Towards Greener Government Procurement: An Environment Canada Case Study, p. 8, 
available at http://www.apo-tokyo.org/gp/e_publi/gsc/0305RES_PAPERS.pdf (last visited 03/03/10), pp. 
53-53. 
665
 See EcoLogo Programme at http://www.ecologo.org/en/  (last visited 17/06/10). 
666
 US EPA, Determinants of Effectiveness for Environmental Certification and Labelling Programs, 
(Pollution Prevention Division office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, Washington, DC, April 1, 1994), p. 1, available at: http://www.p2pays.org/ref/17/16863.pdf (last 
accessed 28/10/08).  
667
 Ibid. 
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social factors related to the product or its production processes.668 Hence, at the 
Earth Summit, governments agreed to “encourage expansion of environmental 
labelling and other environmentally related product information programmes 
designed to assist consumers to make informed choices.”669 
 
6.2.2.6 Relationship between standards, eco-labelling and technical  
 regulations 
 
The relationship between eco-labelling on the one hand and standards and/or 
technical regulations on the other, could be seen in the fact that eco-labelling 
consists of the information about the standards used in the manufacturing or 
production of a product or service. On the other hand, the use of particular eco-
labels may have been required by specific national regulations. Thus, depending on 
their purpose, eco-labels which derive from standards are “complementary to … 
standards and regulations.”670 Therefore, using eco-labelling as a basis of technical 
specifications in GPP means looking at the standards mentioned for the product, 
service or processes covered by the labels. Thus, it is for the product producers to 
ensure their product standards have qualified and hence acquired certification by an 
eco-labelling scheme, so as to attract buyers for government.671 
6.2.2.7 Technical specifications: performance-centred 
By virtue of GPA Art. VI:2(a), technical specifications should be aimed at specifying 
goods and services that will “perform” the job, and should not be unduly concerned 
with the “design or descriptive characteristics” of the goods or services. A question 
                                                        
668
 Deere, C., “Eco-Labelling and Sustainable Fisheries,” (IUCN-The World Conservation Union and the 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), 1999), p. 4. 
669
 Agenda 21, Paragraph 4.21 of UNCED, 1992 supra, n. 60. 
670
 Syunkova, A., WTO – Compatibility of Four Categories of U.S. Climate Change Policy, (National 
Foreign Trade Council, 2007) available at: 
http://www.nftc.org/default/trade/WTO/Climate%20Change%20Paper.pdf  (accessed: 25/06/07). 
671
 For details on how international standards and eco-labelling interact, see generally the WTO World 
Trade Report 2005, supra, n. 621. 
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then arises as to the stage at which the “performance” attribute of the goods or 
services is determined, namely, whether at the production or consumption stage of 
the product life-cycle? Naturally the performance is actualised at the consumption 
stage.672 Of course, the production stage similarly could and does play a decisive 
role on how the product performs. The distinction between the production and the 
consumption stages of the life-cycle of a product or service is relevant in the context 
of the arguments for or against the permissibility of consideration of non product-
related PPMs under the WTO system.673 It is also one of the areas that attract much 
controversy in international environmental policy-making.674  
 
In terms of services procurement, the question that arises is the extent to which a 
procuring authority can specify a particular manner in which a service should be 
performed where the same service can effectively be performed in different ways. 
With respect to environmental services, an example of a typical situation was cited 
earlier, of a procuring entity in need of local transport facility, to require the supplier 
to use not only climate friendly bus fleet, but also use electricity generated from 
renewables sources or biofuels generated/procured from sustainably managed 
biomass. In this case, in addition to the determination of the relevance of those 
conditions to the firm’s capability to perform the contract, the usual PPMs rules 
apply, namely, PPMs are relevant only when they are product-related. 
                                                        
672
 See Kuzlik, P., International Procurement Regimes supra, n. 170, p. 109. national Procurement Regime 
673
 PPMs are discussed infra, section 6.4. 
674 For discussions on aspects of this controversy, see Knill, C.,  Environmental Policy, in Peters, B. G., 
Handbook of Public Policy, London Sage Publ, 2006, 251 
http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0657/2005934841-d.html (accessed: 14/02/09). 
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6.3 GPP and technical conditions for supplier participation 
6.3.1 The basic rules for setting supplier qualifications 
Conditions for supplier participation are requirements or qualifications that 
prospective suppliers should fulfil in order to qualify for participation or to tender in a 
particular procurement exercise.675 Generally, the type of procurement/tendering 
procedure adopted determines the kinds of conditions that a procuring authority 
would require the participants to fulfil. Conditions for participation may be general 
administrative requirements, as required by other relevant legislation or policies. 
They may take the form of fulfilling requirements of the law relating to establishment 
and/or operation of companies, income tax, business practices, company’s solvency 
and financial viability; mandatory insurance policies/levels and other relevant 
licences. They may also relate to professional accreditations or registrations, 
compliance with draft contract terms, and compliance with conditions of tender.676 
Indeed, conditions for participation may also relate to the job at hand. For examples, 
companies may be required, for the purpose of a particular procurement, to have a 
specified level of share-capital or possess certain types of expertise or equipment. 
Failure to satisfy conditions for participation may result in excluding the firm’s bid. 
 
It is possible to also implement GPP through the conditions for supplier 
participation. This occurs where a procuring entity inserts environment-related 
technical qualifications for the participation of suppliers in tendering process. The 
basic rules of setting conditions for supplier qualification, pursuant to GPA Art. VIII, 
are that: 
                                                        
675
 See Arrowsmith, S., supra, n. 51, Chapters 9 – 11. 
676
 Ibid.. 
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1) entities shall not discriminate among suppliers of other Parties or between 
domestic suppliers and suppliers of other Parties.677  
2) conditions for participation in tendering procedures shall be limited to those 
which are essential to ensure the firm's capability to fulfil the contract in 
question.678  
These rules essentially re-emphasise the observance of the non-discrimination and 
transparency requirements when setting the conditions. Indeed Art. VIII further 
elaborates that supplier conditions for participation to be imposed by procuring 
entities should be determinable by “the financial, commercial and technical capacity 
of the supplier,”679 to execute the job in question, not all jobs. For the purpose of 
implementing GPP, such technical conditions may include the supplier’s compliance 
with, or being certified by, a certain international standardisation body or system for 
environmental protection or energy efficiency. Such a condition will be objectionable 
under Art. IX:9 of the GPA if it is unrelated to the technical ability of the supplier to 
perform the contract at hand.680 Thus, suppliers should not be burdened with 
technical conditions of participation that are irrelevant to the particular procurement, 
as this may put some of them at an undue disadvantage, and consequently result in 
de-facto discrimination against them. Thus where in GPP process, the procuring 
authority requires potential bidders to be ISO 14001 EMS-certificated, unless this 
requirement could be linked with the supplier’s technical ability to perform the 
contract, this will be invalid pursuant to GPA Art. VIII(b).681 
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 GPA Art. VIII:(a) 
678
 Ibid. (b) 
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 Ibid. (b) 
680
 See supra, Chapter 5, Section 5.2.1.2. 
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 See also infra, Section 6.5 BSI, A Quick Guide to ISO 14001, available at http://www.bsi-
emea.com/Guidance+Documents/PDFs/EMSQuickGuide.pdf. For a brief on EMS and ISO framework see 
generally, the ISO website: www.iso.org   
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6.3.2 Technical specifications, supplier qualification and award criteria  
Technical specifications, supplier qualifications and contract award criteria are inter-
woven. Award criteria are those issues usually pre-determined and included in the 
technical specifications section of the tender, by the procuring entity, against which 
tenders are evaluated and points given, so that, at the end of the evaluation, the 
tender with the highest points wins the contract. This is more the case in GPP 
where technical qualifications of the supplier may constitute a necessary part of its 
tender.  
 
For instance, a firm that has been certified for EMAS will be able to show how it 
fulfils the conditions for award of a GPP-related contract more readily than another 
firm not so certified. On this, what readily comes to mind is the ECJ case of Evn AG 
and Wienstrom Gmbh v. Austria/Stadtwerke Klagenfurt AG682 where the appellants 
argued before the Austrian Federal Procurement Review Commission, inter alia, 
that the proof of suppliers’ ability to ensure compliance with the technical 
specifications of the product and services (supply of electricity generated from 
renewable sources) should not be used also as basis for selecting tenderers.683 
 
In that case, part of the contract award criteria required by procuring authority was 
that the suppliers should show capability to produce electricity from renewable 
sources. However there was no mechanism set in the tender documents to assess 
the extent of the observance of this condition. There was therefore no way of 
assessing compliance. That meant the contracting authority would arbitrarily make 
this determination, which would of course result in disqualifying some tenders. 
Hence, in the view of the appellants, this condition should not be used as a basis for 
                                                        
682
 Case c-448/01, Evn AG and Wienstrom Gmbh v. Austria/Stadtwerke Klagenfurt AG ECJ 4 December 
2003 (hereinafter: “Evn AG case”). For summary report see [2003] All ER (D) 81. Full report is available 
at the website of the ECJ: www.curia.eu.int. . 
683
 See also Bowsher, M., The ECJ, transparency, and procurement as an environmental policy: Evn AG & 
Wienstrom GmbH v. Austria (2004) 21(2) International Construction Law Review 189-196, at p. 190. 
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selecting qualifying tenders. The ECJ held inter alia that contracting authorities 
should not set an award criterion which confers an “unrestricted freedom of choice 
on the purchasing authority”.684 To allow this type of criterion would work against the 
transparency objective of the Common Market.685 
 
On award criteria, the GPA Art. XIII:4(b)686 says: 
… the entity shall make the award to the tenderer who has been determined 
to be fully capable of undertaking the contract and whose tender, whether for 
domestic products or services, or products or services of other Parties, is 
either the lowest tender or the tender which in terms of the specific 
evaluation criteria set forth in the notices or tender documentation is 
determined to be the most advantageous.  
 
Thus, going by this provision, award should be made to a tenderer who: 
1) is capable of undertaking the contract and 
2)  is either: 
i. the lowest tender; or  
ii. the tender which in terms of the specific evaluation criteria set forth in the 
notices or tender documentation is determined to be the most 
advantageous.687  
 
On the issue of what constitutes “the most advantageous tender” that forms the 
basis of contract award, the provisions of the GPA and the position of the EU law 
and policy are comparable. While under the GPA Art. XIII:4(b) the award is made to 
either the lowest tender or the “most advantageous”, those of the EU require the 
                                                        
684
 See Evn AG case, supra, n. 682, paras. 69 and 94.   
685
 See Bowsher, M., supra, n. 683, p. 193. 
686
 (Emphasis added) See also Art. XIV:1(b) on Negotiated tendering process applying, inter alia, “when it 
appears from evaluation that no one tender is obviously the most advantageous in terms of the specific 
evaluation criteria set forth in the notices or tender documentation.” 
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 For an overview on the creation, purpose and achievements of the EU Single Market see European 
Commission report 'It's a better life - How the EU's single market benefits you', 2002, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/publications/booklets/move/35/en.pdf  
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award to be made to the “most economically advantageous” tender. What is still in 
controversy is what are the perimeters for determination of the “advantageous 
(economically) tender”, but more so the extent to which environmental 
considerations could be used as part of the elements for that determination.  
 
The recurrent question has been: what if such a consideration results in preferences 
being given to products and services on the basis of non-PR PPMs? This and 
similar questions brought about controversy and disputes in the EU procurement 
system. These disputes then, among other things, led to a major review of the EU 
system which culminated in the promulgation of the new public procurement 
directives in 2004.688 This aspect is discussed in section 6.6 on the comparability of 
the EU procurement system with the WTO GPA. 
6.4 GPP and the PPMs Question  
Chapter 3 it was indicated how government procurement was used traditionally as 
an instrument of protectionism, making it among the five most notable of the non-
tariff measures that constituted a barrier to international trade. Although the Tokyo 
Round Government Procurement Code (and subsequently the WTO GPA) 
intervened, GP still remained an avenue by which countries hide and perpetrate 
protectionism, either overtly or covertly. The essence of the GPA in giving 
prominence to international standards to serve as basis for technical specifications 
is to minimise the protectionist effect. The GPA definition of a standard and eco-
labelling includes the PPMs. However, even where an international standard is 
“appropriate”, an international environmental or energy efficiency standard, used for 
GPP is usually based not on the characteristics of the product or services in 
question, but on their PPMs. This brings to relevance the PPMs debate over issues 
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 See infra, Section 6.4.1.3 
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related to environmental labelling and trade.689 Indeed, the definitions of 
international standards and national technical regulations describe the products as 
well as their related PPMs.  
 
In view of the significance of the question of PPMs in the determination of what the 
appropriateness of international standards for the purpose of technical 
specifications in tendering, it is considered necessary to give an insight on what 
PPMs really are and how they raise issues in international trade law. But the PPMs 
question is particularly relevant for the determination of likeness of products and 
services for the purpose of application of the non-discrimination rules of the GPA. 
6.4.1 What are PPMs?  
PPMs are the methods used in processing raw materials and producing products 
and/or services which are the subject matter of the transaction. PPMs signify a 
situation where, in considering the nature of a “product” or “service”, which is the 
subject-matter of the regulation or dispute, not only the physical composition of the 
product or service itself is taken into account, but also those processes that were 
undertaken in the course of its manufacturing/production. This consideration can 
include the methods of harvesting of the product, or the manner of the performance 
of the service. This is what is referred to as the whole life-cycle consideration of the 
product. These processes take different form depending on the product in question.  
Where the product or service or its PPMs is harmful to the environment, then its use 
results in an externality, namely, an additional cost to the environment. It will take 
the tax-payer intervention to remediate this externality.  
 
                                                        
689 The debate has engaged the OECD, UNCTAD, UNEP and, of course, the WTO. See Polak, J., Trade as 
an Environmental Policy Tool?, Global Eco-labelling Network (GEN), Eco-labelling and Trade, 
WTO/GEN symposium on, Eco-labelling: Trade Opportunities & Challenges Ahead on the Road to 
Cancun, June 16-18, 2003) available at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/symp03_gen_ecolab_e.doc. See also a brief on the debate in 
Chapter 2, section 2.2.1-2.2.2. 
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Thus, in environmental policy-making such an externality should be the 
responsibility of the producer or user the product or (the provider of) the service 
causing the damage or to whom the service is rendered. Such cost is supposed to 
be “internalised”, that is included in the cost of the production, so that the use the 
product or enjoyment of the service is compensated for up-front, and this saves the 
tax-payer’s money. Therefore, products or services that entail more serious 
environmental consequences in their PPMs including their end use and disposal 
make a world of difference from other similar products or services that do not have 
such consequences. This distinction is regardless of whether these negative 
environmental consequences are related to the production (PPMs) of the products 
or the end-used and disposal of the product. This is the basis of the idea of inserting 
specifications that favour purchase of the environment-friendly products as against 
others not so friendly. 
 
In trade law and policy, however, where two products differ only in their PPMs, the 
difference is taken into account only of it is product-related. Now the determination 
of the distinction between PPMs that are “product-related” and those that are non-
product related (non-PR) becomes crucial. PPMs are product related where they 
are discernible in the physical characteristics of the product in its final form (at 
consumption stage). The common example of product-related PPMs is pesticide 
residue seen on farm produce at consumption level: the produce tastes differently 
and it takes longer time in its good/usable state than product not sprayed with 
pesticides. Thus, differential treatment is permitted as between similar products 
where the PPMs are discernible in the characteristics of the products at the 
final/consumption stage. 
 
On the other hand, non-PR PPMs are those PPMs that cannot be discerned in the 
final product or service. Trade restriction or discrimination of any form is not 
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permitted in respect non-PR PPMs. Early analysis of trade restrictive measures 
regarding these types of PPMs concern import bans on goods produced by a 
monopoly, goods made from prison-labour, copyrighted materials or goods inimical 
to public health.690 Thus an energy-efficient computer is not distinguishable in its 
physical characteristics or in the way it performs the usual functions of a computer, 
from one which is not.   
 
This product/process distinction has generated heated controversy among trade 
lawyers and economists. Indeed, “PPMs” has been described as “the most debated 
set of letters in the trade law history.”691 The PPMs debate was popularised in the 
aftermath of the GATT US – Tuna/Dolphin decisions in the early 1990s.692 The logic 
of trade law in distinguishing between product-related and non-PR PPMs is that if 
non-PR PPMs are allowed to serve as basis of differential treatment between 
otherwise like products, then it won’t be possible to draw a clear line between 
measures taken unilaterally for genuine concerns (e.g., environmental protection) 
and those that are simply protectionist. Thus, it would be impossible, according to 
Jackson, to prevent abuses where WTO Members maintain trade-restricting 
measures tied to PPMs.693 It will result into “a slippery slope which no one is able to 
control.694  
 
Thus, as relates environment-related PPMs, the main areas of the controversy are: 
firstly, the uncertainty associated with non-PR PPMs related to environment for the 
purpose of policy making, and trade law discipline. That is to say how to distinguish 
                                                        
690
 See Charnovitz, S., The Law of Environmental “PPMs” in the WTO: Debunking the Myth of Illegality’, 
27 Yale J Int’l L (2002) 59-110, at 60 n. 2, with extensive further references. 
691
 UNEP/IISD, Environment and Trade –A Handbook (2nd Ed.), (UNEP, 2005), p. 53. 
692
 See supra, Chapter 2 Section 2.2.3 
693
 See Jackson, H. J., Comments, supra, n. 157, p. 304. 
694
 Ibid. 
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a legitimate policy objective and protectionism as the basis of the PPMs measure. A 
related issue is the extent to which unilateral PPMs-based measure (e.g., a 
country’s harvesting method of a product) could be allowed to have extra-territorial 
effect. In other words how country A could be allowed to imposed its harvesting 
methods (PPMs) on country B as a condition for accepting B’s products in its (A’s) 
territory.695 On this second point, Jackson suggested that even the AB statement in 
US – Shrimp that seemed to conclude that extraterritoriality could be a common 
feature in all PPMs based measures that could fall under the Article XX exceptions, 
used the word “may”.696 This denotes uncertainty of the type that generates 
debates. Chapter 2 did allude to some of the controversies between publicists on 
this question.697  
6.4.2 PPMs and the GPA provisions on technical specifications  
It could be recalled that the GPA definition of standards and national technical 
regulations document, for the purpose of setting technical specifications, includes 
the description of the “characteristics for products or services or related processes 
and production methods”.698 Procuring authorities thus are permitted to include 
PPMs in setting their product descriptions. These however should be “related 
PPMs”. This thus does seem to merely confirm the traditional position of the WTO 
position which allows only product-related PPMs as defined above, to serve as 
reason for differential treatment between otherwise like products.699  
 
                                                        
695
 Ibid., p. 306. 
696
 Ibid.. The AB words in para. 121 of the ruling are:   
It appears to us, however, that conditioning access to a Member's domestic market on whether 
exporting Members comply with, or adopt, a policy or policies unilaterally prescribed by the 
importing Member may, to some degree, be a common aspect of measures falling within the 
scope of one or another of the exceptions (a) to (j) of Article XX.  (emphasis mine) 
697
 See supra, Chapter 2, Section 2.2.3 
698
 Art. VI:2(b) 
699
 Ibid.. See Esty, D. C. supra, n, 70, p. 221 
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The real problem is where these requirements favour domestic suppliers who are 
already familiar with their country’s national environmental priorities and regulations. 
This state of affairs may impose more difficulty on competing suppliers who are 
based in, or originate from, other countries with lax environmental regulations, and 
hence, the standards of their production methods generally lower than required by 
the contracting authorities.700 Developing countries, in particular could find 
themselves effectively shut off from participation in the procurement processes as 
described above.701 Although, on the other hand, as some empirical  researchers 
have discovered, standards have helped developing countries to improve the quality 
of their productions especially in agro-food export areas.702 With this reasoning, 
some commentators support the idea that international standardization of PPMs, 
and eco-labelling schemes could help to bridge the dividing line in the trade-
environment debate.703 Similarly affected are small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SME) that find it too costly to abide by environmental regulations of say, facility up-
grading and installation of GHG emissions filters, or to minimise pollution by waste 
water from manufacturing facility. Some such SME also may not be able to bear the 
cost of eco-labelling certification and licensing.704 Admittedly, the trade effects of 
such requirements apply generally to all suppliers in the industry. However where 
such trade effects disproportionately affect foreign-based suppliers more than 
domestic suppliers this may give rise to de-facto discrimination.  
                                                        
700
 See supra, the hypothetical example provided in chapter 2, section 2.2.1, pp 22-23 and n. 72. 
701
 See Kunzlik, P., supra, n. 170. 
702
 Ibid., p 12. See for instance, Jaffee, S. and Henson, Spencer, Standards and Agro-Food Exports from 
Developing Countries: Rebalancing the Debates (World Bank Research Working Paper 3348, June 2004). 
The paper re-examines the stereotype belief that international standards requirements are automatically a 
barrier against developing country market access, and suggests the potential of standards to serve as a 
“catalyst” to enhance market access for developing countries.  
703
 Staffin, E. B., supra, n. 103, p. 209. 
704
 See Legault, L., supra, n. 664, p. 8. 
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6.5 GPP as de-facto discrimination 
6.5.1 The WTO non-discrimination norms and the “likeness” question  
A marked difference existing between the GATT and the GPA provisions on non-
discrimination is that while the GATT Art. III prohibiting less favourable treatment 
against foreign “like” products,705 the GPA for the same discipline conspicuously 
avoids the “like” term. Attempts to get to know why the GPA omitted the like term 
was not fruitful.706 Indeed, this term is prevalent in almost all the WTO 
Agreements707 but the GPA. This omission started at the outset of the negotiations 
for the 1979 GP code. This is observable in the initial integrated GP draft which was 
prepared by the GATT Secretariat based on earlier proposals from, inter alia, OECD 
documents and practice, which also served as the basis for negotiations.708 The 
omission of this term from the GPA is rather absurd in the sense that the very notion 
of discrimination in the treatment of two objects implies comparability of the objects 
based on a certain specified benchmark. Hence, the notion of “likeness” is arguably 
                                                        
705
 Other terms with the same connotation encountered in the GATT are “like commodity” and “like 
merchandise.” In GATS, the expression is “like services and service suppliers”. See GATS Art. II:1 on 
MFN. 
706
. See part of the efforts, namely, contacts with the Secretary to the Committee on Government 
Procurement, at Appendix VI hereto 
707
 Jackson lists 10 GATT provisions with the likeness term. These are: I:1, II:2(a), III:2, III:4, VI:1(a) and 
(b), IX:1, XI:2(c), XIII:1, XVI:4, See Jackson, J., World Trade and the Law of GATT, supra, 277, p. 259, 
n. 1.. Similarly, according to the 1970 Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments the phrase “like or 
similar products” appeared 16 times in the text of the General Agreement. GATT, BISD, 18th Supp. 97, 
101 (1972). See Hudec, R. E., “Like Product”: The Differences in Meaning in GATT Arts. I and III, p. 1 in 
Cottier, T. & Mavroidis, P. (eds.), Regulatory Barriers and the Principle of Non-Discrimination in World 
Trade Law, (University of Michigan Press 2000) pp. 101-123. 
708
 GATT, Draft Integrated Text for Negotiation on Government Procurement (Note by the Secretariat) 
(MTN/NTM/W/133/Rev.1). See Part  II:1 on national treatment and non-discrimination with no “like” 
term, thus: 
With respect to all laws, regulations, procedures and practices affecting government procurement, 
covered by this Agreement, signatories shall provide immediately and unconditionally to the 
products and suppliers of all signatories offering products originating within the signatory 
countries! Treatment no less favourable than: 
(a) that accorded to domestic products and suppliers; and 
(b) that accorded to products and suppliers of any other signatory. 
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inherent in the idea of non-discrimination.709 The explicit exclusion by the GATT Art. 
III of GP from the reach of GATT would have made the mention of the “likeness” 
term in the GPA Art. III on non-discrimination even more necessary. This would 
have avoided the lacuna which the omission has now created.  
 
Noteworthy also is the fact that despite the mention of “likeness” in several 
provisions of the WTO Agreements it was nowhere defined, hence, the difficulty 
encountered by GTT/WTO dispute settlement Panel in interpreting it. Thus, the term 
became as much a controversial concept as the PPMs discussed earlier. This 
difficulty is accentuated by the use of another term “like or competitive products” 
used in GATT Art. Art. XIX:2, which seems to widen the coverage of the term. 
 
Determination of “likeness” of products or services is essential for the operation of 
the GAT/WTO system which essentially enforces non-discrimination and equal 
treatment of products/services traded by the WTO Members. Tariff nomenclature 
and classification help to identify classes of products for the purpose of tariff 
negotiations, and scheduling by WTO Members.710 This classification in a way helps 
to also define products likeness. However, there is still the need for parameters to 
identify when two products bear similar characteristics as to be classified same or 
different.  
 
In this regard, to determine likeness of products Panels have frequently cited the 
Report of the 1970 Working Party on Border Tax Adjustment711 as a guide. This 
report first stated that problems arising from the interpretation of the term should be 
examined on a “case-by-case basis”. This will allow “a fair assessment in each case 
                                                        
709
 This view was also endorsed by van Calster. See Van Calster, G., supra, n. 38. p. 301. 
710
 See Jackson, J., supra, n. 277, p. 238 and 259. 
711
 See Working Party Report, Border Tax Adjustment, adopted 2 December 1970, BISD 18S/97. The 1970 
BTA Working Party reviewed the application of GATT Art. III. 
  
189
 
of the different elements that constitute a "similar" [“like”] product.” It then suggested 
some guiding criteria for making this determination, namely “(i) the product's end-
uses in a given market; (ii) consumers' tastes and habits, which change from 
country to country; (iii)  the product's properties, nature and quality.”712 But the 
Panel in Spain- Unroasted Coffee713 did not use consumers' tastes and habits, 
criterion it introduced “tariff classification” regimes of other WTO Members as 
additional criterion for determining likeness within the meaning of GATT Art. I:1.  
 
Similarly, the AB in E.C.-Asbestos, faced with determining whether different 
Asbestos products were “like” under Art. III:4, referred first to a dictionary meaning 
of the term “like”, which suggested that “like products” were products that shared a 
number of characteristics. The AB, emphasising also the “case-by-case”714 
approach, suggested that three questions of interpretation need to be resolved in 
order to determine like products, thus: 
1) which characteristics or qualities are important in assessing “likeness”; 
2) to what degree or extent must products share qualities or characteristics in 
order to be “like products”; and 
3) from whose perspective should likeness be judged?715  
Generally however, the PPMs used in the production of the goods or products, or 
performance of the services in question, played a decisive role in how products and 
services are regarded as “like” or “unlike”. Hence, the fact that green and 
conventional electricity are physically the same in terms of physical design and 
                                                        
712
 Ibid. at para. 18. 
713
 See Spain - Tariff Treatment Of Unroasted Coffee 1981 GATTPD Lexis 5 (Report of the Panel adopted 
on 11 June 1981) (L/5135 - 28S/102)  
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 E.C.-Asbestos (ABR), para. 101. See also Steenkamp, L., Complexities and inadequacies relating to 
certain provisions of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), available At 
http://wto.tralac.org/pdf/WP_1_04_-
_Complexities_and_inadequacies_relating_to_certain_provisions_of_the_GATS.doc (visited 11/08/07)   
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characteristic as well as performance may or may not necessarily make the two the 
same thing if the PPMs are taken into considerations, and this thus determines what 
rules are applicable to interpret the two. At production level, the two types of 
electricity are different, but are “like” at consumption level. However, in the case of 
energy efficient computers for use in public offices, these may be different both from 
the perspective of the PPMs (produced through cleaner and more energy efficient 
processes), as well as “consumption” level, namely how they actually perform 
(consuming less electricity than other computers in the same category). So they are 
not like at all levels. 
 
Thus, the omission of likeness term from GPA was, according to Van Calster,716 
probably intended to avoid the controversy and complication experienced by various 
GATT/WTO judicial Panels in determining the meaning of the term, especially in the 
interpreting the GATT Art. III on national treatment. Indeed, rather than questioning 
the wisdom behind the WTO negotiators for this omission, it is safer to up-hold Van 
Calster’s assumption that the likeness notion is implicit even if not expressly 
mentioned. This presumption also helps to ensure consistency in the WTO 
jurisprudence. This is especially so, as the issue concerns the basic norms and 
objectives of the multilateral trading rules, namely, national treatment and non-
discrimination. Indee, implying “like” term is justifiable under the principle of 
effectiveness of treaty interpretation (ut res magis valeat quam pereat) as codified 
under the VCLT Art. 31. This principle requires, as the AB puts it, that “[a]n 
interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that would result in reducing whole clauses 
or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility” (pursuant to the principle of 
effectiveness:717 
 
                                                        
716
 Ibid.  
717
 US – Gasoline  (ABR), supra note 31, at 23, confirmed in, inter alia, Japan —Taxes on Alcoholic 
Beverages (ABR)II, supra n. 24 ps. 12 and 18. 
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The GPA thus prohibits discriminatory effects of preferential procurement practices 
because these practices “can act as protectionist measures, thus limiting import 
competition and introducing distortions that limit choices, increase prices and 
discourage economic efficiency.”718 These concerns are heightened where the 
procurement exercise pursues objectives other than those for “value for money”. 
Such objectives as environmental protection often also undermine transparency, 
which is a key feature of many procurement processes.719 In order to give effect to 
these obligations, the Agreement under Arts. VII to XVI makes detailed provisions 
on the need for transparency in the conduct of their procurement practices. These 
norms have been discussed in details in chapter 3.   
6.5.2 When GPP constitutes a de-facto discrimination  
In practices, GPP measures are essentially de-facto, as countries do not expressly 
state the country of origin for the green products and services required, or the 
nationality of the environmentally-qualified service supplier. Similarly, countries do 
not expressly provide for the purchase of the green goods from domestic market or 
manufacturers, or employ only local suppliers for the job.720 Discriminatory effects of 
GPP measures are rather experienced from the implementation of the legislation or 
measures. The existence of evidence of discrimination or protectionism in a 
measure is the decisive issue.  
 
The perceived GPP de-facto discrimination is based mainly on the adoption in GPP 
practice of international standards, national regulations and eco-labelling schemes 
for environmental protection purposes. Where the use of such elements result in 
                                                        
718
 See OECD, The Environmental Performance of Public Procurement: Issues of policy coherence, p. 107. 
(By Johnstone, N., 2003), p 107.  
719
 Ibid. 
720
 See for instance, Section 1605(a) of the America Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 which 
expressly requires government authorities to spend the economic recovery money on American goods only. 
See supra, Chapter 3, Section 3.3.1. 
  
192
 
disproportionately costlier and thus harder effects on foreign producers, 
manufacturers or suppliers because of their lax environmental regulatory regimes 
and experiences, then GPP may result in discrimination. This situation is illustrated 
by US – Autos case.721 The issue before the GATT Panel was whether the US 
“luxury” and “gas guzzler” taxes imposed on certain type or class of automobiles 
violated GATT Article Art III:2 . This Art. inter alia requires a national treatment in 
the internal taxation system charged on products traded in the domestic market of a 
GATT contracting party.722 The so-called luxury and gas guzzler taxes were 
imposed by the US with a view to encouraging manufacturers to produce more 
energy efficient cars. The taxes were imposed uniformly on specified classes of cars 
regardless of the origin of the cars or their manufacturers. However, the EC and 
Sweden argued inter alia that the taxes discriminated against European 
manufacturers who bore a disproportionately greater burden of the taxes because 
they happened to be manufacturers of the class of automobiles subject to the taxes. 
The Panel found that as the tax measure was origin-neutral, and not imposed “so as 
to afford protection to domestic production”, it was GATT-consistent.723 This also 
meant that where a discriminatory effect of a measure is of a de-facto nature, then 
the Panel would look at the measure’s aim and the effect in order to determine 
violation of Article III.724 The Panel in this case similarly accepted the argument that 
even if there would be any violation of Article III, then in so far as the taxes in 
question were based on a legitimate policy objective, then GATT Art. XX (b) and (g) 
                                                        
721
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 Article III:2, first sentence, states:  
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other 
contracting party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly to internal taxes or other internal 
charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products. 
723
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193
 
exceptions (in this case, for energy conservation and environmental protection) 
would be relevant.725  
 
The point here is tha an origin-neutral measure which is discriminatory on a de-facto 
basis is regarded on equal terms under the WTO jurisprudence as de-jure 
discrimination.726 Hence countries are entitled to the same level of protection 
against such measures as in the case of de-jure measures. In the same token, 
Parties maintaining such measures would have to bear the same level of the burden 
of proof in their defence. 
6.6 The EU GPP system and its compatibility with the GPA 
This section seeks to highlight the EU GPP system and: (1) how it compares with 
the GPA provisions, but more specifically, and importantly to for this study, (2) how 
compatible it is with the GPA. The purpose is to establish the real life meaning, 
objectives and practice of green procurement, and examine the likely legal issues a 
GPA party like the EU may encounter in its GPP processes. The choice of the EU 
The discourse under this section however is not intended to be exhaustive, as the 
author has published a paper on the subject where more details could be found.727  
Chapter 1 has identified the reasons for adopting the EU system for this 
illustration.728 
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6.6.1 GPP under EU law and policy: overview 
6.6.1.1 Public procurement, the EU Single Market and climate change  
Public procurement is one of the major instruments used by the European 
Commission to open up the European Single Market.729 The EU single market is an 
integrated economic system where the policies are crafted so as to pursue various 
economic and development objectives simultaneously, seeking to balance 
competitiveness, the environment and external relations.730 Thus, one finds the EU 
energy policy also addressing environmental protection and climate change 
mitigation. In the same way, the EU GPP is closely related to the climate change 
objectives and policies, just as the EU policy on biofuels is also targeted at climate 
change mitigation.731 Generally, however, integrating environmental considerations 
in other government policies is a basic requirement of the so-called “Integration 
Principle” enunciated in Art. 6 of the EU Treaty.732 This principle requires that 
environmental protection should be integrated in all policies of the Community. This 
principle, it could be recalled, is one of the foundations of the Agenda 21 adopted at 
Rio de Jenairo, at the UNCED.733   
 
                                                        
729
 For a brief on the EU Single Market, its purpose and principle as well as achievements so far, see 
European Commission report 'It's a better life - How the EU's single market benefits you', 2002 available 
at: http://ec.europa.eu/publications/booklets/move/35/en.pdf (last visited 20/06/10). 
730
 See generally, Murphy, D., (et. al), Furthering EU Objectives on Climate Change and Clean Energy: 
Building partnerships with major developing economies (IISD, 2008). See also Climate Change and 
Foreign Policy: An exploration of options for greater integration (IISD, 2006). These are studies about the 
EU’s engagement with the developing world to explore all available opportunities for EU to perform its 
commitments to the climate regime. Available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/eu_objectives_climate.pdf  
(last visited: 20/06/10). 
731
 See for instance, Directive 2003/30/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 May 2003 
on the promotion of the use of biofuels or other renewable fuels for transport.  Art. 1 of this Directive 
explicitly states that the Directive is aimed at: promoting the use of biofuels or other renewable fuels to 
replace diesel or petrol for transport purposes in each Member State, with a view to contributing to 
objectives such as meeting climate change commitments, environmentally friendly security of supply and 
promoting renewable energy sources. See OJEU, 17.5.2003. 
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 See supra, Chapter 1, Section 1.5.2, n. 56. See also Usui, U., The Principle of Environmental 
Integration in the European Union: From a Discursive Constructivism, Niigata University of International 
and Information Studies, Bulletin of Niigata University of International and Information Studies, Vol. 8, pp. 
89-117.    
733
 See UNCED, supra, no. 60. 
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Indeed, in view of the EU’s ambitious climate commitment under the KP,734 GPP is 
regarded as essential policy tool to contribute to the EU’ efforts to meet its 
obligations under the climate regime. The EU, in the main, regards the energy 
sector as essential area of focus for its government procurement. This is of course 
in view of the contribution of the energy sector to the global GHG emissions.735 The 
climate change benefit of green procurement has been underscored by a study 
conducted between 2001 and 2003 for the European Commission, which shows, for 
instance, that “if all public bodies in the EU switched to green electricity,736 they 
would avoid more than 60 million tonnes of CO2 emissions per year, thus 
contributing towards 18% of the EU’s Kyoto target.”737 Earlier on, the EU had aimed 
to have renewable energy sources providing 21% of electricity by the year 2010.738   
 
This potential of green electricity to benefit EU climate change policy had since 
2001 been recognized by the ECJ, in a proposition which directly linked the green 
energy procurement policies of the EU with the EU’s GHG emissions reduction 
efforts pursuant to the climate change regime. The ECJ stated thus:  
The use of renewable energy sources for producing electricity…… is useful 
for protecting the environment in so far as it contributes to the reduction in 
emissions of greenhouse gases which are amongst the main causes of 
climate change which the European Community and its Member States have 
pledged to combat. Growth in that use is amongst the priority objectives 
which the Community and its Member States intend to pursue in 
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 EU accounts for about 15% of the global GHG emissions and have committed to reduce its emissions 
with 
735
 See supra, Chapter 4, Section 4.3.1. 
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 See Directive 2001/77/EC for the definition in Art. 2(c) of “green electricity,” thus: ‘Electricity 
produced from renewable energy sources shall mean electricity produced by plants using only renewable 
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plants also using conventional energy sources …’  
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 See EC, Buying Green! supra, n. 168, p. 5. 
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 See the EU Commission communication: The support of electricity from renewable energy sources, 
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renewables in the EU electricity” will bring about. 
  
196
 
implementing the obligations which they contracted by virtue of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.739 
 
 It was this ruling that gave impetus to the subsequent rulings in two other cases 
discussed later in this section. The cumulative effect of these decisions heralded a 
fundamental shift in the EU law and policy for green procurement in that it inspired 
the codification of GPP in the subsequent Directives. Consequently, it became part 
of requirements in the energy procurement system of the EU to ask suppliers to 
ensure a certain percentage of their electricity is generated from carbon-neutral 
(renewable) sources. 
6.6.1.2 EU law and Jurisprudence on GPP 
On the legal aspects of the EU GPP, prior to the judgement in Concordia Bus 
Finland case,740 the position of the law on public procurement was that contacting 
authorities, subject to certain conditions, could also consider environmental criteria 
in deciding which tender is the “most economically advantageous” pursuant to 
applicable procurement directives. The conditions include cases where reference to 
such factors would financially benefit the contracting authority, and the 
environmental award criteria relate to the nature of the job to be done.741 That is to 
say such considerations were permissible only if the organiser of the tender 
(procuring authority) stands to gain “an economic advantage attributable to the 
product or service which is the object .of the procurement.”742 The law however 
                                                        
739
 See Case C-37998 PreussenElectra AG v. Schhleswag AG, in the presence of Windpark Reufsenjoge III 
GmbH and Land Schleswig-Holstein (hereinafter, ”PreussenElectra”) [2001]ECR I-2099, para. 73. See also 
Trepte, P., supra, n. 172, p. 291. 
740 Case C-513/99 Concordia Bus Finland Oy Ab v Helsingin kaupunki and HKL-Bussiliikenne Judgment of 
the Court of Justice (17 September 2002) (hereinafter, “Concordia Bus Finland case”).  
741
 See Commission’s Green Paper, Government procurement in the EU: Exploring the Way Forward,  see 
also, Kunzlik, P., Case Law Analysis, PP. 193-194 available at: 
http://jel.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/15/2/175.pdf )  
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 See Commission of the European Communities, Public Procurement in European Union, COM(l998) 
143 final (Brussels, 11.03. 1998), 27. See also Kunzlik, P., Making the market work for the environment: 
Acceptance of some “green” contract award criteria in public procurement, (Case Law analyses): 
Concordia Bus Finland Oy Ab v Helsingin kaupunki and HKL-Bussiliikenne (2002). Para 34, Journal of 
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changed dramatically since the “landmark” decision of the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) in the above-mentioned case which was delivered on 17th September, 
2002. Indeed, even as the ECJ decision in that case was pending the EU 
Commission issued its Interpretative Communication in July 2001743 to clarify the 
possibilities offered by the law to integrate environmental considerations into public 
procurement procedures. With the said Communication, environmental 
considerations were not only permissible but indeed encouraged as elements to 
determine the “economically most advantageous” tender. 
 
Still in furtherance of its GPP policy the European Council, by the decision of 17 
Dec 2007, laid down new regulations for implementing strict energy efficiency rules 
for government authorities. By this communication the EC adopted the US-based 
Energy Star programme. Under the new scheme, EU institutions and member state 
bodies are now expected to use energy saving criteria, based on its Energy Star 
programme, when buying office equipment. 744  
6.6.1.3 The New Public Procurement Directives 
Shortly after the issuing of the Interpretative Communication, the so-called New 
Public Procurement Directives were passed in 2004. These are the public contracts 
directive (2004/18/EC)745 and the utilities contracts directive (2004/17/EC).746 These 
                                                                                                                                                             
Environmental Law Vol. 15 No. 2, pp 175-201, available at 
http://jel.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/15/2/175 (accessed 13/02/09). 
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 See EC, Commission interpretative communication of 4 July 2001 on the Community law applicable to 
public procurement and the possibilities for integrating environmental considerations into public 
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http://www.sigmaweb.org/dataoecd/36/12/35026732.pdf 
744
 Fiveash, K., Brussels mandates Energy Star for green procurement, available at: 
http://www.channelregister.co.uk/2007/12/18/green_regulations_benchmark_summit/ (14/01/08) See also 
http://www.computing.co.uk/computing/news/2206098/eu-mandates-energy-efficient and 
http://www.iisd.ca/mea-l/meabulletin39.pdf (last visited 30/12/09). 
745
 Directive 2004/18/EC supra n 361. This Directive amends the Council Directives 92/50/EEC of 18 June 
1992 relating to the coordination of procedures for the award of public service contracts, 93/36/EEC of 14 
June 1993 coordinating procedures for the award of public supply contracts) and 93/37/EEC of 14 June 
1993 concerning the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts. 
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directives amended earlier directives that regulated various aspects of EU public 
procurement system. The Directives brought about significant changes in the whole 
public procurement system of the EU, including clarifying how the contracting 
entities may contribute to the protection of the environment and the promotion of 
sustainable development, whilst ensuring the possibility of obtaining the best value 
for money for their contracts.747 
 
The two directives are generally comparable in terms of their provisions related to 
the environment.748  They provide clearly that procuring authorities and entities are 
permitted, subject to specified conditions, to insert environmental considerations in 
the various stages of process, namely from defining the objectives of procurement, 
through specifying the goods and services to be procured.749  Similarly, in specifying 
performance or functional requirements for service contracts, in designing the terms 
of supplier conditions of participation, and the award criteria, entities may include 
environmental characteristics or considerations.750 However, transparency must be 
observed to ensure that the contract is awarded on clear terms.751 As appropriate, 
procuring authorities are permitted too to use eco-labelling system 752 to define the 
quality and environmental characteristics of the goods. In relation to supplier 
qualification for environment-related jobs, the Directives permit procuring authorities 
                                                                                                                                                             
746
 Directive 2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 coordinating 
the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services 
sectors. This is an amendment to the Council Directive 93/38/EEC of 14 June 1993 coordinating the 
procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and telecommunications 
sectors. 
747
 Ibid., Recital 12. 
748
 Indeed they are almost identical even in the style used in the drafting. For instance both the directives 
stated in Recital No. 1, inter alia, that the directive was based on case law. Similarly in recital No. 6 each 
one of them referred to the integration principle of Art. 6 of the EC Constitution (See supra, n. 56). Again, 
they are similar in language and style for both the recitals and the substantive provisions.  
749
 See Recital 42 to Directive 2004/17/EC 
750
 Ibid. Art. 31(b).  
751
 Ibid.. See also Art. 38 of the Directive 2004/17 
752
 Ibid. Art. 34(6) 
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to demand the firms to show evidence or certification by an environmental 
management system designed or established by an international standardizing 
body.  
 
Generally, the provisions of Art. VI of the GPA and those of the new Directives are 
comparable in prescribing that technical specifications shall be formulated “in terms 
of performance or functional requirements”753 One clear difference between them is 
in the definition of technical specifications: while the Directives are explicit in 
including “environmental performance” as part of the elements of technical 
specifications754 under the GPA, these are to be argued under the general 
exceptions (GPA Art. XXIII).  
6.6.1.4 The Case Law 
The Directives explicitly mentioned that the environmental provisions therein 
contained were informed by “case law”. 755 Although the Directives themselves did 
not mention “climate change” in the reference to the environment, the case-law 
which founded the directives in that regard, made it explicit that the major 
consideration for the inclusion of environmental factors was in fact the EU’s climate 
change commitments.756  
 
                                                        
753
 Technical specifications Art. 43 (3)b: 
754
 See Directive 20017/EC, Annex XXI on definition of certain technical specifications, thus: “‘Technical 
specification’, in the case of service or supply contracts, means a specification in a document defining the 
required characteristics of a product or a service, such as quality levels, environmental performance 
levels,…” 
755
 See Directive 2004/17EC, Recital no. 1 which stated thus: “[T]his Directive is based on Court of Justice 
case-law, in particular case-law on award criteria, which clarifies the possibilities for the contracting 
entities to meet the needs of the public concerned, including in the environmental and/or social area…”. 
See also Directive 2004/18/EC, Recital 46, p. 10.  
756 See e.g. Commission Communication on Limiting Global Climate Change to 2 degrees Celsius- The way 
ahead for 2020 and beyond, COM(2007) 2 final, See also, generally, Kunzlik, The Procurement of 
“Green” Energy, in Arrowsmith, S. and Kunzlik, P. (eds.) Social and Environmental Policies in EC 
Procurement Law New Directives and New Directions (Cambridge, 2009). 
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The case law to which the Directives referred is Concordia Bus Finland Oy Ab v 
Helsingin kaupunki and HKL-Bussiliikenne.757 This case established the foundation 
for the possibility of incorporating environmental considerations into EU public 
procurement system. The case, in particular, delineated the criteria for determining 
economically most advantageous tender. This case also serves to show how inter-
woven are technical specifications, supplier qualifications and contract award 
criteria. It concerns procurement by the city of Helsinki of bus transport services 
pursuant to the Directives 92/50758 and 93/36.759 The award criteria in the tender 
documents stipulated that the contract would be won by the company submitting the 
“economically most advantageous” tender. Three award criteria were specified, 
thus: (1) price, (2) quality of the bus fleet and (3) environmental certification of the 
bus company. Tenderers with the lowest price would receive a score of 86 points on 
the price factor and others proportionately less. Within a total maximum score of 
100 points, an additional maximum 10 points would be given with respect to the 
quality of the bus fleet, those points to be awarded according to a certain formula 
related to nitrogen dioxide emission and noise of the buses offered. Finally, 
maximum 4 points would be given for quality and environment certification of the 
bus company. Six tenders were submitted, of which one (with alternative A and 
alternative B) from Concordia and one from a company owned by the city, HKL, 
which offered buses of a particularly environment-friendly type. In spite of 
Concordia's alternative B receiving maximum price points, HKL received a higher 
total score on the three award criteria and thus won the contract. Concordia 
submitted a complaint before a Finnish court, which referred some three questions 
                                                        
757
 Concordia Bus case, supra, n. 739. 
758 
 Council Directive 92/50/EEC Coordinating Procedures for the Award of Public Service Contracts (18 
June 1992) (Services Directive)._ 
759
 Council Directive 93/38/EEC Coordinating the Procurement Procedures of Entities Operating in the 
Water, Energy, Transport and Telecommunications Sectors (14th June 1993) (Utilities Directive). 
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to the ECJ for preliminary ruling. It is the answer to these questions that formed the 
basis of the decision of the ECJ. 
 
In response, the ECJ held that a contracting agency could, subject to certain 
conditions, take into account such environmental criteria as the nitrogen dioxide 
emission of buses or their noise levels. The Court elaborated on the factors relevant 
to determining what constitutes the "economically most advantageous tender" 
holding that such factors need not necessarily be of a purely economic nature.760 
Thus, other factors which may influence the value of a tender could also be taken 
into account. The EU Services Directive (Art. 36 (1) (a) refers also to the "aesthetic 
and functional characteristics" of a tender. The Court interpreted the Services 
Directive to mean that, where in the context of a public contract for the provision of 
urban bus transport services the contracting authority decides to award a contract to 
the tenderer who submits the economically most advantageous tender, it may take 
into consideration ecological criteria such as nitrogen oxide emissions or the noise 
level of the buses on condition that these criteria:  
• have a direct connection with the subject-matter of the contract, 
• do not confer on the contracting authority an unrestricted freedom of choice 
as regards the award of the contract, 
• are expressly mentioned in the contract documents or the tender notice,  
• comply with all the fundamental principles761 of Community law, in particular 
the principle of non-discrimination. 
The Court accepted that the particular environmental criteria at issue in the case 
satisfied all the above requirements. The criteria related to the level of nitrogen 
                                                        
760
 See the Concordia Bus Finland case. Supra, n. 739, para. 54. 
761
 Ibid., para. 69. These fundamental principles of the EC law are contained essentially in Arts. 14, 28 and 
49 of the EC Treaty. They also form Art. 97 of the Euratom Treaty. These include (a) the principle of equal 
treatment which incorporates non-discrimination; (b) the principle of mutual recognition; (c) the principle 
of proportionality, as well as (d) the principle of transparency.  See Directive 2004/17EC, Recitals 1 and 9, 
p. 2. 
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oxide emissions and noise levels of the buses to be used in providing the public 
transportation services for which the authority had invited tenders. As such they 
were to be regarded as linked to the subject matter of a contract for the provision of 
urban bus transport services.762 Furthermore, the point system according to which 
the environmental criteria were to be applied did not confer unrestricted freedom of 
choice on the contracting authority since it required tenders to meet specific and 
objectively quantifiable environmental requirements.763 Moreso, the criteria had, 
indeed, been expressly mentioned in the relevant tender notice. 
 
Thus, under the EU system, the elements of a “most economically advantageous” 
tender could include climate change mitigation-related considerations insofar as the 
stated conditions are met. This reasoning was re-affirmed by ECJ in the Evn AG’s 
case.764 Accordingly, from the stage of initial decision by a contracting authority, on 
the subject-matter of the contract, to the drawing of technical specifications, the 
selection of tenderers and the defining of award criteria, the EU systems has given 
considerable policy space of including climate change and sustainability 
considerations for the authorities.765  
Figure 3:  
Figure 3 Leverages in EU procurement law for introducing environmental considerations: an overview 
 Definition of the subject 
matter of the contract 
The environmental considerations and/or requirements should 
be indicated 
 
 Drawing up technical 
specifications 
Product specification may relate to demands on type of 
materials/substances in the product (or service)  
The specification may relate to the environmental characteristics of 
process and production methods (PPMs) 
 
Product specification may refer to eco label criteria (of certified eco-
label systems) 
 
                                                        
762
 Concordia case, para. 732. 
763
 Ibid. para. 66. 
764
 Evn AG’s case, supra, n. 682. See also Van Calster, European Case Law Report, October 2003–March 
2004 in RECIEL 13 (2) 2004 European Case Law Report, p. 4. 
765
 See Kunzlik, International Procurement Regimes, supra, n. 170, p. 191. 
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Purchasers are allowed to formulate specific environmental 
requirements (other than implied by ‘standard’ requirements of, for 
instance, eco-labels) 
 
 Selection of tenderers Environmental considerations may become relevant in the 
assessment of the ‘technical capabilities” of candidates. This 
assessment cannot rely on an evaluation of a firm’s management 
structure (i.e. environmental management schemes such as EMAS 
or ISO 14001 are not sufficient proof of high environmental 
performance of a product or service) 
 
 Awarding a contract The legislation distinguishes three award criteria: lowest price; most 
economically advantageous, and “additional award criteria”. The 
discussion is on the scope of the applicability of the concept of 
“external costs” as an element of deciding on “most economically 
advantageous” and, in the context of additional criteria, on 
“secondary policy criteria” (e.g. social policy goals) 
 
 Execution of the contract The procurement directives do not cover the execution stage of a 
contract. The contract, however, may specify rules for the execution 
of the contract (e.g. recuperation of packaging material) 
Source: After Barth and Fischer (2002)766 
6.6.2 Examining the EU GPP system in the face of the GPA  
Although the Concordia Bus Finland decision was applauded by environmental 
NGOs, as a “landmark”767 this position of the EU law which permitted green 
procurement was heavily debated and criticized at Forum Europe conference in 
2004.768 Many questions, including those being considered by this research, were 
raised at the conference. These include questions of the extent of the compatibility 
green procurement with the WTO law.769 As noted in Chapter 3,770 the GPA obliges 
each Party to ensure that “its laws, regulations and administrative procedures, and 
the rules, procedures and practices applied by the entities, conform to the 
provisions of the GPA.”771 This obligation includes Parties’ responsibility to notify the 
                                                        
766
 See Brander, L. and Olsthorn, X., supra, n. 494, p. 24 
767
 See Court ruling opens door to green and social procurement, where the Coalition for Green and Social 
Procurement (EEB, WWF, Oxfam and others) reportedly welcomed the "landmark decision", (Published: 
Monday 16 August 2004 and Updated: Thursday 9 November 2006) at arctiv: 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/sustainability/court-ruling-opens-door-green-social-procurement/Art.-114707)  
(last accessed 12/08/08). 
768
 See Commission's green procurement plans heavily criticized, supra, n. 603. 
769
 Ibid.  
770
 See Chapter 3, Section 3.4.1.1 
771
 GPA Art. XXIV 
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Committee on Government Procurement (CGP) of any changes in the laws and 
regulations or how they are administered.772  
 
In his recent work,773 Trepte stated that as the EU participated actively in the 
architecture of the current GPA and that many of GPA’s provisions were moulded in 
the fashion of the EU public procurement directives, there is the presumption that 
the EU law is (or should be) consistent with the GPA.774 But this is not necessarily 
so. Indeed, Trepte’s work mentions the potential of green energy procurement 
policy, which is permitted under the EU law and policy, to raise issues with the WTO 
principle of non-discrimination. This is in view of the fact that both green electricity 
and the fossil-based type are, as far as end-user is concerned, one and the same 
thing. In other words, while under the EU law, this differentiation based on PPMs not 
related to the physical characteristics is acceptable in so far as green energy 
procurement is concerned, this is not so under the WTO law. This position, as the 
jurisprudence775 seems to show, has much to do with EU’s constitutional obligation 
to use all avenues available at its disposal, in order to address climate change in 
accordance with its commitments under the climate regime.  
 
Trepte’s own view however, is in line with the WTO position, namely non-PR PPMs 
should not be a basis for preferential treatment for one over the other.776 In his view, 
                                                        
772
 Ibid. The EU had formally approved the application of the GPA as well as all the Agreements reached in 
the Uruguay Round multilateral negotiations. See Council Decision 94/800/EC: (of 22 December 1994) 
concerning the conclusion on behalf of the European Community, as regards matters within its 
competence, of the agreements reached in the Uruguay Round multilateral negotiations (1986-1994), Art. 
2, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31994D0800:EN:HTML 
773
 See Trepte, P., supra, n. 172. 
774
 Ibid.. Trepte referred to the parties’ obligations under EC public procurement directives as “broadly 
similar” but not “identical” to those of the GPA. See 131 at n. 139. 
775
 The jurisprudence referred to here is essentially those of the PreussenElectra, Evn AG, and Concordia 
Bus Finland decision, supra, n. 682 and 683 repectively. 
776 On this, See Malumfashi, G. I., supra, n. 11.      
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this seems to be the position even under the EU law. And this will mean the green 
energy procurement is not actually warranted by the EU Law and policy.  
 
On the other hand, Kunzlik argues that PPMs both at production and consumption 
stages are acceptable as differentiating factors in green energy procurement under 
the EU law. For example, he believes that generally the non-discrimination 
principles of the EU law are comparable to the WTO’s.777 Hence, the environmental 
arguments based on GATT Art. XX (b) and (g) and the AB interpretation of these of 
this Article in the US – Shrimp decision could be applicable to permit PPMs based 
distinction under the EU procurement system.778 Accordingly, he interpreted Art. 
GPA VI:1 which defines technical specifications of products to include also “the 
processes and methods for their production” as meaning both product-related and 
non-product related PPMs and at both production and consumption stage.779 
  
From the fore-going, it can be discerned that there is a systemic difference between 
the GPA and the EU law on GPP. The difference hinges on the fundamental policy 
objectives that underline the two systems. That is to say while the GPA as a 
component of the WTO system is essentially about safe-guarding trade 
liberalisation in the context of GP, the EU system, on the other hand, has 
environmental protection at the heart of its common market policy and structure.  
 
Thus, to the GPA and the whole WTO system, environment is not a core objective 
per-se; it is merely an incidental, or a complementary objective. This is seen in the 
fact that, as the EC puts it in EC – Tariff Preferences: "[T]he WTO Agreement is not 
                                                        
777
 Kunzlik, P., International Procurement Regimes, supra, n. 170. 
778
 See Recital 42 which says: Contracting entities that wish to define environmental requirements for the 
technical specifications of a given contract may lay down the environmental characteristics, such as a 
given production method, and/or specific environmental effects of product groups or services. 
779
 See Kunzlik, P., International Procurement Regimes, supra, n. 170, pp. 110-112.  
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an environmental agreement and ... it contains no positive regulation of 
environmental matters."780 Thus environment-related issues are merely mentioned 
either in the preamble to the WTO Agreement, or in the general exceptions, and not 
as norms in themselves. On the other hand, under the EU, not only does the 
integration principle permeate all the EU policies, but the GPP is specifically an 
established policy tool by which the environmental, energy and climate change 
agenda are targeted. Accordingly, the law and policy of the EU places much weight 
on the GPP as a climate change tool. GPP thus is explicitly provided for in the EU 
statutes, and solidly backed up by the ECJ. 
 
 This therefore presupposes that while under the EU, henceforth, environmental 
considerations are not per se, a matter for a defendant to proof before the court; it is 
an issue of proof under the WTO law. In order words, a WTO party who faces a 
legal challenge for maintaining a climate-friendly procurement has the onus to prove 
it as falling under the GPA general exceptions. And as will be shown in chapter 7 of 
this work, it is always difficult to prove such exceptions because of the rule of 
“necessity” as well as “the chapeau” contained in the exceptions   
 
In sum, while the WTO has always regarded non-trade concerns including the 
environment, with great caution, the EU, on the other hand, is proactive in its 
environmental and overall sustainable development policies. In particular, it is 
because the EU is conscious of its commitments under the climate regime that 
necessitate making the GPP as an integral aspect of it policy portfolio.781  
 
                                                        
780
 See the AB, referring to EC’s appellant's submission, (para. 54) in EC – Tariff Preferences (ABR), 
supra, n. 45, para. 96. 
781
 See Malumfashi, G. I. supra, n. 11. 
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It is pertinent to observe that although there is no corresponding elaboration of the 
conditions under the GPA for the use of environmental considerations as found in 
the EU system, there are still synergies between the two systems. For instance, the 
elaborated conditions as found under the EU systems are targeted at ensuring non-
discrimination, equal treatment and transparency which are also the hallmarks of 
the GPA and the WTO system as a whole.  It is however still to be seen the extent 
of policy space provided under the WTO/GPA for Parties to include 
environmental/climate friendly considerations in the procurement decisions and 
processes. The WTO position is hinged on its reluctance to permit the use on NPR 
PPMs as basis of discrimination between products and services. 
6.7 Summary 
 
This chapter addressed the scope of GPP, and the likely legal issues that arise 
under the GPA. Trade effects in GPP are envisaged in the design of technical 
specification for products and services. The emphasis by the GPA on the use of 
international standards as yardstick for technical specification is arguably intended 
to reduce the trade effects arising from environmental PPMs. Thus the GPA gives 
more latitude to the Parties than what obtains in the TBT and SPS agreements, in 
that it requires that technical specifications must generally “be in terms of 
performance rather than design or descriptive characteristics.”782  
 
On the discriminatory or protectionist nature of GPP measure, the chapter explored 
the textual disparities between the GPA Art. III and GATT Arts. I and III on non-
discrimination. Particularly, the omission of the term “like” in the GPP Art. III was 
seen as potentially a source of contention in event of litigation.  
 
                                                        
782
 GPA Art. VI:2(a)   
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The chapter also highlighted the controversy sorrounding the legality of the EU GPP 
system as it relates to the green energy procurement. Here, commentators including 
Trepte consider the PPMs issue as still an open matter. Others like Kunzlik look at 
PPMs issue in GPP as resolved. This is in view of the clear inclusion of PPMs in the 
definition of technical specifications in the New Directives. In general terms, 
however comparison between GPA and the EU GPP system revealed that the 
major difference between the GPA and the EU GPP systems hinges on the 
foundations of the two systems. That is to say, while the GPA is primarily a trade 
instrument and part of the overall WTO system, hence has environment only as 
complementary objective, the EU Common Market has environmental protection as 
part of its primary objective as provided in the the Integration Principle.783 
Accordingly, while under the EU, GPP is an established positive norm in the legal 
sources, under the GPA, a Party who maintains a GPP measure has the onus 
under the exception provisions, to prove that it is necessary, and also not 
discrimination. 
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 See Malumfashi, G. I., supra,, n. 11 
  
209
 
CHAPTER 7 
 
CLIMATE-FRIENDLY GP, THE APPLICATION OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL 
EXCEPTIONS AND THE BURDEN OF PROOF QUESTION 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
It has been noted in Chapter One784 that, generally, the GATT/WTO system 
recognises the sanctity of Members’ sovereignty and the right to fashion domestic 
regulatory policies for securing certain “non-trade” concerns. These concerns are 
specified under the GATT Art. XX general exceptions (as reflected under GPA Art. 
XXIII). This chapter examines the extent of the said policy space for the GPA 
Parties to reflect the environment and sustainable development factors in their 
procurement processes. It seeks to specifically show how the WTO could be made 
more responsive to climate change mitigation demands. Ultimately, the chapter 
shows how through GPP the WTO system can contribute towards establishing 
coherence in the international legal instruments regulating trade and climate 
change. This is in line with objectives of the WTO system as outlined in the 
Preamble to the WTO Agreement which recognises that “trade and economic 
endeavour should be conducted … [also] in accordance with the objective of 
sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment”.785  
 
Although there has been no complaints to the WTO dispute settlement body (DSB) 
against a climate-related procurement measure, this research, however, sees the 
potential for the occurrence of such disputes in the future. This is in view of the 
increasing awareness about climate change challenge on the one hand,786 and the 
                                                        
784
 Supra, Chapter 1 Section 1. 
785
 See Paragraph 1 of the Recital to the Preamble of the WTO Agreement.  
786
 See, Esty, D., Bridging the Trade-Environment Divide, Journal of Economic Perspectives—Volume 15, 
Number 3—Summer 2001—pp. 113–130, at 115. 
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importance being attached to GPP as an effective tool for GHG emissions 
reduction.787 The GATT jurisprudence is controversial on the issue of the extent of 
policy space provided by these exceptions, particularly as this relates to the 
environment. First, we observe some textual differences as between the GATT and 
the GPA provisions both on the non-discrimination norms and the environmental 
exceptions. Second, we see the difficulty associated with the meaning and/or proof 
of the chapeau, the introductory part of the exceptions: no environment-related 
measure in all the disputes ever, was able to be proved under the chapeau even 
most of the disputes had been accepted as covered under the exceptions.  
 
The Brazil – Tyres ruling indeed had taken the jurisprudence from the known US – 
Shrimp ruling to some steps further, in clarifying the extent of the policy space 
provided under the GATT Art. XX. However, that dispute, not being climate-change 
related, and also not concerned with procurement, could not address some of the 
GPA-related textual and conceptual issues raised by this research. This chapter 
indicates however, that in an event of a GPP-related dispute between Parties to the 
GPA, the GATT jurisprudence would in general terms still inform the interpretation 
of the GPA.788  
 
The question of allocation of burden of proof for claims or measures maintained 
under the GATT XX general exceptions ( referred to as “affirmative defences”), is of 
particular interest to this research. It is normal in traditional international law to 
require a party to a dispute to prove an affirmative defence relied upon. This is also 
                                                        
787
 For instance, both Senators Barack Obama and John McCain in their campaign for the USA presidency 
for 2008 proposed GPP as part of their energy and climate change policy packages. They however did not 
advert attention to any potential conflicts between their proposals and the WTO rules. See for instance 
Presidential Candidates’ Key Proposals on Health Care and Climate Will Require WTO Modifications 
Overreach of WTO Highlighted by Potential Conflicts with Candidates’ Non-Trade Proposals, (Public 
Citizen’s Global Trade Watch, Washington, DC, USA, February 2008), available at: 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/PresidentialWTOreport.pdf (accessed last: 07/10/08). 
788
 These are the GPA versions of the GATT Arts. I, III and XX provisions respectively. 
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the position under the WTO. However, where the subject-matter of the defence is of 
special importance to the WTO Members, this rule seems to be problematic. 
Indeed, in EC – Tariff Preferences (dispute related to the application of the Enabling 
Clause), the rule was altered.789 Thus, in the same spirit, in view of the significance 
to the WTO Members of climate change problems, the same approach adopted in 
the Enabling Clause case may be desirable. Indeed, this research is seeking an 
even safer and more conventional approach to achieve this. Climate-related 
measures are arguably accommodated under the GPA Art. XXIII. However, looking 
back at the GATT Art. XX(b) and (g) jurisprudence, such measures may not scale 
through the chapeau to that Article. This situation potentially will be constraining the 
efforts of the WTO Members to pursue that legitimate policy concern. Thus, re-
examining this position, this research suggests that GPP be specifically insulated 
from the GPA Art. XXIII. Climate measures should instead be provided for as a 
separate positive norm. This would effectively reverse the application of the rule on 
the allocation of burden of proof, as explained later in this chapter.  
 
This suggestion may raise concerns about possible abuse by GPA Parties hiding 
behind the proposed positive norm to perpetrate protectionism in the garb of climate 
change motivated GPP. The chapter suggests that limits could be imposed on the 
type of products or services that may qualify for the dispensation granted climate-
related GPP measures. Thus, the current Doha negotiations on liberalization of 
environmental goods and services could provide an agreed definition for the goods 
and services to be designated as climate-related for the purpose of the proposed 
positive norm. The current review of the GPA could provide an opportunity to make 
the suggested changes in the text. 
 
                                                        
789
 See infra, section 7.5.1.2. 
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The chapter first, critically reviews the notion of the WTO single-undertaking vis-a-
vis the relationship between the WTO Agreement and the Annexes, particularly, the 
relationship between the GATT Art. XX(b) and (g), and the GPA Art. XXIII. This is 
followed by a review of the WTO jurisprudence on the GATT Art. XX(b) and (g). 
Then the revised GPA 2007 provisions are considered, with a focus on the 
adequacy or otherwise of the newly inserted Art. X:6, which makes an explicit 
permission for inclusion of environmental considerations in procurement policies. 
The chapter concludes with suggestions for further improvement on the said Art. X:6 
in line with the proposal for inserting positive norm which specifically permits 
climate-related procurement. 
7.2 The GPA and the notion of “single undertaking” of the WTO system  
In order to determine the applicability of the jurisprudence on the GATT Art. XX 
general environmental exceptions, to interpret measures brought under GPA Art. 
XXIII, it is pertinent to re-examine the constitutional relationship between the GATT 
and the GPA vis-à-vis the WTO notion of the “Single Undertaking”. Single 
undertaking seems to have originated in Art. II:2 of the WTO Agreement which 
provides thus: 
 The agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annexes 1, 2 
and 3 (hereinafter referred to as “Multilateral Trade Agreements”790) are 
integral parts of this Agreement, binding on all Members. 
This provision, according to the AB in Brazil — Desiccated Coconut,791 requires all 
WTO Members to accept, as a “single undertaking,” all the multilateral trade 
agreements which were attached in the 3 annexes to the WTO Agreement. Thus by 
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 These agreements are in Annexes “1” to “4”. Annex 1A contains 13 agreements that regulate trade in 
goods, while Annex 1B is the GATS for services-related trade regulation, and Annex 1C contains the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS). Annex 2 to the WTO Agreement is 
the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), while Annex 3 is 
the Trade Policy Review mechanism (TPRM). 
791
 See Brazil – Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut, Appellate Body Report, WT/DS22/AB/R, adopted 
20 March 1997, DSR 1997:I, pp. 12–13.  
  
213
 
single undertaking, as a negotiation technique, the whole Final Act should either be 
accepted or rejected.792 The slogan between the Members during the Uruguay 
Round was “[N]othing is agreed until everything is agreed”.793 In other words, in 
order to enjoy any rights under one of the agreements, a Member must agree to be 
bound by the obligations stipulated in all the agreements. This technique, which had 
been adopted for the Doha Round too,794 guides the relationship between various 
WTO agreements, and aims to achieve “greater consistency”795  in their application 
by the Members.  
 
The GPA, however, comes under Annex 4 which contains the plurilateral 
agreements796 not included under Art. the single undertaking obligation of Article 2 
of the WTO Agreement. GPA, going the WTO Agreement Art II:2 is thus an 
“exception” to the single undertaking scheme.797 Similarly, as discussed earlier in 
Chapter 3,798 that GP as an international trade mechanism is excluded from the non 
discrimination rules of the GATT (as well as the GATS).  
                                                        
792
 See Levy, P. I., Do we need an undertaker for the Single Undertaking? Considering the angles of 
variable geometry, in Evenett, S and Hoekman, B. (eds.), Economic Development and Multilateral Trade 
Cooperation, (World Bank Publications, 2006), p. 417. This is admittedly an “exaggeration”, because of 
the “plurilateral agreements” which bind “only certain members joined.” 
793
 Doha Ministerial Declaration adopted on 14 November 2001 (WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1), available at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm#organization [last visited 
29/05/10]. See para. 47: “With the exception of the improvements and clarifications of the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding, the conduct, conclusion and entry into force of the outcome of the negotiations 
shall be treated as parts of a single undertaking.” [Emphasis added] 
794
 Ibid. 
795
 VanGrasstek, C. and Sauvé, P., The consistency of WTO rules: can the single undertaking be squared 
with variable geometry? Journal of International Economic Law 9(4) 837–864 [Advance Access 
publication 3 November 2006], at p. 480. Whether Single Undertaking actually helps to achieve the 
“greater consistency” or not is debatable. See generally, Wolfe, R., The WTO single undertaking as 
negotiating technique and constitutive metaphor, Journal of International Economic Law 12(4), 835–858. 
 
796
 As pointed earlier, two out of the four plurilateral agreements have, however, been deleted from the 
annex as they had expired. See supra, Chapter 1 Section 1 and Chapter 3 Section 3.  
797
 See Cottier T., From Progressive Liberalization to Progressive Regulation in WTO Law, Journal of 
International Economic Law, 2006 1(43) at pp. 7-8 and 14. The opposite technique to the “single 
undertaking” is “variable geometry” adopted under the Tokyo Round. Variable geomatry allows the GATT 
Contracting Parties, to select to become to complementary plurilateral codes as they wish. 
798
 See supra,, Chapter 3 Section 3.3.2.1 
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On the other hand, according to the AB in the US – Shrimp ruling, the Preamble to 
the WTO Agreement (which recognizes “the protection of the environment” as one 
of the core objectives of the WTO) “informs all the multilateral and plurilateral 
agreements annexed to the WTO Agreement”.799 What then is the relationship 
between the GATT and the GPA? The answer to this question may help clarify the 
applicability of the jurisprudence of the GATT Art. XX to measures brought under 
GPA Art. XXIII. However, we also observe certain textual disparities between the 
provisions of GATT Art. XX and those of GPA XXIII.800 The relevant provisions are 
set out below (with added emphasis): 
The GATT XX: 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner 
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised 
restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be 
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of 
measures: 
[…] 
 (b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;  
[....] 
 (g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such 
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on 
domestic production or consumption.   
 
The GPA Art. XXIII:2: 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner 
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail or a disguised 
restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be 
construed to prevent any Party from imposing or enforcing measures: 
                                                        
799
 Ibid., para. 129. [Emphasis added]. 
800
 Textual disparities were also observed earlier in relation to the GATT Articles I and III and GPA Art. III 
on non-discrimination. See supra, Chapter 6 Section 6.5. 
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necessary to protect public morals, order or safety, human, animal or plant 
life or health …       
It is clear from the above that the GATT Art. XX provisions on the exceptions for 
environment-related measures are more extensive than those of GPA’s Art. XXIII. 
Of course, the drafting styles, it can be seen from the texts, differ generally in the 
two instruments.801 Specifically, the paragraph (g) of GATT XX (relating to the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources802) is omitted in the GPA version. 
Details of the negotiating history of the GPA Art. XXIII, would have helped to clarify 
the motive of this omission (and that related to the “like” term under GPA Art. III 
discussed earlier in chapter 6803). Efforts were made, including contacts to the WTO 
Secretariat,804  by the author, to obtain these details but up to the time this work was 
completed such information was not forth-coming. The author notes however the 
assertion by Thomas Cottier to the effect that because of the more liberal 
interpretation of the GATT Art. XX witnessed over time, “it is no longer required that 
the measure at stake directly benefit the conservation of natural resources.”805 The 
fact however remains that GATT Art. XX(g) is still the law.  
 
                                                        
801
 The GPA version, generally, is a shorter version of the general exceptions incorporating both GATT 
Articles XX, and XXI (on “security” exceptions) [GPA version has 150 words while the GATT’s is 534 
words]. Specifically, while the GATT version has the introductory or head-note (referred to as “the 
chapeau”) separate from the sub-paragraphs (a) to (j), the GPA’s does not have sub-paragraphs and all is 
lumped in together with the chapeau. In effect, however the two versions address one and the same subject-
matter: general exceptions to the substantive obligations. It can be observed also that the GPA version 
should cover “trade in services,” too, but this is not made explicit. The same lacuna in the GATT’s version 
is filled in by the GATS. We note that the main Non-discrimination rules in GPA Art. III explicitly 
includes also services. Thus it is logical that the (GPA) exceptions too, specify services too. 
802
 The phrase “exhaustible natural resources”, in the GATT Art. XX (g) has been interpreted by the AB in 
the US - Shrimp ruling using evolutionary approach, to include both living and non-living natural 
resources. There are however controversies as to whether the phrase was really intended to include the 
“living” natural resources like shrimp. See for instance Kelly, J. P., supra, n. 108. For our purpose 
however, the phrase is relevant regardless of the controversy, in so far as climate change problem affects 
both living and non-living resources. 
803
 See Chapter 6, Section 6.6.1. See also Chapter 3, Section .3.4.1.1(c)(ii). 
804
 See communications with some principal staff of the WTO Secretariat, Geneva, on this issue, attached 
as Annex Appendix VI.  
805
 See Cottier, T., et al (eds.) supra, n. 546, p. 18. 
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The significance of this clarification could be seen where, in an event of a climate-
related procurement dispute, the subject-matter is covered by the (g) paragraph. 
This argument is corollary to the wider question of the extent to which GATT Art. XX 
can be invoked as an exception to justify non-GATT violation (e.g. a violation of a 
norm under SCM Agrrement).806 This clarification becomes necessary in view of the 
fact the exclusion of the GP is only in respect of the non-discrimination rules 
provided for in the GATT Articles I and III,807 namely that, the exclusion does not 
include the application of the GATT Art. XX. Two possible answers suggested for 
the question of the extent of the application of the GATT Art. XX jurisprudence to a 
case procurement measures brought under GPA Art. XXIII:2, thus: 
1) That the GATT Art. XX exceptions are applicable to procurement measures that 
contravene other provisions than the GATT Art. I and III, e.g., provisions of 
GATT Art. XI. In this case, therefore, the GATT (including the GATS as 
appropriate) would generally apply concurrently with the GPA to regulate 
procurement measures, at the least in areas not fully covered by the GPA.  
2) If however, the exclusion means that government procurement is to be 
exclusively regulated by the GPA, which, in any event, has also provided for 
both non-discrimination (with its two pillars of NT and MFN) and the prohibitions 
on quantitative restrictions (all in GPA Art. III), as well as the general exceptions 
(GPA Art. XXIII), then the GATT Art. XX would not apply. In this case, however, 
the lacuna observed earlier in the GPA version of the general exceptions 
relating to environment would become relevant. The question then is what 
happens if a procurement measure at issue falls under the (g) part of the Art. XX 
omitted by GPA Art. XXIII? 
                                                        
806
 On this, see Christopher, T., Using GATT, Art XX to Justify Climate Change Measures in Claims Under 
the WTO Agreements, Environmental and Planning Law Journal, Vol. 27, pp. 346, 2010, available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1676105; China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution 
Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WTO Doc WT/DS363/AB/R 
(Report of the Appellate Body, 2009). 
807
 It has been noted earlier that the exclusion of government procurement in the GATS includes also 
commitments on market access. supra, Chapter 3, Section 3.2.1 
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As noted earlier, the single - undertaking notion requires all WTO Members to 
accept all the multilateral trade agreements attached in the 3 annexes to the WTO 
Agreement. However the WTO system includes also the Annex 4 to the Final Act 
which contains the plurilateral agreements, of which GPA is one. Thus the 
relationship between the GATT 1994 and all the other 13 agreements in Annex 
1A808 (and to some extent the Annexes 2 and 3 agreements too) looks clear: it is 
single undertaking.809 Indeed, the AB in Canada – Periodicals,810 declared 
concerning the relationship between the GATT 1994 and GATS thus: 
“We agree with the Panel’s statement: ‘The ordinary meaning of the texts of 
GATT 1994 and GATS as well as Art. II:2 of the WTO Agreement, taken 
together, indicates that obligations under GATT 1994 and GATS can co-
exist and one does not override the other.’”811 
 
We see also, the General Interpretative Note attached to Annex 1A which provides 
that if there is “conflict” between the provisions of GATT 1994 and another Annex 1 
Agreement the provisions of the latter prevails to the extent of the inconsistency.812 
This of course is in line with the spirit of the traditional international law principles of 
interpretation as enunciated by the VCLT.813  
                                                        
808
 For instance, the AB held in Argentina — Footwear (EC), affirming their earlier decision in US — 
Gasoline, that the provisions of Art. XIX of the GATT 1994 and those of the Agreement on Safeguards are 
all provisions of one treaty, the WTO Agreement. Thus, “an appropriate reading of this ‘inseparable 
package of rights and disciplines’ must, accordingly, be one that gives meaning to all the relevant 
provisions of these two equally binding agreements.” (Para. 81). 
809
 For a concise exposition of the WTO jurisprudence on this, see Montaguti, E. and Lugard, M. , The 
GATT 1994 and Other Annex 1 Agreements: Four Different Relationships?, JIEL 2000 3(3):473-484. The 
authors identified through Panels and AB reports four types of relationships (namely, conflict, express 
derogation, overlap and complementarity) existing between provisions of the GATT 1994 and provisions 
of the other Annex 1 Agreements. 
810
 See Canada - Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals AB-1997-2 Report of the Appellate Body 
(WT/DS31/AB/R)  
811
 Ibid., p. 19 citing the Canada - Periodicals Panel Report, para. 5.17. For more insight on this the 
specific relationship between GATT 1994 and GATS, see EC – Bananas III, supra, 549, para. 221.  
812
 See the General Interpretative Note to Annex 1A, Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods, of the 
WTO Agreement, The Legal  Texts: The Result of the URMTNs, supra, n. 3. 
813
 VCLT Arts. 31 and 32, supra, ns. 19-20. 
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There is no such clarity as to the relationship between the GATT/GATS on the one 
hand and, on the other hand, the Annex 4 agreements as it relates to the aspects 
not excluded, and as between the members of those agreements. In this regard, 
this research adopts the first answer, for two reasons: Firstly, the GPA Parties were 
first and foremost all Members of the WTO as the umbrella body. As such they are 
bound originally by the WTO agreement. Secondly, to the extent that the (g) part of 
the GATT Art. XX is essential to make the environmental exceptions more 
encompassing, it only makes sense that the GATT Art. XX is read alongside, and 
thereby making more complete the environmental aspects of, the GPA Art. XXIII. 
That is to say the GATT provisions and those of the GPA not covered by the GATT 
Art. III:8 exceptions, are binding as between GPA members on the basis of 
complementarity.  
7.3 GPP and the application of the environmental exceptions 
This section first looks at the parameters for the application of the general 
exceptions, and the attitude of the WTO adjudicatory bodies in this connection. The 
section then contextualizes GPP for climate change within those parameters. The 
current standing of the jurisprudence on this subject is represented, more or less by 
the rulings in the US – Gasoline, US – Shrimp, US – Gambling and Brazil – Tyres 
disputes.  
7.3.1 The conventional jurisprudence on the environmental exceptions 
7.3.1.1 The functions of the exceptions and the logic of their sequence  
Going by the AB rulings in the above disputes, the function of the general 
exceptions under GATT Art. XX (and GATS Art XXIV), is to “affirm the right of 
Members to pursue objectives identified in the paragraphs of these provisions even 
if, in doing so, Members act inconsistently with obligations set out in other 
provisions of the respective agreements, provided that all of the conditions set out 
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therein are satisfied.”814 Thus the AB stated in its ruling in US – Shrimp, thus, “... We 
have not decided that the sovereign nations that are Members of the WTO cannot 
adopt effective measures to protect endangered species, such as sea turtles. 
Clearly, they can and should. ...”.815 The determination of what constitutes such goal 
and the appropriate level of protection required to achieve the goal are sovereign 
decisions of the Members pursuing those goals. The WTO system recognises such 
decisions by Members as also aspects of their national sovereignty.816  
 
However, in exercising this right using “unilateral”817 types of measures, each WTO 
Member is required to safe-guard the non-discrimination obligations, and that its 
policies do not amount to affording “protection to domestic products”818.  Thus, the 
AB emphasized the need to strike a proper balance between the affirmative 
commitments set out in, e.g., Articles I, III and XI, and the policies and interests 
embodied in Article XX. This balance can be established by considering the entire 
framework of the GATT and “its object and purpose, on a case-to-case basis [as 
well as] by careful scrutiny of the factual and legal context in a given dispute, 
without disregarding the words actually used by the WTO Members themselves to 
express their intent and purpose."819 
 
                                                        
814
 US – Gasoline (ABR), p. 18; US – Gambling (ABR), para. 291 
815
 US – Shrimp (ABR), para. 185 
816
 Ibid.. See also United States-Measures affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, Panel Report, DS23/R, 
adopted 19 June 1992, BISD 39S/209, [hereinafter referred to as ‘US - Malt Beverages’]. The Panel 
cautioned that “determination [made] in the context of Article III ... [should] not unnecessarily infringe 
upon the regulatory authority and domestic policy options of contracting parties.” Para. 5. 72. 
817
 Unilateral measures, in contrast to multilateral ones, are those trade measures that individual countries 
take “unilaterally” and which may affect or even undermine the trade interests of other countries. The 
popular example of unilateral measures is found in the US - Tuna/Dolphin and US - Shrimp disputes. The 
actions of the US to conserve the dolphin and shrimp in those cases were considered as unilateralism. This 
is because the US actions were not agreed upon by all the parties concerned. 
818
 GATT Art. III. 
819
 US – Gasoline (ABR), p. 18. 
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With the above background in mind, it becomes now pertinent to examine briefly 
how the WTO adjudicatory bodies treat the environment-related disputes. Their 
approach has been to place the burden on the party maintaining the measure 
complained of, to prove that it was “necessary” for the attainment of the legitimate 
regulatory purpose intended.820 The defendant should then proceed to show that, in 
line with introductory part of the Art. XX (“the chapeau”), the application of the 
measure was not arbitrary nor a means of an unjustifiable discrimination as between 
WTO Members, nor was it a disguised restriction on international trade. In other 
words, the defendant has to prove also that the measure does not amount to an 
abuse of the exceptions.821 In order to examine the evidence and assertions of the 
parties to the dispute within the context of the exceptions the bodies then engage 
what has been referred to as the “process of weighing and balancing” of a series of 
factors. These factors mainly include ‘the contribution made by the compliance 
measure to the enforcement of the law or regulation at issue, the importance of the 
common interests or values protected by that law or regulation, and the 
accompanying impact of the law or regulation on imports or exports.822 
 
The above has been the conventional approach applied by the WTO judicial bodies 
in the rulings where GATT Art. XX exceptions are at issue. In US – Gasoline823, the 
AB stated that for Art. XX to apply to justify a measure, such measure “must not 
only come under one or another of the particular exceptions… listed under Art. XX; 
                                                        
820
 US – Gasoline (ABR), pp. 22-23, DSR 1996:I, 3, at 21; US – Wool Shirts and Blouses (ABR), pp. 15-16, 
DSR 1997:I, 323, at 337; US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC) (ABR), para. 133; US – Gambling (ABR), paras 
319-310. 
821
 US – Gasoline (ABR), p. 21. 
822
 See Korea – Measures Affecting Imports Of Fresh, Chilled And Frozen Beef,  Panel Report, 
WT/DS161/R, WT/DS169/R, 31 July 2000, modified by Appellate Body Report, 11 December 2000, 
WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R, adopted 10 January 2001, DSR 2001:I, 5 [hereinafter, Korea - Beef 
(ABR)], para. 164. Aspects of the process of weighing and balancing have however been subject of 
controversy among commentators. See Regan, D. The Meaning of “Necessary” in GATT Article XX and 
GATS Article XIV: The Myth of Cost-Benefit Balancing, (2007) 6 World Trade Review, 3, 347−69. Regan 
believes for instance that the less-restrictive-alternative inquiry component of the “weighing and 
balancing” does not involve comparison between benefit and cost. It only compares “the costs of different 
measures that would achieve the benefit.” 
823
 Ibid., p. 22 
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it must also satisfy the requirements imposed by the opening clauses of Art. XX.”824 
The cumulative connotation of the provisions of GATT Art. XX (b) and (g) and those 
of GPA XXIII is to potentially exempt an environmental measure from other 
substantive WTO obligations if such a measure: 
a) is “necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life and health’, or is “related 
to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources,”825 and 
b) is not to be applied in an “arbitrary” or “unjustifiably discriminatory manner” 
or as a disguised restriction on trade.826 
The essence of the sequence is logicality, in that if the purpose of the chapeau, as 
indicated by the AB in US – Gasoline, is “so as to prevent the abuse or misuse of 
the specific exemptions provided for in Art. XX”,827 then it follows that the measure 
at issue must first be properly investigated to see if it fits under the sub-paragraph 
the complainant places it. Thus, the AB in the US – Shrimp ruling out-rightly faulted 
the methodology adopted by the Panel that considered the design of measure, 
rather than the manner of its application, under the chapeau.828 The Panel, on 
finding the measure as “discriminatory” closed its analysis and found that it was not 
justified under the Art. XX even without first identifying and examining the measure 
under the sub-paragraphs relied upon by the Defendant. The AB thus observed that 
this approach made the “task of interpreting the chapeau so as to prevent the abuse 
... of the specific exemptions provided for in Article XX is rendered very difficult, if 
indeed ... possible at all.”829  
                                                        
824
 Ibid., p. 20. See also US – Shrimp US – Shrimp (ABR), para. 104 (approving this methodology as 
followed by the US - Shrimp Panel below. See Panel’s report in para.  7.28. 
825
 By virtue of XX(g), the measure must also be made effective “in conjunction with restrictions on 
domestic production or consumption”. 
826
 See Deal, T. E., WTO Rules and Procedures and their Implication for the Kyoto Protocol (USA Council 
for International Business, 2008), pp. 4-5, available at http://www.uscib.org/docs/wto_and_kyoto_2008.pdf 
827
 US – Gasoline (ABR),  p. 22. 
828
 US – Shrimp (ABR), para. 120. 
829
 Ibid.. 
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7.3.1.2 The crux of the US – Shrimp (AB) ruling 
The AB in the US – Shrimp830 did indicate that even though the GATT XX provisions 
were crafted in 1947, they have to be interpreted in accordance with the present day 
understanding of the principles and dictates of sustainable development. Thus 
adopting an “evolutionary” approach, the AB used the Preamble to the WTO 
Agreement to read “living natural resources” into Art. XX(g). Thus, the US unilateral 
and process-based measure adopted to ban the importation of turtle-unfriendly 
shrimp from the complainant countries was admitted as a bona-fide conservation 
measure well within the ambit of GATT Art. XX(g).831  
 
However, when analysed against the chapeau, the US’s measure was found 
wanting. By its express terms, the chapeau, as stated earlier is focused on “the 
application of a measure already found to be inconsistent with an obligation of the 
GATT 1994 but falling within one of the paragraphs of Article XX.”832 Thus US’s 
measure was found to be applied contrary to the provisions of the chapeau for 
essentially two reasons.  First, the application of the measure was arbitrary as no 
opportunity was made available to affected countries “for any inquiry into the 
appropriateness of the regulatory program for the conditions prevailing in those 
exporting countries [e.g., in form of an appeal process].”833 Secondly, the application 
also constituted an unjustifiable discrimination between countries when the same 
conditions existed because the affected countries were treated differently by the US 
                                                        
830
 For summary of the facts of US – Shrimp, see supra, n. 104. For more analysis on this ruling, see 
Trachtman. J. P., Decisions of the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization Current Survey: 
United States--Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, EJIL,Vol. 16 no .4 [2005], 
available at: http://207.57.19.226/journal/curdevs/sr47.html (last visited 4/07/10). 
831
 Ibid. para. 142. Then in para. 141, the AB stated: The means and ends relationship between Section 609 
and the legitimate policy of conserving an exhaustible, and, in fact, endangered species, is observably a 
close and real one, a relationship that is every bit as substantial as that which we found in United States - 
Gasoline between the EPA baseline establishment rules and the conservation of clean air in the United 
States. 
832
 US – Gasoline (ABR), p. 22;   US – Gambling (ABR), para. 339 and Brazil – Tyres (ABR) , Para 215. 
833
 Ibid., para. 165 
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and for no justifiable reason. Indeed, in seeking to avoid unilateralism, the US law, 
[Section 609(a)] upon which the measure was based, required the US to engage in 
prior negotiations with countries that would potentially be affected by its application. 
The US did not effectively institute such negotiations. Where they did, it was found 
to be selective, not all-inclusive.834  
 
In this sense, the AB inter alia, cited the Ministerial Decision establishing the CTE835 
which in turn made reference to the Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration, which called 
for the avoidance of unilateralism, and decided that the US should have taken 
serious steps to negotiate with all, not just some, of the Parties potentially to be 
affected by the measure, with a view to reaching a multilateral solution to the 
problem.836 Thus, the shrimp importation ban was simply protectionist, as claimed 
by the plaintiffs, a form of eco-imperialism instituted by the US to favour its own 
industries under the garb of environmental protection. 837  
 
Therefore, the developments brought about by the US – Shrimp ruling in the WTO 
trade-environment jurisprudence could be seen in the following ways: 
a) Loosening the “necessity” grip 
One of the fundamental effects of the US – Shrimp (AB) ruling is that it shifted 
emphasis away from the “necessity” proof of an environment-related measure under 
the sub-paragraphs, to the chapeau conditionalities. In other words, it made 
                                                        
834
 The US did negotiate seriously over this issue with western hemisphere trading partners, and actually 
conclude with them a multilateral environmental agreement: the Inter-American Convention for the 
Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles, opened for signature Dec. 1, 1996, 37 I.L.M. 1246. However, 
the US refused to make similar efforts with the complainants in this dispute. 
835
 See Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2.3 
836
 Ibid. 
837
 Thompson, B. H. (Jr.) and Coyle, J., Trade Issues in Sustainable Tourism Certification: an Examination 
of the Constraints Imposed by International Trade Rules and Organizations (NAFTA, WTO, ECT), 
Barriers to Trade, (Centre on Ecotourism and Sustainable Development, the International Ecotourism 
Society, Standford, 2005), p.4, available at: 
http://www.ecotourism.org/site/c.orLQKXPCLmF/b.4835379/k.55C1/TIES_Publications__The_Internatio
nal_Ecotourism_Society.htm (last accessed 21/07/10). 
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mockery of the US – Shrimp (Panel) ruling as much as it did the earlier US – Tuna I 
and II rulings which found the conservation of tuna and shrimps (respectively) as not 
covered by the exceptions in the sub-paragraphs. Thus, in the US – Shrimp, the AB 
here found it rather easy to admit the measure under environmental cover. 
Admittedly, even here, the AB’s adventurism was criticised by a number of 
commentators as being without textual authority.838 
b) The early shift in favour of PPMs  
Related to earlier point made in respect of how necessity test has been watered 
down, is the PPMs issue. Going by the US – Shrimp, non-product related PPMs-
based environment-related measures are in principle now admitted under the 
exceptions. Elementarily, the two categories are shrimps (those caught with TED 
and those with non-TEDS) here are ordinarily “like” products, but are made “unlike” 
only by their harvesting methods (PPMs). Differentiated treatment between them 
would be inconsistent with GATT Art. III:4, but permitted under XX(b). The US – 
Shrimp, however did not address the PPMs issue even as India, Pakistan and 
Thailand as Joint Appellees had brought this argument forward. US – Shrimp 
therefore followed the path of the earlier US – Tuna/Dolphins I and II rulings where 
the Panel ducked the PPMs issue by considering that GATT Art III essentially refers 
to measures affecting “product” not the “processes”, and that trade-restrictions 
based on processes are covered by Art. XI.839 Therefore, in both the Tuna and 
Shrimp disputes, as the matter was based on process (method of harvesting 
tuna/shrimp), the adjudicatory bodies' attention was adverted only to the Art XI. 
c) Enthroning due process and negotiated approach to the chapeau 
Rather than following the strict textualism as instituted by the VCLT, the AB 
introduced into GATT Art. XX what Charnovitz refers to as “a modicum of 
                                                        
838
  See supra, chapter 2, section 2.2.2.1. 
839
 See Conrad, C. R., supra, n. 28, p. 20.  
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procedural due process”840 as means to fulfil the conditions of the chapeau. This 
includes good faith efforts to negotiate multilateral solutions, giving formal 
opportunity for the Complaining countries to be heard and an formal appeal 
process. However the chapeau language or the GATT does not provide for such 
negotiations or due process. Rather, these processes are found in the US 
legislation (Section 609(a)) and in the UNCED Report and the Agenda 21. This 
position however is problematic to this author as it seems to have been contradicted 
by the position in US – Gambling.  
7.3.1.3 US – Gambling: contradicting or improving on the US – Shrimp? 
US – Gambling was a services (GATS) related dispute. It is the first dispute in which 
protection of “public morals” exceptions under the GATS Art. XIV(a)841 were 
examined. Thus the relevance of the ruling here is that it also generally addresses 
the application of the general exceptions and seems to up-date (until Brazil – Tyres) 
the jurisprudence related to the necessity and chapeau tests following from the US 
– Shrimp dispute.  
 
In this dispute, Antigua complained against certain US federal and state laws that, 
according to Antigua, imposed a “total prohibition” on cross-border delivery of 
gambling services contrary to GATS Art. XVI on MFN obligations related to market 
access commitments.842 The Panel found in favour of Antigua.843  Further, the Panel 
                                                        
840
 Charnovitz, S., Belgian Family Allowances and the challenge of origin-based discrimination, supra, n. 
272, p. 25. 
841
 The counterpart of this GATS Art. XIV(a) is GATT Art. XX(a). It provides for exceptions for GATS-
inconsistent measures taken “necessary to protect public morals”. 
842
 For detailed analysis of this aspect of the ruling, see generally, Trachtman, J. P., Decisions of the 
Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization, supra, n. 829; Ortino, F., Comment -United States – 
Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services [Prepared for the ALI 
Project on the Case Law of the WTO], World Trade Review (2008), 7: 1, 115–119; Irwin, D. A. and 
Weiler., J., Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services (DS 285), 
World Trade Review (2008), 7: 1, 71–113. 
 
843
 Panel Report, paras. 6.338 and 6.355. The Panel found inter alia that where there is a supply of services 
restriction through a particular “means of delivery”, that restriction would effectively limit to zero the 
number of service suppliers and service operations. This would be contrary to Arts. XVI:2(a) and (c). 
  
226
 
found that the defence of GATS Art. XIV(a) would not avail US as it could not 
demonstrate necessity of the measures taken. This conclusion was based on the 
fact that the US rejected Antigua's invitation to “engage in bilateral or multilateral 
consultations and/or negotiations” which would have facilitated the US “to pursue in 
good faith ... a reasonably available WTO-consistent alternative."844   
 
The AB reversed the Panel’s conclusion and accepted the Appellant’s (US) view, 
inter alia, that there was no textual authority that required instituting such 
negotiations. However, the AB noted the Panel’s finding that “... the United States 
has legitimate specific concerns with respect to money laundering, fraud, health and 
underage gambling that are specific to the remote supply of gambling and betting 
services, which suggests that the measures in question are "necessary" within the 
meaning of Article XIV(a).” Accordingly, the AB admitted the measures by US as 
necessary within the meaning of Art XXIV(a).845  
 
Applying the chapeau test, the AB rejected the Panel’s finding that inconclusive 
evidence of differential enforcement of the measures as between the domestic and 
foreign suppliers846 was evidence of discrimination.  The AB however, upheld the 
Panel’s finding of discrimination where in applying a particular US legislation 
(Interstate Horseracing Act), domestic suppliers of remote betting services for horse 
racing were exempted from the prohibitions in the relevant pieces of legislation.847  
In other words, the US had failed to show that the prohibitions stipulated in the said 
legislation were applied to both foreign and domestic service suppliers848 
                                                        
844
 Ibid., para. 6.531. 
845
 US – Gambling (ABR), para. 325. 
846
    Panel Report, para. 6.607.   
847
   These legislation are: (i) Section 1084 of Title 18 of the United States Code (the "Wire Act"); (ii) 
Section 1952 of Title 18 of the United States Code (the "Travel Act"); and (iii) Section 1955 of Title 18 of 
the United States Code (the "Illegal Gambling Business Act", or "IGBA"). See US – Gambling (ABR), 
para. 369. 
848
   Ibid. t, para.  372. 
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Thus going by US – Gambling, the question of holding negotiation and/or observing 
due process in the application of the measures or as an effort towards finding 
available alternatives to the measures at issue, was rendered irrelevant a factor in 
the weighing and balancing process to establish necessity of a measure or its 
compliance with the chapeau. Thus, this aspect of the ruling which otherwise 
constitutes the crux of the US – Shrimp, raises the question whether US – Gambling 
strengthens or undermines the US – Shrimp.849  
 
The above state of affairs made those commentators sympathetic to the “due 
process” and “negotiation” as a solution or pre-empt disputes, in particular Van 
Calster, wish the AB would take up the opportunity provided by Brazil – Tyres 
dispute to clarify  on this and other grey areas in the trade-environment 
jurisprudence. “Disappointingly”850 the AB did not.851 This author is of the view that 
pre-complaint “negotiation” and the due process approach will have to be 
textualised to enable the AB to sustain it.  
7.3.1.4 The effect of Brazil – Tyres on the conventional jurisprudence 
Brazil – Tyres ruling represents the latest development in the WTO trade-
environment jurisprudence, even as many issues are still unsolved. The ruling is 
seen by many commentators as initiating novel approach in interpreting the 
chapeau, which might reduce its constraining effect. Rather paradoxically, the ruling 
                                                        
849
 It can indeed be also recalled that the AB in US – Gasoline rejected a similar reasoning and reversed the 
Panel’s finding to the effect that to the Defendant (Appellant) had omitted to “explore adequately means, 
including in particular cooperation with the [Complainant/Respondents’] governments”, with a view to 
“mitigating the administrative problems relied on as justification” of the Defendant’s measure.  See US – 
Gasoline (ABR), n. p. 28. 
850
 See Van Calster, G., supra, n. 38, p. 135.  
851
 Ibid.. According to van Calster, the negotiated approach in this dispute:  
“would have meant in this instance, reviewing the regulatory process which had led Brazil to 
imposing the various targeted measures, including any efforts to discuss alternatives with the EU. 
Instead, the AB has left us with a ‘truly Byzanthian’ necessity test and a chapeau analysis much 
less focussed on due process and more on substance (but without clear indication how far Panels 
have to go in reviewing substance under the chapeau). 
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inter alia shows, as observed Pauwelyn,852 that the chapeau must be complied with 
(i.e., avoiding “discrimination between countries where the same conditions exist”), 
even if, as a consequence, the Defendant: (1) would be more trade-restrictive, and 
(2) would favour the policy objective pursued. But Brazil – Tyres is even more 
interesting because, contrary to convention, it is now a developing country (Brazil) 
that instituted the environmental measure which a developed economy (EC) 
complained against. 
 
Brazil imposed prohibitions853 on the import of retreaded and used tyres. Retreaded 
tyres have shorter life-span than normal new tyres; hence their wastes rapidly 
accumulate, with adverse health and environmental consequences. Thus the stated 
objective of the Import Ban was the reduction of the "exposure to the risks to 
human, animal or plant life or health arising from the accumulation of waste 
tyres”.854 The level of protection set by Brazil was the reduction of the said risks “... 
to the maximum extent possible"855 The ban, however, excluded MERCOSUR856 
countries following a MERCOSUR arbitral award.857 Similarly, following an injunction 
obtained at a Brazil domestic court, “used tyres” that were banned alongside the 
retreaded tyres, were now allowed. The EC complained that the ban inter alia 
violated Brazil’s obligations under GATT Arts. XI, I:1 and III:4. Brazil did not contest 
                                                        
852
 See Pauwelyn, S. supra, Chapter 2 Section 2.2.2.4, n. 137. 
853
 Together with the associated measures including imposition of certain fines (hereinafter, “Import Ban”) 
854
 Brazil – Tyres (ABR), para. 170. 
855
 Ibid. 
856
 Mercosur (Spanish) or Mercosul (Portuguese), officially, the Common Market of the South, Latin 
American trade organization established in 1991 to increase economic cooperation among the member 
countries. Full members now include Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay; Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela (which will become a full member once all four full members ratify its 
accession) are associate members. 
857
 See Brazil – Tyres (Panel), paras 2.13 – 2.16. 
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the illegality of its measures under the said provisions of the GATT, but cited as its 
defence, the GATT Art. XX(b), (g) and (d), as well as GATT Art. XXIV858.  
 
The Panel found the ban inconsistent with Article XI:1, but provisionally justified as 
"necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health" within the meaning of 
Art. XX(b).859 The Panel regarded the discrimination resulting from MERCOSUR 
exemption (effected to comply with a MERCOSUR binding Arbitral award against 
Brazil), as neither arbitrary nor unjustifiable. The Panel applied an effects test to 
reach at this conclusion, namely, that the quantity of import of retreaded tyres 
coming from MERCOSUR countries was insignificant as to affect the achievement 
of the Brazil’s stated objectives behind the ban.860 
 
The Panel however considered that the discrimination resulting from the exclusion 
of “used tyres” from the ban failed to meet the requirements of the chapeau. The 
Panel’s decision here too was premised on the same effects test used in the case of 
MERCUSOR exemption, namely, that Brazil’s imports of used tyres (now permitted) 
were so substantial that they “significantly undermined” the policy objective of the 
import ban on retreaded tyres. In other words, the Panel took into account not the 
fact that the court injunction was Brazil’s internal matter (which should not be 
allowed to justify discrimination) but that the quantity of the used tyres was 
substantial enough to undermine the reasons for which the ban was imposed. On 
this basis alone, the Panel held that the import prohibition on retreaded tyres was 
applied by Brazil in a manner that constituted both “a means of unjustifiable 
                                                        
858
 GATT Art. XXIV essentially permits derogation from the non-discrimination obligations for Custom 
union members. On the application of this Article see generally Report of the Appellate Body Turkey – 
Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products WT/DS34/AB/R 22 October 1999. See also 
further analysis by Pauwelyn, J., Legal Avenues to “Multilateralizing Regionalism”: Beyond article XXIV, 
[Paper presented at the Conference on Multilateralising Regionalism Sponsored and organized by WTO – 
HEI Co-organized by the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) (Geneva, Switzerland 10-12 
September 2007)].  
859
 Brazil – Tyres (Panel), para. 7.215. 
860
 See paras 7. 270 - 274 
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discrimination [between countries] where the same conditions prevail”861 and “a 
disguised restriction on international trade”862, within the meaning of the chapeau of 
Article XX of the GATT 1994. 863  
 
Another interesting aspect of this dispute is the winner (EC) appealed the Panel 
ruling requesting the AB to conduct proper analysis of the necessity of Brazil’s 
measure against the environmental exceptions. The AB reversed certain aspects of 
the Panel’s ruling, but still affirmed the conclusion of the Panel. Thus, the import 
ban: (1) was a violation of GATT XI,864  (2) was “necessary” to protect health (and 
the environment) within the meaning of Article XX(b), but (3) failed to satisfy the 
requirements of the chapeau to Art. XX. Specifically, the AB faulted the Panel’s 
reasoning based on quantitative analysis of the effects of the MERCOSUR 
exemption, and the used tyres exclusion. The AB considered that regardless of the 
actual effects of the MERCOSUR exemption and the used tyres exclusion, these 
are in, and of, themselves the reasons that made the measure an unwarranted 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions existed. The basis of 
this reasoning is that the MERCUSOR exemption and the permission for continued 
importation of used tyres run contrary to the objective of the ban, making it now to 
appear clearly that it was protectionist.  
 
 
 
                                                        
861Ibid.., para. 7.310;  see also para. 7.306. 
862Ibid., para. 7.349.  
863
 Ibid., paras. 7.357 and 8.1(a)(i) and (ii). The Panel exercised judicial economy with respect to the EC’s 
claims that the exemption of MERCOSUR countries from the import ban and associated fines was 
inconsistent with Articles I:1 and XIII:1 of the GATT 1994. Same applied too with respect to Brazil's 
defence under Articles XX(d) and XXIV of the GATT 1994. 
864
 As the ban violated GATT Art. XI, the Panel exercised judicial economy and did not examine the ban 
under Art. I. The AB however faulted this exercise of judicial economy since there was a substantive 
complaint which hinged on 
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7.3.1.5 Significant jurisprudential lessons learnt from Brazil - Tyres  
Many commentators, among them Van Calster and Pauwelyn, as seen earlier in 
Chapter 2,865 have highlighted the significance of this dispute in the development of 
the trade-environment jurisprudence following the US – Shrimp. Of particular 
interest to this research are the following points:  
a) Confirms the shift from the Art. XX sub-paragraphs to the chapeau  
Thus Brazil – Tyres has re-affirmed the shift of emphasis in the analysis of Art. XX 
disputes from the sub-paragraphs to the chapeau, an exercise that started with the 
US – Shrimp ruling. As Pauwelyn theorized, “Brazil essentially lost the case 
because it should have been MORE trade restrictive.”866 In other words, to show 
seriousness in its concern for the health and environmental hazards of the tyres 
(which was the central objective of the ban), Brazil should have extended the ban to 
include all countries in compliance with the conditions of the chapeau. Again, the 
court injunction, which necessitated Brazil to lift the aspect of the ban dealing with 
used tyres, was seen as counterproductive negating the integrity of the objective of 
the ban. These two scenarious worked against the justifiability of the ban under the 
chapeau. Thus, on the over all in effect, Brazil should have been more trade-
restricting to achieve the level of the policy goal it set for the ban.867 This leads 
some commentators to wonder if WTO is becoming an environmental watchdog 
after all. Hannes Schloemann, for instance, excitedly stated that the case was a 
                                                        
865
 See supra, Chapter 2 section 2.2.2.4. 
866
 See Pauwelyn, J., IEL thread: Brazil–Tyres: Breaking New Ground in Chapeau Interpretation, supra, n. 
137. [emphasis in the original] (See Panel’s Report, paras 7.44 till 7.46).  
867
 Ibid.. This line of reasoning is further confirmed by the AB’s rejection of EC’s proposed alternative and 
arguably less trade-restricting measures than “the total ban”, which, according to EC, Brazil should have 
taken. The AB thus accepted the total ban would be the only measure that would reasonably be effective in 
addressing the problem of wastes accumulation resulting from the importation of re-traded tyres. See the 
AB report, paras. 156 – 175. 
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“slam dunk victory” for the environment.868 Others however see Brazil – Tyres as 
essentially health-related case, as even the Defendant (Brazil) used “environment” 
“only as short-hand for human, animal or plant life and health.869 On the other hand, 
the AB faulted the Panel’s analysis of the chapeau which led to the conclusion that 
unjustifiable discrimination would be relevant only where it is “significantly” 
undermining the purpose of the measure. The AB held that unjustifiable 
discrimination need not be considered from its quantitative or qualitative effects.   
b) Need for a balance between WTO Members’ right and the chapeau  
Brazil – Tyres arguable makes more glaring a looming contradiction between, on 
the one hand, the right of the WTO Members to determine the nature of their 
policies under the exceptions, regardless of the trade effects of those measures, 
and the restrictions on that right imposed by the chapeau conditionalities, on the 
other hand.870 For instance, the AB’s rejection of EC’s proposed alternatives was 
based on the fact that these alternatives would not be adequate to serve the 
legitimate purpose pursued by Brazil with the ban: whereas what Brazil aimed at 
was to put “a preventive non-generation measure,” 871 the alternatives proposed 
were waste management and disposal measures, hence “remedial in character.”872  
 
Thus a WTO Member is permitted to subjectively set its desired level of health and 
environmental protection measures, which other Members would be required to 
                                                        
868
 See Schloemann H, Brazil Tyres: Policy Space Confirmed under GATT Article XX, (2008) 12(1) 
Bridges Monthly, http://www.ictsd.net/i/news/bridges/3141 viewed 10 August 2010 (last accessed 
12/09/10). 
 
869
 Joel P. Trachtman too does not see this case as demonstrating that “the WTO has ‘truly become an 
environmental treaty.’" Rather the environmental aspect in the case “is best viewed as incidental.” See 
contributions by Joel, Julia and Seema Sapra in the IEL Blog thread supra, n. 829. 
870
 See also Ortino, F., supra, n. 829, pp. 117-119, (highlighting this complexity albeit from a different 
perspective).  
871
 Brazil – Tyres (ABR), para. 56. Brazil sought to “reduce accumulation, transportation, and disposal 
risks associated with the generation of waste tyres in Brazil to the maximum extent possible.”  [emphasis in 
the original] 
872
 Ibid., para. 211 
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respect when suggesting alternatives. So this seems to show that the conditions for 
accepting a measure as necessary under Art. XX(b) has been relaxed in the face of 
possible alternatives proposed by the Complainant. The earlier position is that a 
measure is accepted as “necessary” “only if there were no alternative measures 
consistent with the General Agreement, or less inconsistent with it,”873 which the 
Defendant could “reasonably be expected to employ to achieve its health policy 
objectives.” 874 This standard was set forth by GATT Panel in United States – 
Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930875 and then affirmed by the AB in Korea – 
Beef.876   
 
Brazil – Tyres seems to indicate that it is not the seriousness of the trade effects of 
the measure that is crucial; what is more relevant is the extent of the adequacy of 
the proposed alternative/s to achieve the desired level of the protection of health or 
the environment as set subjectively by that Defendant. Thus, the motivations for the 
measure in question are subjective, and regardless, could be necessary. However, 
examination of the measure under the chapeau is based on objective test. The 
chapeau on the other hand still comes to set strict constraints on this right of the 
WTO Members to the extent that no measure has ever been able to cross over the 
                                                        
873
 Thailand – Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes (Panel Report), Adopted 20 
February 1990, BISD 37S/200, para. 75. 
874
 Korea – Beef (AB) 
875
 United States – Section 337 of the Tariff Act of, Adopted 7 November 1989, BISD 36S/3451930. The 
Panel stated in para. 5.26 thus thus:  
It was clear to the Panel that a contracting party cannot justify a measure inconsistent with 
another GATT provision as "necessary" in terms of Article XX(d) if an alternative measure which 
it could reasonably be expected to employ and which is not inconsistent with other GATT 
provisions is available to it.  By the same token, in cases where a measure consistent with other 
GATT provisions is not reasonably available, a contracting party is bound to use, among the 
measures reasonably available to it, that which entails the least degree of inconsistency with other 
GATT provisions.  
876
 Para. 166. 
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constraints from the environment perspective.877 Brazil – Tyres seems to have 
touched the issue but left it still un-solved.   
c) Brazil – Tyres, developing countries and the trade-environment debate 
A novel issue in the history of trade environment jurisprudence is the fact that the 
Complainant in the Brazil - Tyres dispute is a developed country and the Defendant 
developing country.878 Indeed, developed countries are disposed to higher 
environmental standards as they possess the capacity to shoulder the high cost of 
environmental protection and management. Secondly, the relevant technology for 
environmental protection is more readily available and cheaper in the developed 
world than in developing countries. Thus, this effort by Brazil to institute 
health/environmental management measures is a welcome development even as 
Brazil still had to face litigation to prove that the new-found strength is not 
protectionist or discriminatory under Art. XX.  
 
It is gratifying to note, however, that both the Panel and the AB were sensitive to the 
fact of real life difficulties and costs Brazil as other developing countries would face 
in handling their health and environmental issues. Thus, in rejecting the alternative 
measures suggested by the EC, the AB reiterated that the capacity of a country to 
institute measures that would be “particularly costly, or would require advanced 
technologies, may be relevant to the assessment of whether such measures or 
practices are reasonably available alternatives.”879 This is in a way an affirmation of 
what the AB expressly asserted in US – Gambling. There, the AB stated that a 
                                                        
877
 At least, it is gratifying to note that a health measure has been able to cross the hurdle in EC – Asbestos, 
where the EC’s restrictions on imports of asbestos were admitted both under the necessity and the chapeau.  
878
 Thus, it was not surprising that, of the third parties, the developed and near-developed countries (U.S., 
Japan, S. Korea, and Chinese Taipei) sided with the EC, while developing countries (Argentina, Cuba, and 
Thailand) sided with Brazil. China only urged the Panel not to be oblivious of the fact that Brazil is a 
developing country, and the associated difficulties faced in dealing with environmental problems. 
879
 Brazil – Tyres (ABR), para. 171. See also EC – Hormones (ABR), para. 187, where the AB, from a more 
general perspective, did underline the imperative of giving serious consideration to problems with “actual 
potential for adverse effects on human health in the real world where people live and work and die.” 
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Respondent would not be rebutting the necessity case made by the Defendant if the 
alternative measure proposed is “purely theoretical” or it is such that the 
Respondent would be capable of taking “or where the measure imposes prohibitive 
costs or substantial technical difficulties.880  
 
Thus Brazil’s total ban, even though more trade restrictive, but so long it does not 
involve "prohibitive costs or substantial technical difficulties" and thus within the 
reach of a developing country like Brazil would be admissible as necessary under 
Art. XX.881 Secondly, those alternatives would be inadequate in and of themselves 
alone as measures, to achieve the level of health and environmental protection that 
Brazil had set for itself.882 This has important consequences for developing 
countries.883 
 
Thus, if Brazil were a Party to GPA, and maintained a climate-friendly procurement 
measure against which a developed country GPA Party complains, Brazil’s measure 
would most likely be readily justified as necessary. The main hurdle on Brazil then 
would be how to fulfil the chapeau conditionalities. On the other hand, however, and 
following from earlier analysis on the nature of the GPA as plurilateral agreement 
binding WTO Members who are signatories to it, 884 a developing country who is not 
a Party to the GPA would not be able to challenge a GPA measure against it. It can 
however challenge other environment-related measures not covered by the GPA.   
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 See US – Gambling Paras. 308-9. See also Ortino, F., supra, n. 829, p. 119. 
881
 Supra, See also the Panel’s Report, paras 7.60-67; 7.80, and 7.208. 
882
 Ibid. 
883
 Harrison, J., International Law –Significant Environmental Cases 2007- 08, Journal of Environmental 
Law 20:3 [2008], 475 - 481, at 476 [Advance Access: 7 August 2008]. 
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 Chapter 3 Section 3.3.2.1 
  
236
 
7.3.2 Climate-friendly procurement as a legitimate policy objective 
In order to qualify for justification under the general exceptions a measure has to 
qualify first as being maintained to pursue “a legitimate policy objective” as outlined 
under the sub-paragraphs. Thereafter a legal and factual and legal relationship has 
to be established between the measures and that policy objective.885  
7.3.2.1 The significance of climate change and the GPA Art. XXIII  
GPP, in pursuance of the climate change problem, no doubt, qualifies as a 
“legitimate policy objective” for the purpose of the GPA Art. XXIII. However, relevant 
GATT/WTO jurisprudence in this regard indicates that environment is taken as a 
whole, and the exceptions do not take cognisance of the differing nature and 
magnitude of environmental problems. Environmental issues that may give rise to 
trade-restricting policies differ, for instance, as to whether they are local, 
transboundary or global. These differences consequently differ also as to their 
impacts, and the appropriateness of the measure to be applied to address them. 
This differentiating character of environmental problems, were emphasized, among 
others, by Bhagwati, as considerations capable of influencing how a particular 
environmental phenomenon is to be addressed.886  
 
As noted in Chapter 4,887 many factors make climate change a particularly sensitive 
phenomenon which also requires urgent response. It is in view of this fact that this 
study considers if necessary that the trade rules give climate change a more special 
treatment commensurate to its sensitivity. Chapters 2 and 4 have pointed to a trend 
going towards this direction.888 Indeed, climate-motivated GPP is not only a 
legitimate policy issue; it is also essentially backed by another multilateral 
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 US – Shrimp (ABR), para 135. 
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 Bhagwati, supra, n. 73, p. 190. 
887
 See Chapter 4. Section 4.2.2 
888
 See Chapter 2, Section 2.1 and Chapter 4, Section 4.3.2.  
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agreement, the UNFCCC and indeed the KP. GPP may arguably be also justified in 
general terms pursuant to GATT Art. XX(d) which permits Members to maintain 
measures necessary to secure compliance with other laws which themselves are 
consistent with the WTO law. In this regards, even the Art. 3.2 of the DSU re-
asserts that the WTO dispute settlement system aims to preserve the rights and 
obligations of the Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify those 
agreements “in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public 
international law.” It is to be noted here, however, that going by the AB ruling in EC 
– Biotech,  WTO Parties’ obligations under another sub-sector of international law 
(in casu the Biosafety Protocol889) would only be relevant as a justification for an 
otherwise GATT-inconsistent measure if all the Parties involved are signatories to 
that other rule or sub-sector of international law.890  
 
This position is rather controversial as based on the interpretation by the AB of Art. 
31(3) of the VCLT which requires that, to be relevant as basis for interpretation of 
WTO Agreement in relation to a disputed measure, that international rule must be 
"applicable in the relations between the parties."891 It is even more controversial 
where the environmental policy in question which gives rise to the measure is 
climate change mitigation: a problem that affects every nation regardless of whether 
that nation is a signatory or ratifies the climate change treaty or not.  
 
Even more controversial is the ruling in the Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft Drinks 
                                                        
889
 The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity 1992 Convention on 
Biological Diversity signed in 2000, entered into force on 11 September 2003 (hereafter "the Biosafety 
Protocol"). 
890
 EC – Biotech (Panel), para. 7.75.  
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 This position is subject of another study. See generally:  Pauwelyn, J. The role of public international 
law in the WTO: how far can we go? AJIL Vol. 95 [2001]:535-587); Pauwelyn, J., Unity and 
Fragmentation in International Law: Introductory Report on the World Trade Organization, (Palma 
Workshop, 20-21 May 2005). 
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and other Beverages,892 dispute. Here both the Panel and the AB decided that the 
reference to compliance with “other laws and regulations” under GATT Art. XX(d) 
was to the “rules that form part of the domestic legal system of a WTO Member and 
do not extend to the international obligations of another WTO Member.”893 Thus, 
rules of the UNFCCC or KP could only be invoked under GATT Art. XX(d) as 
justification for a climate-motivated procurement measure, if they are already 
domesticated by the Party invoking them.894 This situation underlines the need to 
treat environmental issues that give rise to environmental measures on a case by 
case basis. This study submits that it is absurd to subject climate change issue to 
the interpretations and conclusions reached in the Mexico – Soft Drink and EC – 
Biotech decisions.  
7.3.2.2 GPP and the “Necessity rule” 
By virtue of the GPA Art. XXIII, to be justifiable climate-motivated GPP measure 
must be “necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life and health.” And, if the 
GATT Art. XX(g) is read into it, then the measure, as appropriate, should be shown 
to “relate” to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources. Literally, the 
“necessity” requirement demands a closer level of relationship between the 
measure and the policy goal aimed at. The AB is supportive if this observation when 
it characterized the “relating to” requirement of paragraph (g) as being “more flexible 
textually than the "necessity" requirement found in Article XX(d).”895  
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 Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and other Beverages, WT/DS380/R 7 October 2005. 
893
 Ibid., paras 8.174 – 8.181; WT/DS380/AB/R. Para. 70. This position of the AB is regarded as “highly 
controversial” as it “completely ignore the status of international agreements in domestic law.” See Cottier, 
T., et al, supra, n. 546, p. 19. 
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 WT/DS380/R 7 October 2005, paras 8.174 – 8.181; WT/DS380/AB/R 
895
 See Korea – Beef (ABR) para. 161, footnote 104. Because of this flexibility, the AB accepted in US – 
Gasoline a measure because it presented a “substantial … or close and genuine relationship … of ends and 
means (between the measure and clean air conservation). Similarly in US – Shrimp, the AB accepted a 
measure for being "reasonably related" to the protection and conservation of sea turtles. 
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Since the GPA focused on the necessity test, it is logical that the research also 
focuses on the analysis to the meaning and effect of necessity in justifying a GPP 
measure. This approach avoids the seeming complications in the relationship 
between the GPA and the GATT in respect of the application of the exceptions, as 
highlighted in Section 2 of this Chapter. There, a point was made that based on the 
fact GATT Art. XX was not part of the government procurement curb-out under 
GATT Art III:8, GATT Art. XX (g) should apply alongside the GPA Art. XXIII.896  
 
It is pertinent to recall, in any events, that the early high profile environment-related 
cases by which WTO including the 1996 US – Gasoline and 1998 US - Shrimp were 
all based on the Art. XX(g): US – Gasoline accepted “clean air” and US – Shrimp, 
interpreted “shrimps” all as falling within the meaning of “exhaustible natural 
resource” provided for under Art. XX (g). Consequently, if a measure to protect the 
air is justifiable under Art. XX(g), then logically, climate change mitigation measures 
such as GPP could be justifiable. What the GPP practitioner country needs to do at 
this stage is to establish a “substantial … or close and genuine relationship … of 
ends and means”.897 Indeed, Zhang opined that the capacity of the atmosphere to 
absorb GHG without adverse effect is an exhaustible natural resource within the 
meaning of GATT Art. XX(g).898  
 
Now we turn back to the necessity test. It is to be noted that earlier jurisprudence on 
the test of “necessity” under Art. XX points to the fact that “necessity” of an 
otherwise GATT-inconsistent measure is to be considered from two perspectives: 
(1) whether the measures is particularly “indispensable” or “of absolute necessity” or 
                                                        
896
 See Cottier, T., supra, n. 546 asserting in any event that Art. XX(g) is no longer effective.    
897
 US – Gasoline (ABR), para. 
898
 See Zhang, Z. .X., The U.S. Proposed Carbon Tariffs, WTO Scrutiny and China’s Responses, 
International Economics and Economic Policy, 2009, p. 15, (available at 
www.eastwestcentre.org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs/econwp106/pdf (last accessed 07/07/10). 
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“inevitable” in addressing the national policy objectives sought,899 and (2) whether it 
is necessary to apply the measure to the extent and level of the resulting 
inconsistency with the WTO rule.900 In EC - Asbestos, after extensive reference to 
previous WTO jurisprudence,901 the AB came to the conclusion that a measure 
could be considered “necessary” in terms of GATT Art. XX (b) only if there were no 
alternative measures consistent with the GATT, or less inconsistent with it, which a 
country could reasonably be expected to employ in order to achieve its health policy 
objectives.902 This made some commentators to believe that “the necessity test in 
Article XX is too stringent.” 903  
 
However, the recent understanding of the necessity requirement as seen in US – 
Gambling and more particularly Brazil – Tyres, indicates that necessity does not 
necessarily mean indispensability. In Brazil - Tyres, the EU contended that the mere 
fact that a measure is “trade restrictive” is enough to rule it out as “unnecessary”. 
The Panel however disagreed with EU’s perception, and emphasized thus:  
We do not exclude, however, that there may be circumstances in which a 
highly restrictive measure is necessary, if no other less trade-restrictive 
alternative is reasonably available to the Member concerned to achieve its 
objective…904 [Emphasis added] 
But then, as seen earlier, the available less trade-restrictive measure here should 
refer to a measure that the developing country is capable of taking as determined by 
its own level of health/environmental protection sought. 
                                                        
899
 See Korea –Beef , Panel Report, WT/DS161/R, WT/DS169/R, 31 July 2000, modified by Appellate 
Body Report, 11 December 2000, WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R, adopted 10 January 2001, DSR 
2001:I, 5, para. 161. The AB however, considered that “necessity” in relation to Art. XX(d) (on measures 
maintained as necessary to secure compliance with another law which itself in on inconsistent with the 
GATT) could simply mean “making a contribution to”. 
900
 See Brazil Tyres (ABR), para. 7.209; See also AB in US – Gambling (ABR), para. 307. 
901
 See GATT Art. XX (b) and the corresponding GATS a XIV (b). 
902
 Ibid. para. 170–175.   
903
  See Mattoo, A. and Subramanian, A., supra, n. 85, p. 20. 
904
 Ibid.  para. 7.211 
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Thus from the above, it is safe to suggest that GPP as primarily targeted at climate 
change mitigation, particularly, through reducing energy-related GHG emissions 
could be covered under both paragraphs (b) and (g) of GATT Art. XX. For this 
reason, and as also suggested by some commentators, including Howse905  the 
GPA Art. XXIII:2 even without the GATT XX(g) aspect, would cover climate-
motivated preferential government purchases. This is more so for climate-friendly 
products such as in renewables area, given the environmental harms and risks 
associated with conventional methods of generation.  
7.3.3.3 GPP and the “Chapeau” 
The necessary climate-motivated GPP measure has to also pass the chapeau 
conditionalities stipulated in the GPA Art. XXIII:2. As indicated earlier in this section, 
the chapeau addresses not the measure itself but the manner of its application.906 
Thus, the chapeau, according to AB in US - Gasoline seeks to prevent the “abuse of 
the exceptions”.907 Accordingly, the measure must be applied “reasonably, with due 
regard both to legal duties of the party claiming the exception and the legal right of 
the parties concerned.”908 The chapeau thus imposes higher degree of discipline, 
responsibility, and good faith909, in the manner the measure is applied. The chapeau 
                                                        
905
 See Howse, R., Post-Hearing Submission to the International Trade Commission: World Trade Law and 
Renewable Energy: The Case of Non-Tariff Measures, Renewable Energy and International Law Project 
(May 5, 2005), pp. 26-27. 
906
 US- Gasoline (ABR), p. 20. See also United States - Imports of Certain Automotive Spring Assemblies, 
Panel Report, BISD 30S/107, para. 56;  adopted on 26 May 1983 
907
 US – Gasoline (ABR), Ibid.. The AB stated here, thus:  
The burden of demonstrating that a measure provisionally justified as being within one of the 
exceptions set out in the individual paragraphs of Article XX does not, in its application, constitute 
abuse of such exception under the chapeau, rests on the party invoking the exception.  That is, of 
necessity, a heavier task than that involved in showing that an exception, such as Article XX(g), 
encompasses the measure at issue. 
See also Brazil – Tyres (ABR), Para. 224.  
908
 Ibid. 
909
 US – Shrimp (ABR), Para. 158. 
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requires that where a measure complained of is proved to be covered by any one of 
the policy objectives enunciated in paragraphs (a) to (j) of the GATT Art. XX, it must 
not have been maintained in a manner that will constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade. These phrases are 
ambiguous.910 The fact these phrases were not defined in the legal texts made them 
even more controversial. The AB indeed acknowledged the difficulty associated with 
their interpretation. Thus a correct interpretation of the chapeau should allocate and 
mark out a “line of equilibrium between the rights of a Member to invoke an 
exception under Art. XX and the rights of the other Members under varying 
substantive provisions ... of the GATT 1994, so that neither of the competing rights 
will cancel out the other...”911 Such an interpretation of the chapeau should ensure 
that the balance of “rights and obligations constructed by Members themselves” is 
not impaired or nullified.912 
 
These chapeau terms, on the face of it, seem to imply one and the same thing, 
namely prohibition of an unjustified discrimination between all Members of the WTO 
in applying a measure which in itself is otherwise accommodated under the 
exception. Indeed, even the AB stated in US – Gasoline, that “arbitrary 
discrimination”, “unjustifiable discrimination” and “disguised restriction” on 
international trade, may be read “side-by-side”,913 as the phrases “impart meaning to 
one another”.914 Their imports complement one another.  And although some 
commentators opine that generally, there is lack of judicial guidance on the meaning 
                                                        
910
 Ibid. p. 21. 
911
 Brazil - Tyres (ABR), para. 224 (citing Cheng, B., General Principles of Law as Applied by International 
Courts and Tribunals, (Stevens and Sons, Ltd, 1953), p. 125.) 
912
 Ibid. 
913
 Ibid., p. 23 
914
 Ibid. 
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of the term ‘disguised restriction on international trade”,915 the AB added that 
“disguised restriction” could include disguised discrimination in international trade.916  
 
Thus what actually constitutes infringement of the chapeau is difficult to discern, and 
is determinable by the circumstances of each case. In all the environment-related 
disputes, the measures at issue passed the necessity tests, but failed the chapeau 
for different reasons. For instance, in US –Tuna and US – Shrimp,  as the US failed 
to engage in good-faith efforts to resolve an environmental concern multilaterally, its 
unilateral imposition of domestic environmental policies through trade rules, or even 
provide opportunity for the affected countries to enquire into the appropriate of the 
application of the measure against them, was both “arbitrary” and “unjustified.”917 
This ground however was rejected by the AB in the US – Gasoline ruling, as a 
reason, or additional reason upon which to found infringement of the chapeau in the 
application of the measure at issue. Similarly, in US – Gambling, and in the Brazil – 
Tyres, the chapeau was infringed because Brazil unjustifiably excluded 
MERCOSUR countries from the application of the measure, and also allowed other 
policies (import of used tyres) that would negate the object pursued by the measure 
at issue.  
 
What the above scenarios seem to suggest is the uncertainty as to what the chapeau 
really means, or would require at each given time. This uncertainly results in the 
                                                        
915
 Howse, R., WTO Disciplines and Biofuels: Opportunities and Constraints in the Creation of a Global 
Marketplace (IPC Discussion Paper October 2006), available at:    www.agritrade.org (last accessed: 
10/08/10). Howse lamented that ‘[T]here is lack of clear judicial guidance so far on the meaning of 
“disguised restriction on international trade. See generally US – Gasoline (ABR). 
916
 US – Gasoline (ABR), p. 25. 
917
 US – Shrimp (ABR), para. 186. See more analysis on this in: Shaw, S. and Schwartz, R., Trade and 
Environment in the WTO – State of Play, Journal of World Trade, Vol. 36, no. 1, February 2002, 129-154, 
at pp 146-147. See also Thompson, B. H. (Jr.) and Coyle, J., Trade Issues In Sustainable Tourism 
Certification: an Examination of the Constraints Imposed by International Trade Rules and Organizations’ 
(NAFTA, WTO, ECT), Barriers to Trade, 4 (Centre on Ecotourism and Sustainable Development, the 
International Ecotourism Society, Standford, 2005), available at: 
http://www.ecotourism.org/site/c.orLQKXPCLmF/b.4835379/k.55C1/TIES_Publications__The_Internatio
nal_Ecotourism_Society.htm (last accessed 21/07/10). 
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difficulty of countries to discharge the burden imposed by the chapeau. The result is it 
makes the litigation process tedious and time consuming and the result at times 
unsatisfactory even to a winning party. We recall how the winning Party in the Brazil 
–Tyres was also the appellant, asking the AB inter alia to re-assess the chapeau 
interpretation by the Panel. The AB did modify the Panel’s ruling, even as it still 
found the chapeau conditionalities not fulfilled by the Brazil in some other ways.  
7.4. GPP, the general exceptions and “burden of proof” 
The question of the appropriateness of placing non-trade interests (including the 
environment) under the exceptions has also been regarded by critics in the section 
of the academia as additional hurdle limiting the domestic regulatory authority of the 
WTO Members. The placing of these interests necessarily meant that invoking them 
as “affirmative defences” 918 would require proof. In other words, it is trite law, and as 
seen in the preceding sections of this chapter, that a WTO Member defending, or 
responding, in defence of its otherwise GATT-inconsistent measure based on the 
GATT Art. XX, has the burden to prove the necessity of the measure as well as the 
chapeau conditionalities.  
 
“Burden of proof,” in the law of evidence, refers to the responsibility of a party to a 
dispute to persuade the court or tribunal of the veracity of the party’s assertions or 
claims.919 This responsibility is required of both the plaintiff/appellant and 
                                                        
918
 An “affirmative defence” in Criminal Law, under the Common Law (as opposed to “failure of proof”), 
is one in which the defendant, in a way, affirms the facts against him as stated by the claimant, and then 
asserts his defence as specified within the provisions of the applicable law. See Brody, D. C., Acker, J. R. 
and Logan, W. A., Criminal Law (First edition), (Aspen Publishers Inc., Maryland, United States, 2000). 
See also Simester, A. P. and Sullivan and G. R., Criminal Law – Theory and Doctrine, (Second edition, 
revised 2004) (Hart Publishing, Oxford, United Kingdom, 2003, pp. 537 – 543). Thus, invoking the GATT 
Art. XX exceptions, presupposes that the defendant has accepted the fact it has acted inconsistently with 
other GATT positive obligations in e.g., Article I or III or XI. 
919
 Kazazi, M., The Burden of Proof and Related Issues – A Study on Evidence Before International 
Tribunals (The Hague, Kluwer Law, 1996)  p.378.   
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defendant/respondent.920 Its object is to identify the party whether complainant or 
defendant, that “must provide proof of a determinate issue at the risk of having the 
adjudicator rule against it with respect to that issue.”921 The traditional legal position 
of the concept of burden of proof as generally practiced by international tribunals922 
is partly encapsulated in the maxim actori incumbit probation which literally means 
“On the plaintiff rests the proving”.923 Following from this traditional position of 
international law the AB in the US – Shirts and Blouses ruling clearly stated that: 
[T]he sub-paragraphs in Article XX are “[…] limited exceptions from 
obligations under certain other provisions of GATT 1994, not positive rules 
establishing obligations in themselves. They are in the nature of affirmative 
defences. It is only reasonable that the burden of establishing such a 
defence should rest on the party asserting it."924 [Emphasis added] 
 
Thus, from the perspective of the general international law, the WTO law 
arrangement is normal. However, some commentators under the “trade and ...” 
discourses, seem to be critical though, only to the blind application of the rule, 
namely, without closer consideration of realities on the ground in the WTO Members 
circumstances. Howse, for instance, referred to this arrangement as a “GATT-
specific” approach for the Party who invokes the non-trade exception to be required 
                                                        
920
 See Ibid., for discourses on the minor differences between the common law and civil law legal systems 
on the concept of burden of proof. Under Islamic Law of Evidence and Civil Procedure too, a ‘the party 
that asserts a fact is responsible for providing proof thereof ’. See generally, Arbouna, M. B.,  Islamic law 
of evidence - the function of official documents in evidence : a comparative study with common law, 
(Syarikat Nurulhas, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 1999); Al-Andalusi, A. A. G., Tuhfah al-Hukkaam (Arabic, 
translated in Hausa language by Daura, U. M., pp. 1-2).   
921
 Ibid.. Grando, T. M., p 1. 
922
 See, generally, Pauwelyn, J., Evidence, Proof and Persuasion in WTO Dispute Settlement: Who Bears 
the Burden? 1 J. Int'l Econ. L, 1998 227- 258 citing at 232, the example of the practice at the ICJ, 
particularly the Case Concerning Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (USA v Italy), International & 
Comparative Law Quarterly (1992), 41: 701-709. 
923
 Anderson, W. C., A Dictionary of Law (1893), See the Law Dictionary (online) at the Lawyer Intl 
website at http://www.lawyerintl.com/law-dictionary/8200-actori%20incumbit%20probatio (accessed last 
28/09/09). 
924
 US – Shirts and Blouses, pp. 15-16. 
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to prove it before the dispute settlement body.925 Hudec was quoted as saying in 
effect that “Article XX is an unfortunate design conceptually”.926 Indeed, Hudec 
advocated for the resurrection of the “Aims and Effects” approach927  to 
interpretation of the general exceptions.928  
 
“Aims and Effect” approach is an alternative or additional tool to explain the general 
exceptions. This approach affords WTO Members opportunity to distinguish valid 
exercise of their sovereign right to maintain well-intentioned domestic regulatory 
polices from those intended to undermine the objectives of trade liberalization. The 
approach applies where the measure at issue is origin-neutral in nature. In the 
practice of GPP, countries do not refer to the origin of the preferred (climate-
friendly) product or service or the prospective bidders seeking to participate in 
procurement. It is usually in the implementation of the measure that foreign products 
and services or the bidders are found disproportionately affected by the measure. 
Thus, where the theory is applied it lightens the weight of the burden of proof 
required to prove an exception based on origin-neutral measure, as against the 
                                                        
925
 See Howse, R, From politics to technocracy—and back again: The fate of the multilateral trading 
regime, presented at the symposium on: The Boundaries of the WTO, in Alvarez (ed), supra, n. 59, p. 110.  
 
926
 See Julia Quin’s contribution to an IEL blog discourse on implications of the Brazil – Tyres (Panel) at 
the IEL Blog, at: http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2007/06/braziltyres-bre.html (June 23, 2007), 
supra, n. 136. 
927
 See Hudec, R., supra, n. 165, pp. 619-649, and Wille, S. B., supra, n. 165. “Aims and effects” in the 
literature is variously referred to as an “approach” or a “theory”. These terms are used in this study inter-
changeably.  
928
 To support his view, Hudec referred to the position under the EU law provisions on exceptions to the 
rules on non-discrimination and quantitative restrictions through “indistinctly applicable” (meaning de-
facto based) measures. Art. 30 of the Treaty of Rome prohibits discrimination based on quantitative 
restrictions, while Art. 36 provides for exceptions. Although the language in Art. 36 is based on GATT’s 
Art. XX, Art. 36 has been interpreted more narrowly. Specifically, national environmental measures must: 
(1) not be arbitrary discrimination, (2) not have negative effects disproportionate to the objectives pursued, 
(3) be necessary to achieve environmental objectives, and (4) use the means that least restrict the free 
movement of goods. For a summary description of the somewhat uneven case law treatment of this 
distinction under the EU law, see Steiner, J., Woods, L., and Twgg-Flesner, C.,  EU Law, (5th ed. 2005), 
pp. 98-102. See also, generally, Charnovitz, S., Environmental Harmonization and Trade Policy, in 
 Zaelke, D.,Orbuch, P. and Housman, R. F. (eds.), Trade and the environment: law, economics, and policy 
(Island Press Inc. Washington DC, US, 1994), 267-286; Ortino, F., Studies in International Trade Law -
 no. 1: Basic Legal Instruments for the Liberalisation of Trade A Comparative Analysis of EC and WTO 
Law, (Hart Publishing, 2004), pp. 147-142. 
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burden required in case of a measure which is textually discriminatory. Hence, the 
“aim” aspect looks at the stated policy objectives of the measure, while the “effect” 
considers the unintended discriminatory or protectionist consequences that result 
from the application of an otherwise origin-neutral measure.929 
 
The theory was first considered by the Panel ruling in US – Malt Beverages,930 and 
then in the US – Autos.931 However, in a number of disputes including Japan - 
Alcoholic Beverages, the AB refused to adopt this approach because it would make 
GATT XX redundant in cases where the measure relates to one of the issue areas 
falling under those exceptions.932 However, Hudec and many other commentators 
criticised the AB’s position on aims and effects approach.933 They believed the 
theory was still relevant and still alive.934 Indeed, the theory was believed to have 
been implicitly applied by the AB in EC – Asbestos.935 However, whether the theory 
is applied or not, this research sees wisdom in lightening the strictness applied in 
the scrutiny of GPP as an origin-neutral policy. Where the measure at issue 
concerns a scientifically recognised environmental challenge with global impact like 
climate change, an origin-neutral policy should be spared too close scrutiny. 
                                                        
929Thus the test is “a broad description of a process, which evaluates multiple variables in determining 
cases. Factors that deal with intention fall under the ‘aims’ category and those that deal with results under 
the ‘effects’ category.” See Wigneswaran, N., The Myth of Equality ‘Aims And E Effects’ in International 
Trade Law And Human Rights Law, Thesis Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy Submitted by to the 
Fletcher School, Tufts University (2006) (unpublished) available at 
www.fletcher.tufts.edu/research/2006/Wigneswaran.pdf  (accessed on 18/12/08), p. 30. 
930
 US - Malt Beverage, para. 5.21. See also generally, Trachtman, J. P., International Economic Law 
Revolution and the Right to Regulate, (Cameron May (15 Dec 2005)].  
931
 US – Autos, supra, n. 319. 
932
 The second reason for the rejection of the aims and effects approach is that the texts of GATT Art. III:2 
first sentence, specifically preferred the traditional text-based approach to the determination of “like 
products”. Thus where the products in question are “like”, then the regulatory purpose of the measure 
would not be relevant, and the measure would be invalid unless it could be justifiable under GATT Art. 
XX. See Hudec, supra,, n. 165, p. 15 
933
 Qin, J. Y., Defining Nondiscrimination Under the Law of the World Trade Organization, Boston 
University International Law Journal, Vol. 23 [2005], pp. 214- 297, at 245. 
934
  See generally, Trachtman, J. P., and Porges, A., Robert Hudec and Domestic Regulation: The 
Resurrection of "Aim and Effects", 37 Journal of World Trade 4 (2003), 783-799. Esty too argued not for 
the theory as such but for the import and purpose of the theory. See Esty, D. C., supra, n. 70, pp. 116-117. 
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7.5 Any solutions for climate-motivated procurement? 
This uncertainty and difficulty generally associated with the GATT XX jurisprudence 
(and the chapeau in particular) was recognised once by the AB,936 as well as 
various commentators including Cottier937 and Howse,938 among others. What this 
means is that to the extent that climate change is included, as it is currently, within 
the myriad of environmental concerns, then any climate-friendly measure 
maintained will have to face the chapeau conditionalities as well. The reason is that 
Art. XX is a “general exceptions” provision. As highlighted earlier an exception 
invoked has to be proved.  
7.5.1 GPA amendment proposal  
7.5.1.1 Provide for GPP as a positive norm 
It could be recalled that, earlier on, the critique labelled by environmentalist was 
targeted at the appropriateness of the WTO system to handle environmental 
concerns. This critique was instigated by the US – Tuna rulings. One of the 
popularly suggested solutions then, was to remove environmental issues from the 
WTO and assign them to a proposed GEO (Global Environmental Organisation).939 
When the US – Shrimp tactfully saved the situation, the attention of the 
environmentalists and the academia now re-directed not on the WTO system as a 
whole, but to viability of the GATT Art. XX as a whole, namely both the necessity 
                                                                                                                                                             
935
 Ibid., p. 784. 
936
  US – Gasoline (ABR), p. 22. The AB stated thus:  
 The burden of demonstrating that a measure provisionally justified as being within one of the 
exceptions set out in the individual paragraphs of Article XX does not, in its application, constitute 
abuse of such exception under the chapeau, rests on the party invoking the exception. That is, of 
necessity, a heavier task than that involved in showing that an exception, such as Article XX(g), 
encompasses the measure at issue. [emphasis added] 
937
 See generally Cottier et al, supra, n. 546. 
938
 See Howse, R., supra, n. 914.  
939
 See chapter 2, section 2.2.2.1; Esty, D., supra, n. 70 
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and the chapeau tests. From what has been seen in this thesis, the problem has 
shifted from the necessity to the chapeau even as the two are inter-connected.940  
 
The question now is what next do we expect in this logic and progression? It is clear 
that creation of a GEO or even a radical review of the current general 
(environmental) exceptions to alter the strictness of its requirements or proof 
thereof, is rather a long shot. On the other hand, the immediate problem being 
addressed by this thesis is what contribution government procurement tool could be 
made to climate change mitigation efforts.  
 
This thesis first posits that this jurisprudential uncertainly may undermine the 
urgency needed to address the climate change. Thus while the controversy in 
search of the parameters for the application of the GATT Art. XX continues this 
thesis sees a way out in the area of climate-friendly procurement, namely:  
• to multilaterally agree on the definition of the climate-friendly goods and 
services in the context of Doha or outside it, 
• amend the GPA and provide for a positive norm that permits procurement 
measures that would relate to the specified CGS. A “permissive norm”, 
according to Pauwelyn is the aspect of international law norms that “grant a 
right to states to do something”. 941 
This explicitness, it could be recalled, is the approach of the EU law and policy for 
green procurement. For WTO, multiple benefits could be achieved with this 
approach. It is a middle course between the two extreme positions: the position of 
                                                        
940
 The inter-connection can be seen where, in an effort to determine necessity of the measure at issue, the 
adjudicatory bodies embark on the “weighing and balancing” of various factors, including the available 
alternatives. But that alternative has to be negotiation on a bilateral or multilateral level between the 
defendant and the countries potentially affected. This negotiation will trigger chapeau case: how even was 
the involvement of the various countries concerned. (US – Shrimp, US – Gambling),   
941
  See Pauwelyn, J., supra, n. 21, pp. 159-161. [Emphasis in the original] 
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the unlikely creation of a GEO or the radical review of the environmental exceptions 
on the one hand, and on the other hand, the perpetuation of the status-quo. 
1) This approach will accord climate change challenge its significance, while 
allowing for the existing provisions on the exceptions to address other 
environmental problems of merely domestic or trans-boundary nature. This 
thus allows for a proportionate response given to climate change. This 
therefore responds to the suggestion by many commentators, including Esty 
and Bhagwati, that  the magnitude of the environmental problem at stake 
should be taken into account in deciding on regulating measures taken 
pursuant thereof.  
2) The positive norm will ease out or circumvent the textual disparities and 
inconsistencies existing as between the GATT Art. XX and GPA Art. XXIII 
which could potentially breed controversies in an event of a complaint 
against climate-related procurement measure.942 
3)  The approach will effectively also circumvent the technicalities and 
uncertainties associated with the interpretation of the necessity and chapeau 
tests. In a way, this approach also serves the controversial question of the 
need to hold “negotiations” with countries that may be affected by an 
impending measures, with a view to reaching a multilateral (or bilateral) 
solution. 
4) Strategically, and most importantly, this proposal will effectively shift the 
burden of proof from the party maintaining the measure to the party 
complaining against the measures. In other words, the party maintaining the 
climate-friendly procurement measure would be doing so not under an 
exception, but as permission under the new positive norm as proposed. This 
positive provision will be backed by the CGS list attached to the Agreement. 
                                                        
942
 See supra,, section 7.2 
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In other words, so long as the defendant’s contracting relates to any item 
found in the CGS list, then, the burden of proof shifts to the complainant who 
will need to show why the measure should not be taken. He should show 
discrimination or protectionist motive or behaviour behind the measure. The 
defendant would then respond in the conventional manner.  
 
Thus this proposal may be seen also as a reward for climate-conscious GPA Parties 
for taking hard measures to deliver global public good. It therefore assures the GPA 
Parties of their domestic regulatory authority to freely convert their huge 
procurement power into an opportunity to pursue other policy ends. All that a Party 
needs to do, in maintaining a climate change related measure, is establish clear 
nexus between the measure taken and climate change ends. 
 
One issue that immediately comes to mind in considering the above proposal is the 
safe-guard against abuse of the provision that made climate-friendly procurement a 
positive rule. This can be addressed by inserting relevant complementing conditions 
to be observed by any GPA Party engaged in climate-friendly procurement under 
that provision. The conditions may include whatever agreement or understanding 
that may be negotiated in relation to the definition and the supply of climate-friendly 
good and services (CGS) (as a sub-category of EGS), as well as definition of 
climate change projects (as suggested by Cottier943), at the Doha. Whatever 
decision or arrangement reached in this regard at the Doha could be used as a 
reference point for climate-friendly procurement measures under the proposed new 
provision in the GPA.  
 
This suggestion is not entirely new, or radical, to the WTO law and jurisprudence. 
Similar approach, in effect, was adopted in two situations: First, it can be likened to 
                                                        
943
 See supra,, n. 579 
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the happening in the EC – Tariff Preferences case.944 There the AB accepted that 
although the Enabling Clause945 was an “exception” to GATT Art. I, however, for the 
purposes of allocation of burden of proof, it was regarded as a special kind of 
exception and should, and did indeed receive a treatment different from and more 
favourable than, other exceptions of the GATT Art. XX nature. Secondly, it is likened 
to the approach adopted in the TBT and SPS Agreements where non-trade 
legitimate policy concerns including those in the GATT Art. XX exceptions are 
provided for in the main positive provisions. Though this is a subject of a more in-
depth study, suffice it to mention here that these two agreements permitted 
technical regulations including on these concerns so long as they are based on 
international standards and or backed risk assessment and sound scientific 
evidence.946 Below is an elaboration of the “EC – Tariff Preferences example. 
7.5.1.2 Burden of proof in the light of “EC – Tariff Preferences” ruling 
One of the main issues of contention in this dispute was whether the Enabling 
Clause,947 was an exception to GATT Art.I:1 on MFN obligation, or a positive norm 
establishing obligations, for the purpose of allocating the burden of proof. India, the 
Complainant, contented that the Enabling Clause was an exception. India, 
accordingly, asserted that the EC (Dependant) which maintained Generalised 
                                                        
944
 EC – Tariff Preferences (ABR) supra, n. 45. 
945
 The Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of 
the Developing Countries, GATT Document, L/4903, BISD 26S/203. 
946
 See supra, chapter 6, section 6.2. See elaborate treatment of the TBT and SPS approaches by Matto and 
Subrimanian, supra, . 88. 
947
 Ibid.. The Enabling Clause constitutes one of the "other decisions of the CONTRACTING PARTIES" 
provided for by paragraph 1(b)(iv) of Annex 1A incorporating the GATT 1994 into the  WTO Agreement., 
That provision states that: 
 1. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 ("GATT 1994") shall consist of: 
... 
(b) the provisions of the legal instruments set forth below that have entered into force under 
the GATT 1947 before the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement: 
... 
  (iv) other decisions of the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947[.]  
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System of Preferences for Developing Countries (GSP) programme pursuant to the 
Enabling Clause must comply with its MFN obligation under the said GATT Art.I:1. 
India further maintained that the EC could not rely on the Enabling Clause to act 
inconsistently with the said obligation, by discriminating between the developing 
countries that were the beneficiaries to the EC’s GSP programme. The EC 
supported, inter alia, by the US, counter argued that Enabling Clause was, in itself, 
a "positive rule establishing obligations",948 just like the GATT Art. I:1. The Panel 
found in favour of India, namely, that the Enabling Clause constituted an exception 
to the GATT Art. I:1, and that a party relying on it must act consistently with the 
conditions stipulated therein.949 
 
On appeal, the AB first accepted that Enabling Clause, by its content, context and 
history, served as an exception to the MFN rule established by GATT Art.I:1.950 The 
AB, however, cautioned that the Enabling Clause was an exception of a special 
nature, ‘not a typical "exception", or "defence", in the style of Article XX of the 
GATT 1994, or of other exception provisions identified by the Appellate Body in 
previous cases.’951 Thus, it should be treated differently from the manner Art. XX 
exceptions have traditionally been treated.952 In other words, going by its history the 
Enabling Clause was consciously accepted as permitting, indeed “encouraging”953 
the contravention by the contracting parties of their MFN obligations under GATT 
                                                        
948
 EC – Tariff Preferences (ABR), para. 74. 
949
 See EC – Tariff Preferences (Panel) WT/DS246/R, 1 December 2003, para. 8.1(c) 
950 AB re-asserted that mere use of the phrase “Notwithstanding the provisions of GATT Art. I:1…” in 
para. 1 of the Enabling Clause points to the fact that it was an exception to that Art. Paragraph 1 of the 
Enabling Clause, which applies to all measures authorized by that Clause, provides as follows: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of Article I of the General Agreement, contracting parties may 
accord differential and more favourable treatment to developing countries, without according 
such treatment to other contracting parties.  
951
 EC-Tariff Preferences (ABR), paras. 106-107 [Emphasis added] 
952
 Ibid., para. 108. The AB stated regarded “the particular circumstances of this case as dictating a special 
approach, given the fundamental role of the Enabling Clause in the WTO system as well as its contents.” 
953
 Ibid., para. 111. 
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Art 1:1.954 This arrangement was allowed in order to serve the special purpose for 
which it was negotiated,955 namely, to allow for special and differential and more 
favourable treatment for developing countries. The Enabling Clause was thus aimed 
at stimulating the growth and economic development of the developing countries 
within the overall objectives of the GATT/WTO system.956  
 
Accordingly, the AB held that India as the complainant would have to establish 
clearly its complaint under the Enabling Clause and not under the GATT Art. I:1. 
This would mean the fact that the EC did not observe MFN obligation under the 
GATT Art. I:1 would not form a basis of India’s complaint as the Enabling Clause 
operates “notwithstanding” the GATT Art. I:1. In the same way, the AB maintained, 
that the EC relying on the Enabling Clause would still shoulder the responsibility of 
establishing that the GSP scheme it was engaged in satisfies the conditions of the 
Clause.957 In this way, the conditions parallel to those of the Enabling Clause would 
include, as stated earlier, the list of the CGS with which the Dependant’s 
procurement should be shown to relate. 
 
Parallels can be drawn between the position of the Enabling Clause and that of 
climate change. The Enabling Clause addresses a special issue which is also an 
appendage to the core principles and values of the WTO, namely, enabling the 
economic development,958 especially of the developing countries, through the 
encouragement of the developed countries to engage in the GSP schemes. GSP 
schemes offer developing countries trade preferences and concessions without also 
                                                        
954
 EC-Tariff Preferences (Panel),  para. 9.9. 
955
 Ibid., para. 110 
956
 Ibid. 
957
 Ibid., para. 105 
958
 Ibid. Para 108, citing the Ministerial Decision of 14 November 2001, Implementation-related Issues and 
Concerns, WT/MIN(01)/17, paras. 12.1-12.2. 
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asking for reciprocations from them.959 Thus the Enabling Clause arrangements 
were accepted even as they would naturally result in contravening the core 
GATT/WTO principle of MFN. In the same spirit too, climate-friendly procurement 
policies which are aimed at addressing global concerns (developing countries 
inclusive), are entitled to similar treatment under the trade rules.  
 
The AB underscored the significance of the Enabling Clause also in the light of the 
Doha Development Agenda (DDA), noting that the trade and development 
relationship between and “in particular the role of the Enabling Clause, remain 
prominent on the agenda of the WTO, as recognized by the Doha Ministerial 
Conference in 2001.” Climate change, on the other hand is equally important in the 
light of the DDA, especially as relates to the agenda on the liberalisation of 
environmental goods and services as highlighted in chapter 5 of this study.960  
 
This study notes the AB’s opinion in EC – Tariff Preferences that placing an issue 
under the exception does not necessarily diminish its importance.961 And indeed, 
this is more so in view of the fact that “the environment”, the umbrella subject of this 
study, is already included as one of the preambular objectives of the WTO system. 
However, moving an issue from being an exception and making it the rule, or from 
the preamble962, to the main text of the treaty, will definitely elevate its 
significance.963 Therefore, even though the Enabling Clause still remains in its 
status as an exception and has not been re-coached into a positive norm, the EC – 
                                                        
959
 Ibid., para. 111.  
960
 See supra, Chapter 5, Section 5.2.2.3(b). 
961
 EC-Tariff Preferences (ABR), para. 95. 
962
 Of course, “Preamble” (as well as annexes) according to the VCLT is included, for the purpose of treaty 
interpretation. See VCLT Art. 31(2). See Jacobs, F. G., supra, n. 107. 
963
 See generally supra, chapter 2, section 2.2.2.1. Bhagwati likened the items stated in a preamble as “the 
overture at the opera: the audience is free to rustle through the libretto and even to whisper to friends until 
the real opera begins!” See Bhagwati, Afterword: The Question of Linkage, supra, n. 60, footnote 27.  
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Tariff Preference ruling has placed the status of Enabling Clause close to that of a 
positive norm. The ruling for instance maintained that where a complaint is to be 
brought based on an Enabling Clause -related measure, the complainant should 
essentially establish his case against the provisions of the Enabling Clause, not the 
GATT Art. I:1. Thereafter, the defendant is required to discharge its burden of 
proving that the measure if fact has been authorised by the Clause, and that the 
conditions in the clause have been satisfied by the measure. 
 
Meanwhile, the provision of Art. XXIII will remain in the GPA to work as the normal 
general exceptions, and could cater for other environment related measures which 
fall outside of the specific CGS now provided in the annex. With this, the GPA 
regime would be used as an active supporter and enabler of measures which are 
aimed at “non-trade” ends, and in this case, the climate change. The revised version 
of the GPA 2007 which is currently not in force could provide an appropriate and 
timely opportunity to effect these proposals. And indeed, it could be recalled that 
even the Tuna/Dolphin Panel suggested it was for the Contracting Parties to 
negotiate whatever change they deem necessary. Thus, the Doha Round 
negotiating agenda for liberalisation of environmental goods and services is an 
added opportunity for this.  
7.6 Revision of the GPA and the environment-related provisions 
7.6.1 The Committee on Government Procurement revisions: overview 
The Committee on Government Procurement (CGP) was established pursuant to 
Art. XXI of the GPA. It administers the GPA, oversees its implementation. Its 
membership is composed of representatives from each of the Parties. It is the 
Committee’s responsibility, pursuant to GPA Art. XXIV:7(c) to periodically organise 
the GPA Parties to “undertake further negotiations, with a view to improving this 
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Agreement and achieving the greatest possible extension of its coverage among all 
Parties on the basis of mutual reciprocity.” It is in accordance with this “built-in 
commitment to negotiations”964 that negotiations were launched in 2004 to review 
the GPA. The agreement was revised and by December 2006, a revised version 
(Revised GPA 2007) was produced. It was provisional and “subject to (i) legal 
checks; and (ii) a mutually satisfactory outcome to the other aspect of the 
negotiations on a new Government Procurement Agreement, namely those on an 
expansion of coverage (i.e. the lists of government entities whose procurement is 
opened up).”965 Of particular interest to this study, are new provisions inserted in the 
revised GPA 2007 which explicitly permitted the Parties to take procurement 
measures to protect the environment, namely Art. X:6 discussed further in the next 
sub-section. 
7.6.2 Revision of the GPA and the environment-related provisions 
The new draft GPA which now explicitly permitted the inclusion of environment-related 
considerations in public procurement is Art. X:6. It states thus: 
“For greater certainty, a Party, including its procuring entities, may, in 
accordance with this Art., prepare, adopt, or apply technical specifications to 
promote the conservation of natural resources or protect the environment.”966 
 
This attempt, for the start, indicates that there is a problem already felt in this area, 
and that an action needs to be taken. This thus serves a further justification for this 
study. The provision ostensibly was meant to make up for the GATT Art. XX (g) 
which was missing in GPA Art. XXIII. Thus to the extent that the Art. GPA XXIII still 
remains, it is arguable that this new revision does not fundamentally change the 
                                                        
964
 WTO, at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gp_gpa_e.htm  
965
 The revised GPA 2007 is available to the public in the WTO document GPA/W/297. 
966
 See Revised GPA 2007 at 
<http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/PLURI/GPA/W297.docGPA/W/297>. For more information 
the revised text see WTO, Provisional agreement on text of revised Government Procurement Agreement at 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news06_e/gproc_8dec06_e.htm (accessed 15/07/10). 
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current legal situation under the WTO jurisprudence. It simply re-enforces and 
expands what the GPA Art. XXIII GATT Art. XX (b) and (g) already provide for. In 
other words, the usual procedural rules would still apply in an event of an 
environment-related dispute. That is to say climate-motivated procurement measure 
still has to pass the necessity test, as well satisfy the Art. XXIII chapeau still retained 
in the revised GPA. Therefore, to the extent that paragraph (g) of the GATT is no 
longer crucial as suggested earlier by Cottier,967 the new Art. X:6 is logically 
redundant in the face of GPA Art. XXIII. 
 
Again, if the new Art. X:6 stands alone, and independent of the current GAP Art. 
XXIII exceptions, then it is dangerously susceptible to manipulation and abuse, as it 
has no limits or conditions attached to its application. The missing limits and 
conditions here are in the form of those suggested for the new norm to include the 
list of CGS and climate-motivated projects to which climate-related procurement 
should relate. These are the type of conditions that regulate the operation of the 
Enabling Clause, and the conditions set for the maintenance of technical regulations 
under the TBT and SPS agreements.  
 
Thus, in line with the analysis made earlier in this section, the current review 
exercise of the GPA should proceed, and further modify Art. X:6 so as to give effect 
to the proposal for explicit permit for climate-motivated procurement. The purpose 
as explained earlier is to give Parties to climate regime pursuing their commitments 
thereunder to have free hand to do so through their procurement policies. This 
approach ultimately will serve the spirit of seeking legal coherence between the 
climate change regime and trade regulation, and to enable the WTO system play a 
more practical role in the fight against climate change challenge.  
 
                                                        
967
 See supra, n. 546, p. 18. 
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It is suggested further that part of the conditions to be inserted in the new provisions 
should include those that would also address the concerns of the developing 
countries as relates their development level and the capacity to participate in the 
climate-friendly procurement processes permitted in the new provisions. This aspect 
should be included in the new provisions pursuant to the principles guiding the 
implementation of the climate regime. 968  
 
Figure 4 The proposed modification of Art. X:6 of the Revised GPA 2007 
 
For greater certainty, a Party, including its procuring entities, may, in accordance with the 
provisions of this Article, prepare, adopt, or apply technical specifications for goods and 
services be procured, conditions for supplier participation or award criteria, to protect the 
environment, and in  particular, to promote the stabilisation of the concentration of 
anthropogenic GHG emissions in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change and its implementing Protocols: 
─Provided that:  
(1)  a party maintaining climate-change related measures shall have the duty to 
establish the bearing of the measures to the list of climate related goods, services, 
technology, projects and programmes provided for in Appendix …. to this Agreement. 
 (2) where substantial investments are required in order for an exporting developing 
country Member to fulfil the green procurement requirements set by an importing 
developed country Member, in a particular procurement, the latter shall assist in providing 
such technical assistance as may enable the developing country Member to participate in, 
or and benefit, from the procurement  opportunities. 
 
Thus, the pre-determination of what constitutes climate friendly goods and services, 
and projects serves inter alia the following objectives: 
                                                        
968
 See Chapter 4, section 4.4.3. See generally, Malumfashi, G. I, ‘Phase-out of gas flaring in Nigeria by 
2008: the prospects of a multi-win project (Review of the Regulatory, Environmental and Socio-Economic 
Issues)’, Petroleum Training Journal Vol. 4 No. 2. July, 2007 (available at: http://www.nccr-
trade.org/images/stories/publications/IP6/Nig_GasFlaring_Petroleum%20Training%20Journal%20(PTJ)%
20Vol%5B1%5D.%204%20No.%202%20July%202007.pdf 
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a) incorporates all the negotiating proposals before Doha related to the 
liberalisation of EGS, namely, list-based, project-based, and the combination 
of them all; 
b) It makes it easier for both the procuring authority and prospective suppliers 
to identify or verify the products and services in the particular green 
procurement as climate friendly.  
c) It affords the procuring authority an opportunity to seek legal justification for 
the procurement as being prima facie motivated by climate change 
concerns. All it needs to do, in an event of challenge, is pin-point how the 
procurement is related to the list;  
d) It makes it easier for suppliers to supply what is clearly already identified 
through the indicative list. This makes a good case for transparency in 
government procurement. 
 
With this approach, therefore, GPP could also assist in the efforts to achieve 
coherence in the international system as enunciated under the WTO system as in 
the preamble to the WTO Agreement and in the Ministerial Declaration on the 
Contribution of the WTO to Achieving Greater Coherence in Global Economic 
Policymaking.969 This approach is also strengthened by the CTE endorsement that 
“multilateral solutions based on international cooperation and consensus as the best 
and most effective way for governments to tackle environmental problems of a 
transboundary or global nature” and said it preferred that trade disputes arising in 
connection with a multilateral environmental agreement be resolved through the 
mechanisms established by that agreement.970  
                                                        
969
 See WTO, Declaration on the Contribution of the WTO to Achieving Greater Coherence in Global 
Economic policymaking, by Minister in Marrakesh on 15 April, 1994.  
970
 See The Declaration on Trade and Environment, supra n. 18. See also WTO Doc. WT/CTE/1, para. 171, 
(1996). 
 
  
261
 
7.7 Summary 
 
This chapter examined the extent of the policy space provided by the GPA Art. XXIII 
on the general exceptions for climate-friendly procurement policies. It highlighted 
the transition in the multilateral trading system from the conservatism and phobia for 
environmental protection under the GATT as indicated especially by the Tuna 
Dolphin I and II Panels to a more liberal and pragmatic approach, of the WTO era 
as exemplified by inter alia, AB in US-Shrimp, EC-Asbestos, and Brazil Tyres 
rulings. It also indicated how, through the legal texts, the WTO trade liberalisation 
mission could be made more amenable and responsive to climate change mitigation 
demands. A case was made for climate change to receive the special and urgent 
attention it much deserves as among the environmental challenges facing the globe. 
This led to a suggestion that the amended GPA 2007 draft should be further 
modified to reflect this outlook for climate change. The specific suggestion is to 
modify the newly inserted Art. X:6 to permit climate-friendly procurement pursuant to 
the impending results of Doha negotiations on liberalisation of EGS/CGS. This will 
facilitate the attainment of multiple advantages to serve the climate change, trade 
and development concerns.   
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CHAPTER 8 
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This research was an enquiry into the legal issues arising in the emerging concept 
of “green” procurement from the stand-point of the provisions of the WTO GPA. It 
investigated the policy space available under the trade law for pursuing climate 
change mitigation objectives, particularly GHG emissions reduction, through 
government procurement. GPP is a government purchase or contracting system by 
which environment-friendliness and energy-efficiency attributes of products and 
services and services suppliers, play a major decision-making factor. As 
government procurement is a subject of international trade, the research looked at 
the extent to which GPP, being an environment-related measure, could be placed 
within the context of trade-environment interactions and discourses. The main issue 
is how GPP conforms to, or is constrained by, the non-discrimination limits set by 
relevant provisions of the GPA. Similarly, the study examines how the GPA could be 
made more amenable to the global climate change mitigation drives.   
 
With the rising awareness created by the increasing enlightenment from the 
scientific and economics communities, climate change has now gained recognition 
as a peculiar global environmental problem. Policy makers are convinced that 
climate change is a global emergency, the solution to which requires not only a 
multilateral approach, but also utilization of all available policy options at both 
national and global levels. It is also accepted that inaction or a delay now to address 
climate change will entrap humanity into an uncertain future catastrophe which will 
be costlier to cure. Consequently, the use of measures like GPP, to address climate 
change, is seen as preventive action in the spirit of “precaution” within the meaning 
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of the term under the UNFCCC Art. 4. The motive of such measures would be to 
avert the danger of future climate-related catastrophes the solution to which may be 
impossible or much more costly to bear. 
 
In order to establish the parameters within which to conduct this research, initial 
research questions were posed, as follows: 
 
1. In pursuing green government procurement policies pursuant to their climate 
change mitigation goals, how will the GPA Parties also safeguard their non-
discrimination and transparency obligations under the GPA?  
2. Could climate-motivated government procurement be effectively 
accommodated under GPA Art. XXIII on environmental exceptions as it 
currently is? Or will there be need for amendment?  
 
In attempting to address this question, the research adopted mainly doctrinal 
method otherwise referred to as Black-Letter approach to analyse the primary legal 
authorities as interpreted by judicial bodies. This method was considered 
appropriate because it helps to, in a systematic manner, categorise and analyse 
legal sources and examine how these were interpreted in decided cases in different 
contexts.971 This approach is complemented by an interdisciplinary and critical legal 
approach. This combination made it possible for the author to look at the 
effectiveness of the legal texts from current implementation experiences and to 
make suggestions for amendment considered desirable. This work made use of 
primary legal authorities including the text and official interpretations and 
explanations of the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol as well as the WTO treaty and the 
                                                        
971
 See Chynoweth, P., Legal scholarship: a discipline in transition, (Editorial From: International Journal 
of Law in the Built Environment, Volume 1, Issue 1) (The servant of the legal profession), available at: 
Emerald Journal News: 
http://info.emeraldinsight.com/products/journals/news_story.htm?PHPSESSID=1ltaudjamcc2vt0vf0fgkkgb
s0&PHPSESSID=1ltaudjamcc2vt0vf0fgkkgbs0&id=1473 (accessed on 18/07/09). 
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annexed agreements, particularly the GPA. Consulted also were secondary 
materials in terms of books and published journal articles written by experts, and in 
which the primary sources were analysed and explained. Attempts were also made 
to consult experts on the subject.  
 
The major strength of this study is that it highlighted the interrelationship between 
the two major themes of particular global significance, namely climate change and 
trade, and how the subject of Government Procurement links them up together. The 
significance of this linkage is to draw the attention of policy-makers of the potential 
opportunities for policies that pursue the objectives of trade liberalization and the 
climate concurrently without fear of contradiction. This linkage also will help allay 
any regulatory chill972 as may be entertained in thinking that climate-motivated 
procurement measures undermine the Parties’ GPA obligations, and are liable to 
face complaints before the WTO dispute settlement system. 
 
The research was organised in 8 chapters divided into 3 parts as follows: Part 1 
consists of chapters 1 and 2. It laid down the foundations for the research, and 
explained its objectives and goals, as well as the approaches adopted. Part 2 is 
comprises chapters 3, 4 to 5, which, in the main, were descriptive of the major 
themes, as well as the analytical framework of the research. Finally, Part 3 which is 
composes of chapters 6-8 was essentially analytical. Arguments were presented in 
chapter 6 and 7. These led to conclusions and recommendations, as well as 
suggestions for further research chapter 8. 
                                                        
972 
“Regulatory chill” is a controversial concept. In simple terms, it suggests a situation where countries 
hesitate in taking certain regulatory measures so as to avoid undermining their obligations under other 
instruments which may trigger international dispute settlement procedure. See Kirton, J. J. and Hajnal, P. I., 
Sustainability, civil society and international governance - Local, North American and Global 
Contributions, (Ashgate; illustrated edition, 2006), p 3. 
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8.2 Main research findings 
8.2.1 GPP and the Interaction of climate change and the WTO system:  
The main theoretical basis of this research is that GPP which is an element of 
government procurement in which secondary procurement goals are pursued is 
potentially discriminatory. This is based upon the premise that pursuing secondary 
goals of procurement may raise issues of discrimination and protectionism. The 
WTO’s primary objective is to eliminate discrimination and protectionism in trade 
policies of the Members. On the other hand, climate change is increasingly being 
recognised not only as an environmental issue but also a socio-economic and 
development phenomenon. It is generally accepted as an issue of common concern 
for human kind and should be addressed squarely. 
 
Anthropogenic climate change is caused by the fossil energy sources. These 
sources provide for most of the global energy need. This factor coupled with the 
other factors973 that characterise the current global energy sector all combined to 
call for the formulation of policies for support for development of new and 
renewable energy sources, and indeed the general re-orientation of our life-styles 
towards energy efficiency and energy sustainability. In particular, the climate 
change challenge phenomenon is characterised by the following considerations: 
a) Climate change affects the energy sector and therefore affects the energy 
policies of the WTO Members. Indeed in jurisdictions like the EU that have 
ambitious climate change commitments climate change is regarded as an 
energy security concern.  Paradoxically also, climate change catalyses energy 
efficiency and energy sustainability approach to production and consumption. 
Adoption of GPP policies is an example of this side impact of climate change. 
                                                        
973
  These factors are subject of other studies. They include high and fluctuating prices of energy, and the 
exponential increase in energy demand especially in economies in transition and the newly industrializing 
developing countries of China, India and Brazil.  
  
266
 
b) Climate change raises ethical issues of equity and fairness. This is seen in the 
fact that industrialisation era of the developed nations caused the present 
experience of the changing climate, and that the developing and the least 
developed countries are being worst hit by the impacts of climate change; 
c) Climate change is not only a cross-border environmental problem, but global in 
nature: GHG emissions, regardless of their origin, accumulate into atmosphere 
to contribute to the warming which results in the changing conditions of the 
climate. 
d) The future ecological effects, as well as consequences of climate change are 
still very uncertain and unpredictable. Hence, this calls for taking precautionary 
measures to prevent the occurrence of harm the magnitude of which will be 
more costly in terms of human life and finance to bear if no serious action is 
taken now.  
This realisation positions climate change as a peculiar environmental problem 
which is different from other conventional cross-border environmental problems, 
and the solution to which requires multilateral approaches and cooperation among 
all nations and institutions, as well as a combination of different response 
measures. It is also on this premise that government procurement was identified by 
the IPCC, and then encouraged by the climate regime, as among the policies and 
measures that potentially could help in addressing the global climate concerns. 
From the review of literature, the interaction between green procurement, climate 
change mitigation, energy and international trade regulation, seems even more 
complex than the usual the trade-environment interaction has been. This is 
because, to start with, the literature generally appeared to be dispersed and 
inadequate. Also, the complexity was accentuated by the generalist manner the 
issue of environment has been addressed in trade regulation. That is to say the 
issue was addressed from the perspective of the broader trade and environmental 
interaction. This therefore indicated the need for an in-depth research which will 
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inter alia streamline the arguments and thereby contribute in filling part of the gap 
prevailing in the existing literature which addresses the defined area of this 
interaction. 
8.2.2 The GPA regulation of GP and the GPP question 
At the outset, this research noted that GP conventionally is an instrument for 
governments to acquire goods and services for their everyday governmental 
functioning at the lowest price and best quality possible. This is the concept of value 
for money objective of procurement. However, GP was also traditionally used by 
governments as a tool to pursue non-economic objectives including social and 
environmental. This is in view of the significantly large amount of resources and 
power involved in GP, which, if channelled in the direction of climate-friendly goods 
and services as well as suppliers of those goods and services, would benefit not 
only climate change goals, but also sustainable economic development at large. 
Specifically, therefore, GPP catalyses investment and innovation in climate friendly 
technology and boosts markets which in the long run also brings prices down.  
 
However, GP is a special subject of international trade law. It is regulated by the 
GPA. The GPA requires Parties to observe the non-discrimination norms in their 
procurement laws, practices and processes. Parties are not allowed to accord less 
favourable treatment to goods and services of one Party over other Parties’, or even 
discriminate between products or services themselves in the domestic market 
situation. And GPP gives preference to climate-friendly goods and services and 
suppliers over others in the same category. It is a fact that some jurisdictions, 
notably the EU, are more committed to addressing climate change and so their 
productions processes as well as consumption patterns are generally cleaner. 
Therefore, any preferences in favour of climate-friendliness of goods and services 
will potentially have disproportionate impacts against those other countries that are 
less committed to climate change. Effectively, therefore, GPP falls under the “non-
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trade” concerns which impacted on the WTO Members’ national regulatory spheres 
vis-à-vis their non-discrimination obligations towards each other. These concerns 
have been subject of intense discussions and debate under the trade rules. Of 
course, the GPA in line with the tradition of the GATT/WTO system has brought 
about general exceptions provisions to accommodate measures targeted at non-
economic objectives, including by default, environment-related measures.  
 
The GPA Art. VI requires the use of internationals standards, national technical 
regulations, eco-labelling as the basis for technical specifications in tender notices. 
This highlights the relevance of the environment and energy issues to procurement 
systems.974 These are the main areas that raise trade concerns. This is because 
issues of PPMs as well as transparency usually arise in those areas. As regards the 
setting of technical specifications, thus the GPA states: 
 
• that technical specifications for contracts must generally “be in terms of 
performance rather than design or descriptive characteristics.”975  
• that technical specifications “shall not be prepared, adopted or applied with a 
view to, or with the effect of, creating unnecessary obstacles to international 
trade.”976 And finally 
• that the conditions that may be imposed on a prospective supplier for getting 
or bidding for a government contract must be “limited to those which are 
essential to ensure the firm’s capability to fulfil the contract”977 and not on 
environmental performance. 
                                                        
974
 See supra, Chapter 6. 
975
 GPA Art. VI:2(a)   
976
 GPA Art. VI:1   
977
 GPA Art. VII(b) 
  
269
 
On the other hand, the GPA rules on transparency requirement are linked to the use 
of green technical specifications as stated above. These in the main include that 
technical specifications should: 
a) be included and defined from the very beginning of the tendering 
process as these must be communicated in the tender document;  
b) Sufficient time must also be given for the prospective tenderers to submit 
tenders, or to comply with participation requirements; 
Where they relate to the product and service, technical specifications must  
a) be in terms of performance rather than design or descriptive characteristics; 
b) be sourced from recognised international standards or national technical 
regulations, building codes, and certified by ecol-labelling scheme. 
Where they relate to the service provider, they must relate to the subject-matter of 
the contract and the technical qualification and financial capability of the contractor 
to carry the specific job in question. 
 
Accordingly, where there is complaint against a climate-motivated procurement 
measure which results in either from the manner the technical specifications are set 
(for example, where specifications are based on non-product-related energy 
efficiency standards), or that the procuring entity disregarded transparency 
requirements which results in (de-facto) discrimination against foreign business, 
then the environmental exceptions, provided for in GPA Art. XXIII, may provide the 
defendant with recourse for justification. The thesis addressed this question, and the 
findings are presented in section 8.2.4 
8.2.3 Policy space and scope for GPP under the GPA and EU  
The EU GPP system was used as illustration in this research. The research found 
that on the face of it, policy space potentially exists for GPP both under the WTO 
GPA and the EU systems. While under the GPA, GPP could only be potentially 
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defended under the general exceptions, the EU system, as up-graded by the EU 
new public procurement directives (Directives) is generally richer and more explicit 
in the substantive provisions than GPA’s approach. The technical legal issues are 
considered in section 8.2.4.  
 
As for the scope made available for public entities to use climate-friendly 
procurement policies, the EU GPP law and policy could provide a general model. 
The EU GPP system is essentially based on the judgment of ECJ in Concordia Bus 
Finland case.978 The Court held in that case that for the purpose of attainment of the 
“most economically advantageous” tender under the relevant procurement 
directives,979 procurement authorities were allowed to also incorporate 
environmental considerations in their energy procurement. The technical 
specifications inserted in the tender documents, however: 
- should be linked to the subject matter of the contract;  
- do not give the contracting authority unrestricted freedom of choice; 980 
- are applied in conformity with the applicable Directive’s rules; and 
- comply with fundamental principles of Community law especially non-
discrimination. 
 
In general terms, comparison between GPA and the EU GPP system revealed that 
the major difference between the two systems hinges both on substance as well as 
style. While the GPA does not explicitly permit the inclusion of environmental 
                                                        
978
 Concordia Bus Finland case, supra, n.739. See Kuzlik, P., Green procurement under the new regime, in 
The New EU Public Procurement Directives, (Copenhagen, Djof Publishing, 2005), pp.  142-144. 
979
 The EU New Public Procurement Directives (see Chapter 6) 
980
 In Case T-4/01 Renco SpA v. Council of the European Union, judgment of 25th February 2003,  the 
Court of First Instance, whilst purporting to apply the principles in Concordia Bus Finland, ignored or 
overlooked the requirement that award criteria must be such as not to give the contracting authority an 
unrestricted freedom of choice. See Peter Braun, “The use of qualitative award criteria and the difference 
between award and qualification criteria: a note on T-4/01 Renco SpA v, Council of the European Union 
(2003) 5 Public Procurement Law Review NA116. Braun rightly concludes that the case in fact “deviates 
from the requirement of Concordia Bus Finland” as regards this point.  
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considerations, but reduces them to the general exceptions, albeit in “incomplete” 
fashion, the EU system, based on both statute and case law, made the permission 
for GPP very explicit. This therefore presupposes that while, under the EU, 
environmental considerations are an established norm in the legal sources; it is still 
an issue of debate, under the WTO law, where the matter is treated as an exception 
rather than norm. Thus, a GPA Party who maintains a climate-friendly procurement 
has the strict onus to prove it as justifiable under the exceptions. 
 
The above state of affairs should not come as a surprise. This is because the WTO 
considers itself as strictly “trade” body. As such, issues that are regarded as “non-
trade concerns” including the environment are merely incidental matters, hence 
handled with indifference or caution.981 On the other hand; the EU, which is much 
more than a “trade” body, is proactive in its integration of the environment and 
sustainable development into all other policies. In particular, the EU is conscious of 
its commitments under the climate regime. Hence, considering the climate change 
mitigation potential of public procurement the EU integrated GPP in its overall 
climate and energy policies.982  
8.2.4 The GATT and GPA general exceptions: a closer look at the texts 
On the question whether discriminatory GPP is defendable under the GPA Art. XXIII 
general exceptions, the answer seems to be in the affirmative, at least on the face 
of it. This is in view of the recognition by the WTO system, of the need to protect the 
environment and promote sustainable development, as enshrined in the Preamble 
to the WTO Agreement. The Preamble is thus the foundation for the interpretation of 
the GATT Art. XX (b) and (g) which justifies environment related GATT-inconsistent 
measures. The US – Shrimp was the initial test case that laid the ground for this 
                                                        
981
 See for instance Bhagwati, T J., The World Trading System At Risk, Princeton University Press, US, 
1992) (based on the 1990 Harry Johnson Lecture delivered in London). 
982
 See Malumfashi, G. I. supra, n. 11. 
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environment friendly interpretation. This interpretation was followed in many other 
subsequent rulings including US – Gambling and most recently, Brazil – Tyres.  
 
On the other hand, to accept the above as the answer to the question posed earlier 
may seem just too simplistic. To start with, this study discovered that none of the 
environment-related disputes, numbering about seven in all in the history of 
GATT/WTO actually scaled through the chapeau to the GATT Art. XX. Indeed, even 
the AB ruling in the US – Shrimp dispute, so celebrated as it is, appeared only as 
paying lip-service to the environment. There, the AB, using the so-called 
evolutionary approach, accepted the shrimp conservation measure by the US as 
covered by the AB under XX(g). Then the AB denied the measure as contravening 
the XX chapeau. But even the acceptance of the measure under the XX(g) was 
objectionable at various quarters, including from Bhagwati983  and Kelly.984 But also, 
the denial of the measures was based on a consideration which arguably is extrinsic 
of the text of GATT Art XX: failure of the US to hold negotiations in good faith with 
the Complainants, with a view to finding a multilateral solution to the problem. 
 
US – Gambling came to contradict the bases upon which US – Shrimp ruling was 
established as stated above. The AB in US – Gambling faulted the requirement of 
negotiations as reason for discrimination contrary to the chapeau to GATS Art. XIV. 
 
Brazil – Tyres too accepted environmental measures under XX(b) but rejected the 
measure under the chapeau, holding that Brazil should not have exempted 
MERSOCUR Countries, and should not have permitted import of used tyres while 
banning import of retreaded tyres. These two actions did contract Brazil’s purpose 
of the total import ban, namely, the health and environmental concerns resulting 
                                                        
983
 See Bhagwati, J., supra, n. 60, p. 133.  
984
 Ibid. 
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from accumulation of used tyres. Thus, the inconsistencies still remained in the 
trade-environment jurisprudence. On the over all, the constraining posture of the 
chapeau was still in-tact even after Brazil – Tyres. 
 
Indeed, the study observed that the extent to which GPA Article XXIII covers 
environment related measures is still doubtful, for the GPA "lacks a general 
exception for the environment or for measures relating to the conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources."985 Even where the GPA Article XXIII is accepted as 
referring to the environment, then it is not entirely safe to apply the AB interpretation 
of GATT Art. XX(b) and (g) in the US – Shrimp dispute. This is because, inter alia, 
there are textual disparities between the provisions of the GATT and those of the 
GPA on both the non-discrimination norms, and the exceptions. For example: 
a) The main premise of the GATT Article XX is the GATT’s non-discrimination 
rules in Art. I and III which prohibit discrimination between “like” products. 
The GPA Art. III on non-discrimination, however, does not use the term “like” 
products or any other term which denotes likeness. So, at the outset, there is 
uncertainty what the basis of the prohibited discrimination under the GPA 
Art. III will be. This argument sounds technical, but can well have practical 
significance; 
b) The GATT Art. XX exceptions under paragraphs (b) and (g) for environment-
related measures permit measures which, in the pre-WTO era did not 
include environmental measures that were based on non product related 
PPMs. These were however accepted by the AB interpretation of the WTO 
era. On the textual issues specifically, the part of GPA Art. XXIII which 
relates to environmental exceptions is not identical with the GATT Art. XX(b) 
and (g): in GPA’s provision, the “(g)” part is omitted as stated above.  
                                                        
985
 See Hufbauer, G. C., Charnovitz, S. and Kim, J., supra, n. 25. The XX (g) allows measures “related” to 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources, that is to say, the environment 
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These disparities are relevant for two broad and practical reasons, namely, (a) the 
WTO “single-undertaking” norm which has excluded the GPA; and (b) the fact the 
GATT (as well as GATS) has excluded its regulatory authority over governmental 
purchases for governmental functioning. It is the GPA that now regulates this sector, 
even with the lacunae observed in its (GPA’s) text. Thus should there be a climate-
related dispute that touches upon “like products” question, or an item which falls 
under XX(g), it is not clear how  a dispute settlement body will apply the GPA. If the 
GPA  is not amended, then recourse must be had to the GATT.  
8.2.5 Climate-related procurement measure and the ‘burden of proof’  
Apart from the above observations, especially as they relate to the textual problems 
between the relevant GATT and GPA provision, the research assumed, for the sake 
of argument, and in view of the said single-undertaking posture of the WTO system 
which itself is controversial, that climate-friendly procurement measure would be 
covered by the general exceptions. However, there is also the procedural aspect 
which could constitute another problem. In fact, the eventual conclusions of this 
research are hinged more on this aspect. This is to do with procedure for 
establishing the extent to which a measure is covered under the exceptions.  
 
The conventional “GATT-specific” approach, as Howse lamented,986 is for the Party 
who invokes the non-trade related measure as an exception to a trade liberalization 
norm to prove it before the dispute settlement body. This proof, regardless of 
whether the measure is based on de-jure or de-facto discrimination, will require the 
strict proof of “necessity” of the measure. In the same vein, the measure must 
satisfy the requirements of the “chapeau” – the introductory paragraph of the Art. XX 
(in this case, GPA Art. XXIII). As these provisions have proved extremely technical, 
the proof process has always been very onerous and time-consuming. They also 
                                                        
986
 See Howse, R, supra, n. 924, p. 110.  
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tend to encroach upon the domestic regulatory authority of the WTO Members, 
which they seek to safe-guard. It is in this wise that Hudec suggested that origin-
neutral measures, which is usually the design taken of GPP measures, should not 
be subjected to the same strict level of proof as (required in the case of) the overt 
discriminatory measure. He based his argument of the position under the EU law. 
 
What this means is that whenever a GPA Party engages in climate-motivated 
procurement measure that Party should be “commended” or even rewarded for 
showing practical concern for the climate. Indeed, economists consider this act as 
an effort to deliver global public good987  which is also very costly. Therefore, asking 
the Party to “prove” the measure, because it came under the “exceptions” may 
tantamount to “punishing” the Party for doing the right thing. In this situation, this 
Party will be entertaining “regulatory chill,” namely, the potential of being dragged to 
the WTO dispute settlement to prove the “necessity” and the “chapeau” of the 
measure. This is also quite apart for the fact that, as the jurisprudence has shown, 
the yardstick to measure the chapeau requirements has became elusive to the 
dispute settlement bodies.988 
 
                                                        
987
 See Carraro, C. and Egenhofer, C., supra, n. 43.  
988
 There are other areas of concern in the analysis of GPP processes against the GPA provisions as well as 
other agreements under the WTO’s single-undertaking rule. Such areas were identified and discussed in 
Chapter 3 and 6. They mostly relate to issues of transparency and PPMs as emanating from use in GPP 
process, of international standards, national technical regulations and so on, which are subjects covered by 
TBT and SPS Agreements. They include the provisions on: 
a) transparency in government procurement 
b) technical specifications of the subject-matter of procurement 
c) supplier conditions for participation contract award criteria 
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8.3 Recommendations 
8.3.1 Provide for climate-friendly procurement as a positive norm 
There is an opportunity to more effectively address the issues of climate-friendly 
procurement under the WTO, and make WTO more amenable to sustainable 
development through government procurement. This can be done amending the 
GPA in such a way as permit climate-motivated procurement as a norm rather 
having to be proved under the exceptions. There are so many problems observed 
associated with these exceptions. So avoiding them completely will go a long way to 
secure multiple benefits: to the climate change, to the GPA parties (and potential 
parties including developing countries), and to the multilateral trading system as a 
whole. Sections 7.5 and 7.6 of this chapter made a case for the desirability, and 
purpose and objective of this arrangement. There is also a provisional text to 
support the suggestion. Suffice it to mention here that this suggestion is tantamount 
to giving climate change the due attention it deserves among other environmental 
problems, as well as securing for the GPA Parties their domestic regulatory 
authority and smoothing it for them to pursue climate change problem, a problem of 
common concern. 
 
Thus where climate-friendly procurement is made a norm, relevant conditions as to 
effectiveness of the measure could be attached to it, so as to prevent or minimise 
abuse. For instance, the suggested provision could provide that such procurement 
in question should relate to the procurement of climate good and services (CGS) or 
climate projects as defined in a list to be agreed [possibly at Doha EGS (CGS) 
negotiations] and annexed to the GPA as an Appendix. A reference paper approach 
could also be used to indicate the list of the CGS and related projects. Thomas 
Cottier even suggests that projects here could mean or include such projects as are 
eligible for Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol.  Any 
item on that list would be eligible for concessional procurement. 
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Meanwhile, the provision of Art. XXIII will remain in the GPA to work as a normal 
exception for other environment related measures which fall outside specific 
climate-friendly EGS. The revised version of the GPA 2007 which is currently not in 
force could provide an appropriate and timely opportunity to effect these proposals. 
8.3.2 The GPA 1994 revision and the Revised GPA 2007 
The revision of the GPA which was started in 2004, and concluded in 2006, and 
produced the Revised GPA 2007, is considered as a further justification for this 
study. The review has inserted a new provision (Art. X:6) which explicitly permits the 
GPA Parties to include environmental consideration in their procurement activities. 
This is the approach of the EU which, in 2004, issued the Directives to make explicit 
the permission for inclusion of environmental considerations in the processes. This 
new Art. X:6, however, is more or less a codification of the missing GATT XX(g). It 
thus does not fundamentally change the legal uncertainty. Indeed, this change does 
not affect the procedural rule which require the defendant to strictly prove 
environment related measure. Thus, the review process affords opportunity to make 
further modify the said Art. X:6 in line with the recommendation of this research.  
8.3.3 Further research  
 
Some questions arose in the course of the research which may require further in-
depth consideration. These are highlighted below:  
8.3.3.1 The GPP and the developing country concerns 
It has been noted in chapter 5 that environmental standards are a thorny issue for 
developing countries in view of their generally low capacity to produce or even 
consume in a cleaner manner. Thus a proposal for an amendment which explicitly 
authorises climate-friendly procurement may shut the developing countries out or 
further distance them away from acceding to GPA. Thus, this unintended 
consequence should have to be looked into, and with a more in-depth research. 
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Provisionally, however, the amendment suggested in this study has made provision 
too which c minimise the overall impacts of the new proposal on the developing 
countries. The provision in the amendment has incorporated some safe-guards to 
take care for their concerns. This approach is not new, and it has been adopted in 
the SPS agreement. This Agreement made special provisions under Art. 8 for 
technical assistance to be extended to developing countries with a view to enabling 
them to more them properly implement it provisions. Indeed, the principles of equity 
and fairness and common but differentiated responsibilities, in the climate regime, 
require that developing countries be assisted and be carried along in the fight 
against climate change. Works of Bhagwati related to this issue would be valuable 
in such a research. 
 
A related question here is in view of the fact that climate change mitigation can 
hardly be effective without the participation of the developing countries, to what 
extent can the developed countries “utilise” the developing countries through 
liberalised and green procurement policies to achieve their climate change 
objectives? 
8.3.3.2 Non-Kyoto Countries and GPP in the light of EC – Biotech ruling989  
The EC – Biotech ruling, inter alia, emphasized that a WTO Member cannot rely on 
its obligations under another treaty to act inconsistently with the provisions of WTO 
agreements. This may be allowed, pursuant to Art. 31 through 33 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), only if the treaty is "applicable in the 
relations between the parties"990 to the dispute. Thus, as the US, the complainant in 
this dispute was not a Party to, as such not bound by, the said Protocol, the Panel 
refused to take into account of the EC’s obligations under the Protocol to interpret 
EC’s obligations under SPS agreement. This aspect of the ruling has of course 
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 See supra, Chapter 7 Section 7.3.2.2. 
990
 EC – Biotech (Panel), para. 7.75. 
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been described as controversial by prominent commentators including Thomas 
Cottier, as well as environmental and human rights groups. The source of the 
controversy may well be the AB’s emphasis that the GATT should “not to be read in 
clinical isolation from international public law”.991 Accordingly, the Protocol could be 
regarded as a lex specialis, and could be useful in interpreting the WTO rules.992 In 
the light of the said ruling, to what extent could a Kyoto Party (EU, for example) 
maintain a climate protection argument for its discriminatory or trade restrictive GPP 
against a non-Party (e.g., US) that is not bound by the KP?  
8.3.3.3 The GATT Art. XX(d) and GPP in the light of Mexico - Soft Drinks  
This question relates to the one above (para. 8.3.3.2) but is more general. It is to do 
with the question: how could the provisions of GATT Art. XX(d) (which permits a 
measure aimed at securing compliance with provisions of other law which is not 
inconsistent with the provisions of the GATT),  be extended to climate-friendly 
measures to secure compliance with a treaty like the Kyoto Protocol. In other words 
could “other law” in GATT Art. XX(d) be interpreted to include an international 
treaties, especially, in view of the fact, in this case, that both GATT and climate 
regime aim at sustainable and economic development? In the Mexico – Soft Drinks 
ruling inter alia suggest that such an interpretation was not contemplated, and the 
other law here referred to domestic law of the party maintaining the measure 
complained of.993  
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 US – Gasoline (ABR), p. 17.  See Pauwelyn, J., Unity and Fragmentation In International Law (Palma 
Workshop, 20-21 May 2005) [Introductory Report On The World Trade Organization], available at: 
http://eprints.law.duke.edu/1314/1/unityandfragmentationininternationallaw.pdf (last accessed 20/10/09). 
992
 See Suppan, S., U.S. vs. EC - Biotech Products Case, WTO Dispute Backgrounder, (Institute for 
Agriculture and Trade Policy Trade and Global Governance Program, 2005), p. 3. 
993
 See Supra, para. 7.4.1.2 
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8.3.3.4 Whether GPP amounts to injurious subsidy 
To what extent can climate-friendly procurement amount to an indirect subsidy 
given to the industry producing climate-friendly goods and services as to trigger 
action based of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties?.   
8.4 Concluding Remarks 
 
The ultimate aim of this research was to see the possibility of streamlining polices 
aimed the environment and sustainable development with those of international 
trade regulation. Thus, the main proposal of the thesis, namely, a targetted 
amendment of the GPA, more specifically, presents government procurement as a 
tool under the WTO system, to contribute to the overall efforts to establish 
coherence between the environment, energy and trade spheres of global 
governance. Although the proposal relates to government procurement only, it  is, 
nevertheless, relevant in addressing the wider trade–environment conflict. Indeed, 
the proposal can be adapted to address all the legal and policy controversies 
related to the other so-called non-trade concerns, which pose real challenges to the 
subsistence of the WTO system. 
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APPENDIX I 
SELECTED PROVISIONS FROM THE GENERAL AGREEMENT  
ON TARIFFS AND TRADE 
 
PART I 
 
Article I 
 
General Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment 
 
1. With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection 
with importation or exportation or imposed on the international transfer of payments for 
imports or exports, and with respect to the method of levying such duties and charges, and 
with respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation and exportation, and 
with respect to all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III,* any advantage, 
favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or 
destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like 
product originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.  
 
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall not require the elimination of any 
preferences in respect of import duties or charges which do not exceed the levels provided 
for in paragraph 4 of this Article and which fall within the following descriptions: 
 
(a) Preferences in force exclusively between two or more of the territories listed in 
Annex A, subject to the conditions set forth therein; 
 
(b) Preferences in force exclusively between two or more territories which on July 1, 
1939, were connected by common sovereignty or relations of protection or 
suzerainty and which are listed in Annexes B, C and D, subject to the conditions set 
forth therein; 
 
(c) Preferences in force exclusively between the United States of America and the 
Republic of Cuba; 
 
(d) Preferences in force exclusively between neighbouring countries listed in Annexes E 
and F. 
 
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 shall not apply to preferences between the countries 
formerly a part of the Ottoman Empire and detached from it on July 24, l923, provided such 
preferences are approved under paragraph 5† of Article XXV, which shall be applied in this 
respect in the light of paragraph 1 of Article XXIX. 
 
4. The margin of preference* on any product in respect of which a preference is 
permitted under paragraph 2 of this Article but is not specifically set forth as a maximum 
margin of preference in the appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agreement shall not 
exceed: 
 
(a) in respect of duties or charges on any product described in such Schedule, the 
difference between the most-favoured-nation and preferential rates provided for 
therein; if no preferential rate is provided for, the preferential rate shall for the 
purposes of this paragraph be taken to be that in force on April 10, l947, and, if no 
most-favoured-nation rate is provided for, the margin shall not exceed the difference 
between the most-favoured-nation and preferential rates existing on April 10, 1947; 
 
(b) in respect of duties or charges on any product not described in the appropriate 
Schedule, the difference between the most favoured- nation and preferential rates 
existing on April 10, 1947. In the case of the contracting parties named in Annex G, 
the date of April 10, 1947, referred to in sub-paragraph (a) and (b) of this paragraph 
shall be replaced by the respective dates set forth in that Annex. 
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Article II 
 
Schedules of Concessions 
 
1. (a) Each contracting party shall accord to the commerce of the other contracting 
parties treatment no less favourable than that provided for in the appropriate Part of the 
appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agreement. 
 
(b) The products described in Part I of the Schedule relating to any contracting party, which 
are the products of territories of other contracting parties, shall, on their importation into the 
territory to which the Schedule relates, and subject to the terms, conditions or qualifications 
set forth in that Schedule, be exempt from ordinary customs duties in excess of those set 
forth and provided therein. Such products shall also be exempt from all other duties or 
charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with the importation in excess of those 
imposed on the date of this Agreement or those directly and mandatorily required to be 
imposed thereafter by legislation in force in the importing territory on that date. 
 
(c) The products described in Part II of the Schedule relating to any contracting party which 
are the products of territories entitled under Article I to receive preferential treatment upon 
importation into the territory to which the Schedule relates shall, on their importation into 
such territory, and subject to the terms, conditions or qualifications set forth in that Schedule, 
be exempt from ordinary customs duties in excess of those set forth and provided for in Part 
II of that Schedule. Such products shall also be exempt from all other duties or charges of 
any kind imposed on or in connection with importation in excess of those imposed on the 
date of this Agreement or those directly or mandatorily required to be imposed thereafter by 
legislation in force in the importing territory on that date. Nothing in this Article shall prevent 
any contracting party from maintaining its requirements existing on the date of this 
Agreement as to the eligibility of goods for entry at preferential rates of duty. 
 
2. Nothing in this Article shall prevent any contracting party from imposing at any time 
on the importation of any product: 
 
(a) a charge equivalent to an internal tax imposed consistently with the provisions of 
paragraph 2 of Article III* in respect of the like domestic product or in respect of an 
article from which the imported product has been manufactured or produced in 
whole or in part; 
 
(b) any anti-dumping or countervailing duty applied consistently with the provisions of 
Article VI;* 
 
(c) fees or other charges commensurate with the cost of services rendered. 
 
3. No contracting party shall alter its method of determining dutiable value or of 
converting currencies so as to impair the value of any of the concessions provided for in the 
appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agreement. 
 
4. If any contracting party establishes, maintains or authorizes, formally or in effect, a 
monopoly of the importation of any product described in the appropriate Schedule annexed 
to this Agreement, such monopoly shall not, except as provided for in that Schedule or as 
otherwise agreed between the parties which initially negotiated the concession, operate so 
as to afford protection on the average in excess of the amount of protection provided for in 
that Schedule. The provisions of this paragraph shall not limit the use by contracting parties 
of any form of assistance to domestic producers permitted by other provisions of this 
Agreement.* 
 
5. If any contracting party considers that a product is not receiving from another 
contracting party the treatment which the first contracting party believes to have been 
contemplated by a concession provided for in the appropriate Schedule annexed to this 
Agreement, it shall bring the matter directly to the attention of the other contracting party. If 
the latter agrees that the treatment contemplated was that claimed by the first contracting 
party, but declares that such treatment cannot be accorded because a court or other proper 
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authority has ruled to the effect that the product involved cannot be classified under the tariff 
laws of such contracting party so as to permit the treatment contemplated in this Agreement, 
the two contracting parties, together with any other contracting parties substantially 
interested, shall enter 
promptly into further negotiations with a view to a compensatory adjustment of the matter. 
 
6. (a) The specific duties and charges included in the Schedules relating to contracting 
parties members of the International Monetary Fund, and margins of preference in specific 
duties and charges maintained by such contracting parties, are expressed in the appropriate 
currency at the par value accepted or provisionally recognized by the Fund at the date of this 
Agreement. Accordingly, in case this par value is reduced consistently with the Articles of 
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund by more than twenty per centum, such 
specific duties and charges and margins of preference may be adjusted to take account of 
such reduction; provided that the CONTRACTING PARTIES (i.e., the contracting parties 
acting jointly as provided for in Article XXV) concur that such adjustments will not impair the 
value of the concessions  provided for in the appropriate Schedule or elsewhere in this 
Agreement, due account being taken of all factors which may influence the need for, or 
urgency of, such adjustments. 
 
(b) Similar provisions shall apply to any contracting party not a member of the Fund, as 
from the date on which such contracting party becomes a member of the Fund or enters into 
a special exchange agreement in pursuance of Article XV. 
 
7. The Schedules annexed to this Agreement are hereby made an integral part of Part I of 
this Agreement. 
 
 
 
Article III* 
 
National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation 
 
1. The contracting parties recognize that internal taxes and other internal charges, and 
laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, 
transportation, distribution or use of products, and internal quantitative regulations requiring 
the mixture, processing or use of products in specified amounts or proportions, should not 
be applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic 
production.* 
 
2. The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any 
other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other 
internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic 
products. Moreover, no contracting party shall otherwise apply internal taxes or other 
internal charges to imported or domestic products in a manner contrary to the principles set 
forth in paragraph 1.* 
 
3. With respect to any existing internal tax which is inconsistent with the provisions of 
paragraph 2, but which is specifically authorized under a trade agreement, in force on April 
10, l947, in which the import duty on the taxed product is bound against increase, the 
contracting party imposing the tax shall be free to postpone the application of the provisions 
of paragraph 2 to such tax until such time as it can obtain release from the obligations of 
such trade agreement in order to permit the increase of such duty to the extent necessary to 
compensate for the elimination of the protective element of the tax. 
 
4. The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any 
other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to 
like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting 
their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use. The 
provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent the application of differential internal 
transportation charges which are based exclusively on the economic operation of the means 
of transport and not on the nationality of the product. 
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5. No contracting party shall establish or maintain any internal quantitative regulation 
relating to the mixture, processing or use of products in specified amounts or proportions 
which requires, directly or indirectly, that any specified amount or proportion of any product 
which is the subject of the regulation must be supplied from domestic sources. Moreover, no 
contracting party shall otherwise apply internal quantitative regulations in a manner contrary 
to the principles set forth in paragraph 1.* 
 
6. The provisions of paragraph 5 shall not apply to any internal quantitative regulation 
in force in the territory of any contracting party on July 1, 1939, April 10, 1947, or March 24, 
l948, at the option of that contracting party; Provided that any such regulation which is 
contrary to the provisions of paragraph 5 shall not be modified to the detriment of imports 
and shall be treated as a customs duty for the purpose of negotiation. 
 
7. No internal quantitative regulation relating to the mixture, processing or use of 
products in specified amounts or proportions shall be applied in such a manner as to 
allocate any such amount or proportion among external sources of supply. 
 
8. (a) The provisions of this Article shall not apply to laws, regulations or requirements 
governing the procurement by governmental agencies of products purchased for 
governmental purposes and not with a view to commercial resale or with a view to use in the 
production of goods for commercial sale. 
 
(b) The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the payment of subsidies exclusively to 
domestic producers, including payments to domestic producers derived from the proceeds of 
internal taxes or charges applied consistently with the provisions of this Article and subsidies 
effected through governmental purchases of domestic products. 
 
9. The contracting parties recognize that internal maximum price control measures, 
even though conforming to the other provisions of this Article, can have effects prejudicial to 
the interests of contracting parties supplying imported products. Accordingly, contracting 
parties applying such measures shall take account of the interests of exporting contracting 
parties with a view to avoiding to the fullest practicable extent such prejudicial effects. 
 
10. The provisions of this Article shall not prevent any contracting party from 
establishing or maintaining internal quantitative regulations relating to exposed 
cinematograph films and meeting the requirements of Article IV. 
 
 
PART II 
 
Article XX 
 
General Exceptions 
 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the 
same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this 
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting 
party of measures: 
 
(a) necessary to protect public morals;  
 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
 
(c) relating to the importations or exportations of gold or silver;  
 
(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which  are not inconsistent  
with the provisions of this Agreement, including those relating to customs enforcement, 
the enforcement of monopolies operated under paragraph 4 of Article II and Article XVII, 
the protection of patents, trade marks and copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive 
practices;
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APPENDIX II 
SELECTED PROVISIONS FROM THE AGREEMENT ON GOVERNMENT 
PROCUREMENT  
 
PART I 
 
The Preamble 
 
Parties to this Agreement (hereinafter referred to as "Parties"), 
 
Recognizing the need for an effective multilateral framework of rights and obligations with 
respect to laws, regulations, procedures and practices regarding government procurement 
with a view to achieving greater liberalization and expansion of world trade and improving 
the international framework for the conduct of world trade;  
 
Recognizing that laws, regulations, procedures and practices regarding government 
procurement should not be prepared, adopted or applied to foreign or domestic products and 
services and to foreign or domestic suppliers so as to afford protection to domestic products 
or services or domestic suppliers and should not discriminate among foreign products or 
services or among foreign suppliers; 
 
Recognizing that it is desirable to provide transparency of laws, regulations, procedures and 
practices regarding government procurement; 
 
Recognizing the need to establish international procedures on notification, consultation, 
surveillance and dispute settlement with a view to ensuring a fair, prompt and effective 
enforcement of the international provisions on government procurement and to maintain the 
balance of rights and obligations at the highest possible level; 
 
Recognizing the need to take into account the development, financial and trade needs of 
developing countries, in particular the least-developed countries; 
 
Desiring, in accordance with paragraph 6(b) of Article IX of the Agreement on Government 
Procurement done on 12 April 1979, as amended on 2 February 1987, to broaden and 
improve the Agreement on the basis of mutual reciprocity and to expand the coverage of the 
Agreement to include service contracts; 
 
Desiring to encourage acceptance of and accession to this Agreement by governments not 
party to it; 
 
Having undertaken further negotiations in pursuance of these objectives; 
 
Hereby agree as follows: 
 
 
 
Article I 
 
Scope and Coverage 
 
1. This Agreement applies to any law, regulation, procedure or practice regarding any 
procurement by entities covered by this Agreement, as specified in Appendix I.1  
 
2. This Agreement applies to procurement by any contractual means, including through such 
methods as purchase or as lease, rental or hire purchase, with or without an option to buy, 
including any combination of products and services. 
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3. Where entities, in the context of procurement covered under this Agreement, require 
enterprises not included in Appendix I to award contracts in accordance with particular 
requirements, Article III shall apply mutatis mutandis to such requirements. 
 
4. This Agreement applies to any procurement contract of a value of not less than the 
relevant threshold specified in Appendix I. 
 
-------------------------------- 
 
Appendix I. 
 
For each Party, Appendix I is divided into five Annexes: 
- Annex 1 contains central government entities. 
- Annex 2 contains sub-central government entities. 
- Annex 3 contains all other entities that procure in accordance with the provisions of this 
Agreement. 
- Annex 4 specifies services, whether listed positively or negatively, covered by this 
Agreement. 
- Annex 5 specifies covered construction services. 
Relevant thresholds are specified in each Party's Annexes. 
 
 
Article II 
 
Valuation of Contracts 
 
1. The following provisions shall apply in determining the value of contracts(2) for purposes 
of implementing this Agreement. 
 
2. Valuation shall take into account all forms of remuneration, including any premiums, fees, 
commissions and interest receivable. 
 
3. The selection of the valuation method by the entity shall not be used, nor shall any 
procurement requirement be divided, with the intention of avoiding the application of this 
Agreement. 
 
----------------------- 
 
(2) This Agreement shall apply to any procurement contract for which the contract value 
is estimated to equal or exceed the threshold at the time of publication of the notice in 
accordance with Article IX. 
 
4. If an individual requirement for a procurement results in the award of more than one 
contract, or in contracts being awarded in separate parts, the basis for valuation shall be 
either: 
 
(a) the actual value of similar recurring contracts concluded over the previous fiscal year or 
12 months adjusted, where possible, for anticipated changes in quantity and value over the 
subsequent 12 months; or 
 
(b) the estimated value of recurring contracts in the fiscal year or 12 months subsequent to 
the initial contract. 
 
5. In cases of contracts for the lease, rental or hire purchase of products or services, or 
in the case of contracts which do not specify a total price, the basis for valuation shall be: 
 
(a) in the case of fixed-term contracts, where their term is 12 months or less, the total 
contract value for their duration, or, where their term exceeds 12 months, their total value 
including the estimated residual value; 
 
(b) in the case of contracts for an indefinite period, the monthly instalment multiplied by 48. If 
there is any doubt, the second basis for valuation, namely (b), is to be used. 
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6. In cases where an intended procurement specifies the need for option clauses, the basis 
for valuation shall be the total value of the maximum permissible procurement, inclusive of 
optional purchases. 
 
 
Article III 
 
National Treatment and Non-discrimination 
 
1. With respect to all laws, regulations, procedures and practices regarding government 
procurement covered by this Agreement, each Party shall provide immediately and 
unconditionally to the products, services and suppliers of other Parties offering products or 
services of the Parties, treatment no less favourable than: 
(a) that accorded to domestic products, services and suppliers; and 
 
(b) that accorded to products, services and suppliers of any other Party. 
 
2. With respect to all laws, regulations, procedures and practices regarding government 
procurement covered by this Agreement, each Party shall ensure: 
 
(a) that its entities shall not treat a locally-established supplier less favourably than another 
locally-established supplier on the basis of degree of foreign affiliation or ownership; and 
 
(b) that its entities shall not discriminate against locally-established suppliers on the basis of 
the country of production of the good or service being supplied, provided that the country of 
production is a Party to the Agreement in accordance with the provisions of Article IV. 
 
3. The provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to customs duties and charges of 
any kind imposed on or in connection with importation, the method of levying such duties 
and charges, other import regulations and formalities, and measures affecting trade in 
services other than laws, regulations, procedures and practices regarding government 
procurement covered by this Agreement. 
 
 
Article VI 
 
Technical Specifications 
 
1. Technical specifications laying down the characteristics of the products or  services 
to be procured, such as quality, performance, safety and dimensions, symbols, terminology, 
packaging, marking and labelling, or the processes and methods for their production and 
requirements relating to conformity assessment procedures prescribed by procuring entities, 
shall not be prepared, adopted or applied with a view to, or with the effect of, creating 
unnecessary obstacles to international trade. 
 
2. Technical specifications prescribed by procuring entities shall, where appropriate: 
(a) be in terms of performance rather than design or descriptive characteristics; 
and 
(b) be based on international standards, where such exist; otherwise, on 
national technical regulations3, recognized national standards4, or building 
codes. 
 
3. There shall be no requirement or reference to a particular trademark or trade name, 
patent, design or type, specific origin, producer or supplier, unless there is no sufficiently 
precise or intelligible way of describing the procurement requirements and provided that 
words such as "or equivalent" are included in the tender documentation. 
 
4. Entities shall not seek or accept, in a manner which would have the effect of precluding 
competition, advice which may be used in the preparation of specifications for a specific 
procurement from a firm that may have a commercial interest in the procurement. 
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Article VII 
 
Tendering Procedures 
 
1. Each Party shall ensure that the tendering procedures of its entities are applied in a non-
discriminatory manner and are consistent with the provisions contained in Articles VII 
through XVI. 
 
2. Entities shall not provide to any supplier information with regard to a specific procurement 
in a manner which would have the effect of precluding competition. 
 
3. For the purposes of this Agreement: 
 
(a) Open tendering procedures are those procedures under which all interested 
suppliers may submit a tender. 
 
(b) Selective tendering procedures are those procedures under which, 
consistent with paragraph 3 of Article X and other relevant provisions of this 
Agreement, those suppliers invited to do so by the entity may submit a 
tender. 
 
(c) Limited tendering procedures are those procedures where the entity contacts suppliers 
individually, only under the conditions specified in Article XV. 
 
 
Article VIII 
Qualification of Suppliers 
 
In the process of qualifying suppliers, entities shall not discriminate among suppliers of other 
Parties or between domestic suppliers and suppliers of other Parties. Qualification 
procedures shall be consistent with the following:  
 
(a) any conditions for participation in tendering procedures shall be published in 
adequate  
 
(3) For the purpose of this Agreement, a technical regulation is a document 
which lays down characteristics of a product or a service or their related 
processes and production methods, including the applicable administrative 
provisions, with which compliance is mandatory. It may also include or deal 
exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling 
requirements as they apply to a product, service, process or production 
method. 
(4) For the purpose of this Agreement, a standard is a document approved by a 
recognized body, that provides, for common and repeated use, rules, 
guidelines or characteristics for products or services or related processes 
and production methods, with which compliance is not mandatory. It may 
also include or deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging, 
marking or labelling requirements as they apply to a product, service, 
process or production method. 
 
time to enable interested suppliers to initiate and, to the extent that it is compatible with 
efficient operation of the procurement process, complete the qualification procedures; 
 
(b) any conditions for participation in tendering procedures shall be limited to those 
which are essential to ensure the firm's capability to fulfil the contract in question. Any 
conditions for participation required from suppliers, including financial guarantees, technical 
qualifications and information necessary for establishing the financial, commercial and 
technical capacity of suppliers, as well as the verification of 
qualifications, shall be no less favourable to suppliers of other Parties than to  domestic 
suppliers and shall not discriminate among suppliers of other Parties. The financial, 
commercial and technical capacity of a supplier shall be judged on the basis both of that 
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supplier's global business activity as well as of its activity in the territory of the procuring 
entity, taking due account of the legal relationship between the supply organizations; 
 
(c) the process of, and the time required for, qualifying suppliers shall not be used in 
order to keep suppliers of other Parties off a suppliers' list or from being considered for a 
particular intended procurement. Entities shall recognize as qualified suppliers such 
domestic suppliers or suppliers of other Parties who meet the conditions for participation in a 
particular intended procurement. Suppliers requesting to participate in a particular intended 
procurement who may not yet be qualified shall also be considered, provided there is 
sufficient time to complete the qualification procedure; 
 
(d) entities maintaining permanent lists of qualified suppliers shall ensure that suppliers 
may apply for qualification at any time; and that all qualified suppliers so requesting 
are included in the lists within a reasonably short time 
 
(e) if, after publication of the notice under paragraph 1 of Article IX, a supplier not yet 
qualified requests to participate in an intended procurement, the entity shall promptly 
start procedures for qualification; 
 
(f) any supplier having requested to become a qualified supplier shall be advised by the 
entities concerned of the decision in this regard. Qualified suppliers included on 
permanent lists by entities shall also be notified of the termination of any such lists 
or of their removal from them; 
 
(g) each Party shall ensure that: 
 
(i) each entity and its constituent parts follow a single qualification procedure, 
except in cases of duly substantiated need for a different procedure; and 
(ii) efforts be made to minimize differences in qualification procedures between 
entities. 
(h) nothing in subparagraphs (a) through (g) shall preclude the exclusion of any supplier 
on grounds such as bankruptcy or false declarations, provided that such an action is 
consistent with the national treatment and non-discrimination provisions 
 
 
Article XVII 
 
Transparency 
 
1. Each Party shall encourage entities to indicate the terms and conditions, including any 
deviations from competitive tendering procedures or access to challenge procedures, under 
which tenders will be entertained from suppliers situated in countries not Parties to this 
Agreement but which, with a view to creating transparency in their own contract awards, 
nevertheless: 
 
(a) specify their contracts in accordance with Article VI (technical specifications); 
 
(b) publish the procurement notices referred to in Article IX, including, in the version of the 
notice referred to in paragraph 8 of Article IX (summary of the notice of intended 
procurement) which is published in an official language of the WTO, an indication of the 
terms and conditions under which tenders shall be entertained from suppliers(7) Offsets in 
government procurement are measures used to encourage local  development or improve 
the balance-of-payments accounts by means of domestic content, licensing of technology, 
investment requirements, counter-trade or similar requirements. situated in countries Parties 
to this Agreement; 
 
(c) are willing to ensure that their procurement regulations shall not normally change 
during a procurement and, in the event that such change proves unavoidable, to ensure the 
availability of a satisfactory means of redress. 
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2. Governments not Parties to the Agreement which comply with the conditions specified in 
paragraphs 1(a) through 1(c), shall be entitled if they so inform the Parties to participate in 
the Committee as observers. 
 
 
Article XXI 
 
Institutions 
 
1. A Committee on Government Procurement composed of representatives from each of the 
Parties shall be established. This Committee shall elect its own Chairman and Vice-
Chairman and shall meet as necessary but not less than once a year for the purpose of 
affording Parties the opportunity to consult on any matters relating to the operation of this 
Agreement or the furtherance of its objectives, and to carry out such other responsibilities as 
may be assigned to it by the Parties. 
 
2. The Committee may establish working parties or other subsidiary bodies which shall carry 
out such functions as may be given to them by the Committee. 
 
 
PART II 
 
Article XXIII 
 
Exceptions to the Agreement 
 
1. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent any Party from taking any 
action or not disclosing any information which it considers necessary for the protection of its 
essential security interests relating to the procurement of arms, ammunition or war materials, 
or to procurement indispensable for national security or for national defence purposes. 
 
2. Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which 
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where 
the same conditions prevail or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this 
Agreement shall be construed to prevent any Party from imposing or enforcing measures: 
necessary to protect public morals, order or safety, human, animal or plant life or health or 
intellectual property; or relating to the products or services of handicapped persons, of 
philanthropic institutions or of prison labour. 
 
Article XXIV 
 
Final Provisions 
 
7. Reviews, Negotiations and Future Work 
 
(a) The Committee shall review annually the implementation and operation of this 
Agreement taking into account the objectives thereof. The Committee shall annually inform 
the General Council of the WTO of developments during the periods covered by such 
reviews. 
 
(b) Not later than the end of the third year from the date of entry into force of this Agreement 
and periodically thereafter, the Parties thereto shall undertake further negotiations, with a 
view to improving this Agreement and achieving the greatest possible extension of its 
coverage among all Parties on the basis of mutual reciprocity, having regard to the 
provisions of Article V relating to developing countries. 
 
(c) Parties shall seek to avoid introducing or prolonging discriminatory measures and 
practices which distort open procurement and shall, in the context of negotiations under 
subparagraph (b), seek to eliminate those which remain on the date of entry into force of this 
Agreement. 
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APPENDIX III 
 
DIFFERENTIAL AND MORE FAVOURABLE TREATMENT RECIPROCITY AND 
FULLER PARTICIPATION OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
Decision of 28 November 1979 
(L/4903) 
 
 Following negotiations within the framework of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 
the CONTRACTING PARTIES  decide as follows: 
 
1. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article I of the General Agreement, contracting 
parties may accord differential and more favourable treatment to developing countries1, 
without according such treatment to other contracting parties. 
 
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 apply to the following:2 
 
 (a) Preferential tariff treatment accorded by developed contracting parties to 
products originating in developing countries in accordance with the 
Generalized System of Preferences,3 
 
 (b) Differential and more favourable treatment with respect to the provisions of 
the General Agreement concerning non-tariff measures governed by the 
provisions of instruments multilaterally negotiated under the auspices of the 
GATT; 
 
 (c) Regional or global arrangements entered into amongst less-developed 
contracting parties for the mutual reduction or elimination of tariffs and, in 
accordance with criteria or conditions which may be prescribed by the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES, for the mutual reduction or elimination of non-
tariff measures, on products imported from one another 
 
 (d) Special treatment of the least developed among the developing countries in 
the context of any general or specific measures in favour of developing 
countries. 
 
3. Any differential and more favourable treatment provided under this clause: 
 
  (a) shall be designed to facilitate and promote the trade of developing countries 
and not to raise barriers to or create undue difficulties for the trade of any 
other contracting parties; 
 
 (b) shall not constitute an impediment to the reduction or elimination of tariffs 
and other restrictions to trade on a most-favoured-nation basis; 
 
 
 
1
 The words "developing countries" as used in this text are to be understood to refer also to 
developing territories. 
2
 It would remain open for the CONTRACTING PARTIES to consider on an  ad hoc  basis 
under the GATT provisions for joint action any proposals for differential and more favourable treatment 
not falling within the scope of this paragraph. 
3
 As described in the Decision of the CONTRACTING PARTIES of 25 June 1971, relating to 
the establishment of "generalized, non-reciprocal and non discriminatory preferences beneficial to the 
developing countries" (BISD 18S/24). 
 
Nothing in these provisions shall affect the rights of contracting parties under the General Agreement. 
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 (c) shall in the case of such treatment accorded by developed contracting 
parties to developing countries be designed and, if necessary, modified, to 
respond positively to the development, financial and trade needs of 
developing countries. 
 
 
4. Any contracting party taking action to introduce an arrangement pursuant to 
paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above or subsequently taking action to introduce modification or 
withdrawal of the differential and more favourable treatment so provided shall:4 
 
 (a) notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES and furnish them with all the 
information they may deem appropriate relating to such action; 
 
 (b) afford adequate opportunity for prompt consultations at the request of any 
interested contracting party with respect to any difficulty or matter that may 
arise. The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall, if requested to do so by such 
contracting party, consult with all contracting parties concerned with respect 
to the matter with a view to reaching solutions satisfactory to all such 
contracting parties. 
 
5. The developed countries do not expect reciprocity for commitments made by them 
in trade negotiations to reduce or remove tariffs and other barriers to the trade of developing 
countries, i.e., the developed countries do not expect the developing countries, in the course 
of trade negotiations, to make contributions which are inconsistent with their individual 
development, financial and trade needs. Developed contracting parties shall therefore not 
seek, neither shall less-developed contracting parties be required to make, concessions that 
are inconsistent with the latters' development, financial and trade needs. 
 
6. Having regard to the special economic difficulties and the particular development, 
financial and trade needs of the least-developed countries, the developed countries shall 
exercise the utmost restraint in seeking any concessions or contributions for commitments 
made by them to reduce or remove tariffs and other barriers to the trade of such countries, 
and the least-developed countries shall not be expected to make concessions or 
contributions that are inconsistent with the recognition of their particular situation and 
problems. 
 
7. The concessions and contributions made and the obligations assumed by 
developed and less-developed contracting parties under the provisions of the General 
Agreement should promote the basic objectives of the Agreement, including those embodied 
in the Preamble and in Article XXXVI. Less-developed contracting parties expect that their 
capacity to make contributions or negotiated concessions or take other mutually agreed 
action under the provisions and procedures of the General Agreement would improve with 
the progressive development of their economies and improvement in their trade situation 
and they would accordingly expect to participate more fully in the framework of rights and 
obligations under the General Agreement. 
 
8. Particular account shall be taken of the serious difficulty of the least-developed 
countries in making concessions and contributions in view of their special economic situation 
and their development, financial and trade needs. 
 
9. The contracting parties will collaborate in arrangements for review of the operation 
of these provisions, bearing in mind the need for individual and joint efforts by contracting 
parties to meet the development needs of developing countries and the objectives of the 
General Agreement. 
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APPENDIX IV 
 
SELECTED PROVISIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK 
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, AND THE KYOTO PROTOCOL 
 
 
1.  THE OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE UNFCCC, AND THE  
COMMITMENTS OF THE PARTIES 
 
 
Article 2 
 
OBJECTIVE 
 
The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments that the 
Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with the relevant 
provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow 
ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not 
threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner. 
 
Article 3 
 
PRINCIPLES 
 
In their actions to achieve the objective of the Convention and to implement its provisions, 
the Parties shall be guided, inter alia, by the following: 
 
1. The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future 
generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country 
Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof. 
 
2. The specific needs and special circumstances of developing country Parties, especially 
those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, and of those 
Parties, especially developing country Parties, that would have to bear a disproportionate or 
abnormal burden under the Convention, should be given full consideration. 
 
3. The Parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the 
causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects. Where there are threats of 
serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason 
for postponing such measures, taking into account that policies and measures to deal with 
climate change should be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest 
possible cost. To achieve this, such policies and measures should take into account different 
socio-economic contexts, be comprehensive, cover all relevant sources, sinks and 
reservoirs of greenhouse gases and adaptation, and comprise all economic sectors. Efforts 
to address climate change may be carried out cooperatively by interested Parties. 
 
4. The Parties have a right to, and should, promote sustainable development. Policies and 
measures to protect the climate system against human-induced change should be 
appropriate for the specific conditions of each Party and should be integrated with national 
development programmes, taking into account that economic development is essential for 
adopting measures to address climate change. 
 
5. The Parties should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international economic 
system that would lead to sustainable economic growth and development in all Parties, 
particularly developing country Parties, thus enabling them better to address the problems of 
climate change. Measures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should 
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not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on 
international trade. 
 
Article 4 
 
COMMITMENTS 
 
1. All Parties, taking into account their common but differentiated responsibilities and their 
specific national and regional development priorities, objectives and circumstances, shall: 
 
(a) Develop, periodically update, publish and make available to the Conference of 
the Parties, in accordance with Article 12, national inventories of anthropogenic 
emissions by sources and removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled 
by the Montreal Protocol, using comparable methodologies to be agreed upon by 
the Conference of the Parties; 
 
(b) Formulate, implement, publish and regularly update national and, where 
appropriate, regional programmes containing measures to mitigate climate change 
by addressing anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of all 
greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, and measures to 
facilitate adequate adaptation to climate change; 
 
(c) Promote and cooperate in the development, application and diffusion, including 
transfer, of technologies, practices and processes that control, reduce or prevent 
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal 
Protocol in all relevant sectors, including the energy, transport, industry, agriculture, 
forestry and waste management sectors; 
 
(d) Promote sustainable management, and promote and cooperate in the 
conservation and enhancement, as appropriate, of sinks and reservoirs of all 
greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, including biomass, 
forests and oceans as well as other terrestrial, coastal and marine ecosystems; 
 
(e) Cooperate in preparing for adaptation to the impacts of climate change; develop 
and elaborate appropriate and integrated plans for coastal zone management, water 
resources and agriculture, and for the protection and rehabilitation of areas, 
particularly in Africa, affected by drought and desertification, as well as floods; 
- 
(f) Take climate change considerations into account, to the extent feasible, in their 
relevant social, economic and environmental policies and actions, and employ 
appropriate methods, for example impact assessments, formulated and determined 
nationally, with a view to minimizing adverse effects on the economy, on public 
health and on the quality of the environment, of projects or measures undertaken by 
them to mitigate or adapt to climate change; 
 
(g) Promote and cooperate in scientific, technological, technical, socio-economic 
and other research, systematic observation and development of data archives 
related to the climate system and intended to further the understanding and to 
reduce or eliminate the remaining uncertainties regarding the causes, effects, 
magnitude and timing of climate change and the economic and social consequences 
of various response strategies;  
 
(h) Promote and cooperate in the full, open and prompt exchange of relevant 
scientific, technological, technical, socio-economic and legal information related to 
the climate system and climate change, and to the economic and social 
consequences of various response strategies; 
 
(i) Promote and cooperate in education, training and public awareness related to 
climate change and encourage the widest participation in this process, including that 
of non-governmental organizations; and 
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(j) Communicate to the Conference of the Parties information related to 
implementation, in accordance with Article 12. 
 
2. The developed country Parties and other Parties included in Annex I commit themselves 
specifically as provided for in the following: 
 
(a) Each of these Parties shall adopt national(1) policies and take corresponding 
measures on the mitigation of climate change, by limiting its anthropogenic 
emissions of greenhouse gases and protecting and enhancing its greenhouse gas 
sinks and reservoirs. These policies and measures will demonstrate that developed 
countries are taking the lead in modifying longer-term trends in anthropogenic 
emissions consistent with the objective of the Convention, recognizing that the 
return by the end of the present decade to earlier levels of anthropogenic emissions 
of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal 
Protocol would contribute to such modification, and taking into account the 
differences in these Parties’ starting points and approaches, economic structures 
and resource bases, the need to maintain strong and sustainable economic growth, 
available technologies and other individual circumstances, as well as the need for 
equitable and appropriate contributions by each of these Parties to the global effort 
regarding that objective. These Parties may implement such policies and measures 
jointly with other Parties and may assist other Parties in contributing to the 
achievement of the objective of the Convention and, in particular, that of this 
subparagraph; 
-------------------------------------------- 
(1) This includes policies and measures adopted by regional economic integration 
organizations. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
(b) In order to promote progress to this end, each of these Parties shall 
communicate, within six months of the entry into force of the Convention for it and 
periodically thereafter, and in accordance with Article 12, detailed information on its 
policies and measures referred to in subparagraph (a) above, as well as on its 
resulting projected anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of 
greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol for the period referred to 
in subparagraph (a), with the aim of returning individually or jointly to their 1990 
levels these anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse 
gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol. This information will be reviewed by 
the Conference of the Parties, at its first session and periodically thereafter, in 
accordance with Article 7; 
 
(c) Calculations of emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse 
gases for the purposes of subparagraph (b) above should take into account the best 
available scientific knowledge, including of the effective capacity of sinks and the 
respective contributions of such gases to climate change. The Conference of the 
Parties shall consider and agree on methodologies for these calculations at its first 
session and review them regularly thereafter; 
 
(d) The Conference of the Parties shall, at its first session, review the adequacy of 
subparagraphs (a) and (b) above. Such review shall be carried out in the light of the 
best available scientific information and assessment on climate change and its 
impacts, as well as relevant technical, social and economic information. Based on 
this review, the Conference of the Parties shall take appropriate action, which may 
include the adoption of amendments to the commitments in subparagraphs (a) and 
(b) above. The Conference of the Parties, at its first session, shall also take 
decisions regarding criteria for joint implementation as indicated in subparagraph (a) 
above. A second review of subparagraphs (a) and (b) shall take place not later than 
31 December 1998, and thereafter at regular intervals determined by the 
Conference of the Parties, until the objective of the Convention is met;  
 
(e) Each of these Parties shall: 
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(i) coordinate as appropriate with other such Parties, relevant economic and 
administrative instruments developed to achieve the objective of the Convention; 
and 
 
(ii) identify and periodically review its own policies and practices which encourage 
activities that lead to greater levels of anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse 
gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol than would otherwise occur;   
 
(f) The Conference of the Parties shall review, not later than 31 December 1998, 
available information with a view to taking decisions regarding such amendments to 
the lists in Annexes I and II as may be appropriate, with the approval of the Party 
concerned; 
 
(g) Any Party not included in Annex I may, in its instrument of ratification, 
acceptance, approval or accession, or at any time thereafter, notify the Depositary 
that it intends to be bound by subparagraphs (a) and (b) above. The Depositary 
shall inform the other signatories and Parties of any such notification. 
 
3. The developed country Parties and other developed Parties included in Annex II shall 
provide new and additional financial resources to meet the agreed full costs incurred by 
developing country Parties in complying with their obligations under Article 12, paragraph 1. 
They shall also provide such financial resources, including for the transfer of technology, 
needed by the developing country Parties to meet the agreed full incremental costs of 
implementing measures that are covered by paragraph 1 of this Article and that are agreed 
between a developing country Party and the international entity or entities referred to in 
Article 11, in accordance with that Article. The implementation of these commitments shall 
take into account the need for adequacy and predictability in the flow of funds and the 
importance of appropriate burden sharing among the developed country Parties. 
 
4. The developed country Parties and other developed Parties included in Annex II shall also 
assist the developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of 
climate change in meeting costs of adaptation to those adverse effects. 
 
5. The developed country Parties and other developed Parties included in Annex II shall take 
all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or 
access to, environmentally sound technologies and know-how to other Parties, particularly 
developing country Parties, to enable them to implement the provisions of the Convention. In 
this process, the developed country Parties shall support the development and 
enhancement of endogenous capacities and technologies of developing country Parties. 
Other Parties and organizations in a position to do so may also assist in facilitating the 
transfer of such technologies. 
 
6. In the implementation of their commitments under paragraph 2 above, a certain degree of 
flexibility shall be allowed by the Conference of the Parties to the Parties included in Annex I 
undergoing the process of transition to a market economy, in order to enhance the ability of 
these Parties to address climate change, including with regard to the historical level of 
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol 
chosen as a reference. 
 
7. The extent to which developing country Parties will effectively implement their 
commitments under the Convention will depend on the effective implementation by 
developed country Parties of their commitments under the Convention related to financial 
resources and transfer of technology and will take fully into account that economic and 
social development and poverty eradication are the first and overriding priorities of the 
developing country Parties. 
 
8. In the implementation of the commitments in this Article, the Parties shall give full 
consideration to what actions are necessary under the Convention, including actions related 
to funding, insurance and the transfer of technology, to meet the specific needs and 
concerns of developing country Parties arising from the adverse effects of climate change 
and/or the impact of the implementation of response measures, especially on: 
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(a) Small island countries; 
 
(b) Countries with low-lying coastal areas; 
 
(c) Countries with arid and semi-arid areas, forested areas and areas liable to forest 
decay; 
 
(d) Countries with areas prone to natural disasters; 
 
(e) Countries with areas liable to drought and desertification; 
 
(f) Countries with areas of high urban atmospheric pollution; 
 
(g) Countries with areas with fragile ecosystems, including mountainous 
ecosystems; 
 
(h) Countries whose economies are highly dependent on income generated from the 
production, processing and export, and/or on consumption of fossil fuels and 
associated energy-intensive products; and 
 
(i) Landlocked and transit countries. Further, the Conference of the Parties may take 
actions, as appropriate, with respect to this paragraph. 
 
9. The Parties shall take full account of the specific needs and special situations of the least 
developed countries in their actions with regard to funding and transfer of technology. 
 
10. The Parties shall, in accordance with Article 10, take into consideration in the 
implementation of the commitments of the Convention the situation of Parties,   particularly 
developing country Parties, with economies that are vulnerable to the adverse effects of the 
implementation of measures to respond to climate change. This applies notably to Parties 
with economies that are highly dependent on income generated from the production, 
processing and export, and/or consumption of fossil fuels and associated energy-intensive 
products and/or the use of fossil fuels for which such Parties have serious difficulties in 
switching to alternatives. 
 
 
 
ii. THE COMMITMENTS OF THE PARTIES UNDER THE KYOTO PTOTOCOL 
 
 
Article 2 
 
1. Each Party included in Annex I, in achieving its quantified emission limitation and 
reduction commitments under Article 3, in order to promote sustainable development,  shall: 
 
(a) Implement and/or further elaborate policies and measures in accordance with its national 
circumstances, such as: 
 
(i) Enhancement of energy efficiency in relevant sectors of the national economy; 
 
(ii) Protection and enhancement of sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases not 
controlled by the Montreal Protocol, taking into account its commitments under 
relevant international environmental agreements; promotion of sustainable 
forest management practices, afforestation and reforestation;  
 
 
(iii) (iii) Promotion of sustainable forms of agriculture in light of climate change 
considerations; 
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(iv) (iv) Research on, and promotion, development and increased use of, new and 
renewable forms of energy, of carbon dioxide sequestration technologies and of 
advanced and innovative environmentally sound technologies; 
 
(v) Progressive reduction or phasing out of market imperfections, fiscal incentives, 
tax and duty exemptions and subsidies in all greenhouse gas emitting sectors 
that run counter to the objective of the Convention and application of market 
instruments; 
 
 
(vi) Encouragement of appropriate reforms in relevant sectors aimed at promoting 
policies and measures which limit or reduce emissions of greenhouse gases not 
controlled by the Montreal Protocol; 
 
(vii) Measures to limit and/or reduce emissions of greenhouse gases not controlled 
by the Montreal Protocol in the transport sector; (viii) Limitation and/or reduction 
of methane emissions through recovery and use in waste management, as well 
as in the production, transport and distribution of energy; 
 
(b) Cooperate with other such Parties to enhance the individual and combined effectiveness 
of their policies and measures adopted under this Article, pursuant to Article 4, paragraph 2 
(e) (i), of the Convention. To this end, these Parties shall take steps to share their 
experience and exchange information on such policies and measures, including developing 
ways of improving their comparability, transparency and effectiveness. The Conference of 
the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall, at its first session or 
as soon as practicable thereafter, consider ways to facilitate such cooperation, taking into 
account all relevant information. 
 
2. The Parties included in Annex I shall pursue limitation or reduction of emissions of 
greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol from aviation and marine bunker 
fuels, working through the International Civil Aviation Organization and the International 
Maritime Organization, respectively. 
 
iii. The Parties included in Annex I shall strive to implement policies and  
measures under this Article in such a way as to minimize adverse effects, including the 
adverse effects of climate change, effects on international trade, and social, environmental 
and economic impacts on other Parties, especially developing country Parties and in 
particular those identified in Article 4, paragraphs 8 and 9, of the Convention, taking into 
account Article 3 of the Convention. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of 
the Parties to this Protocol may take further action, as appropriate, to promote the 
implementation of the provisions of this paragraph. 
 
iv. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol, if it 
decides that it would be beneficial to coordinate any of the policies and measures in 
paragraph 1 (a) above, taking into account different national circumstances and potential 
effects, shall consider ways and means to elaborate the coordination of such policies and 
measures. 
 
 
Article 3 
 
1. The Parties included in Annex I shall, individually or jointly, ensure that their 
aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions of the greenhouse gases 
listed in Annex A do not exceed their assigned amounts, calculated pursuant to their 
quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments inscribed in Annex B and in 
accordance with the provisions of this Article, with a view to reducing their overall emissions 
of such gases by at least 5 per cent below 1990 levels in the commitment period 2008 to 
2012. 
 
2. Each Party included in Annex I shall, by 2005, have made demonstrable progress in 
achieving its commitments under this Protocol. 
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3. The net changes in greenhouse gas emissions by sources and removals by sinks 
resulting from direct human-induced land-use change and forestry activities, limited to 
afforestation, reforestation and deforestation since 1990, measured as verifiable changes in 
carbon stocks in each commitment period, shall be used to meet the commitments under 
this Article of each Party included in Annex I. The greenhouse gas emissions by sources 
and removals by sinks associated with those activities shall be reported in a transparent and 
verifiable manner and reviewed in accordance with Articles 7 and 8. 
 
4. Prior to the first session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of 
the Parties to this Protocol, each Party included in Annex I shall provide, for consideration by 
the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice, data to establish its level of 
carbon stocks in 1990 and to enable an estimate to be made of its changes in carbon stocks 
in subsequent years. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to 
this Protocol shall, at its first session or as soon as practicable thereafter, decide upon 
modalities, rules and guidelines as to how, and which, additional human-induced activities 
related to changes in greenhouse gas emissions by sources and removals by sinks in the 
agricultural soils and the land-use change and forestry categories shall be added to, or 
subtracted from, the assigned amounts for Parties included in Annex I, taking into account 
uncertainties, transparency in reporting, verifiability, the methodological work of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the advice provided by the Subsidiary Body for 
Scientific and Technological Advice in accordance with Article 5 and the decisions of the 
Conference of the Parties. Such a decision shall apply in the second and subsequent 
commitment periods. A Party may choose to apply such a decision on these additional 
human-induced activities for its first commitment period, provided that these activities have 
taken place since 1990. 
 
5. The Parties included in Annex I undergoing the process of transition to a market 
economy whose base year or period was established pursuant to decision 9/CP.2 of the 
Conference of the Parties at its second session shall use that base year or period for the 
implementation of their commitments under this Article. Any other Party included in Annex I 
undergoing the process of transition to a market economy which has not yet submitted its 
first national communication under Article 12 of the Convention may also notify the 
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol that it intends 
to use an historical base year or period other than 1990 for the implementation of its 
commitments under this Article. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the 
Parties to this Protocol shall decide on the acceptance of such notification. 
 
6. Taking into account Article 4, paragraph 6, of the Convention, in the implementation 
of their commitments under this Protocol other than those under this Article, a certain degree 
of flexibility shall be allowed by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the 
Parties to this Protocol to the Parties included in Annex I undergoing the process of 
transition to a market economy. 
 
7. In the first quantified emission limitation and reduction commitment period, from 2008 to 
2012, the assigned amount for each Party included in Annex I shall be equal to the 
percentage inscribed for it in Annex B of its aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide 
equivalent emissions of the greenhouse gases listed in Annex A in 1990, or the base year or 
period determined in accordance with paragraph 5 above, multiplied by five. Those Parties 
included in Annex I for whom land-use change and forestry constituted a net source of 
greenhouse gas emissions in 1990 shall include in their 1990 emissions base year or period 
the aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions by sources minus 
removals by sinks in 1990 from land-use 
change for the purposes of calculating their assigned amount. 
 
8. Any Party included in Annex I may use 1995 as its base year for 
hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride, for the purposes of the 
calculation referred to in paragraph 7 above. 
 
9. Commitments for subsequent periods for Parties included in Annex I shall be 
established in amendments to Annex B to this Protocol, which shall be adopted in 
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accordance with the provisions of Article 21, paragraph 7. The Conference of the Parties 
serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall initiate the consideration of such 
commitments at least seven years before the end of the first commitment period referred to 
in paragraph 1 above. 
 
10. Any emission reduction units, or any part of an assigned amount, which a Party 
acquires from another Party in accordance with the provisions of Article 6 or of Article 17 
shall be added to the assigned amount for the acquiring Party. 
 
11. Any emission reduction units, or any part of an assigned amount, which a Party 
transfers to another Party in accordance with the provisions of Article 6 or of Article 17 shall 
be subtracted from the assigned amount for the transferring Party.  
 
12. Any certified emission reductions which a Party acquires from another Party in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 12 shall be added to the assigned amount for the 
acquiring Party. 
 
13.  f the emissions of a Party included in Annex I in a commitment period are less than 
its assigned amount under this Article, this difference shall, on request of that Party, be 
added to the assigned amount for that Party for subsequent commitment periods. 
 
14. Each Party included in Annex I shall strive to implement the commitments 
mentioned in paragraph 1 above in such a way as to minimize adverse social, environmental 
and economic impacts on developing country Parties, particularly those identified in Article 
4, paragraphs 8 and 9, of the Convention. In line with relevant decisions of the Conference 
of the Parties on the implementation of those paragraphs, the Conference of the Parties 
serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall, at its first session, consider what 
actions are necessary to minimize the adverse effects of climate change and/or the impacts 
of response measures on Parties referred to in those paragraphs. Among the issues to be 
considered shall be the establishment of funding, insurance and transfer of technology. 
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APPENDIX V 
THE LISTS OF CLIMATE-FRIENDLY GOODS AND SERVICES AND 
TECHNOLOGY TABLED BEFORE THE DOHA NEGOTIATIONS 
 
[Source: World Bank, International Trade and Climate Change –Economic, Legal and 
Institutional Perspectives, (The World bank, 2008), pp 111-112] 
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APPENDIX VI 
 
COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE WTO SECRETARIAT STAFF ON THE 
NEGOTIATING HISTORY OF GPA ARTICLES III AND XXIII 
 
From: Garba Malumfashi <gmalumfashi@yahoo.co.uk> 
To: "Anderson, Robert"
994
 <Robert.Anderson@wto.org>  
 
Dear Mr Anderson, 
 
Best greetings to you. I'm writing to remind you of my inquiry, as fowarded to you 
earlier by Andrea, regarding aspects of the negotiation history of GPA Article III 
(especially why it does not use the term "like") and Article XXIII (on why it does not 
have an equivalent of GATT Article XX(g)). I foresee you having very busy 
schedules. I'm however still hopeful that you will squeeze a few moments for me on 
this.  
 
Kind regards 
 
Garba 
 GI Malumfashi 
PhD Research Fellow (PTDF, Nigeria/NCCR-WTI, University of Bern, Switzerland) 
(The Global Regimes for Climate Change, Energy and Trade) 
Centre for Energy, Petroleum and Mineral Law and Policy (CEPMLP)  
University of Dundee 
United Kingdom  
(0044 7828 797848 -mobile) 
----- Forwarded Message ---- 
From: "Mastromatteo, Andrea" <Andrea.Mastromatteo@wto.org> 
To: Garba Malumfashi <gmalumfashi@yahoo.co.uk> 
Cc: "Anderson, Robert" <Robert.Anderson@wto.org>; "Boyle, Cathy" 
<Cathy.Boyle@wto.org> 
Sent: Thursday, 28 May, 2009 9:20:41 
Subject: RE: the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraftt 
Dear Garba, 
  
I am forwarding your inquiry to Robert Anderson, who is the Secretary to the Committee on 
Government Procurement.  He may be able to respond to your questions. 
  
Best regards, 
Andrea Mastromatteo 
Rules Division  
World Trade Organization 
154 rue de Lausanne 
1211 Geneva 21 
Switzerland 
 email : andrea.mastromatteo@wto.org  
 office : +41-22-739-6860 
 fax : +41-22-739-5909 
 
                                                        
994
 Robert Anderson was the Secretary to the WTO Committee on Government Procurement (CGP) as at 
the time of this communication. Mr Anderson never acknowledged or, in any way, responded to any of 
these emails. 
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-----Original Message----- 
From: Garba Malumfashi [mailto:gmalumfashi@yahoo.co.uk]  
Sent: 28 May 2009 04:05 
To: Mastromatteo, Andrea 
Subject: Fw: the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraftt 
Dear Andrea, 
 
Greetings to you. It is Garba again. This time it is request for guidance for sources 
of information on the negotiating history of the GPA 1994.  
 
For instance, I'm curious about why Article III of the the GPA on non-
discrimination did not use the term "like" in probiting discriminatory procurement 
practices for products or services. Similarly, Article XXIII on general exceptions did 
not include measures taken for "conservation of exhaustible natural resources", 
namely the equivalent of GATT Article XX (g).  
 
These are some of the issues I'm currently addressing in my PhD. I thought I could 
find some guidance from the negotiating history of these provisions.  
 
I'm confident this information is available on the WTO website, otherwise on some 
printed form. However, as yet, I'm unable to lay my hands on anything in this 
regard. Even the "Reshaping the World Trading System -The History of the Uruguay 
Round" by John Croom, does not say much on this. 
 
Kindly oblige. 
 
Best. 
 
Garba 
 GI Malumfashi 
 
----- Forwarded Message ---- 
From: Garba Malumfashi <gmalumfashi@yahoo.co.uk> 
To: "Mastromatteo, Andrea" <Andrea.Mastromatteo@wto.org> 
Cc: Susan Brown <susan.brown@wti.org> 
Sent: Monday, 30 March, 2009 18:17:29 
Subject: Re: the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft 
Dear Andrea, 
 
I'm very grateful indeed! 
 
Best wishes. 
 
Garba 
 
 
From: "Mastromatteo, Andrea" <Andrea.Mastromatteo@wto.org> 
To: Garba Malumfashi <gmalumfashi@yahoo.co.uk> 
Sent: Monday, 30 March, 2009 16:31:26 
Subject: RE: the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircrafts 
 
Dear Garba, 
 
I can confirm that the TCA Agreement is still operational.  There are 30 Signatories: Canada, 
the European Communities(with the following 20 EC Member States Signatories in their own 
right: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden 
and the United Kingdom), Egypt, Georgia, Japan, Macao China, Norway, Switzerland,  
Chinese Taipei and the United States. WTO Members with observer status are: Argentina, 
Australia, Bangladesh, Brazil, Cameroon, China, Colombia, Gabon, Ghana, India, Indonesia, 
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Israel, the Republic of Korea, Mauritius, Nigeria, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia and Turkey.  In addition the Russian Federation is also an 
observer.  The IMF and UNCTAD sare also observers.  
 
I hope this helps. 
 
Best regards, 
 
Andrea Mastromatteo 
Rules Division  
World Trade Organization 
154 rue de Lausanne 
1211 Geneva 21 
Switzerland 
email : andrea.mastromatteo@wto.org  
office : +41-22-739-6860 
fax : +41-22-739-5909 
 
 
-----Original Message----- 
From: Garba Malumfashi [mailto:gmalumfashi@yahoo.co.uk]  
Sent: 30 March 2009 10:48 
To: Mastromatteo, Andrea 
Subject: Fw: the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircrafts 
 
 
Dear Andrea, 
 
My name is Garba, now about concluding my PhD programme on interaction of green 
government procurement policies, climate change and the GPA. I sent an enquiry to your 
colleague, Mireille, but she advised that you would be in a better position to assist me. You 
sure will be very busy, but kindly see it below and assist if possible. 
 
Kind regds. 
 
garba 
 
----- Forwarded Message ---- 
From: Garba Malumfashi <gmalumfashi@yahoo.co.uk> 
To: mireille.cossy@wto.org 
Sent: Sunday, 29 March, 2009 2:54:13 
Subject: the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircrafts 
 
 
Dear Mireille, 
 
Best greetings to you, again. I just want ot ask if you have any official information as to the 
current status of the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft, one of the 4 plurilateral 
agreements. I know of the expiration of the Dairy and bovine meat agreements. I was 
informed informally that the only functional of the 4 is the GPA (which, as you know, is the 
subject-matter of my PhD). I have a statement somewhere in the thesis on the status of all 
the other plurilateral agreements.  
 
Thanks for your help in advance. 
 
Garba. 
 
 
----- Forwarded Message ---- 
From: Garba Malumfashi <gmalumfashi@yahoo.co.uk> 
To: mireille.cossy@wto.org 
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Sent: Thursday, 19 February, 2009 21:18:04 
Subject: thanks a lot 
 
 
Dear Mireille, 
 
This is Garba, Melaku's student from CEPMLP, Dundee. Just to say thanks a lot once again 
for your talk to us, last week, on Energy and WTO. It was indeed a very exciting and 
comprehensiveness talk. And I said to you after the talk, I had wished to hear you talk of 
climate change and its impact on WTO also as part of the issues raising the profile of energy 
in the WTO. However, as you said there was not time to touch on everything.  
 
Just to tell you, my PhD research currently is on interrelationship of (green) government 
procurement, climate change and the WTO GPA. I'm in my last yr now hoping to conclude 
by July latest. I'm also still with WTI as research fellow. 
 
Hope we have another opportunity to see again. 
 
Best. 
 
Garba 
  
308
 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
309
 
PRIMARY SOURCES 
 
International Conventions/Declarations 
 
Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and  
 their Disposal 1989 (entered into force 1992) 
 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity 1992 Convention  
 on Biological Diversity signed in 2000, entered into force on 11 September 2003  
 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)  
 Signed at Washington, D.C., on 3 March 1973, and [entered in force on 1 July 1975]  
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 10 
 Dec. 1997, 37 I.L.M. 32 (1998), (entered into force: February 14, 2005) 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montreal Protocol to the  
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, adopted on 22 March 
1985), (as either adjusted and/or amended in London 1990 Copenhagen 1992, 
Vienna 1995 Montreal 1997 Beijing 1999)  
 
Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Rio De Janeiro,  
3-14 June 1992) Annex I: Rio Declaration On Environment And Development 
(A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I) (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
(DESA): 12 August 1992) 
Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common 
 Future, 1978, and UNGA Res. 44/228 of December 22, 1989. 
UN, Johannesburg WSSD Plan of Implementation, 2000 Chapter III.19(c), the UN  
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Division of Sustainable Development  
UN, Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 5-16  
 June 1972 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.73.II.A.14 and corrigendum),  
 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 9 May 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849  
 (1992)  (entered into force 21 Mar. 1994 
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer 1985 (entered into force 1988);  
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer 1987 (Entered into 
force 89) 
 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Done at Vienna on 23 May 1969 (Entered  
into force on 27 January 1980). United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 331  
World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future, 1978 and  
 UNGA  Res. 44/228 of December22, 1989. 
 
 
WTO/GATT Legal Texts 
 
WTO, GATT Agreement on Government Procurement opened for signature at Geneva 
 12th day of April 1979, came into force in 1981. 
 
WTO, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994,  
Legal Instruments- Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31, 1915 U.N.T.S. 103, 
available at the WTO website: http://www.wto.org/English/docs_e/legal_e/04-
wto.pdf>.  
 
WTO, Agreement on Government Procurement, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement  
  
310
 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 4B, Art. III, Legal Instruments- 
Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31, 1915 U.N.T.S. 103. 
 
WTO, Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement), Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, Legal Instruments- 
Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31, 1915 U.N.T.S. 103, available at the WTO 
website: http://www.wto.org/English/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto.pdf> 
  
WTO, Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS  
Agreement), Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 
15, 1994, Legal Instruments- Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31, 1915 U.N.T.S. 
103, available at the WTO website: http://www.wto.org/English/docs_e/legal_e/04-
wto.pdf> 
 
WTO, General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1B,  
Legal Instruments– Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1167, 1183 
(1994) 
 
 
WTO/GATT Dispute Settlement (Panel/Appelllate Body) Reports 
 
WTO Reports 
Argentina – Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides and Import of Finished Leather,  
WT/DS155/R and Corr.1, Panel Report, adopted 16 February 2001, DSR 2001:V, 
1779. 
Argentina– Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear Report of the Panel WT/DS121/R  
 25 June 1999 
 
Argentina – Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear Ab-1999-7 Report of the Appellate  
 Body WT/DS121/AB/R 14 December 1999 
 
Brazil – Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut, Appellate Body Report, WT/DS22/AB/R,  
 adopted 20 March 1997, DSR 1997:I 
Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres Report of the Panel WT/DS332/R  
 (12 June 2007)/ [as modified by AB:] WT/DS332/AB/R, adopted 17 December 2007. 
Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft – Recourse by Canada to Article 21.5 of  
 the DSU. Appellate Body Report adopted on 4 August 2000, WT/DS46/AB/RW 
Canada - Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals AB-1997-2 Report of the Appellate Body  
 (WT/DS31/AB/R)  
Chile – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS87/AB/R and WT/DS110/AB/R  
 (adopted 12 January 2000).  
 
EC Bananas III, AB Report EC- Report for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of  
 Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R (adopted 25 September, 1997) 
European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing 
 Products. Doc. no. WT/DS135/AB/R (5 April 2000). 
 
European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas  (EC  
 – Bananas III), (WT/DS27/AB/R) 
 
European Communities-Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech  
 Products WT DS291-293/Interim Panel Report: (7 February 2006) 
Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R; WT/DS10/AB/R and 
 WT/DS11/AB/R 4 October 1996 (Adopted November 1, 1996)  
  
311
 
Korea - Measures Affecting Government Procurement, Panel Report, Korea – WT/DS163/R,  
 Adopted on 19 June 2000.  
 
Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and other Beverages, WT/DS380/R 7 October 2005 
 
Thailand – Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes (Panel Report),  
 Adopted 20 February 1990, BISD 37S/200 
 
Turkey – Restrictions On Imports Of Textile And Clothing Products, Report of the Appellate  
 Body WT/DS34/AB/R 22 October 1999.  
 
United States – Section 337 of the Tariff Act of, Adopted 7 November 1989, BISD  
 36S/3451930. 
 
United States – Measures Affecting The Cross-Border Supply Of Gambling And Betting  
 Services Report of the Appellate Body WT/DS285/AB/R  
United States – Imports of Sugar from Nicaragua (1984) and US – Cuban Liberty and    
 Democratic Solidarity Act (Helms–Burton Act) (1996). 
United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc.  
 WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 8, 1998) 
United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline [adopted  20 May  
 1996, WT/DS2/AB/R, para. 30] 
United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc. 
 WT/DS58/AB/R 
United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
 WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998, DSR 1998:VII, 2755. 
 
 
GATT Reports 
 
Belgian Family Allowances (Allocations Familiales) Panel Report, adopted by the 
 CONTRACTING PARTIES  on 7 November 1952 (G/32 - 1S/59) 
 
Canada - Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon Report of the 
 Panel adopted on 22 March 1988 (L/6268 - 35S/98) 
 
 Canada — Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act, Report of the Panel 
 adopted 7 February 1984, BISD 30S/140 
 
Korea – Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products, WT/DS98/AB/R,  
 Appellate Body Report, adopted 12 January 2000 
Norway – Procurement of Toll Collection Equipment for the City of Trondheim, GATT 
 Panel Report, GPR.DS2/R, adopted on 13 May 1992.  
United States - Imports of Certain Automotive Spring Assemblies, Panel Report , BISD 
 30S/107, para. 56;  adopted on 26 May 1983 
United States - Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages Report of the Panel  
 adopted on 19 June 1992 (DS23/R - 39S/206).  
 
United States - Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from Canada Report of the  
 Panel adopted on 22 February 1982 (L/5198 - 29S/91) 
United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, derestricted 29 November 1991  (reprinted  
 in International Legal Materials (1991) (Unadopted). 
 
United States–Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, L/6175, GATT  
 Panel Report, adopted 17 June 1987, BISD 34S/136. 
  
312
 
 
United States–Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, L/6175, GATT  
 Panel Report,  adopted 17 June 1987, BISD 34S/136. 
 
 
GATT/WTO Official Documents 
 
GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting Held in Geneva  9 November 1971, C/M/74 at 4 (Nov.  
 17, 1971)  
 
GATT Multilateral Trade Negotiations Group on "Non-Tariff Measures" Government 
 Procurement (Note by the Secretariat) (MTN/NTM/W/16) (5 August 1975) 
 
GATT, Multilateral Trade Negotiations Group "Non-ariff Measures" Sub-Group "Government  
 Procurement" Meeting of March 1977 (MTN/NTM/29) (9 march 1977) 
 
GATT Multilateral Trade Negotiations Group "Non-ariff Measures" Sub-Group "Government  
Procurement", Draft Integrated Text For Negotiation On Government Procurement 
Note by the Secretariat (MTN/NTM/W/133/Rev.1) 
 
GATT, Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller   
Participation of the Developing Countries (The Enabling Clause) GATT Document, 
L/4903, BISD 26S/203. 
 
GATT, Industrial Pollution Control And International Trade -Note by the GATT Secretariat  
(GATT L/3538, 9 June 1971), available at:  
http://gatt.stanford.edu/bin/search/simple/process?offset=0&length=10&query=Indus
trial+Pollution+Control+and+International+Trade&search=Search. 
 
GATT, Trade and Environment Factual Note by the Secretariat, (L/6896 18 September  
 1991) 
 
WTO, General Interpretative Note to Annex 1A, Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods,  
of the WTO Agreement, The Legal  Texts: The Result of the Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations 
WTO, Matrix on Trade Measures Pursuant to Selected Multilateral Environmental  
Agreements,” (2007 Revision) WT/CTE/W/160/Rev.4 TN/TE/S/5/Rev.2, 14 March 
2007   
 
WTO, Ministerial Decision on Trade and Environment (WTO Document G/C/W/432/Rev.1,  
 24 February 2003) 
 
 
European Communities Legal Texts and Official Documents 
Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Directive of the European   
Parliament and of the CounciL on the promotion of the use of energy from 
renewable sources (Brussels, 23.01.2008 COM(2008) final)  
 
Directive 2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004  
coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, 
transport and postal services sectors, OJEU  2004 
 
Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on  
the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply 
contracts and public service contracts, in OJEU, 2004. 
 
Directive 2003/30/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 May 2003 on the  
  
313
 
promotion of the use of biofuels or other renewable fuels for transport.  Official 
Journal of the European Union 17.5.2003. 
 
EC, Interpretative communication of the Commission on the Community law applicable to  
public procurement and the possibilities for integrating environmental considerations 
into public procurement (2001/C 333/07) (Text with EEA relevance) (COM(2001) 
274 final)]  
 
EC Case Law 
 
Case C- 379/98 PreussenElektra AG v. Schleswag AG [20010 ECR 1- 209, 
 
Case c-448/01, Evn ag and Wienstrom Gmbh v. Austria/Stadtwerke Klagenfurt AG ECJ (4  
 December 2003)  
Case C-513/99 Concordia Bus Finland Oy Ab v Helsingin kaupunki and HKL-
 Bussiliikenne Judgment of the Court of Justice (17 September 2002)  
 
SECONDARY SOURCES 
 
OECD/IEA Official Documents and specialised research reports 
 
IEA, Dealing with Climate change: Policies and Measures in EIA Countries, (2001 
 Edition), 11 (OECD/IEA, 2001). 
 
IEA, Energy Security and Climate Change –Assessing Interactions, (OECD/IEA,  2007) 
 
IEA, How the Energy Sector can deliver on a climate agreement at Copenhagen, in World  
 Energy Outlook 2009 (Climate Change Excerpt)  (IEA/OECD, 2009) 
OECD (Marron, D.), Greener Public Purchasing as an Environmental Policy Instrument, in 
 Journal of Budgeting, Vol. 3, No. 4 (OECD, 2003)  
 
OECD, Council Recommendation Improving The Environmental Performance of 
 Governments (C(96)39/FINAL) (undated) 
OECD Environmental Strategy for the First Decade of the 21st Century, adopted by OECD 
 Environment Ministers in May 2001. 
OECD, Environmental Performance of Public Procurement: Issues of Policy Coherence,  
 (Johnstone, N., OECD, 2003), 
OECD, Greener Public Purchasing: Issues and Practical Solutions: (Paris, 2000) 
OECD, Trade and Environment Working Paper 2007-02 [Part I] (OECD 
 COM/ENV/TD(2006)48/FINAL) 
OECD, Trade Issues in the Greening of Public Purchasing, 
  OECD/TD/ENVIRONMENT(97)/111/FINAL, (Paris, 1999)  
OECD, Draft Instrument on Government Purchasing Policies, Procedures and Practices, 
1973 
 
OECD, EC Green Paper Public Procurement in the European Union: Exploring the Way  
 Forward, (Communication adopted by the Commission on 27th November 1996) 
OECD, Report on Trade and Environment to the 1999 OECD Ministerial Council  Meeting  
 (C/MIN(99)14) 
 
OECD/IEA, World Energy Outlook 2007- China and India Insights 
 
  
314
 
OECD/IEA World Energy Outlook 2008 
 
OECD/IEA World Energy Outlook 2009 
 
 
Books/Articles 
 
Arrowsmith, S., Government Procurement in the WTO, (Kluwer Law International, The  
 Hague,  The Netherlands, 2003) 
Arrowsmith, S., Transparency in Government Procurement: The Objectives of Regulation  
and the Boundaries of the World Trade Organization, Journal of World Trade 37(2): 
2003 (283–303) 
Arrowsmith, S. and Kunzlik, P. (Eds,) Social and Environmental Policies in EC Procurement  
 Law -New Directives and New Directions (Cambridge, United Kingdom, 2009) 
 
Arrowsmith, S., Linarelli, J. and Wallace.J. D., Regulating Public Procurement: National and  
International Perspectives (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, London. Boston 
2000). 
 
Assunção, L., and Zhang, Z., Domestic Climate Change Policies and the WTO, (UNCTAD  
 Discussion Paper series, No. 164, November 2002) 
 
Aldy, J. E., and Pizer, W. A., The Competitiveness Impacts of Climate Change Mitigation  
Policies, (Resources for the Future Prepared for the Pew Center on Global Climate 
Change, 2009) 
Baron, R. and Philibert, C., Act Locally, Trade Globally, (OECD/IEA, 2005) 
Barton H. Thompson, Jr.; Jennifer Coyle, Trade Issues In Sustainable Tourism Certification:  
an Examination of the Constraints Imposed by International Trade Rules and 
Organizations’s (NAFTA, WTO, ECT), Barriers to Trade,” 4 (Centre on Ecotourism 
and Sustainable Development, the International Ecotourism Society, 2005). 
 
Bhandarkar, M., and Alvarez-Rivero, T., From supply chains to value chains: a spotlight on  
CSR, in O’Connor, D. and Kjollerstrom, M. (eds.), Industrial Development for the 
21st Century, (Zed Books, London, United Kingdome, 2008), p. 391 
 
Blank, A. and Marceau, A History of Multilateral Negotiations on Procurement: From ITO to  
WTO, in Hoekman, B.m. and Mavroidis, P. (eds.), Law and Policy in Public 
Purchasing –The WTO Agreement on Government Procurement, (The University of 
Michigan Press, 1997). 
 
Bernasconi-Osterwalder, N., (et al), Environment and Trade: A Guide to WTO Jurisprudence  
 (Earthscan Ltd,  London, United Kingdom, 2005) 
 
Bernstein, S. and Hannah, E., Non-Satet global standard setting and the WTO: Legitimimcy  
and the need for regulatory space, Journal of Internaitonal Economic Law 
(advanced access published July 19, 2008) 
 
Bodansky, D., .Deconstructing the Precautionary Principle, in Caron, D. D. and Scheiber, H.  
N. (eds.), Bringing New Law to Ocean Waters, (381-91) (Koninklijke Brill N.V. The 
Netherlands © 2004), 
 
Bodansky, D., What's So Bad about Unilateral Action to Protect the Environment? EJIL 2000  
 11 (339)2. 
 
Bolton, P., Protecting the Environment through Public Procurement: The Case of South  
 Africa, Natural Resources Forum 32 (2008) 
 
  
315
 
Botha, H. L.,Burden of Proof in WTO Law - A study of the manner in which the Concept of  
burden of proof has been interpreted and applied by the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Body, Dissertation by to complete the requirements for obtaining the Masters 
Degree in International Law and Economics of the World Trade Institute, University 
of Berne, Switzerland) (2002) 
Brack, D., Grubb, M., and Windram, C., International trade and climate change policies, 
 (London: RIIA Energy and Environment Programme/Earthscan Publications, 1999). 
Brander, L. &  Olsthoorn, X., Three Scenarios for Green Public Procurement, (Institute for  
 Environmental Studies, Amsterdam, The Netherlands December, 2002),  
 
Brody, D. C., Acker, J. R. and Logan, W. A., Criminal Law (First edition), (Aspen  Publishers  
 Inc., Maryland, United States, 2000) 
 
Bowsher, M., The ECJ, transparency, and procurement as an environmental policy: Evn AG  
& Wienstrom GmbH v. Austria (2004) 21(2) International Construction Law Review 
189-196. 
Cameron J., Buck, M., International Trade Law and Green Procurement Initiatives, 
 (IISD, Canada: 1998). 
 
Cameron, P.D., and Zillman, D. (eds.), Kyoto: From Principles to Practice, (Kluwer 
 International, The Hague, The Netherlands, 2001). 
 
Carraro, C. and Egenhofer, C., Bottom-up approaches to climate change control: some  
policy conclusions, in Carraro, C. and Egenhofer, C. (eds.), Climate and Trade 
Policy Bottom-up Approaches Towards Global Agreement, Edward Elgar, 
(Cheltenham, United Kingdom, 2007), pp. 116-120 
 
Charnovitz, S., Belgian Family Allowances and the Challenge of origin-based 
 discrimination, World Trade Review (2005), 4: 1. 7-26 
Charnovitz, S., Exploring the Environmental Exceptions in GATT Art. XX, J. World Trade 37  
 (Oct. 1991). 
 
Charnovitz, S., GATT and the Environment: Examining the Issues, International 
 Environmental Affairs, 4 (3) 1992: 203-33 
 
Charnovitz, S., The Law of Environmental “PPMs” in the WTO: Debunking the Myth of 
 Illegality, 27 Yale J Int’l L (2002) 59-110 
 
Charnovitz, S., Environmental Harmonization and Trade Policy, in  Zaelke, D.,Orbuch, P. 
and Housman, R. F. (eds.), Trade and the environment: law, economics, and policy 
(!sland Press Inc. Washington DC, US, 1994), 267-286 
 
Charnovitz, S., The WTO’S Environmental Progress, Journal of International Economic Law  
 (JIEL), 10.1093/jiel/jgm027, (2007), 1–22 
 
Chaytor, B., Negotiating Further Liberalization of Environmental Goods and Services: An  
 Exploration of the Terms of Art, RECIEL 11 (3) 2002, 287 
 
Cheng, B., General Principles of Law as applied by International Courts and Tribunals,  
 (Stevens and Sons, Ltd, 1953) 
 
Cheyne, I., Trade and the Environment: the Future of Extraterritorial Unilateral Measures  
 after the Shrimp Appellate Body, [2000] 5 Web JCLI 
 http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/2000/issue5/cheyne5.html  
 
 
 
 
  
316
 
Christiansen, A. C., The Role of Flexibility Mechanisms in EU Climate Strategy: Lessons  
Learned and Future Challenges? in International Environmental Agreements: 
Politics, Law and Economics 4: 27–46, (Kluwer Academic Publishers, The 
Netherlands, 2004). 
 
Christopher, T., Using GATT, Art XX to Justify Climate Change Measures in Claims Under 
the WTO Agreements, Environmental and Planning Law Journal, Vol. 27, pp. 346, 
2010, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1676105; 
Clement, S., et al, The Procura+ (Manual: A Guide to Cost-Effective  Sustainable Public 
 Procurement) (2nd edition) (ICLEI European Secretariat, 2007) 
 
Cottier T., From Progressive Liberalization to Progressive Regulation in WTO Law, Journal  
 of International Economic Law, 2006 
 
Cottier, T., et al (eds), International Trade Regulation and the Mitigation of Climate Change,  
 Cambridge University Press, 2010) (forth-coming). 
 
Cottier, T. and Matteotti-Berkutova, S., International Environmental Law and the Evolving  
Concept of Common Concern of Mankind, in T. Cottier et al (eds), International 
Trade Regulation and the Mitigation of Climate Change: World Trade Forum 
(Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
 
Cottier, T., WTO Negotiations on Environmental Goods and Services: A Potential  
 Contribution to the Millennium Development Goals, (UNCTAD, Geneva, 2009) 
 
Curran, C., Green in Europe: how green is public procurement in the European Union? 
 (Society of Chemical Industry, 2002) 
Deborah Murphy (et. al), Furthering EU Objectives on Climate Change and Clean Energy:  
Building partnerships with major developing economies, and Climate Change and 
Foreign Policy: An exploration of options for greater integration, (IISD and Danish 
government under the Climate Change and Foreign Policy Project – Phase II, 2006–
07and 2008) 
 
Desta, M. G., EU Sanitary Standards and the Sub-Saharan African Agricultural Exports: A  
Case Study of the Livestock Sector in East Africa, The Law and Development 
Review (manuscrcipt 1002), 2008.   
 
Deof, J. L., The Death of the trade regime, European Journal of International Law (EJIL)  
 1999 10(4), 733-762. 
Early, J., Green Procurement and Trade Policy, (Background Report for the Commission  
 for Environmental Cooperation, (CEC), Montreal, Canada (undated)),  
Edyburn, D. L., “Scholarly Endeavours: Conducting a Comprehensive Review of the  
 Literature using Digital Resources” (2001) 
 
Eppel, S., Enhancing Markets for Climate Friendly Technologies: Leadership Through 
 Government Purchasing Strategies” (Volume I)  
 
Esty, D., Bridging the Trade-Environment Divide, Journal of Economic Perspectives— 
 Volume 15, Number 3—Summer 2001—Pages 113–130. 
 
Esty, D.C., Greening the GATT, (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics,  
 1994)  
 
The European Environment Agency, et al., The Precautionary Principle in the 20th  
Century: Late Lessons from Early Warnings (Earthscan Ltd, London, United 
Kingdom, 2002) 
 
  
317
 
Evans, A., and Steven, D., A short history of perceptions of climate change, in Climate  
change: the state of the debate, (Centre on International Cooperation: The London 
CO2 Acccord, October, 2007). 
Evenett, S. J., & Hoekmann, B. N., International Cooperation and the Reform of  Public 
 Procurement Policies, (World Bank and CEPR August 2005) 
 
Evenett, S. J., Can Developing Countries Benefit from Negotiations on Transparency in 
 Government Procurement in the Doha Round? 
 
Evenett, S. J. and Hoekman, B. M., Government procurement: market access,  
transparency, and multilateral trade rules, European Journal of Political Economy 
(2004) 
 
Fliess, B., and Kim, J., Business perceptions on Non-Tariff Barriers facing Trade in Selected  
Environmental Goods and associated Services, [OECD Trade and Environment 
Working Paper 2007-02 Part I] (OECD COM/ENV/TD(2006)48/FINAL). 
Freeston, D. and Streck C. (eds.), Legal Aspects of Implementing Kyoto Protocol  
Mechanisms: Making Kyoto Work, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, United 
Kingdom, 2005) 
Green A., and Epps, T., The WTO, Science, and the Environment: Moving Towards  
Consistency, Journal of International Economic Law 10(2), 285–316  
Gregory Shaffer, G., The World Trade Organization under Challenge: Democracy and the  
Law and Politics of the WTO’s Treatment of Trade and Environment Matters, 25 
Harvard Environmental Law Review 1-93 (Winter 2001).  
 
Grimeaud, D. To Design and Implement Climate Change Measures and the Need to Strike  
a Balance Environmental Protection and International Trade law, in Faure, M. with 
Gupta, Joyeeta and Nentjes, A. (eds.) 
 
Guzman, A. T., Global Governance and the WTO, UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper  
 No. 89 (August 2002) 
 
Harris, P. G., Common But Differentiated Responsibility: The Kyoto Protocol and  United 
States Policy, 28 N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal [Volume 7 1999] 
 
Harrison. G., Climate Change Impacts on Renewable Energy, University of Edinburgh,  
 http://www.see.ed.ac.uk/~gph/climate/ 
 
Harrison, J., International Lawç –Significant Environmental Cases 2007- 08, Journal of  
Environmental Law 20:3 [2008], 475 - 481[Advance Access: 7 August 2008]. 
Haoran Pan The economics of Kyoto flexible mechanisms: a survey, (Working Paper Series  
No. 2001-11) (Center for Economic Studies Energy, Transport & Environment, 
Univrsityb of Leuven, 2001). 
Hodas, D. R., Energy, Climate Change and Sustainable Development, in Bradbrook, A. J.  
and Ottinger, R. L. (eds.), Energy Law and Sustainable Development, IUCN 
Environmental Policy and Law Paper No. 47 (Cambridge, UK, 2003) 
Hodas, D. R., Sustainable Development and the Marrakesh Accords, in Bradbrook, A. J., et  
al, (Eds.) (2003) The Law of Energy for Sustainable Development, (IUCN, Gland, 
Switzerland and Cambridge  
Hornbeck, S. K. The Most-Favoured-Nation Clause (German-American most-favored-nation  
relations: arguments against and for the use of the clause: suggestions) AJIL Vol. 3, 
No. 4 (Oct., 1909), pp. 797-827. 
Hossein Razavi, Oil and Gas Financing by the World Bank, Energy Policy, Vol. 23, No. 11  
 (1995) 
  
318
 
 
Howse, R., A New Device for Creating International Legal Normativity: The WTO Technical  
Barriers to Trade Agreement and “International Standards”, in Jeorges, C. and 
Petersmann, E. (eds), Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade Governance and Social 
Regulation, (Portland: Hart, 2006) 383–96. 
 
Howse, R., The Appellate Body Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: A New Legal Baseline for  
the Trade and Environment Debate 27 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 2002, 491 . 
 
Howse, R., World Trade Law and Renewable Energy: The Case of Non-Tariff Measures,  
[Post-Hearing Submission to the International Trade Commission] Renewable 
Energy and International Law Project (May 5, 2005) 
 
Howse, R.,  WTO Disciplines and Biofuels: Opportunities and Constraints in the Creation of  
a Global Marketplace (IPC Discussion Paper October 2006) (IPC and renewable 
energy and international law (reil) Washington, DC USA)   
 
Howse, R. and Regan, D. H., The Product/Process Distinction -An Illusory Basis for 
 Disciplining "Unilateralism" in Trade Policy, (EJIL, 2000 pp. 249-289). 
Hudec, R. E., GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation: Requiem for an “Aim and  
Effects” Test, (Available at: available at: 
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/Arts./hudecrequiem.pdf (undated)  
 
Hudec, R. E., GATT Legal Restraints on the Use of Trade Measures Against Foreign 
Environmental Practices, in Bhagwati, J. and Hudec, R.  E.. (eds.), Fair Trade and 
Harmonization (MIT Press, 1996), 
 
ICLEI (International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives) (Local Governments for 
 Sustainability), Procura+ Manual: A Cost-Effective Sustainable Public Procurement  
 (2nd Edition), (ed. Clement, S.) (ICLEI, Freiburg, Germany, 2007). 
 
Irwin, D. A. and Weiler., J.,Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and  
 Betting Services (DS 285), World Trade Review (2008), 7: 1, 71–113. 
 
IPCC, 2007: Summary for Policymakers. In: Climate Change 2007: The Physical  
Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Solomon, S., D. Qin, M. Manning, 
Z. Chen, M. Marquis, K.B. Averyt, M.Tignor and H.L. Miller (eds.)]. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA 
Irwin, D., Mavroidis, P. C. and Sykes, A’. O., The Genesis of the GATT, (Cambridge 
 University Press, 2008) 
 
Jackson, J. H., The WTO Dispute Settlement System after Ten Years: The First Decade’s  
Promises and Challenges, in Y. Taniguchi, A. Yanovich, and J. Bohanes (eds.), 
TheWTO in the Twenty-First Century: Dispute Settlement, Negotiations, and 
Regionalism in Asia (2007). 
 
Jackson, J. H., in  Davey, W.,  Enforcing World Trade Rules: Essays on WTO  Dispute  
 Settlement and GATT Obligations (Cameron May, 2008)  
 
Jackson, John H., From GATT to the World Trade Organization: Implications for the World  
Trading System, in GATT Uruguay Round, (Thomas Cottier ed.), Institut fur 
Europaund Wirschaftsvolkerrecht, Bern, 1995. 
Jackson, H. J., Comments on Shrimp Turtle and the Product/Process Distinction, 2, EJIL 11, 
 2000, 
 
 
 
  
319
 
 Jackson, J. H., Davey, W. J. and Sykes, A. O., The Legal Problems of International  
Economic Relations: Cases, Materials and Text on the National and International 
Regulation of Transnational Economic Relations (Third Edition) (West Publishing 
Company, 1995) 
 
Jacobs, F. G., Varieties Of Approach To Treaty Interpretation: With Special Reference To 
The Draft Convention On The Law Of Treaties Before The Vienna Diplomatic 
Conference, 18 ICLQ 1969(318-346). 
James R. et al, Non-trade Concerns in WTO Trade Negotiations: Legal and Legitimate  
Reasons for Revising the ‘Box’ System?,” Contributed paper presented at the 
International Conference Agricultural policy reform and the WTO: where are we 
heading? Capri (Italy), June 23-26, 2003 
 
Jones, K., The WTO core agreement, non-trade issues and institutional integrity,  World  
 Trade Review (2002), 1: 3, 257–276.  
Kazazi, M., The Burden of Proof and Related Issues – A Study on Evidence Before  
 International Tribunals (The Hague, Kluwer Law, 1996) 
Kippo-Edlund, P., et al, Measuring the Environmental Soundness of Public Procurement in  
 Nordic Countries, (Nordic Council of Ministers, Copenhagen: 2005) 
 
Kirton, J. J. and Hajnal, P. I., Sustainability, civil society and international governance –  
Local,  North American and Global Contributions, (Ashgate; illustrated edition, 
2006)  
 
Knill, C.,  Environmental Policy, in Peters, B. G., Handbook of Public Policy, London Sage  
 Publ, 2006, 251 http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0657/2005934841-d.html  
Kuzlik, P., Green Procurement” Under the New Regime in Neil, R., and Treumer, S. (eds.),  
The New EU Public Procurement Directives, (Djof Publishing, Copenhagen, 
Denmark, 2005), 117 – 148 
 
Kunzlik, P., International Procurement Regimes and the Scope for the Inclusion of  
Environmental Factors in Public Procurement, published in the OECD Journal on 
Budgeting, Volume 3, No. 4 (OECD, 2003) 
 
Kunzlik, P., Making the Market Work for the Environment: Acceptance of (Some) “Green”  
Contract Award Criteria in Public Procurement, Journal of Environmental Law, Vol. 
15 No. 2 (Oxford University Press, 2003).  
Lai, M. S. and Yu, N., The Current Status of Green Procurement in Taiwan, ROC, Special  
Reports (Environment and Development Foundation, Hsinchu, Taiwan, ROC) 
(undated but estimated 2002) available at: http://proj.moeaidb.gov.tw/isdn/sidn/3-
2/special.htm 
 
Leedy, P.D., Practical Research Planning and Design. Sixth edition. Upper Saddle River, 
 N.J.: Merrill (1997) 
Legault, L., Towards Greener Government Procurement: An Environment Canada Case  
Study, available at http://www.apo-tokyo.org/gp/e_publi/gsc/0305RES_PAPERS.pdf    
 
Levy, P. I., Do we need an undertaker for the Single Undertaking? Considering the angles of  
variable geometry in Evenett, S and Hoekman, B. (Eds.),  Economic Development 
and Multilateral Trade Cooperation, (World Bank Publications, 2006) 
Linarelli, J., The WTO Agreement On Government Procurement and the UNCITRAL Model  
Procurement Law: A View from Outside the Region, in Asian Journal of WTO and 
International Health Law and Policy (AJWH)VOL. 1:317.. (61-84). 
 
  
320
 
Lowrey, Craig, Emissions Trading: Europe’s Emissions Trading Scheme, One year On, in 
 Energy World, January, 2006. 
Lyster, R., The Implications of Electricity Restructuring for a sustainable Energy Framework:  
What’s Law Got to Do with It?, in Bradbrook, A. J., (et al) (eds.), The Law of Energy 
and Sustainable Development, IUCN Academy of Environmental Law Research 
Studies, (Cambridge university Press, New York, 2005) 
Macrory, P. F. J., Appleton, A. E. and Plummer, M. G., The World Trade Organization:  
 Legal,  Economic and Political Analysis: Vol 1-3 (Springer, 2005), 1129. 
Malumfashi, G.I., Procurement Policies, Kyoto Compliance and the WTO Agreement on  
Government Procurement: The Case of the EU Green Electricity Procurement and 
the PPMs Debate, in International Trade Regulation and the Mitigation of Climate 
Change, (Bigdeli/Cottier/Nartova (eds.), Cambridge University Press (forthcoming 
2009).    
 
Malumfashi, G., State Responsibility in Investment Arbitration: to What Extent Is the State  
Responsible for Contracts Concluded By State Enterprises and Sub-National 
Authorities? Transnational Dispute, Management Vol. 2 - issue 1, January 2005  
 
Marisa, M.,Trade Law Implications of Restricting Participation in The European Union  
Emissions Trading Scheme, Georgetown International Environmental Law Review, 
Spring 2007 
 
Martin, M., Trade Law Implications of Restricting Participation in the European Union  
Emissions Trading Scheme, Georgetown International Environmental Law Review, 
Vol. XIX, Issue 3, Spring, 2007, 
 
Mastny, L., Purchasing Power Harnessing Institutional Procurement for People and the  
 Planet, in Thomas Prugh, (Ed.) (WorldWatch paper 166, July 2003), 
 
Matsushita, M., Shoenbaum, T. J. and Mavroidis, P. C., The World Trade Oraganisation Law  
Practice and Policy, (2nd ed.), The Oxford International Law Library, Oxford, United 
Kingdom, 2006). 
Matthias, B., M., and Verheyen, R., International Trade Law and Climate Change – A  
Positive Way Forward, (FES-Analyse: International Trade Law and Climate Change 
July, 2001) 
McCrudden, C., Buying Social Justice -Equality, Government Procurement & Legal Change,  
 (Oxford University Press, 2007) 
McCrudden, C., International Economic Law and the Pursuit of Human Rights: A Framework  
for Discussion of the legality of “Selective Purchasing” Laws under the WTO 
Agreement on Government Procurement, JIEL, 1993, 3-48. 
 
McCrudden, C., Using public procurement to achieve social outcomes, Natural Resources  
 Forum 28 (2004) 257–267  
 
McCrudden, C. and Gross, S. G., WTO Government Procurement Rules and the Local  
Dynamics of Procurement Policies: A Malaysian Case Study, EJIL (2006), Vol. 17 
No. 1, 151–185. 
 
McRae, D. M. and Thomas, J. C., The Gatt and Multilateral Treaty Making: The Tokyo  
 Round The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 77, No. 1 (Jan., 1983) 
 
Michael B. Gerrard (ed.) Global Climate Change and U.S. Law (Chapter One: Introduction  
and Overview), (American Bar Association: Section of Environment, Energy, and 
Resources, 2007)  
 
  
321
 
Mills, R., U.S. Wins WTO Case on Sea Turtle Conservation  (10/22/2001) Ruling Reaffirms  
WTO Recognition of Environmental Concerns,” Website of the Office of the United 
States Trade Representative (USTR).  
 
Montaguti, E. and Lugard, M., The GATT1994 and other Annex 1A Agreements:  Four  
 Different Relationships? JIEL 2000 3(3):473-484. 
  
Mosoti, V., Reforming the Laws on Public Procurement in the Developing World: The  
 Example of Kenya, ICLQ vol. 54, July 2005, pp 621-650). 
 
Musselli, I., and Zarrilli, S.,” Oil and Gas Services: Market Liberalization and the Ongoing  
GATS Negotiations,” in Journal of International Economic Law 8(2), 551-581 (Oxford 
University Press 2005) 
 
Neftel, A., et al, Simple Station ice core. in T.A. Boden, D.P. Kaiser, R.J. Sepanski,  
and F.W. Stoss (eds.) Trends'93: A Compendium of Data on Global Change. 
ORNL/CDIAC-65. Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center, Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tenn. U.S.A. and Keeling, C.D. and T.P. Whorf. 2006.  
 
Ortino, F., Comment -United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of  
Gambling and Betting Services [Prepared for the ALI Project on the Case Law of the 
WTO], World Trade Review (2008), 7: 1, 115–119; 
 
Ortino, F., Studies in International Trade Law - no. 1: Basic Legal Instruments for the  
Liberalisation of Trade A Comparative Analysis of EC and WTO Law, (Hart 
Publishing, 2004) 
 
Ott, H. E., The Bonn Agreement to the Kyoto Protocol Paving the Way for Ratification, in  
International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 1: 469–476, 
(Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands 2001). 
Palmer, A. and Tarasofsky, R., The Doha Round and Beyond: Towards a lasting relationship  
between the WTO and the international environmental regime, (Chatham House: 
2007)  
 
Parker, R., The Use and Abuse of Trade Leverage to Protect the Global Commons: What  
We Can Learn from the Tuna-Dolphin Conflict, 12 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 1 
(Fall 1999);  
 
Pauwelyn, J., Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to other  
 Rules of International Law, Cambridge University Press, (Cambridge, UK: 2003) 
 
Pauwelun, J., Evidence, Proof and Persuasion in WTO Dispute Settlement Who Bears the  
 Burden? 1 J. Int'l Econ. L. 228 1998 227- 258 
Pawelyn, J., How to Win a World Trade Organisation Dispute based on Non- World  
Trade Organisation Law? (Questions on Jurisdiction and Merits)” 37 JWT (6): 997-
2030, (Kluwer International: The Netherland, 2003) (available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=478021 ) 
 
Pauwelyn, J., Unity and Fragmentation in International Law (Palma Workshop, 20-21 May  
2005) [Introductory Report On The World Trade Organization], available at: 
http://eprints.law.duke.edu/1314/1/unityandfragmentationininternationallaw.pdf 
 
Philip, Bernard M. Hoekman, and Aaditya Matto (Eds.), Development, Trade and the  WTO,  
 Geneva: World Trade Organization, 2002, pp. 417-427 
 
Picciotto, S.,The WTO's Appellate Body: Legal Formalism as a Legitimating of  Global  
 Governance, (Governance, vol. 18, issue 3, summer 2005) 
 
 
  
322
 
Pogany, A., Negotiating a JI Contract: A Project Developers, Perspective, in Freestone, D.,  
and Treck, C., (eds.) Legal Aspects of Implementing the Kyoto Protocol p. 331 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford,: (World Bank) 2005. 
 
Pomeranz, M.,Toward a New International Order in Government Procurement, 11 Law &  
 Pol’y Int’l Bus. (1979) 1263. 
 
ProInno Europe, Guide On Dealing with Innovative Solutions in Public Procurement 10  
 elements of good practice [Commission Staff Working Document Sec (2007)] 
Qin, J. Y., Defining non-discrimination under the law of the world trade organization, Boston  
 University International Law Journal Vol. 23:215-297 [2005] 
 
Quick R., Trade and Climate Change,  available at:  
http://www.iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/ICC/policy/Environment/Presentation%20by%2
0R.%20Quick.ppt#264,8 
Redgwell, C., Non-Compliance Procedures and the Climate Change Convention, in  
Chambers, W. B. (ed.), Inter-linkages _The Kyoto Protocol and the International 
Trade and Investment Regimes, 52-53, (United Nations University Press, 2001) 
 
Regan, D., Further Thoughts on the Role of Regulatory Purpose under Art. III of the GATT:  
 Tribute to Bob Hudec, Journal of World Trade (37(4) 737-760, 2003. 
 
Rotherham, T., The Trade and Environmental Effects of Eco-labels: Assessment and  
 Response, 11 (UNEP, 2005). 
 
Sands, P., ‘Unilateralism’, Values, and International Law, 11 EJIL 291 (2000). 
Santarius, T., et al, Balancing Trade and Environment: an ecological reform in the WTO as a  
Challenge in sustainable Global Governance –What Kind of globalisation is 
sustainable? (Wuppertal Institute for Climate, environment, Energy, Wuppertal, 
Germany, 2004) 
 
Schwartz, W. and Sykes, A. O., The economics of the most favoured nation clause, in  
Bhandari, J. S. and Sykes, A. O. (Eds.), Economic diemensions in international law 
–Comparative and empirical perspectives, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
UK, 1997), pp. 43-79 
 
Schloemann H, Brazil Tyres: Policy Space Confirmed under GATT Article XX, (2008) 12(1)  
 Bridges Monthly, http://www.ictsd.net/i/news/bridges/3141 viewed 10 August 2010 
Schoenbaum, T. J., Free international trade and protection of the environment: irreconcilable  
 conflicts? AJIL, 86 (1992), p. 700-727 
Schoenbaum, T.J., International Trade and the Protection of the Environment: The 
 Continuing Search for Reconciliation, 91 AJIL 268  1997) 
 
Shaw, S. and Schwartz, R., Trade and Environment in the WTO – State of Play,  Journal of 
 World Trade, Vol. 36, no. 1, February 2002, 129-154 
 
Simester, A. P. and Sullivan and G. R., Criminal Law – Theory and Doctrine, (Second 
 edition, revised 2004) (Hart Publishing, Oxford, United Kingdom, 2003 
Simula, M., Public Procurement Policies for Forest Products and their Impacts, (Draft  
Discussion Paper) (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, August 
8, 2006)  
Strauss, A. L., From Gattzilla to the Green Giant: Winning the Environmental Battle for the 
 Soul of the World Trade Organization, 1988 Journal of Int’l Econ. L. Vol. 1 19 
 
 
  
323
 
Streck, C., Joint Implementation: History, Requirement, and Challenge, in Freestone, D. and  
Streck, C. (eds.), Legal Aspects of Implementing the Kyoto Protocol, (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, United Kingdom, 2005). 
  
Suppan, S., U.S. vs. EC Biotech Products Case, WTO Dispute Backgrounder, (Institute for 
 Agriculture and Trade Policy  Trade and Global Governance Program, 2005) 
 
Tarasofsky, R. G., Kyoto Protocol and the WTO, (Energy, Environment and  
 Development Programme), (Chatham House, London, UK, 2005). 
 
Tarasofsky, R., The Kyoto Protocol and WTO, [Chatham House (RIIA), 2005],  
Timothy E. Deal, WTO Rules and Procedures and Their Implication for the Kyoto Protocol (A  
Discussion Paper Prepared by Senior Vice President United States Council for 
International Business, January 2008)  
 
Trachtman, J. P., Decisions of the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization, 
 European Journal of International Law (EJIL) Vol. 16 no .4 [2005]; 
 
Trachtmann, J. P., Decision: GATT Dispute Settlement, 86 AM. J. INT’L. L. 142 (1992) 
 
Trachtman, J. P., International Economic Law Revolution and the Right to  Regulate,  
 (Cameron May (15 Dec 2005)]  
Trachtmann, J., Introduction to the Shrimp-Turtle Case Brief Summary and Analysis of the  
WTO Panel and Appellate Body Decisions at: 
<http://www.iilj.org/courses/documents/Shrimp-Turtlecase.pdf> 
 
Trachtman, J. P., and Porges, A., Robert Hudec and Domestic Regulation: The Resurrection 
 of "Aim and Effects", 37 Journal of World Trade 4 (2003), 783-799 
 
Trebilcock, M. J., and Howse, R., The Regulation of International Trade (3rd Edition),  
 Routledge, Oxon, United Kingdom 2005). 
 
Trepte, P., Public Procurement in the EU: A Practitioner’s Guide (2nd ed.), (Oxford 
 Press, 2007). 
UN Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD), Overview of progress towards  
sustainable development: a review of the implementation of Agenda 21, the 
Programme for the Further Implementation of Agenda 21 and the Johannesburg 
Plan of Implementation Report of the Secretary-General, (CSD Fourteenth session 
1-12 May 2006) 
 
UN, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), World Economic and Social 
Survey 2009: Promoting Development, Saving the Planet (The United Nations 
Secretariat, 2008) 
UNCTAD, An Implementation Guide to the Clean development Mechanism – Putting the  
Marrakech Accords into Practice [by Rosales, J and Pronove, G,], (United Nations, 
New York, 2003) 
UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2010 (WIR 2010), available at:  
 http://www.unctad.org/Templates/WebFlyer.asp?intItemID=5539&lang=1.  
 
UNEP  UNEP Annual Report 2007, available at:  
 http://www.unep.org/PDF/AnnualReport/2007/AnnualReport2007_en_web.pdf 
 
UNEP, Trade-related Measures and Multilateral Environmental Agreements, Economics and  
Trade Branch Division of Technology, Industry and Economics (United Nations 
Environment Programme, 2007). 
 
  
324
 
UNEP/UNFCCC Secretariat, Understanding Climate Change: A Beginner’s Guide to the UN  
 Framework Convention and Its Kyoto Protocol, (Revised July, 2002) 
 
UNEP, Legal Issues Guidebook to the Clean development Mechanism, (UNEP, 2004)   
UNFCCC Secretariat, A Guide to the Climate Change Convention Process Preliminary 2nd  
 Edition), UNFCCC Secretariat, Bonn, 2002. 
Van Asselt, (et al), Greener public purchasing: opportunities for climate-friendly government  
procurement under the WTO and EU rules, in Climate Policy 6 (2006) pp 217-229.  
Van Asselt, H., Green government procurement and the WTO, (Institute for Environmental 
 Studies: 2003) 
Van Calster, G., Procurement and the World Trade Organisation: Purchase power or pester  
power?, in Cottier, T., et al (eds.), International Trade Regulation and the Mitigation 
of Climate Change, Cambridge University Press, 2010) (forth-coming). 
 
Van Calster, G., ECJ cases’ review, ECJ 4 December 2003, Case C-448/01, EVN AG and  
Wienstrom GMBH V. Austria/Stadtwerke klagenfurt AG (then not published in ECR) 
European Case Law Report, October 2003–March 2004 in RECIEL 13 (2) 2004 
 
Van Calster, European Case Law Report, October 2003–March 2004 in RECIEL 13 (2) 2004  
 European Case Law Report 
 
van Calster, G., FaitesVosJeuxçRegulatory Autonomy and theWorld Trade Organisation 
 after BrazilTyres, Journal of Environmental Law 20:1, Advance Access: 11 February  
 2008 [Oxford University Press, 2008]. 
 
Van Calster, G., Green Procurement and the WTO- Shades of Grey, RECIEL 11 (3) 2002. 
Van den Bossche, P., The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organisation: text,  Cases and  
 Materials, (Cambridge University Presss, 2005) 
Van den Bossche, et al, Unilateral Measures Addressing Non-Trade oncerns(Ministry  of  
 Foreign Affairs of The Netherlands, 2007). 
 
Van Grasstek, C. and Pierre Sauvé, P., The consistency of WTO rules: can the single 
undertaking be squared with variable geometry? Journal of International Economic 
Law 9(4), 837–864 [Advance Access publication 3 November 2006], 
 
Verbruggen, H. And Kuik, O., Environmental Standards in International Trade, in Van Dijck,  
P. And Gaber, G. (eds.), Challenges to the New World Tarde Organization, pp. 265-
290, Kluwer Law international, The Netherlands the Hague, 1996) 
 
Volker, ELM, “The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade” in Bourgeois, et al, (eds), The  
Uruguay Round Results – A European Lawyer’s Perspective (European University 
Press- College of Europe, 1996). 
 
Vossenaar, R., Climate-related Single-use Environmental Goods, ICTSD Issue Paper No.  
13, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Geneva, 
Switzerland (2010). 
Wang Ping, Coverage of the WTO's Agreement on Government Procurement: Challenges of  
Integrating China and other Countries with a Large State Sector into the Global 
Trading System (Journal of International Economic Law September 21, 2007)  
WB, Access, Transparency, and Multilateral Trade Rules, World Bank Policy Research  
 Working Paper 3195, January 2004, 
 
WB, International Trade and Climate Change –Economic, Legal and Institutional  
 Perspectives, (The World bank, 2008)  
  
325
 
 
Waelde, T., Sustainable development and the 1994 Energy Charter Treaty: between  
pseudo-action and the management of environmental investment risk, in: Weiss, F., 
et.al. (Eds), International Economic Law with a Human Face, Kluwer Law, London 
1998, 223-271. 
 
Weirs, J., French Ideas on Climate Change and Trade Policies, CCLR 1/2008.  
 
Weiss, E. B., Environment and Trade as Partners in Sustainable Development: A 
 Commentary, 86 Am. J. Int’l L. 728-735, (1992) 
 
Weiss, E. B, International environmental law: basic instruments and references, (Trans-
 national Publishers, Incorporated, 1992/1990).  
Werksman, J.: Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading and the WTO, Review of European  
Community and International Environmental Law (RECIEL), Vol. 8 Issue 3 (1999) (Blackwell  
Publishers Ltd., Oxford, UK, 1999).Wolfe, R., The WTO single undertaking as 
negotiating technique and constitutive metaphor  Journal of International Economic 
Law 12(4), 835–858. 
Yukins, C. R., And Schooner, S. L., Incrementalism: Eroding The Impediments To A Global  
Public Procurement Market, 38 Georgetown Journal of International Law 529 (2007) 
available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1002446 
 
Zarilli, S., Climate Change Policies: Some Trade Related Implications, OGEL Vol 2/1, 
 February, 2004. (www.gasandoil.com/ogel/ ) 
Zarilli, S., WTO Doha Declaration and Trade in Energy Goods and Services, OGEL Issue 1,  
 Jaunuary 2003 at www.gasandoil.com/OGEL  
 
Zoellner, C., Transparency: An Analysis of an Evolving Fundamental Principle in  
International Economic Law (Student Note), Michigan Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 27 [Winter 2006], 579-628. 
 
Zhang, Z., and Assunção, L., “Domestic Climate Policies and the WTO,” A paper prepared  
for the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, publishes also as UNCTAD Discussion Paper 
No. 164, November 2002  
 
Zhang, Z., The U.S. Proposed Carbon Tariffs, WTO Scrutiny and China’s Responses,  
International Economics and Economic Policy, 2009, p. 15 (available at 
www.eastwestcentre.org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs/econwp106/pdf 
 
Zhou, W., Non-Discrimination and the Accordion of 'Like Product', (July 15, 2007).at SSRN:  
 http://ssrn.com/abstract=1000173 . 
 
Internet Sources 
 
Amy Myers Jaffe, Wallace S. Wilson Fellow for Energy Studies At the US-Japan Joint  
Seminar on “Current Political Situation in the Middle East and Oil Supply” November 
30, 2006, at: http://www.pecj.or.jp/english/division/MiddleEast/061130_Jaffe.pdf  
Bill Cara, Understanding of the Energy Sector, Environmental Assessment report No  
6: Environmental signals 2000: (http://reports.eea.europa.eu/signals-
2000/en/page005.html) 
 
Centre for international Development (CID), Global Trade Negotiations (Portal for current  
research, activity, proceedings and debate) Centre for international Development, 
Harvard University, Government Procurement, available at: 
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/issues/govpro.html  
  
326
 
 
GDRC, (The Global Development Research Center), “A Quick Introduction to Green  
 Procurement,” at: http://www.gdrc.org/sustbiz/green/doc-proc_introduction.html 
 
Lacey, S., Renewables Are the Solution to Global Climate Change  
RenewableEnergyAccess.com and Dr. Frank Kreith, F at 
http://www.renewableenergyaccess.com/rea/news/story?id=45403 (12 July 2006). 
 
PCGTW (Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch), Presidential Candidates’ Key Proposals on  
Health Care and Climate Will Require WTO Modifications Overreach of WTO 
Highlighted by Potential Conflicts with Candidates’ Non-Trade Proposals, (PCGTW, 
Washington DC, USA, February 2008), available at: 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/PresidentialWTOreport.pdf  
 
Conference papers and reports  
 
Brownsword, R., An Introduction to Legal Research, revised version of  the paper prepared  
for a Welcome summer school on neuroethics, held at St Anne’s College Oxford, 
September 2005, available at:  
http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/stellent/groups/corporatesite/@msh_grants/documents/w
eb_document/wtx030897.pdf 
 
Brimblecombe, P. and Langford, I., Guy Steward [sic] Calendar and the increase in  
global carbon dioxide, paper presented at meeting of Air & Waste Management 
Association, San Antonio, Texas, June 1995 (paper 95-WA74A.02, available from 
AWMA) (See http://www.london-accord.co.uk/final_report/reports/pdf/b1.pdf  
Hardstaff, P., From GATS to New WTO Investment Rules – – Undermining Pro-Poor   
Investment Regulation (Paper presented at a one-day Symposium on ‘Investment, 
Sustainable Development and the WTO’), Washington, May 22 2003 available at 
<http://www.wdm.org.uk/resources/reports/trade/fromGATStonewWTOinvestment22
052003.pdf 
Mace, M. J., Adaptation under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change:  
The Legal Framework, Presented at 'Justice in Adaptation to Climate Change' an 
international seminar organized by the Tyndall Centre, FIELD, IIED and CSERGE at 
the Zuckerman Institute for Connective Environmental Research University of East 
Anglia 7-9 September, 2003 (Field, August 2003) available at 
http://www.field.org.uk/PDF/Adaptation-Tyndall%20Paper-MACE-August%2023-
FINAL.pdf  
 
Obioh, I.B., Climate Change: Causes, Analysis and Management, Paper presented at a  
 Climate Change workshop. Abuja, April 2002. 
 
Weiss, E. B., Globalization and International Environmental Law in the Twenty-First Century,  
Presentation at Yasuda Fire and Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. Tokyo, Japan, February 
7, 2000 at: http://www.sj-ri.co.jp/issue/quarterly/data/qt33weissen.pdf  
 
National Workshop on Greener Government Purchasing: Workshop Proceedings,  
Government of Canada. November, 1996; and National Round Table on the 
Environment and the Economy. Federal Green Procurement Task Force.   
 
Pauwelyn, J., Legal Avenues to “Multilateralizing Regionalism”: Beyond article XXIV, [Paper  
presented at the Conference on Multilateralising Regionalism Sponsored and 
organized by WTO – HEI Co-organized by the Centre for Economic Policy Research 
(CEPR) (Geneva, Switzerland 10-12 September 2007)]. 
 
Smith, C., The Precautionary Principle and Environmental Policy Science, Uncertainty, and  
Sustainability, at Report of the conference by Science and Environmental Health 
Network conference at Wingspread in Racine, Wisconsin, 1998 (available at: 
http://www.sehn.org/pdf/ppep.pdf). 
  
327
 
 
News paper/Periodicals 
 
Adapt or die: Poor countries are hit hardest by global warming, Economist.com September  
12th 2008 at: 
http://www.economist.com/research/Arts.BySubject/displayStory.cfm?story_id=1220
2374&amp;subjectID=348924&amp;fsrc=nwl  
Centre for International Environmental Law (CIEL), Eco-Labeling Standards, Green 
 Procurement and the WTO: Significance for World Bank Borrowers  
Clement, S., et al, The Procura+ (Manual: A Guide to Cost-Effective Sustainable  Public 
 Procurement) (2nd edition) (ICLEI European Secretariat, 2007) 
  
Commission's green procurement plans heavily criticized, Eractiv, 16 August 2004 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/environment/commission-green-procurement-plans-
heavily-criticised/Art.-114854 
Doug Struck, Science: Energy Efficiency to Curb Climate Change, Washington Post  
  Tuesday, January 22, 2008 
Eppel, S., Enhancing Markets for Climate Friendly Technologies: Leadership Through  
Government Purchasing Strategies Volume I, Study Sponsored by the Government 
of Japan (Paris, France June 1998), available at: 
http://www.climatetech.net/pdf/2rpt123.pdf   
EU makes bold climate and renewables commitment,” Friday 9 March 2007,at:  
http://www.euractiv.com/en/environment/brussels-biofuels-push-met-scepticism/Art.-
160789 
 
Government respond to the launch of the Sustainable Procurement Action Plan 
http://www.sustainable-development.gov.uk/what/latestnews.htm 
 
Greener, not leaner: Faced with big penalties, carmakers are improving efficiency, T&E, a  
transport think-tank.” The Economist, September 4th 2008 at: 
http://www.economist.com/daily/news/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12067887&fsrc=nw
l  
Guide On Dealing With Innovative Solutions In Public Procurement: 10 elements of  
good practice (Commission Staff Working Document), SEC (2007) available at: 
http://www.proinno-europe.eu/doc/procurement_manuscript.pdf)  
 
Harvey, F., Climate change: The latest hot issue, Financial times, January 23 2008 
Procuring the Future Sustainable Procurement National Action Plan: Recommendations  
from the Sustainable Procurement Task Force, http://www.sustainable-
development.gov.uk/publications/procurement-action-plan/documents/full-
document.pdf Harvey, F., Government seeks green toilet paper, Financial Times, 
March 06, 2007.  
Koshibu, Green Purchasing Network and its Activities, (a presentation by Green Purchasing  
 Network (GPN) at 
 http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/sdissues/consumption/HiroakiKoshibu.pdf  
Howse, R., Rethinking the WTO, in Forbes, 09/04/08, at:   
http://www.forbes.com/2008/09/04/wto-global-economy-oped-
cx_se_rh_0904trade.html  
Kanter, J., Europe May Ban Imports of Some Biofuel Crops, New York Times, January 14,  
2008 (available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/14/business/14cnd-
biofuels.html?_r=2&ex=1358053200&en=7d15ba09211061ba&ei=5088&partner=rss
nyt&emc=rss&oref=slogin&oref=slogin 
  
328
 
Kelly Fiveash, Brussels mandates Energy Star for green procurement 
http://www.channelregister.co.uk/2007/12/18/green_regulations_benchmark_summit
/  
Legault, L., Towards Greener Government Procurement: An Environment Canada Case  
 Study, available at http://www.apo-tokyo.org/gp/e_publi/gsc/0305RES_PAPERS.pdf  
Lomborg, B., Climate Change: Stern Review: The dodgy numbers behind the latest warming  
scare, available at OpinionJournal from the Wall Street Journal Editorial page at 
http://opinionjournal.com/  
 
Martin P.H., If You Don't Know How to Fix it, Please Stop Breaking it! The Precautionary  
Principle and Climate Change,” Foundations of Science, Volume 2, Number 2, 1997 
(Springer 1997) at 
http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/foda/1997/00000002/00000002/0015594
9;jsessionid=1l6oe2gor9m8i.alexandra?format=print  
 
Report of the Commission of the Environment and Sustainable Development, Canada, to the  
 House of Commons, September, 2006, 
 
Rubin, E., et al, IPCC Special Report Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage (Technical  
Summary), at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/special-
reports/srccs/srccs_technicalsummary.pdf  
 
Traynor, I., and Wintour, P., EU puts carbon trading at heart of climate change battle, (The  
Guardian, Wednesday January 23 2008) available at: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2008/jan/23/climatechange.eu  
 
Snape, R. and  Gunasekera, D., Problems of the global commons ‘Countdown to Kyoto’:  
The Consequences of the Mandatory Global Carbon Dioxide Emissions Reductions, 
Australian APEC Study Centre, Canberra, 19–21 August 1997 Industry Commission 
 
 
